Digressions&Impressions

LEMM & HISTORY NOT ATTRACTING BLACKS IN THE PHILOSOPHY PROFESSION

 There is a willful, not necessarily a conscious, preference among many members of the philosophy profession largely to maintain the status quo in terms of: the social group profiles of members; the dynamics of prestige and influence; and the areas and questions deemed properly or deeply "philosophical." None of this is good for black folks.--LK McPherson at NewAPPS, Dec. 12, 2011.

I put a screaming headline on this post. That's because I just finished reading “What is the State of Blacks in Philosophy?” (2014) Critical Philosophy of Race, by Tina Fernandes Botts, Liam Kofi Bright, Myisha Cherry, Guntur Mallarangeng, and Quayshawn Spencer. DailyNous posted a link to the piece, but to my amazement it has not generated any significant public discussion that I am familiar with. So, let me provoke some. According to the paper (this is summarized on DailyNous from which I quote):

• Blacks make up just 1.32 percent of the total number of people professionally affiliated (as grad students or faculty) with U.S. philosophy departments.
• Approximately 0.88 percent of U.S. philosophy Ph.D. students are black.
• Approximately 4.3 percent of U.S. tenured philosophy professors are black.
• Of black philosophy Ph.D. students in the U.S., half are female. That is about double the rate of the U.S. philosophy Ph.D. student population as a whole.
• The distribution of black female Ph.D. students across philosophy Ph.D. programs is much lower than black males. Specifically, 69 percent of black female Ph.D. students are at Penn State.
• The top areas of specialization for U.S. black philosophers are (1) Africana, (2) Race, (3) Social and Political, (4) Ethics, and (5) Continental philosophy.

One bit of terminology: Fernandes Botts et al. use "BIPs" to refer to Blacks in the Profession; I follow this convention. Before I offer some commentary I want to note that the "4.3 percent of U.S. tenured philosophy professors are black" number is based on the number of tenured APA members. I think it would be a  mistake if that number became the baseline for future discussion of BIPs. For, Kate Norlock reminds me that NCES has calculated (based on now ten year old data) that there are about 13,000 full-time philosophy faculty. (These are NOT all tenured, of course. But it excludes nearly all PhD students/ABDs.)* The number of BIPs in the (non-graduate-student) full-time teaching population, is, thus, probably closer to approximately 1%. This is back-of-the-envelope calculation, so should be treated with caution; it excludes part-time faculty! But that rough 1% number matches better, I think, the other data collected by Fernandes Botts et. al.

Correlation isn't causation. But....ahhh...correlation can also not be ignored.  So, to be blunt, every time we treat the LEMM as the CORE parts of philosophy (recall) and every time we mock SPEP-style Continental philosophy, we are, in effect, also (further) marginalizing (insulting, demeaning, etc.) the majority of BIPs. Every time you are a bystander to this, you are very likely complicit to making matters worse when it comes to the status of BIPs.

Or to get to the nub of the matter: the way professional philosophy understands what philosophy is may well be part of the problem. The issue has been explored with subtlety by Kristie Dotson in her now famous paper (see also her post at NewAPPS and McPherson's post linked at the  top of this post). I think we need to acknowledge that analytical philosophy, the way it has evolved, and the way we understand the history of philosophy are part of the problem. This is not to deny that we may have inherited Plato's original sins. (See also this post; so, yes, I was probably too optimistic, if not just deluded, in this post.) How much, I don't know. (This is not to ignore problems within Continental and other areas of philosophy; I am just not the right person to speak about them.) That is to say, rather than only focusing on fighting bias (explicit/tacit)), and improving procedures, we should be open to the possibility that our systematic downplaying of those parts of philosophy that seriously question both the philosophical status quo as well as the political/social/cultural/institutional status quo, and philosophical complicity in it, may, in fact, contribute to the very problem here.

When I was an undergraduate I was in awe of most of my philosophy teachers. I admired their intelligence, their argumentative skill, and their intellectual integrity. At the time, I didn't think I could become as good as them, but I wanted to join a club in which I could participate as a peer in the noble quest for the search after truth and justice. Professionally philosophy has treated me better than I expected. In looking at the numbers collected by Fernandes Botts and her colleagues, I now recognize that I was also striving to join and be allowed into a club very much like myself. And while I want to scream like my headline, this belated -- 'what took you so long?!' -- insight makes me wonder how many of my aspirations are tainted.

On Firing a Philosophy Professor

When I was a PhD student my first interactions with the Dutch philosopher of science, Ton Derksen, were unpleasant; I thought he was dismissive of my research, aloof in that annoying, European professorial way,  and -- undoubtedly this colored my later memory -- slow in reimbursing my (considerable) travel expenses. Yet, from a distance I have come to admire Derksen greatly because of his very finely developed sense of justice and his willingness to speak up on behalf of unpopular causes; he used his professional authority and expertise in evidential arguments to expose systematic miscarriages of justice in the Dutch legal system through years of diligent research and public advocacy. Whenever he appears in public media, I feel an entirely unjustified pride (in ways aptly described by Hume) in knowing that he is 'on my professional team.'

David Barnett, a philosopher who publishes regularly in the best journals,* is about to be fired by CU--Boulder. According to the Daily Camera, his lawyer presents him as a courageous whistle-blower who "became convinced that [CU-Boulder's] ODH [Office of Discrimination and Harassment] had intentionally and systematically manipulated the evidence in order to support a finding of guilt" against a male graduate student (subsequently hired temporarily as an instructor). The lawyer is reported as implying that Barnett was "unofficial mentor" to the male student (now elsewhere).

In the very first piece I posted on Boulder's philosophy department I noted that even the American Philosophical Association Committee's on the Status of Women (CSW), Site Visit Program's "report clearly states that Boulder's Administration is "not providing (sufficient) support or resources for the Philosophy Department to address these issues" (p. 10--the whole report is a litany of administrative failings)."" Barnett's stance fits the pattern of mistrust toward Boulder's Administration that I have noted in earlier posts ([see this]; see especially this eloquent testimony by Annaleigh Curtis, which suggests this mistrust is fully deserved and that Boulder has much room for improvement in its institutional procedures and attitude.)

Even so, it's extremely striking and utterly unnerving that unlike this eloquent response, several of the most outspoken male philosophers at Boulder have been incapable of expressing even the possibility that they may, in fact, be part of an environment that is sometimes less than respectful to some of their female peers. Given that I reported that I had independent evidence of problems at Boulder from what I still take to be an impeccable source, I have been utterly baffled that rather than seeing more searching self-examination, we have been exposed to what look more like political talking points reminiscent of the 'culture wars,' even political campaigns (recall here and here). What I found shameful about, say, Michael Tooley's arguments is the utter lack of warmth toward possible victims. Yet, a few months later, even Barnett's lawyer "acknowledged that rumors about the victim were circulating in the department, but said those rumors were not started by his client." From context it's clear that those rumors involved the victim's sexual behavior. Even if it turns out that the victim was -- contrary to ODH's findings -- not the victim of sexual assault by that male graduate student, such rumors alone qualify, I think, as workplace sexual harassment.

On Being Silent on Gaza

[A]s meaningless as asking which points in Ohio are starting points.--Quine "Two Dogmas" (1961).

I’m what you get when you cross Quine with Ryle and add some cognitive science.--Daniel C. Dennett.

I am writing in order to disrupt any possibility that the horrible conflation of Zionism and Judaism become further entrenched this week. And I am writing to draw attention to the uncontroversial fact that whatever the merits and legitimacy of the State of Israel and its military actions may be, it does not speak or act in the name of the Jewish religion or in the name of the Jewish people...

Today is the eve of the anniversary of the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, the greatest calamity in the history of Judaism and the beginning of our long and bitter exile. The holy rabbis of the century that saw the rise of Israeli nationalism as a response to this exile have taught me that I will sanctify God's name if I declare publicly the Jewish belief that the Zionist mission is a struggle against God's very will.--Prof. Curtis Franks, "An open letter on Israel and Gaza from Notre Dame philosopher Curtis Franks," Leiter reports.

The fabric of sentences that constitute the "lore" of Quine's fathers "is a pale grey lore, black with fact and white with convention." Quine could not locate "quite black threads in it, or any white ones." Sometimes we do not have Quine's or Dennett's luxury in picking our (surrogate) fathers;+ in the lore of my family there wear dark, black hats tracing back matrimonially (and with a few genealogical gaps) to the Ropschitzer Rebbe. Given the possible puns on Ropschitz, I did not share this with my school friends; we can't all be a Prinz or a Gendler.* Of course, I could spin a story about myself as, say, Dennett's student (which is true), but it wouldn't fit with the work I do, so I have tried out others.

In professional philosophy, we tend to be separated by two degrees or less, but I have to admit I was unfamiliar with Curtis Franks. His website helpfully informs me that he "is the direct patrilineal descendent of Isaac Franks (b. 1772 in the Royal Province of South Carolina)." Not quite the Mayflower, or Newport, but certainly yiches, too. Franks is a logician, I learn, so undoubtedly careful with words. I was made curious because in his open letter, he cites a pacifist passage of the Chofetz Chaim al Hatorah approvingly with its author called "saintly."** It's been a while since I have heard "the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem" described as the "greatest calamity in the history of Judaism." (That's compatible, of course, with greater calamities --either the expulsion from Iberia or (in the one awkward locution of Franks's letter) "the most famous genocide attempt in all of hisstory" -- befalling Jews qua Jews.)

Of course, not in my lifetime would I have ever imagined to see the most important professional philosophy blog (and Brian Leiter is not exactly known as a friend of religion) give prominent space to ideas that I associate with Satmar and other ("Hungarian") Hasidic Anti-Zionists to whom I was sometimes introduced by my (non Hungarian/non-Satmar) grandparents during my childhood visits to Forest Hills. (To be clear Franks's Jewish authorities are neither necessarily Satmar or Hungarian.)

Yesterday Ingrid Robeyns asked me why I keep quiet about Gaza (etc.). She knows that recently I defended (in Dutch) the need for philosophy in the public sphere (while acknowledging that such philosophy is often a very different genre from what we professionals would ordinarily take seriously). Even so, because philosophers rarely have a comparative advantage when discussing newsy events, and we are not trained pundits (although some practice punditry),++ I think restraint on newsy events is advisable. Moreover, training in professional ethics, political philosophy, and meta-ethics does not, I fear, involve training in good moral-political judgment (and there is considerable evidence -- for those that wish to see it -- that becoming a professional philosopher corrupts one's moral reflexes as Ruth Chang has eloquently taught us and Eric Schwitzgebel documented.) The great danger of philosophical skill -- one not emphasized enough in our training -- is that when coupled with public utterances it becomes no better than extremely refined, lawyerly technique in the service of any end (but without the legal framework/rules), that is, propaganda, even war-time propaganda.

On Searle on Williams

Yes. Well, Bernard was a very good friend of mine. He had an enormous influence on me of the kind that would be hard to describe because it was mostly just admiration for his sheer intellectual abilities. I think Bernard was as intelligent as any human being I’ve ever met. He had a kind of quickness which was stunning. Now one consequence of that is there’s a sense in which people who knew him well, or at least in my case, we always feel the published work is not up to the level of the Bernard we remember. Yes, it’s wonderful and admirable, the published work, but the particular fire and light that came from discussions with Bernard are lost on the printed page. Now whether that’s inevitable, or whether or not he had actually been more patient about sitting down and doing a hard slog necessary to write a great book, I don’t know. I know that in the last years of his life he suddenly became very productive. I think -- I mean now since we’re talking about somebody I admire -- that in some ways his career was a disappointment to his admirers because he never produced a work of the calibre of his highest ability. And one of the reasons for that is he had all this other stuff going on. He was always on some Royal Commission, or dining in Buckingham Palace...

He could see instantly the flaws in arguments, including his own. This was the fatal element: that Bernard could see the limitations of philosophical theories, but they led to him seeing the limitations of his own theories, and that was partly debilitating.--John Searle interviewed by Tim Crane [HT Dailynous]

Searle's recent interviews have been making a splash (recall). I am a bit sad that in these interviews, nobody knowledgeable interrogates his exchanges with Derrida.

Anyway, Searle's comment on Williams has escaped, I think, scrutiny. Williams's career was not a professional failure; he was at one point Knightsbridge Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge and Deutsch Professor at Berkeley. His books are widely cited (I blogged about his truth book once), and some of his thought experiments have become evergreens in moral philosophy. I read Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy before I went to graduate school and it assured me that analytical philosophy need not be forfeited to the technicians. (Recently, I wrote a paper on moral luck in which I offer a correction to his account from the vantage point of Adam Smith's treatment.)

Searle's comments remind us of two non-trivial facts: (i) it's very hard to capture in print "the particular fire and light that came from discussions;" (ii) even the most talented and best situated amongst us (e.g. Williams) are unlikely to write "a great book." The two facts are connected, although not by logical entailment. The known professional ways of communicating philosophy -- the journal article, the book -- are both designed to prevent 'fire and light.' Some such affect, "quickness," and "insight" (a key word in the interview with Searle) are not the product of journal articles and books, specially written in the registers of analytical philosophy, in particular; it embraces the ideals of responsible speech in its self-image opposed to purported Heideggerrian nonsense.

Let's talk about our professional norms

There’s a part of me that almost wants to say that if I would get penalized for exposing a serial sexual predator, then to hell with this profession. If I can’t succeed in this discipline because I did the right thing, then this is not the place I thought it was, and I wouldn’t want to be here anyway....Let’s think and talk about our norms...Let’s ask whether famous moral philosophers have a moral responsibility to live a minimally decent life. Let’s ask who would be the authority on what would count as a minimally decent life.--Anonymous.

The quoted lines are from a post [HT Feministphilosophers]*  that seems to have many aims, including (but not limited to): (a) a fishing expedition to obtain information that can aid a "legal case;" (b) to 'out' (if you can read between the lines) a well-known professional philosopher as not just as a serial (deceptive) cheat and sexual predator, but also to call attention to "the instances of sexual harassment he’s perpetrated;" (c) to warn other potential victims against this famous philosopher; (d) to expose "a rampant form of corruption in our discipline" in terms of sexual quid pro quos; (e) to destroy the profession's "culture of silence;" (f) to generate discussion on our professional norms; and more. Her post is a follow up to this one that I commented on here.

There is no doubt that professional philosophers are collectively, culpably negligent for the professional norms that have developed and that have created a permissive environment for sexual harassment and other egregious circumstances of "blurred lines." (The more powerful professional philosophers more so than the less powerful ones, etc.) We may not be solely responsible for these norms (society, religion, university administrators, etc.), but we have not done enough to change them. When I read the catalog of misdeeds experienced by anonymous and, worse, that she claims to have reliable testimony about, I feel shame and am ashamed for my community.

"To hell with this profession..."

 

The Irretrievable Shame of Professional Philosophy

AND LET'S REMEMBER THIS PROBLEM ISN'T JUST AT COLORADO:  There are other "Colorado's" out there, and we have all heard the stories.  Indeed, parts of the report, sad to say, reminded me of the situation in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin, at least back in 2008, which is when I left.--Brian Leiter

"We're reaping the unhappy harvest of an effort to do the right thing," said CU philosophy professor Michael Zimmerman. "We were acting in good faith to identify the concerns (within the department) and address the concerns, which is why we invited those people to come down in the first place.

It wasn't our intention to have a public spectacle. Had we foreseen this, we never would've invited those people to come."--Daily Camera

A year ago, I was approached over drinks by a member of Boulder's philosophy department. "I hear you are trying to recruit to Ghent?" That's right, I said, you know somebody?" "Yes, me." -- Boulder was a department one moved to, not a place to recruit from. -- "But why?" I said, trying to sound nonchalant.  "I want out. We have a culture of sexual harrassment." I think I said a bit too loudly: "crap!" 

I couldn't take it in. Boulder, that's where my best friend -- the best man at my wedding -- lives. Boulder, that's scenes from Mork & Mindy; hiking, skiing, fresh foods, and a department full of fantastic philosophers. The good life. Boulder, a place where I would love to be a regular visitor. I missed some of what my interlocuter, who was describing the active steps some (but not all) colleagues were taking to right the place,  said.  It dawned upon me that I was hearing not just about exhausting bureaucratic maneuvering; I was hearing of women who were denied the possibility to flourish in philosophy due to a very hostile work-place environment; of indifferent men; and of well meaning men that were caught between conflicting loyalties--between the desire to focus on their philosophical development and the demands of justice. 

I did nothing. I did even not reach out to my other acquaintances (male or female) at Boulder. I have effortlessly avoided thinking about the victims at Boulder.

Crap, indeed.