Digressions&Impressions

Íbn Rushd and the Meaning of Scripture

[A] So we affirm definitely that whenever the conclusion of a demonstration is in conflict with the apparent meaning of Scripture, that apparent meaning admits of allegorical interpretation according to the rules for such interpretation in Arabic. [B] This proposition is questioned by no Muslim and doubted by no believer. But (a) its certainty is immensely increased for those who have had close dealings with this idea and put it to the test, and (b) made it their aim to reconcile the assertions of intellect and tradition. [C] Indeed we may say that whenever a statement in Scripture conflicts in its apparent meaning with a conclusion of demonstration, [C*] if Scripture is considered carefully, and the rest of its contents searched page by page, there will invariably be found among the expressions of Scripture something which in its apparent meaning bears witness to that allegorical interpretation or comes close to bearing witness.--Ibn Rushd, Decisive Treatise, Chapter 2, Translated by George Hourani. [Letters added--ES]

Earlier in the Decisive Treatise, Ibn Rushd had established that Scripture cannot conflict with demonstrative knowledge/science. The first sentence of the quoted passage [A] is an implication of Ibn Rushd's tendency to rationalize scripture. So, that allegorical interpretations of Scripture are invited whenever these are required to have Scripture come out true by the lights of demonstration/reason and when the apparent meaning of the text would seem to violate it. (Spinoza scholars are familiar with this position because it is the one Spinoza attributes to Maimonides and criticizes; I ignore here the tricky question to what degree, if any, Ibn Rush influenced Maimonides or the other way around.)

As an aside, it is notable that [A] is explicitly treated by Ibn Rushd as a kind of political axiom, and so perhaps constitutive, of the Muslim community: [B] "This proposition is questioned by no Muslim and doubted by no believer." And he goes on to point out that while the axiom [B] is accepted unquestionably, those few, the cognitive elite,+ that put it to work (a) both come to hold it more firmly [suggesting that unquestioned acceptance is perhaps more fragile than it seems] and (b) end up being committed to a reconciliation project between science and revelation/traditional religion. the ways in which inherited religion and reason can be reconciled. (What the exact relationship between (a) and (b) is, is left unclear--perhaps the Arabic makes clear if this conceptual, logical, or contingent.)

This reconciliation project by the cognitive elite presupposes that Scripture is (and this anticipates Spinoza) primarily aimed at the masses who require opinions to be "guided." That is, Scripture is fundamentally a work of social, ethical, and political significance. (In the first sentence of this paragraph, I say 'primarily' because Ibn Rushd also claims that the apparent tension between reason and Scripture are deliberately there "in order to draw the attention of those who are well grounded in science to the interpretation which reconciles them,"--that is to say, Ibn Rushd claims that Scripture has an esoteric message for those that can understand.) The reconciliation project is explicitly not in the service of public Enlightenment because Ibn Rushd argues later in the Decisive Treatise that (recall) allegorical interpretations by the cognitive  elite should not be shared with ordinary folk. This may entail that the reconciliation project is merely for private edification of the cognitive elite.* 

The final sentence [C] is extraordinary. And it can be taken in (at least) two ways: first, the pious way affirms the miracle of Scripture, which is a holistic work in which any passage can, when taken literally be used,to illuminate some  obscure or evidently false passages, which require allegorical interpretation by the cognitive elite. Second, the scandalous way, which suggests that Scripture can be made to say literally just about anything that, in the hands of the skilled cognitive elite, can support the truths they already know!** 

 

On Written Law and the Rise of the Caliphate according to Al-Farabi

82. If there happens to be an association of these kings at a single moment in a single city, a single nation, or many nations, then their whole association is like a single king due to the agreement in their endeavors, purposes, opinions, and ways of life. If they succeed one another in time, their souls will be as a single soul. The second will proceed according to the way of life of the first, and the one now present according to the way of life of the one who has passed away. Just as it is permissible for one of them to change a Law he legislated at one moment if he is of the opinion that it is more fitting to change it at another moment, so may the one now present who succeeds the one who has passed away change what the one who has passed away has already legislated. For the one who has passed away would change [it] himself, were he to observe the [new] condition. When there does not happen to be a human being of this condition, the Laws that the former [kings] prescribed or ordained are to be adopted, then written down and preserved, and the city is to be governed by means of them. So the ruler who governs the city by means of written Laws adopted from past leaders is the king of traditional law.--Al-Farabi, Political Regime, Translated by Charles Butterfield

In context it is clear that "these kings' are akin to Platonic philosopher-kings ("king in truth according to the ancients," (80)). The most visible difference is that for Al-Farabi, but not Plato, a philosopher-king can rule over an empire ("many nations") whereas Plato limits their rule to an explicitly delimited city-state/polity [Republic, 423b]. Another important difference -- not evident from this quote, but crucial -- is that in the Republic, Socrates farms out to the oracle of Apollo the fundamental laws pertaining to the divine (427),* so that the philosopher-kings of the Republic , which then inherit the oracle's injunctions, are more akin to an executive of earthy matters than a constitutional-onto-theological-legislator. Al-Farabi stresses this difference when he  points out that rather than calling one of them a philosopher king, it's better "of whom it ought to be said that he receives revelation." (80) 

A reader familiar with early Islamic history, is likely to read in this passage, the era of Muhammad and (at least) the four righteous caliphs, which came to an end . Unlike, say, Ibn Rushd later (recall here), he treats the period of the four righteous caliphs not as an imitation of the virtue of Muhammed, but as a continuation of the best kind of polity founded by Muhammad.+ For the sake of argument, I call this a continuity thesis. The continuity comes to an end, when under the Umayyad dynasty caliphs onward, judges and jurists are appointed who rely on and interpret written law.

This continuity thesis has an interesting implication: that the according to the four righteous caliphs contextually necessitated changes away from Muhammad's practice and example are not really changes, as it were, of the inner meaning of the law. It's only when Caliphs started to rely on written law that the polity becomes, at best, an imitation of virtue. This second-best structure is due to the lack of talent at the top. 

Of course, there is an alternative way to read the passage, which suggests that the collection and canonization of the Quran is indicative of this decline. The tradition assigns the completion of this process to the period of the third (righteous) Caliph, Uthman, although it was started under the first. It follows from this, that according to Al-Farabi, already the Rishdun caliphate became an imitation of the best.

Be that as it may, while it is tempting to see in Al-Farabi's position an echo of Socrates' bias against writing. It is important to recognize that for Al-Farabi this is merely a symptom; what he calls rule by "traditional law" is a consequence of a lack of available ruling talent or at least a mechanism by which it can come to rule.

We moderns are inclined to reflect on the selection mechanism or process of the right ruler. But that's not how Al-Farabi sees it. We can put the significance of his point as follows: if you can't govern by personal authority you must rely on written law; this reflects a lack of prudential wisdom. 

Al-Farabi's General Political Science and History.

Political science that is a part of philosophy is limited—in what it investigates of the voluntary actions, ways of life, and dispositions, and in the rest of what it investigates—to universals and to giving their patterns. It also brings about cognizance of the patterns for determining particulars: how, by what, and by what extent they ought to be determined. It leaves them undetermined in actuality, because determining in actuality belongs to a faculty other than philosophy and and perhaps because the circumstances and occurrences with respect to which determination takes place is infinite and without limitation. Al-Farabi "The Book of Religion, 15. in The Political Writings. Trans. Charles Butterworth, p. 106.

In Al-Farabi (reflecting the classical heritage) a philosophy of a special science is, in the first instance, a theoretical subject matter grounded in some principled yields demonstrations or proofs about universals. These are universals that apply to a particular domain. From the perspective of contemporary social science, Al-Farabi's political science that is a part of philosophy, is highly abstract and general. In order  to avoid confusion let's call this (politics that is a part of philosophy) general political science. But as Al-Farabi notes in the quoted passage, it's also part of such a general political science to create the framework that allow some of the preconditions for subsuming important features of political reality under these universals.

Now for Al-Farabi 'religion' is always a means to some given political end ("religion is opinions and actions, determined and restricted with stipulations and prescribed for a community by their first ruler, who seeks to obtain through their practicing it a specific purpose with respect to them or by means of them.") And, given this (recall) expansive functional definition and understanding of religion (which has clear debts to Plato), general political science studies the contents -- i.e., social mores (including institutions), habits of thoughts, and voluntary actions -- that are the main ingredients of religion. So, general political science is the general knowledge of the contours of making 'religion' politically functional. So, general political science is the generic knowledge of how political leaders/founders can achieve their aims. 

Of course, general political science deals in merely possible religions and the ways of discerning types of actions, dispositions, and mores. Really existing political reality is too specific to fall under general political science. It's too specific in ways that are in a sense too varied. Al-Farabi's way of expressing this -- "infinite and without limitation" -- is striking because it reminds one of properties of God. (Modern theorists would say political reality is too complex or too uncertain to be put in a model.) And so applying the generic knowledge of religion requires contextual knowledge, prudence, grounded in experience of individual particulars (17).  

Now, I want to close with a speculative thought (that may involve a terminological misunderstanding). I noted a few years ago, that one of Al-Farabi's distant philosophical successors, Ibn Rushd, inscribed (recall) in his commentary on Plato's Republic, a pattern of the rise and, especially fall of political regimes that was applicable to different social realities (see also this post on the Decisive Treatise). Ibn Rushd is no political historian, but he does thereby provide a framework for the kind of philosophical history that makes Ibn Khaldun worth reading to this day. In particular, Ibn Khaldun is (recall) the historian who focuses on the means by which religion is a means toward political ends, and by analyzing the mechanisms of one of its means, group-feeling.* What I had no appreciated before, but believe is true, is that this is the completion (not the anthisesis) of Al-Farabi's program for a general political science.+ 

Al-Ghazali's Genealogy of Philosophy and Natural Religion

29. Know that the philosophers, notwithstanding the multiplicity of their groups and the diversity of their doctrines, can be divided into three main divisions: Materialists, Naturalists, and Theists.
30. The first category, the Materialists, were a group of the most ancient philosophers who denied the existence of the omniscient and omnipotent Creator-Ruler. They alleged that the world has existed from eternity as it is, of itself and not by reason of a Maker. Animals have unceasingly come from seed, and seed from animals: thus it was, and thus it ever will be. These are the godless in the full sense of the term.
31. The second category, the Naturalists, were men who devoted much study to the world of nature and the marvels found in animals and plants; they also were much taken up with the dissection of animal organs. In these they saw such marvels of God Most High’s making and such wonders of His wisdom that they were compelled, with that in mind, to acknowledge the existence of a wise Creator cognizant of the aims and purposes of all things. Indeed, no one can study the science of anatomy and the marvelous uses of the organs without acquiring this compelling knowledge of the perfect governance of Him Who shaped the structure of animals, and especially that of man. 

32. However, it appeared to these philosophers, because they had studied nature so much, that the equilibrium of the mixture of humors had a great effect on the resulting constitution of the animal’s powers. Hence they thought that man’s rational power was also dependent on the mixture of his humors and that its corruption would follow the corruption of the mixture of his humors, and so that power would cease to exist. Once it ceased to exist, they alleged that bringing back the nonexistent would be unintelligible. So they adopted the view that the soul dies, never to return. Consequently they denied the afterlife and rejected the Garden and the Fire, the assembly and the Recall, and the Resurrection and the Reckoning. So in their view there would be no future reward for obedience, and no punishment for disobedience. Therefore they lost all restraint and abandoned themselves to their passions like beasts. These were also godless men, because basic faith is belief in God and the Last Day — and these men denied the Last Day, even though they believed in God and His Attributes.
33. The third category, the Theists, were the later philosophers, such as Socrates, the master of Plato, and Plato, the master of Aristotle. It was Aristotle who systematized logic for the philosophers and refined the philosophical sciences, accurately formulating previously imprecise statements and bringing to maturity the crudities of their sciences. Taken altogether, these refuted the first two categories of the Materialists and the Naturalists. Indeed, by the arguments they advanced to lay bare the enormities of the latter, they relieved others of that task: “And God spared the believers from fighting (the unbelievers)” (33.25) by reason of the unbelievers’ own infighting.
34. Then Aristotle refuted Plato and Socrates and the Theists who had preceded him in such thorough fashion that he disassociated himself from them all. Yet he, too, retained remnants of their vicious unbelief and innovation which he was unsuccessful in avoiding. So they all must be taxed with unbelief, as must their partisans among the Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sina and al-Farabi and their likes. None, however, of the Muslim philosophers engaged so much in transmitting Aristotle’s lore as did the two men just mentioned. What others transmitted is not free from disorder and confusion and in studying it one’s mind becomes so muddled that he fails to understand it — and how can the incomprehensible be rejected or accepted?--Al-Ghazali Deliverance from Error.

In Deliverance from Error (recall and here), Al-Ghazali conceives the origin of philosophy as a atheist revolt against a natural form of theism, one that posits an omniscient and omnipotent Creator-Ruler of the sort that naturally accompanies sovereign kingship [in which the political ruler understands himself as a God, the mirror image  of the cosmic Creator-Ruler). We are not told much else about the natural form of theism, but (given the stringent denials of the original philosophers), we can infer it posited a providential creation story. (I return to this below.) By contrast (on the hostile interpretation of Al-Ghazali) the first philosophers -- one can recognize a stylized picture of the atomists in it -- posit a cosmic order of eternal return without meaning. 

Al-Ghazali is careful not to name any of these original philosophers nor to characterize the natural theism they reject. But they both precede Socrates. There is, in fact, a peculiarity here in that Al-Ghazali ignores the pure forms of Greek polytheism. The natural form of theism is closer to Judaism and (perhaps more likely on his mind) Zoroastrianism; and original philosophy a revolt against it.  

Al-Ghazali's 'naturalists' are a kind of empirical, natural philosophers. (It's a bit surprising he does not mention medicine in this context, but there are hints of Galen throughout the piece.) These find evidence of functionality and design everywhere, there are led, inductively to a theistic designer. But they view a soul as something emergent from or grounded in physical processes and so mortal. Because they deny an afterlife (and resurrection), they become practical atheists. 

It's no surprise that Al-Ghazali sees a tight connection between beliefs about the nature of the soul and, perhaps, more important the existence of judgment day and  observed behavior. (Let's stipulate he is right about observed behavior.) But it is a bit surprising that the charge of immoral behavior is only lodged against the so-called naturalists and not the earlier materialists (a point repeated in paragraph 33!)

I called Al-Ghazali's narrative a 'genealogy.' But it would have been better, perhaps, to call it a 'natural history.' The achievement of the (Socratic) Theists is not just to refute the materialists and naturalists theoretically and to show why the behavior of the latter was truly immoral, but to turn an immature practice into a mature fields ("accurately formulating previously imprecise statements and bringing to maturity the crudities of their sciences.") To put Al-Ghazali's narrative in Kuhnian terms, Socrates is the start of a revolution in philosophy that culminates in Aristotle's achievements.

In the analysis of the after-effects of Aristotle's achievements, Al-Ghazali notices that even theistic philosophy inherit the "remnants of...vicious unbelief and innovation" of the naturalists and materialists relative to the original religion. This entails that Al-Ghazali treats the original religion as a species of (what we may call along with the tradition) true religion. Not for the first time (recall), I notice that Al-Ghazali suggests that that while Muhammad's revelation is instrumentally useful, it is not itself necessary for the existence of true religion. 

 

On Bullying, Conformism, Self-Censorship, and Clinical Depression: The Religiosity of Fahrenheit 451, revisited

Now let's take up the minorities in our civilization, shall we? Bigger population, the more minorities. Don't step on the toes of the dog lovers, the cat lovers, doctors, lawyers, merchants, chiefs, Mormons, Baptists, Unitarians, second-generation Chinese, Swedes, Italians, Germans, Texans, Brooklynites, Irishmen, people from Oregon or Mexico. The people in this book, this play, this TV serial are not meant to represent any actual painters, cartographers, and mechanics anywhere. The bigger your market, Montag, the less you handle controversy, remember that! All the minor minor minorities with their navels to be kept clean. Authors, full of evil thoughts, lock up your typewriters. They did. Magazines became a nice blend of vanilla tapioca. Books, so the damned snobbish critics said, were dishwater. No wonder books stopped selling, the critics said. But the public, knowing what it wanted, spinning happily, let the comic-books survive. And the three-dimensional sex magazines, of course. There you have it, Montag. It didn't come from the Government down. There was no dictum, no declaration, no censorship, to start with, no!  Technology, mass exploitation, and minority pressure carried the trick, thank God. Today, thanks to them, you can stay happy all the time, you are allowed to read comics, the good old confessions, or trade journals.....
With school turning out more runners, jumpers, racers, tinkerers, grabbers, snatchers, fliers, and swimmers instead of examiners, critics, knowers, and imaginative creators, the word `intellectual,' of course, became the swear word it deserved to be. You always dread the unfamiliar. Surely you remember the boy in your own school class who was exceptionally 'bright,' did most of the reciting and answering while the others sat like so many leaden idols, hating him. And wasn't it this bright boy you selected for beatings and tortures after hours? Of course it was. We must all be alike. Not everyone born free and equal, as the Constitution says, but everyone made equal. Each man the image of every other; then all are happy, for there are no mountains to make them cower, to judge themselves against. So! A book is a loaded gun in the house next door. Burn it. Take the shot from the weapon. Breach man's mind. Who knows who might be the target of the well-read man?--From Ray Bradbury (1953) Fahrenheit 451, pp. 75-6

Judging by the results of a Google search, which shows me links to many essay writing companies, the passage quoted is extremely popular among high school and college students. So, for all I know what follows has been worked out countless times before (and, if not, will -- because it's free -- perhaps become a staple of such essays). The narrator here is Beatty, the fire captain and boss of the main protagonist, Guy Montag. Montag -- his name (man Monday) an allusion to Crusoe's man Friday* -- is part of a book burning brigade (firemen). The speech occurs just as Montag's growing doubts about his work and society are crystallizing.

As it turns out, Beatty's own stance toward his own work and society is also ambivalent, but this is shown more indirectly. Be that as it may, he understands legal censorship as originating in self-censorship which arises out of three elements: a do-no-harm principle, mass democracy, and a heterogeneous population. The embrace of a do no harm principle is not a deeply felt normative stance, but rather dictated by prudence--minorities can organize and create unwanted controversy and hurt sales. In a heterogeneous population it will be difficult to avoid giving offense except by embracing a certain blandness and conformity. The idea being that in a homogeneous society free speech is more natural.

One may read in Beatty's speech a prescient prediction about the origin of what is now known as political correctness (something Bradbury encouraged late in life). But his speech is more subtle. His list of possible would-be-aggrieved minorities omits mention of African Americans and Jews. When the book was published, the great civil rights victories were still in the future, and the persecution of Jews (and the burning of their books) too fresh in living memory.  So, the underlying (neo-Humean) idea is that only when one's resentment can be felt by the majority, will the majority embrace bland conformism toward that minority. 

The previous paragraph may be thought speculative. But Beatty himself goes on to call attention to the two key elements, first not everybody is born equal and, second, he exposes the conformist violence at the core of his consumerist, mass-media society when he describes the school bullying of the boy** that stands out. In an age of McCarthyism, Bradbury need not have done it, but the political significance of bullying is made explicit (with a nod to the Constitution)-- bullying makes us equal. That is, rather than being a bug of a democratic polity, conformist violence is a feature of it.+ While African Americans are effaced, the burning of witches at Salem haunts the whole narrative. It is no surprise, then, that such a society, which disguises its own structural violence by, paradoxically presenting it as spectacle, expresses it abroad with a violent foreign policy. 

To what degree Beatty's origin story fits the facts is an open question. (This is a society in which the printer Benjamin Franklin has become the patron saints of book burners. There is a Swiftian fondness for reversals.) Beatty's diagnosis of the conformism and self-censorship of modern mass culture echoes the meritocratic critique of democracy first developed by Mill (recall here and here). Beatty is an interesting character because he clearly is the nerd in disguise (he is well read despite the prohibition) who  goes on to serve a soul-less and cruel regime.++ The regime is grounded in elections, but no less cruel for it. Its bad laws rooted in public opinion.

This last point deserves more emphasis. The underlying horror of the society depicted is that human life in it is trivialized. Something that Guy Montag becomes increasingly sensitive to. This lack of soul is what creates an undercurrent of clinical despair and dangerous thrill-seeking; where fun is everything. It's a bit surprising that Bradbury is not thought of as the prophet of the clinical depression epidemic of a society addicted to communication by (ahh) screens; this is a society in which all feeling is at the surface and in which our desires for goods are made to outstrip our means, but no connection intimate. For such intimacy is only possible -- the point is made explicit right at the start of the novel [Clarisse does not want anything from him]-- if it is not instrumentalized. 

For, while Bradbury himself facilitated the idea that this was a book about the perils of censorship, the truer theme of the book is the pernicious effects of spiritual deprivation on individual and society. At the start of the book, when talking to Clarisse, Montag understands himself (cf. Plato's Cave), by chance, as somebody watching a puppet show. Clarisse is likened to an angel more than once. She is the prophetic light that points the way out of the cave.*** It's no surprise then in the aftermath of rational-man-made cataclysm -- mutually assured destruction is the fruit of the tree of knowledge --, the novel closes with a quote from Revelation (22:2), which not only prophecies such a destruction, but also the promise of a light that follows. Those that have read the novel will understand my conclusion: there is only redemption if you can hold on to a text.

 

On the Stillness of the Wise

But that which is grounded to [proper] foundations does not wander around. [Non vagatur quod fixum atque fundatum est:] This is the blessed lot of the completely wise man, and also, to a certain extent, of him who is progressing and has made some headway. Now what is the difference between these two classes of men? The one is in motion, to be sure, but does not change its position; it merely tosses up and down where it is; the other is not in motion at all.--Seneca, Letter 35

In this very short letter, Seneca construes of teaching in terms of a proto-rational choice theory, as a kind of self-interested activity in which proper companions are cultivated ("When I urge you so strongly to your studies, it is my own interest which I am consulting.") In such a society of friends the benefit (or profit)  is always mutual (itaque amicitia semper prodest). For Seneca this means that two minds become alike. What sustains the instructor's ongoing effort is the pleasure from imagining such an outcome (Ego quidem percipio iam fructum, cum mihi fingo uno nos animo futuros).

Seneca puts his cards on the table (recall this post for more reflection on the purposes behind this), like a magician who shows the mechanics of his trick before fooling you, again. For, Seneca, teaching involves the construction of the like minded out of course clay. This also acts as a kind of consolation against mortality--on this image a true student is the continuation of oneself (but, as we will be a bit clearer below), a self that is also radically non-individual. 

This is an enduring idea, and, before one sees only narcissism in the image, it is worth noting that is connected to the idea of knowledge as consensus and that, say, experts speak in a single voice. Of course, for Seneca, the point is not that questions have one, and only one, true answer. The aim is rather, to shape, wills that are constant. This has (at least) two elements: first, he understands this construction as a progress toward what I call (recall here and here) integrity, that is "internal consistency" (ut constes tibi. ) Second, it requires steadfastness. 

Now, when I first read the letter I assumed that he meant by this a lack of fickleness in one's goals--to have firm principles (the foundations) and well shaped ends. For Seneca clearly rejects fickleness in one's ends. But this misses the point. 

Seneca is more radical here. I say this not to vindicate his position, but to give it its proper due. To be wise is the removal of oneself from the economy of unsteady desires and from responding to each and every incentive or stimulus. This ordinary economy of desire is one in which one is in continuous motion and running down of value. This idea is captured in an evocative passage in the Quran (103:2), Verily, man is in a state of loss. To have integrity and steadfastness means (see also 26:225) that one need not roam around. This can sound rather dull, but Seneca insists that the friendship of the wise involves a living pleasure (vivae voluptatis). 

Ón Israel's Living Constitution: the new basic law (I)

Despite what the Proclamation of Independence of the State of Israel states regarding the preparation of a constitution by the Constituent Assembly, Israel has no written constitution in the formal sense,even though it has a constitution in the material sense - in other words, laws and basic rules that lay down the foundations of the system of government and the rights of the individual. Some of these are formulated in basic laws, some are scattered in other laws, and part - at least until the passing of basic laws dealing with human and civil rights - were interpreted and formulated in a series of decision by the Supreme Court.

There were those who were inclined to view the Proclamation of Independence as a constitution, since it dealt with the foundations of the establishment of the state, its nature, part of its institutions, the principles of its operation and the rights of its citizens. However, in a series of decisions the Supreme Court ruled that the Proclamation of Independence does not have the validity of a constitutional law, and that it is not a supreme law, in light of which laws and regulations that contradict it are nullified. Nevertheless, article 1 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation relates to the principles mentioned in the Proclamation of Independence as a normative source. According to this article "the basic human rights in Israel are based on recognition of the value of man, the sanctity of his life and his being free, and they will be respected in the spirit of the principles (mentioned) in the proclamation of the establishment of the State of Israel."....

At the end of the debate, on June 13, 1950, the Knesset decided to adopt a resolution known as "the Harari proposal", named after MK Yizhar Harari of the Progressive Party, who proposed it. According to this proposal "the First Knesset assigns to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee the preparation of a proposed constitution for the state. The constitution will be made up of chapters, each of which will constitute a separate basic law. The chapters will be brought to the Knesset, as the Committee completes its work, and all the chapters together will constitute the constitution of the state." Following the passing of this resolution, the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee set up a sub-committee on the Constitution....(2007) The State of Israel. 

Israel's new Basic Law (see here for an English translation) has received a lot of critical attention in recent days. Much of the criticism I have seen ignores that the basic law is part of a larger, evolving constitutional framework that will constrain the interpretation, implementation, and meaning of it. Of course, this also goes in the other direction: the new basic law will also create new emphases in legal and constitutional interpretation.

The one truly foreseeable outcome of this state of affairs is to make Israel's Supreme Court increasingly important in order to resolve the new tensions, if not outright contradictions, introduced by this new basic law.  This is so, even if one assumes that the most recent basic law always supersedes earlier ones. (For example, the new basic law contains material on Jerusalem, which is de facto an amendment to-- and, in fact, mostly a terse restatement -- of earlier basic laws, which dealt with Jerusalem.) For, some of the foreseeable tensions are a consequence of implications of different basic laws.

Because the new basic law is so favorable toward Jewish interests and so-open ended about these -- ["7. The state views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value and will act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation"], there will be inevitable appeals that will be asked to balance the demands of impartiality, historical precedent, and say equal dignity (enshrined in earlier basic laws) with legislation that may follow the more partial spirit of this new law. In particular, this part of the basic law may well be used to settle, say, land-claims and other conflicts with Bedouin tribes in the Negev and the Druze in the North. (I return to this below.)

This -- more juridical review --  is something of an ironic outcome; because the majority behind this basic law has been very critical of the tendency of Israel's Supreme Court to take an expansive view of constitutional review (akin to the US juridical review) since the 'constitutional revolution' under Aaron Barak's tenure as Chief Justice.* This will accelerate, undoubtedly, the political significance of the appointment process to Israeli courts even though elected politicians do not have a decisive say in that process. In fact, because of the large number of supreme justices (15) and mandatory retirement, one can say that the Supreme Court represents, in a lagging fashion, the evolving consensus of the legal profession's and the political elite in Israel (even though it may deviate from the political majority in parliament).  

There is a more fundamental irony here. One notable feature of Israel's constitutional framework is how democratic it is. Unlike the more liberal constitutions common in North American and Europe (but not unlike the Indian constitutional settlement**), the Israeli constitution is intentionally (and Ben Gurion prevailed in this) not a device to constrain future majorities. (The deviations from liberalism are, on my understanding [recall here, here, and here], a feature and not a bug of Zionism.) Most of Israel's basic laws are the product of a mere parliamentary majority and can be reformed by one.+ Because Israel's parliament is elected by proportional representation in a single, national district with a fairly modest qualifying threshold (3.25%), a determined and strategic minority can make its voice felt. The downside of this democratic sensibility is that minority rights and minority interests/symbols may be slighted or worse. The upside is that Israel's constitutional future remains open to political change by determined political organization. That is to say, rather than reflecting a deeply entrenched historical status quo, Israel's constitutional structure is permanently open to political polarization and negotiation. It follows from my present stance that my criticisms here are primarily political. 

This basic law reinforces a wider set of political weaknesses in Israel's strategic position (recall here). Contemporary Zionism (as represented by the State of Israel) has five structural weakness: i) the failure to establish permanent borders for the state of Israel; (ii) to settle what kind of political entity Israel should be so that it can end its near-permanent war-footing and occupation of hostile populations; (iii) (the perception of) Israel's dependence on America's political and military support, which ties Israel to America's strategic interests and electoral politics, while (iv) allowing a split between the interests of Zionism and American Jewry to develop; (v) Israel fails to provide Palestinians with positive incentives and symbolic declarations to come to peace with Israel. On most these, the new basic law reinforces the strategic cul-de-sac that Israel finds itself in. (I will argue this more at length in future posts.)

Today I offer an example related to the claim that "development of Jewish settlement" is a "national value" in the basic law. (As the title of this post suggest, I return to offer a more extended analysis of the implications of the basic law before long.) By itself this hearkens back to the origins of the State. But because minority rights are not even acknowledged in this new basic law -- and the symbolic status of Arab explicitly demoted -- it has dangerous implications even if one ignores (as one should not) Israel-Palestinian relations. Above, I mentioned the Bedouin and Druze for a reason.++ Because of Israeli population growth, their numbers are such that even when unified they may fail to be represented in the Knesset in the future (unless the qualifying threshold is lowered). Today the Druze play an outsized role in Israel military and political affairs (and are especially known for their service in border police, which also recruits among the Bedouin), but demographic realities suggest their influence will wane.

The strategic problem with this basic law (++) is that it will unintentionally be an instrument of creating an internal enemy out of what has been a strategic friend to Zionism (the Druze) or an instrument of the increasing marginalization of the Bedouin. For, it's not hard to imagine, say, politically influential developers creating land conflicts that will be settled at the expense of Druze or, perhaps more likely, Bedouin interests in the name of the Jewish Settlement. In both cases the dangers are non-trivial: the Druze community has had to watch while Israel did little to protect its brethren in the carnage of Syria's civil war; now a new basic law does little to acknowledge their existence. Disillusionment with Israel is a live possibility. The Bedouin are among the poorest Israeli citizens.  Given the rise of Islamic radicalism among the Bedouin in the adjoining Sinai, this risks a colossal own goal by the State of Israel.***

 

On Ibn Khaldun and Ronald Reagan (and a now obscure Belgian scholar).

President Reagan, in his news conference yesterday, cited a 14thcentury Islamic scholar as an early exponent of the ''supply-side'' economic theory on which his Administration bases many of its policies. An authority on the scholar later said that the reference seemed accurate.

Supply-side theory, among other things, holds that a cut in tax rates will stimulate the economy and thus generate even greater tax revenues.

Responding to a question about the effects of tax and spending cuts that began taking effect yesterday, Mr. Reagan said the supply-side principle dated at least as far back as Ibn Khaldun, who is generally regarded as the greatest Arab historian to emerge from the highly developed Arabic culture of the Middle Ages.

Paraphrasing the historian, Mr. Reagan said Ibn Khaldun postulated that ''in the beginning of the dynasty, great tax revenues were gained from small assessments,'' and that ''at the end of the dynasty, small tax revenues were gained from large assessments.''

''And,'' said the President, ''we're trying to get down to the small assessments and the great revenues.'' Interpretation Held Accurate

Franz Rosenthal, the Sterling Professor of Near Eastern Languages at Yale University, who has translated many of Ibn Khaldun's writings and is regarded as one of the world's foremost Ibn Khaldun scholars, said later that the President's interpretation of the historian's ideas on taxes appeared to be accurate.

Ibn Khaldun, who was born in Tunis in 1332 and died in Cairo in 1406, was an official of the Tunisian and Moroccan courts, a judge and teacher in Cairo and the author of many volumes on history. His most noted contribution, Professor Rosenthal said, was to treat history as a science that incorporated politics, economics, sociology and geography. 

Ibn Khaldun is perhaps best known as the author of ''Kitab al-Ibar,'' a four-volume universal history, and ''Muqaddimah,'' an introduction in which he argues that rise and fall of human societies may be traced to specific, discoverable causes.--The New York Times, October 2, 1981, p. 26.

It was moderately newsworthy once that President Ronald Reagan invoked Ibn Khaldun as an athority in a news conference.[*HT Robert Irwin] It would be more startling now that many of our politicians and too many our very own intellectuals try to convince audiences, learned and unlearned, that being Islamic de facto means being intellectually backward. (For a minority of them the association with Reagan or supply-side economics would prove the point.) 

In the press conference (see here for the transcript; the video must be of slightly different occassion, and what follows is my comment on the video), Reagan reminds his audience that he was an economics student in college. (He was an econ and sociology major at Eureka college.) Irwin implies that the reference to Ibn Khaldun originates with Reagan's "speech writers." That's  not impossible, of course. But it is also not impossible that an educated economics or sociology professor (these could be the same persion in that period) could have said it in a depression era economics (or economic soociology) course. After all, most such economics/sociology faculty were trained in the history of economics--then still a central part of graduate education in economics (and sociology). While it would be silly to suggest that Ibn Khaldun was famous, he was not wholly unknown to educated English language readers (as this google search reveals).

And, in fact, the very claim that Reagan fondly remembers can, in fact, be found (I was surprised to learn) in a translation of Ernest Nys's (1899) Researches in the History of Economics, p. 15. (Here's a fuller text of the french original.) Nys is an important early contributor to the development  of international law (and, alas, apologist for Leopold's rule of Congo); I had no idea he also wrote about the history economics. (Sadly a hard copy of the text is not in Eureka's library.) That text would have  been the cutting edge  when Reagan's economics teacher was a student. In fact, I think Nys may well be the original source for Reagan (or his speech writer) because in his speech, Reagan treats of Ibn Khaldun as an Egyptian (which would be a natural way to read Nys) and talks of tax rates in "the empire" which is precisely how Nys talks about Ibn Khaldun's claim (but not the direct translation of Ibn Khaldun--for example, in his English translation, Rosenthal goes for 'dynasty' [which is surely closer to Ibn Khaldun's intent]).** 

There are two further reason to allow that Reagan, who had great fondness for his college education long before he became President, is drawing on his own memory. First, that's because he makes a major gaffe. He claims "Ibn Khaldun lived 1200 years ago in Egypt." (That's about 8-10 second mark.) That would have been ca 780 (the gaffe does not exist in the press conference of 1 October 1981--in the transcript he makes clear this is not the first time he spoke about Ibn Khaldun).

Second, in his remarks at the 1981 press conference (but not in the video), he uses Ibn Khaldun to illustrate his claims about the effects of tax policy of the 1920s. That's not peculiar if you learned about those tax policies alongside a remark about Ibn Khaldun in that same decade.

In his book, Irwin associates Reagan's claims with the Laffer curve. But there is no evidence in the press conference (or video) that Reagan makes that connection. Rather, he claims that tax cuts can generate more revenue than they bring in. (Of course, that's not unconnected to the Laffer curve.) And he claims the principle of that (supply side economics) claim goes back to Ibn Khaldun. That's not all wrong: Ibn Khaldun does recognize that there are conditions in which low taxes bring in larger revenue than high taxes. But the conditions that do so are (as Irwin correctly notes, p. 149) the cause not the effect of the tax rate(s). Some other time I have  more to say about (recall) Ibn Khaldun's political economy. 

 

Mozi On the Escape from the State of Nature

Here are three different translations of a key passage that describes the transition of the state of nature to what I'll call elected kingship, in the Mo Zi:

1. It was understood that the people lacked government leaders to unify the world’s norms of righteousness, and so the world was in disorder. Thus the most worthy, sagely, and intelligent person in the world was chosen, established as the Son of Heaven, and commissioned to work to unify the world’s norms of righteousness (yi). [(Book 12, “Identifying Upward”; quoted from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I assume the translation is by Chris Fraser.]
2. Those who understood the nature of this chaos saw that it arose from a lack of rulers and leaders and so they chose the best person among the most worthy and capable in the world and established him as the Son of Heaven. ["Obeying One's Superiors" Translated by Philip J. Ivanhoe in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, second edition, edited by Ivanhoe & B. Van Norden. Hacket, p. 65.]
3. It became clear to people that not having leaders of government who could unify the principles of the world brought disorder to the world. This was the reason for choosing the world's most worthy, good sagacious, wise, discriminating and clever man, and establishing him as the Son of Heaven, giving him the task of bringing unity to the principles of the world. ["Exalting Unity II" "Translated by Ian Johnston, in the Penguin edition of Mo Zi; The Book of Master Mo, p. 56.]

Before I say anything else, I should note explicitly that Fraser and Johnston translate 12.2 whereas Ivanhoe translates 11.2; so it's possible that Ivanhoe's translation would deviate less from the the other two if he had included the same passage. For, as you will have guessed, in the Mo ZI, there seem to be three nearly identical chapters (11-13) in which the transition from the state of nature to the election of the Son of Heaven is explained. I have mentioned before that all translation is interpretation, and this is also clear by the different choices of the translators of rendering the chapter titles (which I have given in the brackets above). Because I don't read Chinese and am a beginning amateur scholar, I can't help decide the matter (and the reader should be forewarned that this post is even more tentative than most of my Digressions).

What is pretty clear from context in all three translations is that the state of nature is caused by extreme moral/normative/practical pluralism which naturally develops absent a political order (I'll explain the use of 'order' below). There are four key ideas here. First, we all naturally develop our own idiosyncratic norms of righteousness (yi). [I'll sometimes use 'moral' or 'practical' "exemplary character" or 'righteous' to capture yi.)  This is not quite the idea that we all have the capacity to moral goodness (that's developed by Mencius, I think, in response to Mozi), but one can see in Mozi a recognition that all of us have  reactive attitudes* that we understand as moral. Second, such moral diversity alone leads to conflict and, in turn, is used to justify further conflict. The state of nature just is this disorder or disharmony (or chaos). For Mozi, thus, the original establishment of political order solves a meta-coordination problem about which and, simultaneously, whose norms are exemplary. (It's, thus, an open question if he can conceptually distinguish between what we would call a legitimate and a just state, although in practice it's clear that he thinks quite a few states are legitimate even if they are wholly imperfect.)

It is notable that Master Mo's state of nature is distinct from that found in Plato's (see Laws, Book III), where people are naturally, at first, kind toward each other (679C) and it is only the establishment of political orders, polities πόλιν (679D) that generates mutual enmity. In Plato's narrative (which is embedded in a much larger eternal return of the rise and fall of civilization), the different moral outlooks, however, are the consequence of an intermediary stage, where propertied, patriarchal clans develop local mores at odds with each other 681bc). For Plato, it's clan/family and property that are the engines of mutual conflict in the state of nature (and, perhaps, he is also recognizing that it is patriarchal versions of these). The establishment of polities solve that problem locally, but at the expense of making even more violent conflict among polities possible.

And Mozi's approach to the state of nature is also distinct from the famous version found in Leviathan. Hobbes, too, recognizes the importance of disagreement over norms in the state of nature (where normative words are used to describe personal preferences), but his is fundamentally driven by natural equality ("nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he") and natural scarcity, which drives mutual enmity ("if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies") and, thus, mutual fear.

Not unlike in Plato, the Hobbesian social contract solves the problem of local mutual enmity, but by generating a more ferocious international political order--something Hobbes does not emphasize. (Hobbes thinks no or almost no property is possible in the state of nature.) The escape from the state of nature in Master Mo's account is more general because, the Son of Heaven rules over an empire (now quoting Ivanhoe's translation, an 'entire world' which is 'so vast" across many "different regions"). It is tempting to see in this Chinese exceptionalism (in which the rest of us are vassals). But if one is less chauvinist, one can also see in Mo recognition of the conceptual point that only a world-government gets us out of the state of nature and really solves the problem of moral diversity.

As an aside, unlike Hobbes and, more akin to Plato, Mozi leaves it a bit ambiguous if the story he is telling stands outside history (as a useful myth, conceptual thought experiment) or, less likely, is meant to tell a historical account of the origin of the first emperor (Son of Heaven). I return to this at the very end of this post below.

What's useful about Mozi's account for those of us comfortable with modern narratives of political pluralism and raised on Plato (property) and Hobbes (conflicting desires) is to see how existentially and politically important normative differences may well taken to be. People will fight over moral disagreement. (Since the war of religions, Enlightenment thinkers tend to claim this is due to religious disagreement in which religion is used by politically ambitious to ferment disagreement; Mo's analysis suggests that the tinderbox is already lit.) I am not ready to concede Mo's analysis, but it is worth taking seriously. (I also think his analysis is domesticated if it is merely seen as the concern with the way moral language  is corrupted in favor of partial or ideological concerns.)

Third, I think, but I am less committed to this, that Mozi is committed to the idea that any ruling exemplar is better than no exemplar. This is not because he is a relativist--there is, in fact, in his writings (i) a persistent search for an optimal account of yi and jianái (impartial benevolence/care) to be combined in the character of the best sort of ruler (and thereby the political order guided by this Son of Heaven), and (ii) a willingness to judge any political order on its consequences (in terms of diffusion of wealth, population growth, and social harmony). His whole teaching is an attack on the bad political rulers of his day (the age of so-called Warring States) and also bad past rulers (all of whom guided by partiality of one sort or another). So, any ruler who is capable of reducing the major source of conflict is better than no ruler. Now, clearly this is not the point of the quoted passage at the top of this post. There the point is to elect the best first exemplar.

Fourth, this is so because Mozi embraces what we may call a normative/practical trickle-down theory. (I have noted this is also popular in various ways in the early modern world.) Rulers are both standard setters and exemplars, and by their practices and political appointments (of judges, magistrates, feudal lords) shape the political order of society. And, in fact, they show their wisdom by using incentives (rewarding the virtuous by advancing them politically and paying them well; getting rid of bad judges, etc) to promote their political order which will involve also prudential planningagainst natural disasters. The moral/normative/righteous trickle down of yi, is reinforced by lots of good economic and agricultural consequences (prosperity, good harvests, etc.) which generate virtuous cycle (and so become sanctioned by Heaven).

Now, if we return to the translated passage(s). We see that there are three crucial ambiguities (and one clear problem) among them:

1. It is unclear who in the state of nature understands that the problem is moral/normative diversity. Ivanhoe's translation suggests it is a sub-set of people generally, and presumably an intellectual elite of some sort. The other translations suggests there was, in fact, widespread recognition of the source of the state of nature.+
2. It is unclear who are, for lack of a better term, the electors of the First Son of Heaven. I think this is unclear in all versions I have read. But it must be folk who are capable and willing of electing the most worthy (etc.). So, it seems the electors would have to be some kind of (moral) elite. [If one is following Ivanhoe on 1, then it is natural to assume that the electors are those capable of recognizing the source of the problem.]
3. Ivanhoe's translation suggests (perhaps this is unintentional) that the Son of Heaven is, in fact, elected from a pre-selected group of would be worthies (chose the best person among the most worthy and capable in the world). This solves some of the decision problem (in 2) by pushing it back a level (who does the pre-selection and on what grounds).
4. The clear problem is that because Master Mo emphasizes in the very same paragraph that follows from the choice of the Son of Heaven that geographic distance creates communication problems (and so justifies a political hierarchy in which some of the tasks of the Son of Heaven are delegated down to local agents), it is unclear how such communication problems are overcome in 1-3.

In reading Fraser (here), it seems clear that the ambiguity is in the original text.  But Fraser also notes that problem 2 is addressed in the third version of the chapter (so chapter 13): "all under heaven wished to select" (Johnston writes, "the world's desire"). And so rather than the worthy selecting the most worthy, it's everybody selecting the worthy. This is structurally very similar to Hobbes's (and later Hume's) insistence that the original contract involves "every man with every man." And it solves the problem of electing the electors in the context of wide disagreement.

Of course, I am undoubtedly not the first to note that if diverging conceptions of yi is causing a belligerent state of nature, it seems unlikely that (even leaving aside communication problems) in the state of nature all people or even a considerable sub-set will agree on the person with the best yi or who the electors might be. I think Master Mo recognizes this problem (about which another time) which is why I doubt he is treating it as a historical/empirical event.

Let me close with a final terminological-conceptual point. Fraser is adamant that we should not conceive of the transition from state of nature to political order as a social contract because he wishes to prevent the idea that political authority rests on people's tacit/explicit consent (and that's because for Fraser authority and legitimacy are grounded in consequentialist success of the existence of social order.) And if one takes social contract theory and consequentialism as contraries (as Fraser does, but I don't)++ this point is almost tautological. There are two further reasons (both suggested by Fraser) to resist social compact talk because (i) there is no sign that in Mohism voluntary contracts are treated as exemplary of the normativity of political life, and (ii) there is no obvious route from it to a kind of (normatively salient) individualism (with a theory of rights lurking in the distance) or contractual legalism (although impartial law is important).

Even so, the first Son of Heaven is explicitly chosen and so is -- when viewed from the Platonic tradition (recall Al-Farabi; Ibn Rushd)-- properly understood as an elective kingship. Elective kingship is grounded in consent of the electors as a group. (This is why elective kingship is treated as democracy by the Platonic-Islamic thinkers.) This is how Islamic thinkers conceived of the first Ummah with the four righteous caliphs.

In addition, the first Son of Heaven is explicitly tasked by the electors with a project (to impose Yi and social order). He is, in fact, given associates (the Three Dukes/Imperial Ministers, and more local feudal lords) to execute this task. That is to say, a social-political hierarchy is granted in order to produce a certain desirable outcome which benefits all.  If one is cautious about how one understands what follows from this (so no individual rights, etc.), I don't see why one could not call it a social contract. Above I noted that the historical status of Mozi's claim is ambiguous; but it is compatible with his views (perhaps not the traditional interpretation) that one way to understand Master Mo is, thus, that such a social compact in which a proper Son of Heaven is chosen by society always remains a live possibility.

 

Nationalism as self-Subordination. On Ibn Khaldun: On the Nature of Group Feeling

When mankind has achieved social organization, as we have stated, and when civilization in the world has thus become a fact, people need someone to exercise a restraining influence and keep them apart, for aggressiveness and injustice are in the animal nature of man. The weapons made for the defense of human beings against the aggressiveness of dumb animals do not suffice against the aggressiveness of man to man, because all of them possess those weapons. Thus, something else is needed for defense against the aggressiveness of human beings toward each other. It could not come from outside, because all the other animals fall short of human perceptions and inspiration. The person who exercises a restraining influence, therefore, must be one of themselves. He must dominate them and have power and authority over them, so that no one of them will be able to attack another. This is the meaning of royal authority.
It has thus become clear that royal authority is a natural quality of man which is absolutely necessary to mankind. The philosophers mention that it also exists among certain dumb animals, such as the bees and the locusts. One discerns among them the existence of authority and obedience to a leader. They follow the one of them who is distinguished as their leader by his natural characteristics and body. However, outside of human beings, these things exist as the result of natural disposition and divine guidance, and not as the result of an ability to think or to administrate. "He gave everything its natural characteristics, and then guided it." [Qur'an 20.50(52)]
The philosophers go further. They attempt to give logical proof of the existence of prophecy and to show that prophecy is a natural quality of man. In this connection, they carry the argument to its ultimate consequences and' say that human beings absolutely require some authority to exercise a restraining influence. They go on to say that such restraining influence exists through the religious law (that has been) ordained by God and revealed to mankind by a human being. (This human being) is distinguished from the rest of mankind by special qualities of divine guidance that God gave him, in order that he might find the others submissive to him and ready to accept what he says. Eventually, the existence of a (restraining) authority among them and over them becomes a  fact that is accepted without the slightest disapproval or dissent.
This proposition of the philosophers is not [necessary],* as one can see. Existence and human life can materialize without (the existence of prophecy) through injunctions a person in authority may devise on his own or with the help of a group feeling that enables him to force the others to follow him wherever he wants to go....This is in contrast with human life in the state of anarchy, with no one to exercise a restraining influence. That would be impossible.--Ibn Khaldun The Muqadimmah (translated by F. Rosenthal), Chapter 1, First Prefatory Discussion, p. 88.

When we first encounter this passage in The Muqadimmah (recall this post), our attention may well be drawn to the curious mixture of familiar Aristotelian tropes (man is by nature political) with proto-Hobbesian tropes inscribed in an equally almost familiar feeling stadial account of history (moving from pre-civilized to civilized stages). Human political life is distinguished from the bestial kinds of political life in that the latter do not involve rational and administrative capacities of the group leader. Curiously, and somewhat slyly, Ibn Khaldun suggests here, too, that God's providence covers animal political life, but is not intrinsic to human political life. 

Ibn Khaldun then returns (recall this post) to his running critique of the philosophers (Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Ibn Rushd), who he (somewhat unfairly) presents as holding that prophecy is required for the founding of all cities.* But interestingly enough, even though Ibn Khaldun ignores here (but not elsewhere) much of what these philosophers say about the metaphysics and cognitive apparatus of prophecy, he is not wrong (albeit a bit cynical) to suggest that at bottom the philosophical conception of prophecy-legislation boils to being the kind of person that gets others to submit to one's teaching. It's unfair because the philosophers argue repeatedly that theirs is (what we would call) a normative ideal, and that there are many 'ignorant' and imperfect cities that lack a proper prophetic-legislative foundation. 

Ibn Khaldun then introduces one of his central ideas: the significance of group feeling. Earlier, when he had talked about group feeling, he had emphasized the role it plays in mutual cooperation. (Society presupposes the division of labor.) It is a means toward facilitating such cooperation. When you have the group feeling political order will flourish. But crucially, for Ibn Khaldun group feeling can be shaped and controlled by political leaders and it also facilitates their authority and rule.  (So a few pages before he had talked of the ruling "men who controlled the group feeling.") It is, thus, a central way in which dynastic power can be kept (or lost). (It does so, in part, by promoting pride in the group.) So, to simplify his discussion: group feeling is a means to regulate the dispositions that facilitate political unity. 

Group feeling is co-affectation or mutual sympathy of a particular unity. Elsewhere Ibn Khaldon is quite clear that there are some outer limits to how far it can extend, and how durable it may be. But there is no natural unit (the tribe, the nation, etc.) that group feeling attaches itself to--it is, thus, rather malleable and the group feeling that generates, say, tribal or national identity can be developed in many different ways. (Some other time I return to this.)

Now, one often thinks of the dangers of nationalism in terms of the threat it may pose to internal outsiders or non-national-others. Even those that defend nationalism (recall) in terms of something anchored in common traditional law and religion, tend to think of nationalism as a means toward embracing differences among nations in the service of defending a particular (say) national heritage (or identity, territory, etc.). But Ibn Khaldun notes here that group feeling is a means of control by a leader of his own followers; group feeling will allow the leader to have others do what he wants. That is to say, group-mutual sympathy can easily generate the self-subordination of the (vast majority of the) members of the in-group.**