Digressions&Impressions

On Dick Nanninga (1949 – 2015)

The 1978 World Cup involve my earliest televised football memories. (I was seven years old.) My favorite player in the tournament was Daniel Passarella (because of his exotic name). The Dutch side was not expected to do well because its best player, Johan Cruyff, withdrew from the squad. (I had long thought he had boycotted the tournament to protest the military dictatorship, but a few years ago he revealed the real story; I now wonder if I have also been wrong all along about Paul Breitner's absence--Breitner is one  of the classiest German players ever.)

The Dutch had one of the most underrated coaches of all time (Ernst Happel) and he took a scrappy team to Argentina. There they played badly, at first, but they grew in the tournament, and reached the final with convincing games against Austria, Germany, and Italy. Meanwhile, on the other side of the draw, Argentina won a suspicious game (6-0) against Peru to keep Brazil out of the finals.

Now, many melancholic types come to believe they were born too late. And as boy from Amsterdam I was encouraged to believe I was born too late, because I would spend most of my teenage years hearing the same old stories about Amsterdam in the 1960s and 70s, flower power, Provos, pre-Aids sex, and, of course, tales of one of the greatest club-sides (Ajax 1971-3), ever.* Eventually all these stories got overshadowed by 1974; the year of the lost final. But as a seven year old I knew nothing of national traumas or lost finals; I lived from day to day.

Looking back at that 1978 world cup, I wouldn't be surprised if was a time of escapism for me. My parents were separated or separating (perhaps already divorced--I don't recall the exact chronology), and I don't think I was an especially happy child. I was an avid collector of Panini stickers (with the players of all the teams) trading them with my friends at school. (I was reminded of this just recently because my son has been trading animal stickers that were part of a supermarket promotion.)

The 1978 final became associated with a single moment in the dying seconds of regular time with the score tied at 1-1; Rensenbrink hit the post. If you look at the replay, it's not an easy shot. But Rensenbrink was a supremely gifted player, and on most days it would have gone in.

 

But that Holland was in a position to win the world cup was due to a fantastic header by Dick Nanninga a few minutes before. If you look at the clip, you'll notice at once that goal has all the hall-marks of Dutch football at its best: a quick transition, a precise, long diagonal pass to the speeding wing (cf. years later: De Boer-Bergkamp against another Argentina squad) sailing over the opposing defenders, an instant, one-touch cross by René van de Kerkhof, and Nanninga (a late substitute) does the rest.

 

Now unlike all the other players associated with that 1978 Dutch squad, Nanninga was not a star and never became one, despite averaging a goal every second game in the Dutch highest league (when it was still world class). In fact, in looking at Dutch wikipedia, I learned today that his transfer to Ajax fell through because he owned a flower shop in Kerkrade (then a Dutch mining town in Limburg).

Holland has fielded far more gifted squads than that 1978 one with far more gifted players than Nanninga. (I have seen several of them up close.) But Nanninga's header is the finest moment in all of Holland's great world cup campaigns -- yes, greater than the first ninety seconds of the 1974 final -- because he stepped up when his team needed him and put the cup within achingly close reach.

 

 

One last dig at Nate Silver (and the Bayesians)

Four years after a pretty decent Brazilian side cratered under modest pressure of an overachieving Dutch team in the second half of their quarter-final match in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, an extremely solid German side exposed the very visible vulnerabilities and lack of organization of one of the weakest sides Brazil has ever fielded in international competition. As I wrote two weeks ago:

[T]he Croats exposed the vulnerability of Brazil's defense. For whenever the Brazilian backs were challenged on the flanks, they had trouble not just containing the Croatian counter attacks on the wings (catching the Brazilians on the back-foot), they were incapable of preventing Croatian crosses into the box that exposed Brazil's lack of organization at the core of their defense.

Despite this plain evidence of the senses, the number crunchers kept telling us that Brazil was the odds-on favorite not just due to purported home-field-advantage, but also because of the side's performance over the last few years during meaningless practice games. In fact, the supposed home-field advantage may well have been a key disadvantage because it meant that the Brazilian coaching staff was effectively denied the chance to develop a team under more realistic, serious match-play conditions against very good opponents. (The German team has been developed in this very fashion during the last six years.*) The last time the host nation won the world cup was France (1998)--a fantastic side, that was nearly unbeatable for four years. Arguably, the last time home-field advantage really made a difference in the final outcome of world cup play was in 1978. 

It's safe to say that the South American qualifying schedule would have exposed the team's existing vulnerabilities (as well as the fact that Scolari has not adjusted to the new realities of world class football) in the same way the Croatians did. (As I remarked the Mexicans also could have done so.)

Nate Silver's post-game blather reveals that he has not come to terms with the fact that his neo-Bayesian model is nearly meaningless in world cup play, that is, a data-poor environment. The last meaningful game the Brazilians played was three years ago; they failed to beat Paraquay in the Copa América in 2011.  

Predicting World Cup Results

Sunday’s matches weren’t supposed to happen. None of the four teams playing was given even a 50 percent chance of reaching the knockout stage by ESPN’s Soccer Power Index-backed model at the start of the tournament. Now two will reach the quarterfinal and one will play a semifinal. --Fivethirtyeight.com.

It's not difficult to explain why Nate Silver's World Cup forecasts are far less impressive than his election forecasts. As Silver notes before the competition got under way, the World Cup is a data poor environment: the world's top national football sides play each other extremely rarely when the outcome really matters. In such environments forecasting requires really good background-theory, which is lacking. Moreover, Silver's player-centred algorithm misses two key factors this year: quality of coaching and fitness, which have been decisive in the blistering tropical heat. Let's take for example, the Netherlands Vs Mexico.

During their debacle at Euro 2012, where the Dutch (still reigning vice-champions of  the World) got outplayed in three group games, it was evident that the Dutch team was out of shape. This is not the case this year: in all four games (against Spain, Australia, Chile, and Mexico) the Dutch were the fitter side. In each game, they dominated the last thirty minutes of the game. They also tend to dominate the last few minutes of the first half, where they have had a lot of scoring opportunities.* Similar fitness-differentials were apparent in the hard-fought round of sicteen defeats of Nigeria by France and the loss of Algeria to Germany.

Van Persie! (And the number crunchers)

Van Persie's goal is one for the ages.  

Van Persie takes his place alongside Bergkamp's memorable goal against Argentina combining athleticism and astounding skill while turning around high stakes matches.*

The real story was the destruction of the greatest football side of the last few decades. I am not claiming that Spain is out of the cup; Chile and Australia are both uneven teams (the goal that Chile conceded against Australia exposed its defensive weakness), so Spain may well advance. The aura of invincibility had already taken a knock last year (see this excellent analysis); but then Spain had clearly suffered from a brutal schedule at the Confederations Cup. In last night's game, the key factor was, in fact, the difference in fitness between the two sides (as Robben noted in an interview after the game). This helps explain the increasing number of 'mistakes' made by Spain during the second half. The significance of fitness is oddly underestimated in discussions about world-class football. But the Dutch side that embarrassed itself at Euro 2012 was clearly not physically prepared to excell at the highest level. For much of football history, German teams were notorious for winning games in the final minute(s). As Gary Lineker said: "Twenty-two men chase a ball for 90 minutes and at the end, the Germans always win." The Germans were always a class apart physically wearing down more talented teams.

Even so, coaching/strategy made a non-trivial contribution to the Dutch win. To put it bluntly, the Spanish did not fear the Dutch. In particular, they saw no reason to change their tactics in light of the fact that the Dutch side has the two greatest strikers (Van Robben and Persie) any team will field this year. The lack of respect for the Dutch was widely shared among pundits--most of the rest of the team is unknown and untested at the highest level of play. Moreover, Wesley Sneijder is not the dominating player he once was. (This may be a blessing in disguise because he is more dangerous when he plays serving the team.)

Yet, Spanish scouting clearly failed; they seemed unaware of the fact that Daley Blind, who does not play yet in one of the more important leagues, is a great playmaker. They did not press Blind early (which cost them dearly in several goals) [see here for an excellent analysis]. Also, for the first time since the  1970s and 1980s, the Dutch have an athletic, youthful defense. This defense showed its inexperience during the first half hour; Van Gaal -- breaking with four decades of Dutch dogma -- sensibly gave them an extra player to fit any holes in the back. As he explained frankly on Dutch TV, he does not think his side has the talent and quality to attempt to dominate the Spanish team. Because I think Van Gaal may be the best coach in the game (and I have an obvious bias toward the Netherlands), and because I expect a lot from  Chile (although less so after last night's game), before the game I jokingly suggested on facebook that Spain would not make it out of the group.

Is the Ref the story, or Brazil's shaky defense?

Last night's game in São Paulo was marred by two dubious calls by Yuichi Nishimura that arguably decisively influenced the outcome; he awarded Brazil a penalty on the flimsiest grounds, and he disallowed a Croatian goal by an unusually strict interpretation of the rules. (Brazil beat Croatia 3-1.)

Of course,  Croatia had only themselves to blame; with a bit more ruthlessness they could have put the game away. For, the Croats exposed the vulnerability of Brazil's defense. For whenever the Brazilian backs were challenged on the flanks, they had trouble not just containing the Croatian counter attacks on the wings (catching the Brazilians on the back-foot), they were incapable of preventing Croatian crosses into the box that exposed Brazil's lack of organization at the core of their defense.

To observe the preceding is not to deny Brazil's genuine greatness: they have great ball-winning powers on midfield; they have amazing off-the-ball speed and position-play, and with their skill they find openings toward the opponent's goal against  high-quality, mistake-free defense. But as a rule, without a great defense one does not win a World Cup. Some of Brazil's opponents will have just as much skill as Croatia (a fine, but not brilliant side), and if given the same opportunities, they will be more ruthless.