Digressions&Impressions

The History of Federalism, More's Utopia, Spinoza, and Quentin Skinner (II)

It is acknowledged, however, that self-government in this literal sense poses some almost insurmountable difficulties. Of these the most obvious, as Harrington observes, is that 'the whole body of the people' is 'too unwieldy a body to be assembled'.

Sir Thomas More had put forward one possible solution in his Utopia of 1516, at the time when the ideal of the civitas libera was first being seriously canvassed in England. A genuine res publica, More suggests, must take the constitutional form of a federated republic. One of the first things we learn about the newly discovered island of Utopia is that its citizens live in fifty-four self-governing cities that manage their own affairs by means of annually elected magistrates chosen from among themselves. Milton enthusiastically takes up the idea in his Ready and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth, in which he ends by proposing that 'every countie in the land' should become a kinde of subordinate Commonaltie'. The effect will be to enable the body of the people 'in all things of civil government' to have justice in thir own hands', so that they will have none then to blame but themselves, if it be not well administerd'.--Quentin Skinner (1998) Liberty Before Liberalism, 30-31

The other day, I kind of promised a post in which I disagree with Skinner. And since I know readers love polemics, I thought It warn you that this post is no polemic. The comment quoted above is an aside in Skinner's overall argument. But I like the aside. And it got me musing a bit about two issues.

First, Part I of Utopia is framed by a purportedly autobiographical introduction, where the narrator (More) is sent to Flanders as an ambassador by Henry VIII. And the first paragraph tells us the first stop is Bruges. Now, Bruges was a major city at the time. But I have always been puzzled about why the brief stop in Bruges is even mentioned because the action quickly moves on to Antwerp, where the conversation takes place in Peter Giles's garden.  

Here's a suggestion: in 1464 Bruges was (see here) the site of what is now known as "The Estates General of 1464," which was an was the first assembly of the estates of the Burgundian Netherlands  as wikipedia nicely puts it, now parts of France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  Now, historically that's an important event because it was part of (not entirely successful) Burgundian state-building. In Belgium and Dutch history it's important because it is treated (not very prominently) as the origins of Dutch/Belgian parliamentary/representative democracy. (Of course, that takes some twisting and anachronistic interpreting.) But from our perspective what matters is that it is the first really serious modern attempt to bring together representatives of peoples that are formerly represented already on a provincial level in a federative structure.*

So, starting the intellectual journal of Utopia in Bruges is laden with symbolism to then contemporary readers. It is not only a cosmopolitan town of trade, it's also the site of momentous political innovation then less than a half century old, and still unfolding. Of course, Charles the Bold already dead when More's visit to Bruges is supposed to take place. And the streamlined Utopian federation is nothing like the messy affair of the reality of the Estates General of 1464.

Second, I noted a few weeks ago that Spinoza's Political Treatise has a clear plan of federation, in which sovereign states contract joint treaties of peace and so escape the mutual state of war (3.15-16,) Undoubtedly Spinoza is influenced by the political experiences of the then United Provinces, his admiration for the constitution of the Kingdom of Aragon (Political Treatise, 7.30), and his interpretation of the Hebrew State described in the Hebrew Bible. By 1677 this idea was not wholly novel, and there would have been multiple sources that could have inspired it.+

But, even so, (recall) at the start of the Political Treatise, Spinoza makes a point of alerting the reader that More's Utopia is in his sight in the very first paragraph. The allusion is not naturally taken as a compliment: "Whence it has come to pass that, instead of ethics, [philosophers have generally written satire, and that they have never conceived a theory of politics, which could be turned to use, but such as might be taken for a chimera, or might have been formed in Utopia, or in that golden age of the poets when, to be sure, there was least need of it." And as I have noted, Spinoza seems to create (or, perhaps, echo) a trope in which Utopia is ridiculed as useless at the start of an ambitious purportedly more realist reform tract.

But it doesn't follow from this that the mechanisms described in Utopia or the philosophy behind Utopia is rejected entirely. I have already noted that More anticipates Spinoza's (recall) stadial analysis of Mozes' legislation; Utopia anticipates Spinoza's approach to freedom of religion and civic religion; and in other respects here and, also, here]. Without denying the non-trivial differences, the both promote a work ethic in which the corrosive effects of inequality and luxury are held at bay through the use of cleverly designed mechanisms that use incentives to foreseeable ends. All I am suggesting here, echoing Skinner, is that there is a pre-history to thinking about federates states at a large scale in which More and Spinoza figure.+

A thread from Spinoza to James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, via Knut Wicksell (and Christian Wolff)

It should not be surprising, therefore, that the most “sympathetic” or “congenial” works are to be found among the “realists” in the history of political doctrine. Initially we look to Glaucon in Plato’s Republic, to Thomas Hobbes, and to Benedict Spinoza. Of these, and others within this tradition, only Spinoza’s work seems to have much in common with our own, and only his seems deserving of special comment.
In his Tractatus Politicus, published posthumously in 1677, Spinoza approaches the whole study of political organization in a way that seems surprisingly modern by our standards. First of all, men are assumed to be motivated solely by considerations of interest. This is an underlying assumption of the models through which Spinoza examines alternative organizational arrangements. He states, quite specifically, that human behavior is taken as an empirical fact and that he makes no attempt to attach either praise or condemnation to the behavior that he observes. Spinoza examines the various political institutions in terms of their efficacy in producing results which he holds to be desirable. To him, political institutions are variables subject to change and perfection, and he conceives the primary task of the political scientist to be that of analyzing the workings of alternative organizational structures and of making such recommendations for change as seem indicated. His work on the political order anticipates, in many respects, that of David Hume and that of Adam Smith on the economic order. Spinoza deliberately sets out to construct political institutions in such a fashion that individuals acting in pursuit of their own interests will be led, by the institutional structure within which such action takes place, to further the interests of their fellow members in the political group.
The constitutional and the operational levels of collective decision-making are clearly separated in Spinoza’s work. For the latter, at least in his aristocracy model (his discussion of democracy was not completed), simple majority rule is acknowledged as appropriate for reaching decisions in legislative assemblies. For changes in the constitution, in the basic laws, “common consent” or relative unanimity is suggested. Spinoza’s work, in many respects therefore, may be taken as the most appropriately chosen classical precursor to that of this book. It should be stated, however, that Spinoza’s influence on our own ideas has been limited to his general and indirect effects on the Western intellectual tradition. In a specific sense, we have carefully reviewed Spinoza only after the completion of an initial draft of the main body of this book.
Although Spinoza is often described as a follower of Hobbes, we do not find Hobbes’ work at all similar to Spinoza’s in relation to our own construction. As we have suggested above, it seems essential that some separation of the constitutional and the operational level of decision be made before politics, as a social science, can be satisfactorily divorced from moral philosophy. If sovereignty is conceived as being necessarily undivided and indivisible, this essential separation cannot be made readily. The contractual apparatus, to Hobbes, becomes an excuse or a justification for political obedience of the individual and little more. Hobbes’ construction is aimed at establishing a basis for political obligation, whereas Spinoza’s construction becomes a genuine theory of political order that, more than most others, is largely divorced from all issues of obligation.

At this point, as elsewhere in this Appendix, it is necessary to refer to the work of David Hume.

....

We find a similar emphasis in the writings of Christian Wolff in 1750. Wolff’s work is also noteworthy because of his clear conception of the collective organization as a set of rules or institutions that are subject to analysis, to modification, and to reform. His method, like that of Spinoza, was that of examining alternative political institutions on which members of the community of rational individuals might agree jointly.--James M. Buchanan, "Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy" (1962) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, By James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock  [HT Hartmut Kliemt]

The Calculus of Consent launched Public Choice theory and Constitutional Political Economy, and was a major milestone (recall) toward Buchanan's (1986) Nobel. I was sent back to it by Hartmut Kliemt, who had generously commented on a draft paper that I had sent him. In my paper I argue that (recall) Spinoza is concerned with the problem of luxury in the TTP (a key issue in 18th century political economy). And that in the Political Treatise Spinoza shows what mechanisms (recall) might be used to prevent luxury from corrupting the state. I noted in my paper that Spinoza anticipates (recall also here) Hume and James Buchanan in uncanny ways. I noted that I was not the first to muse about this connection. (In particular I cite Doug Den Uyl and Kliemt.)

The Calculus of Consent has two appendices. The one that I quoted above is by James Buchanan. The Appendix is explicitly designed to forestall a certain kind of objection: "Our work could, quite properly, be charged with serious omission if we should fail to include what must be, at best, relatively uninformed commentary on the classical treatment of some of these problems....We hope that these notes will be helpful in relating our analysis to what has gone before and in pointing up the differences which, in our view, make the analysis contained in the main text of this book essentially unique." Buchanan then goes on to describe the "relation of political science to moral philosophy" and how to situate Buchanan & Tullock's achievement. I hope to return to that some day. He then turns to Spinoza, who is explicitly recognized as anticipating their own approach.

First, Spinoza is treated as a proto-rational choice theorist.* In particular, he treats Spinoza (correctly) as a theorist of  alternative organizational structures (hereafter: mechanism design or mechanism). This is exactly right (and also anticipates another Chicago trained Nobel, George Stigler). And, more important what Spinoza's mechanisms have in common is the attempt not to reform human nature, or to turn people into the wise, but rather to make human nature serve the common good; as Spinoza puts it in the Political Treatise, “I conclude that those common perils of peace of which we here speak , must never directly but indirectly be prohibited , namely by making the fundamental principles of the government such as to have for result not that the mass of the people strive to live wisely  ( for this is impossible ) but be led by such dispositions as will promote the state's weal. (TP 10.6; translated by William McCall, 1854--this is the translation Buchanan used.)+ This indeed anticipates Hume (Smith, and Buchanan).

Second, Buchanan is even more struck by the anticipation of his distinction between constitutional level and operational levels of collective decision-making in Spinoza's treatment of aristocracy. At the constitutional level Buchanan and Tullock require unanimity, and he sees Spinoza's use of “common consent”  as a kind of ("relative") unanimity. It is worth noting that in McCall's translation, Spinoza only uses the phrase in 2.17. But that precedes the treatment of aristocracy. And, indeed, what Spinoza says there is true not just of aristocracy, but for all kinds of  constitutions: "This right,which is determined by the power of the multitude, is usually called government. And he possesses this right absolutely and without limitation, who by common consent has the guidance of the commonwealth, which consists in establishing, interpreting, abolishing laws, fortifying cities, deciding on war and peace, etc." (TP 2.17) And so one can see why Buchanan was primed to read this as equivalent to his constitutional level. 

It is worth noting that Spinoza anticipates Hume's account of the genesis of the institution of justice (which really is for him the political founding:  "that justice is the sense that “all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules” (3.2.2.10). This is also a unanimity requirement. But here (in Spinoza and Hume), the distance with Hobbes is not far. For, in Leviathan, the commonwealth is, when not founded through conquest, instituted by a unanimous covenant “of every man with every man . . . as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing myselfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men.”  Of course, Buchanan would not deny that. 

Buchanan makes two related claims about the difference between Hobbes and Spinoza.One is an odd mistake, the other is perceptive. In reverse order, first, he implies that Spinoza allows for divided sovereignty. That's strictly speaking false. Spinoza is as unitary about sovereignty as Hobbes is (which is revealed in Spinoza's treatment of the need for the sovereign to control the church). But it's true that Spinoza thinks there are benefits to be derived from functional division of powers that make it look as if he is willing to allow for division of powers.  But, on a more fundamental level Buchanan is right, Hobbes offers an account of obligation whereas Spinoza does not.** By contrast in Spinoza, and now I quote a perceptive treatment by Justin Steinberg, "The commonwealth must be structured so as to promote compliance; when there is excessive vice or non-compliance, the blame must be “laid at the door of the commonwealth.” 

Interestingly enough, the contrast between Hobbes and Spinoza on obligation is not in J. W. Gough's The Social Contract, which is the authority Buchanan claims to follow when he describes Wolff's debts to Spinoza. (In the first (1936) edition,  Gough writes: "The most important of the followers of Hobbes was Spinoza, who constructed a theory of political obligation which in most essentials corresponds closely to Hobbes's." (107))++ So, Buchanan read his sources with independent mind.++

Okay, let me wrap up. Buchanan says explicitly that Spinoza did not influence the development of his thought. He does repeatedly credit (also in The Calculus of Consent), the great Swedish economist, Wicksell, with decisive influence on him (including the point about unanimity). So, this naturally made me wonder, whether Wicksell could have been influenced by Spinoza. Thanks to Google my search was brief and fruitful. Below I picture the closing lines of Wickell's (1917) fascinating review of the revised, second Swedish translation of Mill's On Liberty. To be continued:

 

Spinoza's Critique of Moses; On Luxury

Scripture itself also establishes that ceremonies contribute nothing to blessedness, but only concern the temporal prosperity of the state [imperii temporaneam foelicitatem]. For it promises nothing in return for ceremonies except the comforts of the body and its promised delights [corporis commoda, et delicias promittit,], and promises blessedness only in return for following the universal divine law. For in the five books commonly attributed to Moses nothing else is promised (as we have said above) than this temporal prosperity [foelicitas], i.e., honors or reputation, victories, wealth [divitiae], delights and health.---Spinoza, Theological Political Treatise [hereafter TTP], chapter V.6, [p. 139-140; translated by Curley with modest changes. Page-numbers refer to Collected Works.]

Lurking in the quoted passage is the controversy over the identity of the author of the Hebrew Bible, which is one of the main themes of the TTP. But here I want to focus on Spinoza's analysis. Not unlike Al-Farabi (recall), Spinoza treats what we would call religion in sociological, that is, functional terms. In particular, he ascribes to the elaborate rituals of the Hebrew Bible a this worldly-end. In particular, it supports the prosperity, to use Hobbes' phrase, the commodious living of and within the state. As Spinoza puts it a few lines below: "the whole law of Moses, was
concerned with nothing but the Hebrew state, and consequently, with nothing but corporeal advantages," (V.31, p. 146; this point is repeated throughout chapter V.)

Of course, part of the point is a critical one:the ritials contribute nothing to blessedness, which is the only authentic or true form of happiness. So, from Al-Farabi's (and, it seems, Spinoza's) perspective this means it is not a true religion. And indeed, while the Old Testament does teach true religion, it is not located in the Hebraic ceremonies, which, and here Spinoza is explicitly siding with the New Testament (V.14), are dispensable once the Jewish state collapses: "there is no doubt that after their state was dissolved the Jews were no more bound by the law of Moses." (V.15, p. 142) For

Now, Spinoza's account is sociological in another sense. For Spinoza inserts his account into what we may call a stadial theory of history. For, he contextualizes even historicizes* the period in which the Jews accept the Covenant with God and receive their ceremonies as follows:  "they were quite incapable of establishing legislation wisely and keeping the sovereignty in their own hands, as a body. Almost all of them were coursened in their  dispositions [rudis fere ingenii] and weakened by wretched bondage." (V.27; this recalls Thomas More's analysis in Part I of Utopia ( also, here] and here).+ The underlying idea is that after a period of slavery, the Jews were mentally incapable of wise self-government. 

From a political perspective, the significance of this passage is (and this looks forward to Montesquieu) that Spinoza thinks a constitution must fit the material and social circumstances of a people. But for present purposes what matters is that the rituals are, in part, a means toward cultivating better dispositions in order to secure the survival even flourishing of the polity. Let's grant Spinoza this reading of the Hebrew Bible. Here I am interested in the connection between the religion and their economic prosperity. Spinoza explains this in a passage that has, naturally, attracted attention from those (see, for example, Beth Lord's paper, which also makes  the point above context noted above) with an interest in egalitarianism and debt jubilees:

There was something else very unyielding in this state, which must have been the most important factor to prevent its citizens from thinking of defection or wanting to desert their country: the principle of advantage/interest [ratio utilitatis], the mainstay and life of all human actions. That force was exceptionally strong in this state. Nowhere did the citizens possess their property with a greater right than did the subjects of this state, who, with the leader, had an equal share of the lands and fields. Each one was the eternal lord of his own share [suae partis aeternus dominus erat]. If poverty compelled anyone to sell his estate or field, it had to be restored to him once again when the jubilee year came. They instituted other similar practices, so that no one could be alienated from his real property. XVII.84-85, p. 315

Spinoza introduces the claim in this passage as a contrast to opinion [opinione], and the implication is that the mechanism he is describing is a part of solid [solidissimum] knowledge. And the reason for this is that is ground in an enduring feature of human nature that exerts a powerful pull over us, our pursuit of interest [ratio utilitatis]. Spinoza's phrase here is striking because reason of public utility [ratio Publicae Utilitatis] was supposed to govern the state's dealing with its citizens (and with other state authorities). This notion of utility, as public interest, was re-interpreted in the eighteenth century (e.g., in Hume, Beccarria, and Adam Smith). But here Spinoza ascribes a notion of interest to the individuals as the most powerful human motive, and, thereby, secure a public flourishing.

What he is describing involve secure property rights,  where land remained inalienably within a family, that is, a system of entails.** And these lots, in turn, are equal, just as the division of tribes had been equal. It is noticeable that such a system is understood to be unstable. For in addition to the Jubilee, multiple (unnamed) other institutions are required to prevent property from accumulating in some and others losing their family possessions.** Lurking here are claims about the role of debt, the effects of bad harvests, and prudent/imprudent and lucky/unlucky behavior in human affairs.

This setup created a fundamental equality centered on perpetual land-ownership. Obviously, the fact that a jubilee was necessary meant that one could through life without enjoying its fruits. But one could live in hope that one, or one's offspring, would return to it. And because the religion preaches charity to the poor "Nowhere could poverty be more bearable." (XVII.87) Another key feature is that such a system would promote long-term investment in one's family land because one could assume that one's family would reap the rewards. This created an attachment to land and fatherland, which prospered. 

This naturally raises the question why this was not enduring. Lord suggests, not implausibly, that Spinoza thinks the system was undermined when inequality was allowed to enter in, first by the institution of the Levites, a parasitic elite class living of taxes and donation, and then, ultimately, by the institution of a King. But while this is well grounded in the text, I do not think this is the whole story.  (In particular, Spinoza is explicit that the Levites could have been accomodated in this order (17.102, p. 319) In particular, Spinoza suggests that luxury is if not the source of corruption, then a hallmark of its impending arrival:

And that’s what happened, as everyone knows. That’s why there were great changes, and a great license to do anything, and extravagant living, and negligence [magnaque ad omnia licentia, luxus et socordia], with everything going from bad to worse, until, having often been subjugated, they completely broke away from the divine law, and wanted a mortal king. XVII.106, p. 320. 

It's true that Spinoza does not mention luxury [luxus] very much in the context of the first Hebrew state (and it is easy to miss in Curley's translation). But he also attributes the decline of the Canaanites (III.49, p. 123) and Tartars (III.56, p. 125) to the embrace of luxury. And Spinoza presents it as the general source of decline (XVII.14, p. 299). In the latter context it is clear he has the Roman Republic in mind.

So, to sum up: lurking in Spinoza, is a traditional republican suspicion of luxury as a source of corruption and decay. The property arrangements of the Hebrew State were fundamentally unstable not just because people could be (temporarily) indebted, impoverished, and enslaved, but also, and more importantly, because it created the conditions of accumulation and the sort of prosperity that leads to ruin. So, while much of the TTP is naturally read as an attack on the pretensions of theology and dangerous fanaticism, there is a clear warning to the merchants of Holland. Next week (but recall here), I'll explore Spinoza's proposed solutions to the dangers of luxury. 

 

 

Cancel Culture Just is the Market-Place of Ideas

1. Free expression is probably at an all-time high right now, at least in the West. There is a huge variety of different venues for your writing, there’s a whole new world podcasts for speeches, and an ever-increasing supply of video outlets. The availability of these platforms and publishers doesn’t guarantee you an audience, but that’s not what free expression means.
2. Related to that, some of the technologies that have enabled easy speech have made counter-speech extraordinarily easy as well.
3. There are a lot more people who are not you than there are people who are you, and so easy counter-speech means that it’s entirely possible to get inundated with unpleasantness.
4. Because of (2 and 3), people are often careful about what they say, and may feel burdened by this.
5. It is hard to get (1) without (2). The ability to broadcast to others means that they can broadcast back.
6. (4) may hit socially well-positioned people, but it hits vulnerable people far more.--Ryan Muldoon "Free Expression and Evolving Standards" @Radical Classical Liberals

By 'cancel culture' I mean the organized efforts to silence others (e.g., their invitations rescinded, and their honorary doctorates denied, moved to assignments with other duties, etc.) without recourse to violence and state authority (that would be censorship).* I have defined it like this to be permissive to efforts that would also be classified as civil disobedience. In this sense cancel culture just is the marketplace of ideas at work. The currency in this market is approval/disapproval (or credit/discredit in the old sense). There is, thus, nothing especially new in cancel culture, although thanks to social media the mechanisms by which it operates are more virtual than ever before. Obviously, for some this is a reason to reject markets; these are the very people that still pine for Betamax.

That is, cancel culture is a disorderly market. It is very much at odds with a picture of democracy that emphasizes reasoned (and civil) debate. And so on a certain (deliberative) conception of democracy cancel culture is problematic as a mechanism of public opinion formation and preparing of collective action. This is why (they treat it as a virtue not a bug) deliberative democrats spend so much time on the pre-conditions of deliberative spaces. 

But cancel culture is one of the ways in which otherwise dispersed and often disorganized individuals can make the more powerful take notice of their views. Sometimes it is very intimidating. I have been on the receiving end of such efforts, and it is no fun (especially when you realize the folk filling your inbox are affiliated with neonazis).  And there is no doubt that cancel culture can shade into threats of violence or misfire at targets who are in no sense worthy of public opprobrium (just unlucky). 

The previous two paragraphs elide a distinction; marxists (see William Clare Roberts) view cancel culture as crowds in action whereas the critics (e.g., Dan Crenshaw, who is one of the more thoughtful Republicans in the House) use 'mob'. I prefer to see cancel culture (and here I am indebted to Tyler Cowen) as a thin association--sometimes there is coordination, mostly -- in the headline grabbing cases -- it seems to be individuals who come together to express their indignation. If the association is durable, we start (recall) calling it a faction or a party.+ (I return to this below.)

So far I have given a broadly Millian interpretation of cancel culture. He thought (recall here and here) that public opinion was needed to check the abuses of the powerful. But the price for that is, as he worried, the danger of conformism (policed by "vituperative" speech). And, there is no doubt that the cumulative effects of cancel culture, like all widely used preference aggregation mechanisms, may be conformism (yes, VHS displaced Betamax). So, while cancel culture is a possibly effective means in breaking up a cozy cartel, it may lead to a homogeneous landscape.

Now, one may think that indignation is the problem here. Indignation seems inimical to liberal political life. Yet, as Adam Smith reminds us, such sense of "sympathetic indignation" is at the root of justice. In its institutions this sense is sublimated and through the rules of evidence and reason redirected to proper ends. (Recall this post on Srinivasan and the aptness of anger.) But this pushes the problem back because such sympathetic indignation may well be corrupted, and is often corrupted, by other commitments and interests. So, perhaps, on balance, and this is my own inclination, liberals should be weary of anything that encourages the crowd? 

This is too easy because such indignation may well be at the root of political life. As Spinoza puts it in his Political Treatise: "men are led...more by passion than reason, it follows, that a multitude comes together, and wishes to be guided, as it were, by one mind, not at the suggestion of reason, but of some common passion...or the desire of avenging some common hurt." (6.1)  Somewhat surprisingly, as Chantal Jaquet has noted, this very desire is at the root of political authority  "the right of the commonwealth is determined by the common power of the multitude" and it is ground in the "desire to avenge some common hurt." (3.9) Political life is a kind of sublimation and domestication of this subsisting indignation. The effect of righteousness is social peace.

What is noticeable in nearly all the critics of cancel culture is that they refuse to engage with the grounds of indignation. Tactically, one understands this move because it helps ferment polarization (and so opportunities for profit) and cement group identity. Morally it is a mistake because one fails to heed the call of justice. Strategically, it is a worse mistake because one, thereby, misses the causal forces that shape the changing directions of the tectonic plates, which are the sediments of and constraints on the marketplace of ideas, of political life.

In December 2015 (look at that date!) I noted that Trump's rise to power within the Republican party was clearly an effect of the sense of indignation in that tribe and a loss of faith in its elites. I tend to view cancel culture in American public life as doing something similar to the intellectual opinion leaders of our time. Since our for profit public culture and media feed on indignation, we should expect a turbulent time ahead.**  The market giveth and taketh away, and it dances to the tune of fortune.**  

 

Spinoza on Incentives, Human Nature, and Church Corruption

To do this it was necessary to indicate the main prejudices regarding religion, i.e., the traces of our ancient bondage, and then also the prejudices regarding the right of the supreme 'powers. Many, with the most shameless license, are eager to take away the greater part of that right, and under the pretext of religion to turn the heart of the multitude (who are still at the mercy of pagan superstition) away from the supreme 'powers, so that everything may collapse again into slavery. I’ll indicate briefly in what order I show these things; but first I must say what reasons have impelled me to write.
[14] I’ve often wondered that men who boast that they profess the Christian religion—i.e., love, gladness, peace, restraint, and good faith toward all—would contend so unfairly against one another, and indulge daily in the bitterest hatred toward one another, so that each man’s faith is known more easily from his hatred and contentiousness than from his love, gladness, etc. Long ago things reached the point where you can hardly know what anyone is, whether Christian, Turk, Jew, or Pagan, except by the external dress and adornment of his body, or because he frequents this or that Place of Worship, or because he’s attached to this or that opinion, or because he’s accustomed to swear by the words of some master. They all lead the same kind of life.
[15 What’s the cause of this evil? Doubtless that religion has commonly consisted in regarding the ministries of the Church as positions conferring status, its offices as sources of income, and its clergy as deserving the highest honor. For as soon as this abuse began in the Church, the worst men immediately acquired a great desire to administer the sacred offices; the love of propagating divine religion degenerated into sordid greed and ambition; and the temple itself became a Theater, where one hears, not learned ecclesiastics, but orators, each possessed by a longing, not to teach the people, but to carry them away with admiration for himself, to censure publicly those who disagree, and to teach only those new and unfamiliar doctrines which the common people most wonder at. This had to lead to great dissension, envy, and hatred, whose violence no passage of time could lessen.

[16] It’s no wonder, then, that nothing has remained of the old (or ancient) Religion [antiquae Religionis] but its external ceremony externum cultum, by which the common people seem more to flatter God than to worship him. No wonder faith is nothing now but credulity and prejudices.--Spinoza, Theological Political Treatise, "preface" translated by E. Curley

The quoted passage is the start of a curious aside within the preface of the TTP. In the lines before it Spinoza has announced the celebrated thesis; at the conclusion of the argument, he offers a summary of the book. The main point of the aside is the conclusion that the existing church has lost its way; nothing [nihl] remains of the religion; it's an empty shell with some adornment [externum cultum]. And before Spinoza goes on to give the summary of the book, he offers examples of this state of affairs. 

My present interest is in Spinoza's diagnosis and explanation of a church that has become an empty shell. For, this is not just a story of decline. It is a story of corruption from within, with a potentially good resource wasted [abusus], with a clear institutional cause. And Spinoza is explicit on the first cause: that Church office (of the common people [vulgo religioni]) has highest status [summo honore] and a source of material benefits [beneficia].

As an aside, Spinoza's conceptual point is clear, butI think Spinoza's wording is ambiguous between two historical possibilities: (i) allowing an uncorrupted early church that got corrupted by a norm/institutional change (which I describe below) or (ii) that the people's church has always been corrupt, once institutionalized, because their shepherds always gain status and other benefits. In what follows I assume (i) because it reveals something interesting about Spinoza's conception of human nature.

Spinoza's argument assumes that once incentives shift toward status and income, different kinds of people will want to become church leaders. For there is a clear shift from people motivated by love of preaching the gospel [amor divinae religionis propagandae] to sordid people who are vain (eager for attention), avaricious, and demagogues [sordidam avaritiam, et ambitionem]. (Recall this post why, in Spinoza, I read 'ambition' as demagoguery.] So, when the incentive structure changes, the labor pool for pastoral care jobs is changed, and the kinds of people that rise to the top within the church is utterly transformed if not corrupted. 

It is important that Spinoza does not think that the pastors are corrupted by and in their jobs. (This is clearly Adam Smith's view later.) He thinks, rather, that people with excessive longings [ingens libido] will become attracted to careers in the clergy. I don't want to put too much emphasis on Spinoza's use of 'libido' but it's clear he thinks that once such people enter the Church a species of love is displaced and it becomes infused with a fetishized energy where spectacle and sensuality reign. 

Now, at this stage I want to backtrack to Spinoza's fascinating claim that now  all lead the same kind of life [vita eadem omnibus est]. Long before Sombart and Marcuse, Spinoza diagnoses a flattening of human kind such that within modernity the differences among people become very narrow and track shallow exterior features, opinions, and religious practices. Spinoza's polemical point, anticipating Swift, is that people kill each other over trivial differences egged on by bad people that exploit religion to malicious self-interested ends. 

Spinoza does not say whether in some previous age human diversity reached into, as it were, our interior. So, he leaves open whether ancient human diversity was due to radically different practices (at, say, the level of cultural anthropology), or whether he is entertaining the possibility of a diversity of human origins and so kinds (at the level of physical anthropology).+ Either way, there is a common (and now i use, recall Susan James' terminology) "thin" human nature now. 

Even so, more than, say, Hobbes or Adam Smith, Spinoza is willing to distinguish among human kind. So, as I noted last week, while commenting on the Political Treatise, he clearly thinks there is a rather steep cognitive hierarchy among men (with about three percent of folk being outstanding in leadership qualities) and he thinks women are subordinate to men even in potential. And, here, in the preface to the TTP, Spinoza clearly distinguishes between humans oriented toward love of the gospel and the more vicious kind of humans with excessive libido.

To be sure, in each case, it is possible to construct a Spinozistic narrative that looks at social causes, at nurture, to explain revealed human differences. But it is notable Spinoza does not do so himself. So, while Spinoza clearly rejects Aristotle's claim that there are natural slaves, the natural reading of Spinoza is that while there is a thin, rather passionate human nature that is governed by unchanging laws, within that nature human diversity reigns.

So, let me wrap up. For Spinoza the mechanism of corruption of the Church is a shift in incentives that attract the wrong sort of people motivated by status and possessiveness of material goods; once such people are in charge, they displace those motivated by love and gift-giving, and the very institution is transformed into one in which office holding takes on a complex transactional character where the church becomes a source of material benefi. It has lost its original mission and can easily destabilize society. This diagnoses also suggests a solution: to ensure that remuneration and benefits of Church offices are controlled (but about some other time).

For now, I just want to note that for Spinoza account of the corruption of the church fits a larger pattern. As the Political Treatise shows, Spinoza thinks lots of institutions are vulnerable to corruption, including outright bribery.* What is key here is that for Spinoza, in institutional design one should not just be alert to the incentive structure of the institutions in shaping behavior, but also in the way these incentives attract people one ought to keep out.

On Spinoza's Patriarchal Sexism and E1P16

But, perhaps, someone will ask, whether women are under men’s control [potestate] by nature or institution [natura an ex instituto]? For if it has been by mere institution, then we had no reason [ratio] compelling us to exclude women from government. But if we consult experience itself, we shall find that the origin of it is in their weakness. For there has never been a case of men and women reigning together, but wherever on the earth men are found, there we see that men rule, and women are ruled, and that on this plan, both sexes live in harmony. But on the other hand, the Amazons, who are reported to have held rule of old, did not suffer men to stop in their country, but reared only their female children, killing the males to whom they gave birth. But if by nature women were equal to men, and were equally distinguished by fortitudinous spirit [animi fortitudine] and ability/talent [ingenium], in which human power [potentia] and therefore human right chiefly consist; surely among nations so many and different some would be found, where both sexes rule alike, and others, where men are ruled by women, and so brought up, that they can make less use of their abilities. And since this is nowhere the case, one may assert with perfect propriety, that women have not by nature equal right with men: but that they necessarily give way [necessario cedere,] to men, and that thus it cannot happen [fieri non posse], that both sexes should rule alike, much less that men should be ruled by women. But if we further reflect upon human passions, how men, in fact, generally love women merely from the passion of lust, and esteem their cleverness and wisdom in proportion to the excellence of their beauty, and also how very ill-disposed men are to suffer the women they love to show any sort of favour to others, and other facts of this kind, we shall easily see that men and women cannot rule alike without great hurt to peace [magno pacis detrimento fieri]. But of this enough.--Spinoza, Political Treatise, 11.4, translated by Elwes

In a recent paper, Susan James (70) has rightly called attention to Spinoza's rejection, earlier in the Political Treatise, of Aristotle's stance that there are natural masters and slaves,  and his embrace of the reality of a common nature. (7.27) Even so, an attentive reader of the Political Treatise will, perhaps, be dismayed by the final paragraph (quoted above), but not wholly surprised.  For, in his treatment of Aristocratic government, Spinoza had quite clearly asserted that out of any given population of hundred patrician men, "hardly three are found that excel in skill and counsel." [ vix tres reperiuntur, qui arte et consilio pollent vigentque, ] (8.2)  This does not seem intended, in the first instance, as criticism of aristocratic education (although he may well (recall) be critical of it), but rather as a kind of statistical regularity of the distribution of cognitive abilities in populations of males.

What is more surprising is given his explicit elitist embrace of the reality of cognitive hierarchy that, unlike so-called Platonic feminists (male and female), Spinoza denies that there are similar number of women with such cognitive excellence. For, in the Ethics Spinoza had appeared to claim, in the context of his retelling of Adam & Eve story (E4P68S), that men and women agree in nature, or, in James' terms "thin" conception  of human nature. But unlike the platonic feminists, Spinoza does not avail himself of pointing to the reality of known excellent women. Spinoza is not just an elitist, but a male chauvenist.

Now, there has been enormous number of excellent and insightful work on the quoted passage above. Some, like Beth Lord, claim that while in this passage the "disempowerment of women is ‘part of nature’. Spinoza does not seek to justify or condemn that fact, but he does seek to explain it." And according to her, he explains it through socio-economic structures. The real question then is if we can imagine a democracy together that is more equal. (1105) Others, like Moira Gatens, who finds Spinoza's philosophy useful in imagining a feminist future, nevertheless read the passage as suggesting that according to Spinoza woman are "rightly excluded from the body politic because men are by nature superior to them," (47)  I am inclined to agree with Gatens' (and James') interpretation.

As an aside, it is worth noting that the quoted passage above is one of four paragraphs on the nature of democracy. Even if one grants the universal consensus that the chapter (and so the book) is unfinished, it is notable that Spinoza thought it important to write/draft this paragraph at the start of the chapter on democracy. And while I grant James, in commenting on he passage, that something "psychologically complicated" is going, it is fair to say that for Spinoza entertaining the very idea of mass democracy seems to demand a stance of excluding women from the franchise. This reaction is clearly not Spinoza's alone; as Eileen O'Neill notes, Gouges, when confronted with the possible revival of mass democracy during the French revolution, recognizes that this exclusion is a temptation for newly enfranchised men (and, against her warnings, she was right and guillotined for it).

Now, I do not have anything to add to Spinoza's one-sided, unimaginatively sexist interpretation of the historical evidence about the relationship between the political possibilities of men and women. But the passage also gives us a glimpse, in its strange treatment of the historical evidence, of a peculiarity in Spinoza's metaphysics of time. For, in the quoted passage, Spinoza fundamentally assumes that in human history, all possible permutations in the sex distribution of political rulerships that can occur have occurred. 

To be sure, Spinoza cannot mean that all possible political organizations have occured because the Political Treatise itself proposes three or four institutional arrangements that have not been tried out in the configurations Spinoza proposes even by his own lights.* We know this because Spinoza thinks that some of these would be (uncurruptable and) enduring (10.1). But apparently, when it comes to figuring out whether females are capable of ruling history's verdict is final. 

Spinoza's use of 'necessity' reminded me of a famous passage in the Ethics: "from the necessity of the Divine nature infinite things must follow in infinite ways (i.e. all things that can fall under an infinite intellect)" (E1p16) And, if we glance back to the quoted passage at the end of the Political Treatise, it is notable that Spinoza does not help himself to an idea he could have borrowed from Al-Farabi or Ibn Rushd, that the gender properties of political rulership need not fall under the infinite intellect. 

Now, it is a feature and not a bug in Spinoza's necessitarianism that eternity is in a sense all alike. This is why the very idea of creation, which singles out one moment as special, as the start of a series, is a superstitious fantasy. (Spinoza's deist and theist critics make a point of suggesting that this leave Spinoza without a viable cosmogony for the visible universe.) Let's call this the homogeneity of time thesis. Of course, there is such a thing as duration but it is not an attribute of substance (as one might have expected), but a mere consequence of the existence of causal interactions (E2p30S & E2p28], that is, the human mind's finitude or (sorry this is puzzling) negation.  

In addition, E1P16 seems to suggest that all possibilities occur. Let's call this modal density. Of course, in some sense, and from the perspective of, say, Leibniz, Spinoza must mean something relative narrow with the 'possible.' But given that for Spinoza extension and mind are infinite, and that there are, perhaps, infinite further attributes, we should also not underestimate how much is genuinely possible for Spinoza. 

Now given the homogeneity of time and modal density, and the reality of human history, it is not obvious that one has any right to assume that there are (knowable) possibilities that have not been tried out yet. For, that would suggests that there is temporal asymmetry between future and past. But that also means that at any given time one knows what one can know of the world (and the past). There is no reason to think one will be in a better position at a later date. And, in fact, this fits with a more general strain of skepticism about the limits of empirical knowledge that I have diagnosed in Spinoza. 

In my view, what this suggests is that in some respects it is odd that Spinoza has become a mascot for progressives everywhere. Because there is a sense in which Spinoza's metaphysics is not, to put it mildly, especially hospitable toward any form of soft providence, including historical progress.+ If history has no fundamental direction things could get better and worse. Of course, just because there is no reason to think  there is a temporal asymmetry between future and past, it does not follow there is a good reason to think the past has exhausted all the possible human permutations.  For at no point could one be secure in that because that would privilege a moment of duration, and single out that moment. And, so while I have tried to point to the peculiarities of Spinoza's metaphysics that may partially account for his thinking in the final paragraph of the Political Treatise, I doubt these necessitate it; Spinoza seems to have underestimated women's capacity for rule and male capacity to adapt to it. 

Spinoza & Rousseau, On European Federation

Let us admit then that the Powers of Europe stand to each other strictly in a state of war, and that all the separate treaties between them are in the nature rather of a temporary truce than a real peace: whether because such treaties are seldom guaranteed by any except the contracting parties; or because the respective rights of those parties are never thoroughly determined and are therefore bound—they, or the claims, which pass for rights in the eyes of Powers who recognise no earthly superior—to give rise to fresh wars as soon as a change of circumstances shall have given fresh strength to the claimants.--Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1761) "Statement of St. Pierre's Project" [here's the French]

The passage is from a text that purports to be a summary of Abbé St. Pierre's proposal of European federation tied together by a permanent peace treaty, free trade, a standing army and what we may anachronistically call a European Council with a rotating presidency. The nineteen major European powers would be represented in this Council. As Rousseau presents it, the proposal would freeze boundaries and constitutional forms in place. The argument in favor of the proposal distinguishes itself from utopian projects by claiming to present the true (as opposed to apparent) interests of rulers and subject in peace which produces the conditions for (to quote Hobbes) commodious living and virtuous cycles of economic and population growth.

The key obstacle, and this is the main point of Rousseau's critical remarks in his "judgment" on St. Pierre's project, published separately (and posthumously), but written more or less simultaneously,* is that the transition from here to there is blocked by the way sovereigns and their chief advisors understand their interests. They recognize that war is a source of possible profit for them personally and that it is a pretext and mechanism to oppress their own citizens. One understands why Rousseau waited to publish this. Although anybody familiar with the first few books of Livy's Discourses and Machiavelli, or the way of the world, could have guessed that this is Rousseau's criticism.

And this gets me to Spinoza, and in particular his Political Treatise, published posthumously alongside Ethics (etc.) For, despite the many allusions and references to Machiavelli, one way to understand the unity among the various proposals of the best constitutional orders in Spinoza's Political Treatise, is (recall my treatment of (6:12 and 7:8)) to find institutional arrangements and incentives that make war unattractive to rulers and their advisors and, as Yitzhak Melamed has recently emphasized, to make states not threatening to their neighbors (7.28); on the significance of institutional arrangements to promote peace as an end, see also 3.10; 4.2; 5.2; 8.7; 8:31; and even 11.4 the last two sentences.

The reason I mention Spinoza in the context of Rousseau's European federalism, is three-fold (and connected). First, and less interesting by itself, the quoted passage above reminded me of Spinoza (and makes me suspect that this passage is one of the places that is more Rousseau than St. Pierre [whom I have  not read yet]). For, it is a doctrine notoriously associated with Spinoza:+ "every commonwealth has the right to dissolve its contract, [proinde unicuique civitati ius integrum est solvendi foedus], whenever it chooses ,and cannot be said to act treacherously or perfidiously in breaking its word, as soon as the motive of hope or fear is removed."(3.14; see also 4.6)** And, indeed, for Spinoza (and here he echoes Hobbes), the commonwealth is, relative to other states, still in the state of nature (7:22; 4.6, and especially 3:11.)).

But, second, and more interesting, in the Political Treatise, Spinoza, too, proposes a federation as a guarantee for peace in the very context in which he describes that treaties may be broken when they outlast their utility.++ 

To commonwealths, which have contracted a treaty of peace, it belongs to decide the questions, which may be mooted about the terms or rules of peace, whereby they have mutually bound themselves, inasmuch as laws of [308] peace regard not one commonwealth, but the commonwealths which contract taken together (Sec. 13). But if they cannot agree together about the conditions, they by that very fact return to a state of war.

The more commonwealths there are, that have contracted a joint treaty of peace, the less each of them by itself is an object of fear to the remainder, or the less it has the authority to make war. But it is so much the more bound to observe the conditions of peace; that is (Sec. 13), the less independent, and the more bound to accommodate itself to the joint will of the contracting parties. [Quo plures civitates simul pacem contrahunt, eo unaquaeque reliquis minus timenda, sive unicuique minor est potestas bellum inferendi; sed eo magis pacis tenetur conditiones servare, hoc est (per art. 13. huius cap.) eo minus sui iuris est, sed eo magis communi foederatorum voluntati sese accommodare tenetur.] Political Treatise 3.15-16,

Spinoza describes here the outlines of a federation of peace (more fully developed in Adam Smith and Kant). And the underlying insight is that if the state of nature of the international arena can be transformed into a state of peace when and only when the grounds of mutual fear among states are reduced. Strikingly, for Spinoza this does not require a common enemy (as nearly all the famous federations in history presupposed). Rather what's required is a transformation of their own internal dynamic or of their joint (state) system. That is to say, that once mutual accommodation can become the norm (without foolishness), in virtue of the expectation that the whole will try to maintain/impose conditions of peace, joint peace has a chance. And, looking ahead to Kant, the very growth of such a system (as more states join), the more pacific it can become. 

So, to sum up, Rousseau and Spinoza both draw on Machiavellian premises to develop institutional design for perpetual peace. Both explicitly deny, and this is my third reason, their approach is utopian in character (and this ties them to Hume and Adam Smith), and takes man as he is not as he ought to be (here in Rousseau; and here, more famously, in Spinoza), that is, they model humans as rational devils. I also believe, but have provided no evidence yet, that their ideas about how to solve the transition from here to peace are roughly similar. But about that some other time.

 

Spinoza Against Public Universities and Pro-Markets (in Ideas)?

Academies, that are founded at the public expense, are instituted not so much to cultivate talents [ingenia colenda]  as to constrain them. [ad eadem coercenda instituuntur.] Skills and sciences will flourish best [optime excolentur], in a free republic, if every one who asks permission [is granted] to teach in public, at his own expense, and to their own reputation risk. [si unicuique veniam petenti concedatur publice docere, idque suis sumptibus, suis sumptibus, suaeque famae periculo].--Spinoza Political Treatise, Ch. 8, p. 49,  translated  Robert Harvey Monro Elwes [with most modifications]

Spinoza assumes that a true cultivation of dispositions will generate excellence in the sciences and technology (or technical arts [scientiae et artes]).* He denies that publicly funded universities produce such excellence. Because regardless of what their purported aims are, the true aim of public universities is to mold talents into the assumed or perceived needs of public authority. This generates a species of conformity, and is incompatible with true excellence. As Adam Smith put the same point in the Wealth of Nations, “The discipline of colleges and universities is in general contrived, not for the benefit of the students, but for the interest, or more properly speaking, for the ease of the masters. It's object is to maintain the authority of all masters.”*

A key hidden assumption is that diverse talents must be cultivated in a variety of ways such that sciences and crafts can flourish. And through direct and indirect censorship (i.e., a curriculum,  etc.)  public universities prevent this variety from being developed. 

More could be said about this passage and his then recent rejection of the Chair at Heidelberg. And much more ought to be said about Spinoza's views of human nature in the Political Treatise.  Given the fondness for Spinozza among today's self-styled radicals and marxists, he is, to be speak frankly, surprisingly elitist about the intellectually gifted (8.2). But that's for another time.

Given the diversity of human character and given the diversity of excellence in the sciences and technology, what's needed according to Spinoza is unlimited freedom to  would be educators to teach what they wish constrained by their budgets and reputation. 

I assume that Spinoza is only speaking of higher education (academies) here. It is notable that even Smith, who was a fierce critic of the universities of his age, would not go as far as Spinoza. Smith thought that professors should indeed be paid by their students (such that a higher enrollment meant higher fees). But Smith did not propose that everybody could organize higher education as they see fit. 

It is notable, Sinoza does not consider an option to reform higher education: the creation and advocacy of something like academic freedom. While the term is a bit anachronistic, it is not much a stretch for the advocate of freedom of philosophizing/scientific thought (which is the explicit thesis of the Theological Political Treatise--a text he refers back to regularly in the Political Treatise);** there is no doubt that the nature and extent of academic freedom was debated in various controversies at Leiden University in his lifetime (some of them having to do with the status of Cartesianism). But given everything else he says about the way incentives and human nature interact to generate conditions of corruption in the Political Treatise, he must have thought this decidedly unpromising (perhaps especially in an aristocracy [since the paragraph is tucked away in a chapter on the best aristocracy]).

Another option would be for universities independent of government (and religious) control in the manner of some ancient academies and future private universities. But it is crucial, I think, that Spinoza does not advocate for the establishment of a single private university to create such freedom. Rather his emphasis is on educators, many would be educators ("each" unicuique). I happen to think we're invited to think of Plato and Aristotle and their business model with fee paying students attracted by their reputation. And it is quite clear that Spinoza thinks that in a heterogeneous population of fee-paying students, it is the interaction of payment and reputation of teachers that will produce the excellence in the sciences and technologies conducive to the flourishing of a free republic. 

It is a peculiar fact of the reception of Spinoza that a book which seriously curtails speech (but not thought), the Theological Political Treatise, is treated as the origin of modern freedom of speech; whereas the book that despite curtailing such speech (3.5) quietly promotes a market place in intellectual ideas is still (to quote Yitzhak Melamed and Hasana Sharp) a "neglected masterpiece."

 

Spinoza's Qualified Limitarianism in context of Monarchic political economy

The fields, and the whole soil, and, if it can be managed, the houses should be public property [publici iuris sint], that is, the property of him, who holds public authority [literally the right of the commonwealth ius civitatis habet]: and let him let them at a yearly rent [annuo pretio] to the citizens, whether townsmen or countrymen, and with this exception let them all be free or exempt from every kind of taxation [exactione] in time of peace. And of this rent a part is to be applied to the defences of the state, a part to the king’s private use. For  it is necessary in time of peace to fortify cities against war, and also to have ready ships and other munitions of war.--Spinoza, Political Treatise, Chapter 6, par. 12, translated  Robert Harvey Monro Elwes

The quoted passage is from a paragraph of Spinoza's treatment of a well-ordered or optimal, monarchy.* Such a monarchy is characterized, initially, by elected kingship (6.5); where the king is subject to  the rule of law. And where, in peacetime, the king's relationship to the people is mediated by a rotating assembly of elders (6.15-16). In many respects, the best form of monarchy described by Spinoza is best characterized as a constitutional monarchy. The major political difference with modern constitutional, hereditary monarchies (7.25) is that the assembly, which has agenda-setting and information power (6.19) over the monarch, is not elected by the citizens, but by the monarch itself (6.16). 

There is much to be said about the  themes of liberty, explicitly introduced with a nod to Machiavelli, (5.7; 7.2) and corruption (e.g., 7.9-10); and the many ways in which the passions are managed through the careful use of incentives and institutional design (see 1.3-4, and the anticipations of Kant and Buchanan's public choice]. I would be amazed if Hume did not have the Political Treatise open when he was writing his political essays, not least Of Perfect Commonwealth.** That's for another time; let's turn to the quoted passage above.

It turns out that there is no private property in land and real estate in a well ordered monarchy. Instead citizens lease it annually from the government.+ Before I discuss the effects of this on income and wealth (and war & peace), it is worth noting the tax significance. This is, simultaneously, the main source of income for the government which pays, thereby, for public works, especially public defense and spying, and the king's expenses. This suggests that the king has no royal estates either (as noted by Noordman 2016: 17). In addition, this also entails is that the government does not raise any tolls, excise taxes, or tariffs (all of them familiar to Spinoza's readers).

The predictable effect and so function of this is clear: the governors' interests are aligned with the people's interest. For, income from taxes can grow only in two ways: first, by population growth. Spinoza is explicit that "means should be devised for more easily increasing the number of citizens, and producing a large confluence of men." (6.32) In addition, to the fact that a growing citizenry can pay more tax (at least over homes), this is useful to have a larger army, in times of war, and to a class of non-citizens who pay a fee "for their exemption from service" or are required to perform "some forced labour." As an aside, his emphasis on population growth, Spinoza anticipates here Locke's "art of government" and he resonates with ideas of the De La Court brothers in the (1662) Interest of Holland.

Second, taxes can grow if land-values and property values grow. I am assuming that the annual renewal of the leases means that there are regular re-evaluations of the assessment. This requires, behind the scenes, as it were, a professional class of land surveyors which had grown in significance in early modern England and the Dutch provinces. At the end of the sixteenth century, Dutch academies were founded and started to churn out, in addition to engineers, such trained surveyors [see Van Bunge for background]. (To be sure, I don't mean to suggest that Spinoza takes either Holland, which he treats as an aristocracy, or England as a nearby example for the best kind of monarchy; strikingly, it seems he takes the early Kingdom of Aragon as the (undoubtedly partial) exemplar (7:30).

A predictable side-effect of annual leases, is that it prevents too much long-term investment in the productive capacity of land. These required (recall) the longer leases pioneered in fifteenth and sixteenth century England. That is not a bug in Spinoza's design, but a feature. For, in referring back to the quoted passage, Spinoza suggests that "all will be obliged, for the sake of gain, to practise trade, or lend money to one another, if, as formerly by the Athenians, a law be passed, forbidding to lend money at interest to any but inhabitants; and thus they will be engaged in business, which either is mutually involved, one man’s with another’s, or needs the same means for its furtherance." (7.8) Because Spinoza assumes that citizens are self-interested (and have relatively few opportunities to gain glory/renown), and, in virtue of lack of property in land and real estate, citizens will be encouraged to become a trading nation domestically and (recall  the lack of tariffs) internationally.

This nudging toward the trades and commerce is reinforced by the fact that banking is limited to domestic banking. That is to say, excess capital accumulation can neither be much invested in land and property nor be loaned out abroad, so this leaves it to be used as capital for domestic investment in trades, commerce, and manufacture. So, while there is some room for accumulation in gold and silver (and jewelry/plate), major landholdings are prevented. And the way Spinoza conceives of trade, this is involves mutual gain (even mutual assistance (2.15; 3:12; 7.8 ([see also, especially, TTP 5]). 

The intended political effect is clear (and explicit): to prevent the rise of a powerful nobility, and to maintain significant wealth equality so that there will be a near equal "risk in war" [ par propemodum periculum est.] (7.8; emphasis added; this, and other remarks clearly anticipates Kant's treatment in Perpetual Peace). With a lack of property in land and real estate, this will not just maintain rough equality, but people's interests and their representatives in the council of state will be pretty much identical (7.8).  While people still can grow somewhat wealthy, they will be doing so in virtue of providing each other in their needs. As population will keep growing, it is clear that this supposed to engender a virtuous cycle of moderate and egalitarian growth. So, when theorizing the best form of monarchy, Spinoza is clearly a qualified limitarian in the sense of (recall) Kramm & Robeyns.

Okay, I could stop here. But it is worth noting something. It turns out that the best form of monarchy in Spinoza's Political Treatise is a variation on Utopia in More's Utopia. That is easy to miss because Spinoza makes a disparaging comment about Utopia at the start of his book (1.1), where it is treated (recall) as useless philosophy. Utopian society is characterized by a lack of liberty, and constant surveillance. But in both places people are incentivized to work hard and provide each other needs, despite the precautions against accumulation of private property. (If anything Utopians are more encouraged to invest in their homes and communal gardens than Spinoza's monarchic citizens.) If anything, we might say that Spinoza's monarchy is, compared to Utopia, less focused on conquest and more on peace. 

For, in Spinoza's monarchy, where the citizens live by trade, and have no landed property and real estate to fall back, and are not paid for soldiering, they will lack war-spiritedness [animus gerendi bellum]. In fact, "war will always cause them fear of losing their possessions and liberty, it is to be added, that war requires fresh expenditure, which they must meet, and also that their own children and relatives, though intent on their domestic cares, will be forced to turn their attention to war and go a-soldiering, whence they will never bring back anything but unpaid-for scars." (7.7)

What we may call the laboring class [quotidiano opere vitam] gets stipends for wartime soldiering, but, by implication, the capitalists (and domestic banker) or entrepreneurs not (6.31). This suggests that Spinoza thinks that ultimate a monarchic state will be divided modestly, by those who live on wages and those who live by credit, trade, or enterprise.

Demagogues and the Crowd in Spinoza's Ethics

This striving [conatus] to do something (and also to omit doing something) solely to please men [hominibus placeamus] is called Ambition [ambitio], especially when we strive so eagerly to please the people [vulgo] that we do or omit certain things to our own injury, or another’s. In other cases, it is usually called human kindness. Next, the Joy with which we imagine the action of another by which he has striven to please us I call Praise. On the other hand, the Sadness with which we are averse to his action I call Blame. Spinoza, Ethics 3, p29, Scholium (translated by Curley)

Above I reproduce the Curley translation because this is the one I generally trust and teach from. But this week-end, while looking at the Latin, I noticed 'vulgo.' And, indeed, when I checked the Silverthorne and Kisner translation, they use 'the crowd;' this strikes me as more fitting. For, this suggests that in the passage, Spinoza is, in fact, treating the demagogue as the ambitious type or exemplar of ambition. Noticing that the demagogue is the characteristic ambitious type impacts how we read a whole number of scholia in the heart of Spinoza's Ethics. You could easily miss it because this is the only time he connects excess of ambition to pleasing the crowd. In what follows I show what happens when you read Spinoza's treatment of such ambitio as a treatment of demagoguery.

A few pages later in the scholium to proposition 31, Spinoza explicitly refers back to the scholium quoted above:

This striving to bring it about that everyone should approve his love and hate is really Ambition (see P29S). And so we see that each of us, by his nature, wants the others to live according to his temperament; when all alike want this, they are alike an obstacle to one another, and when all wish to be praised, or loved, by all, they hate one another. [E3p29S]

That is, the effect of widespread demagoguery is polarization or mutual hatred. I return to this below.

The next mention of ambition is the scholium to E3p32 (which reads) "If we imagine that someone enjoys some thing that only one can possess, we shall strive to bring it about that he does not possess it"); there Spinoza writes, "we see, then, that from the same property of human nature from which it follows that men are compassionate, it also follows that the same men are envious and ambitious."* This property is a kind envy at people enjoying non-shareable goods, that is to say, status and attention (prestige, etc.), the demagogue "desires nothing so much as renown/attention [gloria]" (E3P39S)+ So, the demagogue is driven by the desire for applause from the crowd, and, simultaneously, gain attention and status and, thereby, prevent others from having it. (The significance of this to thee size of Trump's inaugural day crowd is evident.)

The connection between demagogue [ambitio] and renown [gloria] is made explicit in th definitions of the affects: "Ambition is an excessive desire for renown." In the explanation, Spinoza makes the desire for renown a ruling passion (to use Hume's phrase) that can be extremely hard to tame: "ambition is a desire by which all the affects are encouraged and strengthened (by P27 and P31); so this affect can hardly be overcome. For as long as a man is bound by any desire, he must at the same time be bound by this one.**

Spinoza is not done with the demagogue. For, this person instantiates immoderation in all respects: he "will not be moderate in anything provided he can hope he will not be discovered."  You may think that  Spinoza holds out the possibility that outside publicity, a functioning public opinion, might be such a countervailing force. President (then candidate) Trump, de facto, pointed out the weakness in this hope, when he said, "I could stand in the middle of 5th Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn’t lose voters." (E3 Affect 48, explanation.) Once the (would-be) demagogue believes that the crowd is loyal to him (as opposed to truth, justice, liberty, etc.), it can't function as a countervailing force.   

And, in fact, Spinoza himself recognizes the point. Because he goes on to say, "if [the demagogue] lives among the drunken and the lustful, then because he is ambitious, he will be the more inclined to these vices." (E3 Affect 48, explanation.) Thus, the demagogue is especially dangerous in the company of fellow bandits or a corrupted society, etc. For then there is no countervailing force at all which can stop the havoc of the unity of the vices.++ 

In such circumstances, the demagogue is really a symptom, or an effect, of a much wider social malaise. This, too, is Spinoza's position (although I am going to cheat by glancing outside the Ethics), in fact (recall); in the final chapter of the TTP, Spinoza had defined the corrupt state in terms of its susceptibility to demagoguery: "some corrupt state, where superstitious and ambitious persons, unable to endure men of learning, are so popular with the multitude that their word is more valued than the law." In such a case, the demagogue can expect to commit crimes without punishment.

Of course, to say, that a successful demagogue is the effect of a corrupt society, it does not follow that the demagogue has no role in generating the corruption and polarization. For,  the aspiring demagogue is himself characterized by fake morality (think of the Central Park 5), and simultaneously, this fake morality generates polarization and lawbreaking: "Ambition, or a Desire by which men generally arouse discord and seditions, from a false appearance of morality." [Sed si ex affectu oriatur, ambitio est sive cupiditas, qua homines falsa pietatis imagine plerumque discordias et seditiones concitant.'] (E4capt25)

I could stop here, but it is worth noting that Spinoza himself is insistent on the following point: demagogues "are not thought to be mad, because they are usually troublesome, and are considered worthy of hate." But he goes on to insists that it is a "species of madness/delirium [delirare], even though...not numbered among the diseases." (E4P44S) This is, so, I think because a demagogue is characteristic of a certain kind of excess.

It is not entirely clear why Spinoza thinks the excessive longing for renown is a species of madness (except that, perhaps, the excessiveness is supposed to be self-explanatory). But near the end of part 4, Spinoza concludes his analysis of the demagogue with the following thought:

If someone sees that he pursues renown too much, he should think of its correct use, the end for which it ought be pursued, and the means by which it can be acquired, not of its misuse and emptiness, and men’s inconstancy, or other things of this kind, which only someone sick of mind thinks of. For those who are most ambitious [the demagogue] are most upset by such thoughts when they despair of attaining the honor they strive for; while they spew forth their Anger, they wish to seem wise. E5p10S***

There are a number of ways to read this. The first, and less, interesting point is that Spinoza clearly thinks that once the desire of fame becomes all consuming it is just sheer craziness. The more interesting point is that Spinoza clearly thinks that the demagogue fundamentally abuse renown, which in different hands could be instrumentally useful. But in the demagogue renown/fame becomes an all consuming end without any such utility except self-aggrandizement. And, third, the emptiness and the futility of being the center of all attention (to be godlike, really) makes the demagogue angry. And, then oddly, in their despair, they proclaim (repeatedly) their own genius. 

One final comment--this is very speculative. There is a firmly entrenched reading of the Ethics as a book free of politics and history (which Spinoza is said to tackle in his more political works). This reading stands in the way of the kind I have offered. It is possible, of course, that I have read a concern with demagoguery into the Ethics because I have been reading Livy. But, if we read the Ethics, in part, as a manual to become wise, that is a philosopher, and not just seem wise, then an old problem (also to be found in Mill) raises its head. what happens (now quoting Ibn Rushd on Plato) "to virtuous natures when they grow up in corrupt cities and are badly educated"? And the answer is, they can become very bad. So, if you have followed me this far, we can see in the Ethics a manual for the education of wisdom and a diagnostic tool-kit that can help you recognize the demagogue. Sadly, it offers no guidance on how to be rid of one.