Digressions&Impressions

On The Moral Sciences

The eighteenth century term “moral science” (or “moral philosophy”—‘philosophy’ and ‘science’ are often treated as synonyms at the time) does not quite mean what we might think it means. And so when people urge on us to remember that economics was once a moral science and should be reformed back into some such science, they often reveal their ignorance about the past of economics (recall).

In writing about science morale, Condorcet, for example, understood "by this term all those sciences that have as their object either the human mind itself, or the relations of men to another.”[1] Moral sciences were opposed to physical sciences, and distinguished by the kinds of causes to be discussed. Moral sciences dealt with moral causes; and ‘moral’ meant something like ‘social.’ For example, institutions, norms, education, language, emotions, and property-relations (etc.) were all often thought of as moral causes. (By contrast, geography, climate, mechanics, and matter-theory (etc.) were all physical causes). So, for example, in his notoriously racist essay, Hume writes,

By moral causes, I mean all circumstances, which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us. Of this kind are, the nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like circumstances. By physical causes I mean those qualities of the air and climate, which are supposed to work insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving a particular complexion, which, though reflection and reason may sometimes overcome it, will yet prevail among the generality of mankind, and have an influence on their manners. "Of National Character"

So, eighteenth century ‘moral’ science and twentieth century ‘social’ science are closer in outlook than is commonly thought. Even so, the two practices have different presuppositions: since Weber social science often presupposes a version of the fact-value distinction (see here; or here), whereas in moral philosophy, ‘the natural course’ or ‘nature’ is often itself normative. If acting according to nature, or properly cultivated nature, is a key criterion or means toward the practice of virtue – as it is in many traditions --, then moral science might, indeed, be a guide to the practice of virtue.

Now, Adam Smith has a traditional and demanding understanding of virtue. His most explicit definition is as follows: “virtue is excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary” (The Theory of Moral Sentiments 1.1.5.6,).[2] By ‘vulgar’ Smith does not mean somebody rude in our sense, but rather something akin to our ‘run-of-the-mill’ (which can include the rude in our sense). Few people writing today would accept such a demanding standard of virtue. Smith’s political economy did not presuppose, expect or describe virtuous people in this demanding sense, although he did hope that commercial society would make it more likely that such (rare) virtue could be practiced.[3] While Smith thought of prudence as a virtue, moral science, as practiced by, (again) say, Adam Smith, presupposed and made explicit further moral values (humanity, equity, flourishing) that became extrinsic to the practice of late nineteenth century social science. But that story is too extended for a single Impression.

 

Forgotten Addison, founder of Philosophy of Science, and the patron of bloggers

It gives me much Despair in the Design of reforming the World by my Speculations, when I find there always arise, from one Generation to another, successive Cheats and Bubbles, as naturally as Beasts of Prey, and those which are to be their Food.--Steele (6/30/1712), #444, The Spectator.

Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke shall be entirely forgotten.--Hume.

Addison is forgotten.

Hume wrote before the revival of professional philosophy, and so assumed an 'equitable posterity' that was not to be. Professional philosophy has not been kind to the very best essayists--Montaigne, Bacon, and Seneca are familiar names vaguely associated with doctrines or moments (history of skepticism, fideism, crucial experiment, inductions, Stoic suicide, etc.), but they  have not attracted philosophical scholarly industries. Even Hume's great essays tend to be read mostly for supporting evidence--the exception, 'Of Miracles,' the least artful or profound of the lot.

Addison gets passing, sometimes respectable mention in works devoted to eighteenth-century aesthetics (sublime, taste, etc.). Yet, together with Steele, Addison is the patron-saint of today's philosophical bloggers. He wrote (near) daily essays with a lively comments section (including trolls), and found a proper mix of familiarity and surprise in keeping readers engaged over extended period. Steel and Addison were also, despite Hume's deflationary representation of Addison in the full paragraph from which I quote above, subtle thinkers, who -- as Steele notes above -- use reflection to reform their world. They are not mere spectators.

For present purposes, I define 'philosophy of science' as the disinterested study of science with the aim of making generalizations about the nature and methods of the science(s) and scientists. Thus defined scientists can engage in philosophy of science as a kind of second-order practice within the science(s), and they have done so even before the category 'science' took on its present (post 19th century) meaning. If we except scholastic text-books and their authors,  until the eighteenth century nearly all 'philosophy of science' was done by practicing scientists or natural philosophers. This changed in the eighteenth century in response to three non-trivial developments: