Digressions&Impressions

On Being a Hypocrite; or on True Teaching

I could swagger about Fortitude and the Contempt of Riches as much as Seneca himself.---Mandeville, Fable of the Bees (recall).

Far different is the purpose of those who are speech-making and trying to win the approbation of a throng of hearers, far different that of those who allure the ears of young men and idlers by many sided or fluent argumentation; philosophy teaches us to act, not to speak; it exacts of every one that he should live according to his own law [facere docet philosophia, non dicere, et hoc exigit, ut ad legem suam quisque vivat, ne orationi vita dissentiat vel ipsa inter se vita], that his life should not be out of harmony with his words, and that, further, there is unity to the color of one's actions [unus sit omnium actio num color].  This, I say, is the highest duty and the highest proof of wisdom, - that deed and word should be in accord, that a man should be equal to himself under all conditions, and always the same.--Seneca, Letter XX (slightly modified translation).

I am no stranger to falling short of my personal ideals (recall) and know plenty of well-established professional philosophers who are moralistic yet routinely exhibit lack of basic decency. I know extremely kind and generous folk who advocate hardship and worse for less articulate and connected others (in the name of utility, good governance, etc.). I know courageous advocates of civic liberties who fail their students by their incapacity at sublimating intellectual eros. So I did not expect it to find it so difficult to continue my series on Seneca's Letters and write about Letter XX in which Seneca addresses the discord between words and actions (and, thus, extends the theme of Letter XIX, recall). Given that Seneca is notorious for the mismatch between words and deeds, it is tempting to read this letter as Seneca's Apologia Pro Vita Sua addressing the known criticisms of his activities under Nero in which he grew rich in the service of a tyrant.

Upon extended reflection: the key to the letter is the implied distinction between being a teacher and being a philosopher (aka being wise and, explicitly, being great-souled [ingentis animi est]). Seneca identifies himself as a teacher not as a philosopher. He teaches, not unlike Plato [and unlike Nietzsche], in part, by pointing away toward proper exemplars (e.g., Demetrius the Cynic) and by drawing on Epicurean themes. Such exemplars have a three-fold function: (a) they offer an existence-proof that a comportment with integrity, that is, a harmony between right action and words, is humanly possible; (b) he holds up exemplars to be emulated (recall my treatment of Letter 5); (c) it allows him to deflect, in part, the charge of hypocrisy--for he very clearly implies that he falls short of the comportment with integrity while not being so corrupted (by the axiology of the marketplace/public [recall Letter 14]) that he cannot recognize true wisdom in others.

More important, from (c) it follows that (d) Seneca thinks he can bypass the more fundamental version of Meno's paradox (see Abe Stone); he can teach some virtue to Lucilius without being fully virtuous himself in a context where, as he implies, ordinary social institutions do not facilitate even such limited virtue. We may even add that Seneca shows some wisdom by recognizing his own limitations not only in light of exacting pure standards of integrity, but also in light of available human instantiations. (It is, thus, important that Demetrius is not merely a mythical or historical figure.)

So, Seneca knows he falls short of and he does not hold himself up as the standard for comportment with integrity. Thus the traditional charge against Seneca is (somewhat) misguided. Seneca may even hint that he knows intimately what he is warning against (do as I say, not as I did) and, thereby, (against Deleuze's protests) become a better teacher for some pupils (say, ambitious types like Lucilius). It is, after all, by no means obvious that Demetrius un-mediated by, say, a Seneca would be recognized as wise by an untutored pupil. Sincerity of even the noblest expressions does not guarantee moral approval, after all.

Ever since Socrates's trial we know that students' actions can reflect badly on the quality and reputation of their teachers' activities. Seneca embraces this fact--again, like Plato who shows us some of Socrates's more disastrous teaching methods (that's compatible with admiration of Socrates). So, it turns out, that Seneca is closer to the modern university professor than one might initially have thought. Like most of us, he is no holy man, and he does not expect to be evaluated as one.

Rather, Seneca correctly expects to be evaluated, in part, on the consequences of his teaching on his pupils (that is, the addressee and other, later readers of his Letters) and the societies their actions help shape. This is no eternal moral-get-out-of-jail-free-pass. Rather (at least late in life) Seneca embraces that he lives by a rather demanding standard that in addition to complex skills requires considerable luck (recall) and turns each of our teaching and writing lives into trials in which we are judged, fairly (with satire) or not, as causes of unknown (and potentially extended) multiplicity of effects (recall).* We may, then even say -- echoing Spinoza (Ethics 1p36 [recall]) -- that Seneca claims there is true glory [mea enim gloria erit] in being in virtue of such effects.

 

On Lawsuits Against Peers and Students

it's fine to sue one's employer and its officers; it's intolerable to sue peers and students in rape/assault/harassment (etc.) cases - See more at: http://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpressions/2014/11/how-to-reduce-retaliation.html#sthash.7gWerybd.dpuf

[I]t's fine to sue one's employer and its officers; it's intolerable to sue peers and students in rape/assault/harassment (etc.) cases. So, here's a proposal (open to discussion): such a person should not expect job offers from other institutions, be invited to colloquia, special issues, handbooks and all other forms of professional honor we bestow on each other EVEN if s/he wins the ensuing court case. To be clear, this proposal falls short of professional shunning (i.e., not publishing and not citing--recall this post on the Arthur Koestler problem). This approach is also compatible with other, private acts of friendship and support (and outreach). In addition, it also takes no stance on the legal merits of individual cases.--Eric Schliesser

This proposal was rather narrowly tailored to address the deterrence and harms caused by aggressive legal strategies pursued by those peers who, after losing cases in front of university committees, go to court (recall also this post on the significance of indemnification). While my proposal generated considerable discussion, it did not generate even the semblance of a disciplinary consensus (despite Ed Kazarian's effort). Brian Leiter called it "startling and dangerous" on his blog, where he linked to one of those anonymous websites (which had plenty of criticism), and, in addition, he reproduced a misleading comment that he received by another anonymous critic. (I call it "misleading" because that critic never mentions that I am talking about contexts in which (a) one can still sue a university and its officers and (b) a university committee has already made a judgment.) But Professor Leiter was certainly not alone in thinking that I am entirely wrong in trying to discourage recourse to the courts in such cases. To be clear: my proposal was not motivated by a general aversion to lawsuits (after all, I have volunteered money to fund a student's lawsuit against a professor) nor by some nostalgic yawning after collegiality. (I am not against collegiality as such, but it seems to exist too infrequently to ask others to rely on it as a general principle.)

I was reminded of my proposal because today Dailynous reports that Peter Ludlow's case against Northwestern, various university officers, his colleague, Jennifer Lackey, and a grad student has been dismissed. I have no idea if this is the end of this case. (This case is distinct from a case involving Ludlow and an undergrad.) I am pleased by this outcome not because I have any idea about the truth of the matter, but because I worry that a full trial would have acted as a further deterrence on victims of harassment to come forward. This deterrence is not just personal (painful memories will be rehashed in public, one's character will be scrutinized intensely, etc.), but also financial. Given that few countries have generous legal aid, poorer graduate students will be at considerable disadvantage absent university support. And, unfortunately, universities do not have identical (legal) interest to the students involved.

The comments in the previous paragraph make clear that I have not been persuaded by the criticisms against my proposal. But I also have to admit that I do not have new arguments to offer. All I can report is that some male friends think it is important to keep access to  the courts open as a safeguard against cases of gross miscarriages of justice in internal university proceedings. I think this access is not diminished if one only sues the university and its officers, but have not managed to convince others. So, I welcome new suggestions about what can be done to reduce the deterrent effects of these lawsuits against colleagues and students that have come forward to report cases of harassment (or worse).

As regular readers know, I am a huge fan of Ludlow's political activism and reporting. He showed courage and a fine-tuned capacity of empathy in reporting on Manning's court martial and the trials of Barrett Brown. For those of us that are concerned about government abuses, locally and abroad, as well as the growing surveillance state Ludlow has long been the must-read-person in professional philosophy. I hope he can find a way to move on after these cases and continue to find ways to use his analytical talents to generous political ends.

Again, to be clear: it's fine to sue one's employer and its officers; it's intolerable to sue peers and students in rape/assault/harassment (etc.) cases. So, here's a proposal (open to discussion): such a person should not expect job offers from other institutions, be invited to colloquia, special issues, handbooks and all other forms of professional honor we bestow on each other EVEN if s/he wins the ensuing court case. - See more at: http://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpressions/peter-ludlow/#sthash.taJHH6f9.dpuf

How to reduce retaliation?

We are thankful to those who have spent a significant amount of their time and energy making philosophy a more inclusive space, as well as to those who are working to support victims. However, we recognize that if the progress they have made is not to be lost, rights to report concerns of sexual misconduct and retaliation must be protected, and that protecting these rights has to be a community effort.

As things currently stand, there are very substantial professional and personal risks associated with addressing sexual misconduct either informally or through formal university channels—including, as we have now seen, the risk of being sued for defamation. Moreover, these risks accrue not only to victims but to those who try to support them in seeking to have their grievances addressed. Unsurprisingly, many victims have felt as if they have no recourse, many who might otherwise have supported them have remained silent; and the culture of silence understandably contributes to the impression that there are really very few within our profession who are much concerned either about the prevalence of sexual misconduct within our discipline or about the risks associated with seeking to have it addressed. "An Open Letter of Support," John Greco, Don Howard, Jonathan Kvanvig, Mark Murphy, and Michael Rea [HT DAILYNOUS]

What is to be done about legal and personal strategies by our peers that generate "the very substantial professional and personal risks associated with addressing sexual misconduct either informally or through formal university channels—including, as we have now seen, the risk of being sued for defamation?" This "open letter of support" articulates the problem eloquently and accurately (and it expresses my own sentiments). But, alas, it does not point the way to a response to the problem--it is more a cri de coeur than a road-map to the future.  Some of us (recall my post and, more elaborately, Jennifer Lackey) have called attention to the need for more elaborate indemnification policies by universities to support accusers and the faculty/friends that help them. But even if universities adopt such a (costly) strategy, the risk of being sued in a court of law will reduce people's willingness to step forward and, thereby, reinforce the "culture of silence."

As bystanders we should be very clear that in the context of disciplinary cases (involving rape,  sexual assault, harassment, etc.), the professional community draws a sharp distinction between suing one's university and suing one's peers or accusers. We all recognize that university tribunals have their own problems (most of these involving partiality toward faculty) and that victims and accusers alike ought to have some recourse to outside courts. But, as a profession we have a community interest (not to mention common decency) in ensuring that the targets of such a law-suit are employers (that is, universities and their officers) not colleagues and students accusers. 

So, what can we done?

Quite a bit given that there are no controversial epistemic issues involved. It is public knowledge when somebody sues a student or colleague in the context of an rape/assault/harassment (etc.) case. As a community we should treat such legal strategies with aversion. Again, to be clear: it's fine to sue one's employer and its officers; it's intolerable to sue peers and students in rape/assault/harassment (etc.) cases. So, here's a proposal (open to discussion): such a person should not expect job offers from other institutions, be invited to colloquia, special issues, handbooks and all other forms of professional honor we bestow on each other EVEN if s/he wins the ensuing court case. To be clear, this proposal falls short of professional shunning (i.e., not publishing and not citing--recall this post on the Arthur Koestler problem). This approach is also compatible with other, private acts of friendship and support (and outreach). In addition, it also takes no stance on the legal merits of individual cases.

On Firing a Philosophy Professor

When I was a PhD student my first interactions with the Dutch philosopher of science, Ton Derksen, were unpleasant; I thought he was dismissive of my research, aloof in that annoying, European professorial way,  and -- undoubtedly this colored my later memory -- slow in reimbursing my (considerable) travel expenses. Yet, from a distance I have come to admire Derksen greatly because of his very finely developed sense of justice and his willingness to speak up on behalf of unpopular causes; he used his professional authority and expertise in evidential arguments to expose systematic miscarriages of justice in the Dutch legal system through years of diligent research and public advocacy. Whenever he appears in public media, I feel an entirely unjustified pride (in ways aptly described by Hume) in knowing that he is 'on my professional team.'

David Barnett, a philosopher who publishes regularly in the best journals,* is about to be fired by CU--Boulder. According to the Daily Camera, his lawyer presents him as a courageous whistle-blower who "became convinced that [CU-Boulder's] ODH [Office of Discrimination and Harassment] had intentionally and systematically manipulated the evidence in order to support a finding of guilt" against a male graduate student (subsequently hired temporarily as an instructor). The lawyer is reported as implying that Barnett was "unofficial mentor" to the male student (now elsewhere).

In the very first piece I posted on Boulder's philosophy department I noted that even the American Philosophical Association Committee's on the Status of Women (CSW), Site Visit Program's "report clearly states that Boulder's Administration is "not providing (sufficient) support or resources for the Philosophy Department to address these issues" (p. 10--the whole report is a litany of administrative failings)."" Barnett's stance fits the pattern of mistrust toward Boulder's Administration that I have noted in earlier posts ([see this]; see especially this eloquent testimony by Annaleigh Curtis, which suggests this mistrust is fully deserved and that Boulder has much room for improvement in its institutional procedures and attitude.)

Even so, it's extremely striking and utterly unnerving that unlike this eloquent response, several of the most outspoken male philosophers at Boulder have been incapable of expressing even the possibility that they may, in fact, be part of an environment that is sometimes less than respectful to some of their female peers. Given that I reported that I had independent evidence of problems at Boulder from what I still take to be an impeccable source, I have been utterly baffled that rather than seeing more searching self-examination, we have been exposed to what look more like political talking points reminiscent of the 'culture wars,' even political campaigns (recall here and here). What I found shameful about, say, Michael Tooley's arguments is the utter lack of warmth toward possible victims. Yet, a few months later, even Barnett's lawyer "acknowledged that rumors about the victim were circulating in the department, but said those rumors were not started by his client." From context it's clear that those rumors involved the victim's sexual behavior. Even if it turns out that the victim was -- contrary to ODH's findings -- not the victim of sexual assault by that male graduate student, such rumors alone qualify, I think, as workplace sexual harassment.

What to Expect from Peter Ludlow's Lawsuit

What the hell are we meant to advise students just now if they have a complaint? Be prepared to be sued, have your name be made public at one of the most vulnerable times of your life and have to pay for a lawyer at one of the poorest times? What a despicable situation!--Ross Cameron

Let's stipulate, for the sake of argument, that Peter Ludlow has been treated unfairly by Northwestern's internal procedures that handled a number of accusations against him (and found against him). Let's also stipulate, for the sake of argument, that various public statements by Northwestern's Administrators this past Spring caused Prof. Ludlow real harm. It makes sense, then, for Ludlow to sue Northwestern University and its administrators. It's possible that a court will agree with Ludlow's version of the events and it might vindicate Ludlow. I don't have great trust in university procedures, with their routine use of non-disclosure agreements, which seem primarily designed to protect universities rather than protect victims, or -- let's stipulate -- the accused.

Even so, what could be the point of suing the PhD Student that complained against him?  The PhD did not make public statements and has not sought attention to her case. In fact, (a) judging by Ludlow's own account, it seems that she was reluctant about filing a complaint; (b) outside the Northwestern community, the existence of her charge against Ludlow was disclosed by Ludlow in the brief filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division [HT Brian Leiter]. If one is concerned about "reputational damage," as Ludlow claims in his complaint, it is very odd to reveal that one dated a PhD student and that she filed a complaint against you and that one of your own colleagues thought you behaved inappropriately toward students on a trip abroad. (According to Ludlow's complaint, folk at Northwestern were informed of this by the NU administration.)

Moreover, I understand that lawyers will use any legal means to win cases, but it seems unnecessary and hypocritical (given that one cares about "reputational damage") to disclose information about the PhD Student's past (as Ludlow does in his complaint). It's not clear what purpose this could serve except to exploit existing stereotypes and to try to undermine her professional reputation.

Finally, as Prof. Cameron notes in the passage above, the foreseeable effect of Ludlow's course of action is that bystanders will likely discourage future victims to step forward. Active bystanders must now be concerned that they can be sued (cf. Prof. Lackey), and they will have to inform victims that they can also be sued when, in fact, they are most vulnerable. Perhaps, Prof. Ludlow will win his day in court. Perhaps, too, this case will lead to a fruitful reform of university procedures. But unless universities start assuring students that they will cover legal fees in such cases, the foreseeable consequence is that many victims will likely to prefer to keep quiet. It's disconcerting that a fellow professional philosopher's pursuit of justice, may well lead to such an outcome. 

On Peter Ludlow's New Lawsuit

I did go read the complaint in Prof. Peter Ludlow's suit against Northwestern University, some of its senior officials, his philosophy colleague, Prof. Jennifer Lackey, and an unnamed PhD Student. [HT Brian Leiter & DailyNous]. To avoid confusion: this is separate from his counter-suit against the undergraduate student that filed suit against him (in Illinois state court) and that brought a Federal suit against Northwestern alleging that the university mishandled her complaint against him (recall this post, and this post).

We learn from Prof. Ludlow's complaint that, as the Daily Northwestern Reports, "the University also investigated Ludlow after a philosophy graduate student lodged a complaint in March that Ludlow had non-consensual sex with her." In addition, his complaint [HT Leiter] suggests that he has also been accused by Professor "Lackey" of behaving "inappropriately toward female students on a trip to South America." So, that's three different incidents. (He joined Northwestern in 2008.) It's an odd a feature of the law, I suppose, that even if one is concerned with (quoting the complaint) "reputational damage," one would make public information that cannot help one's reputation. It's striking that he does so while Rutgers is "considering whether to make...an offer."

In addition, Ludlow's complaint reports that an internal investigation by Northwestern "concluded that Plaintiff and Defendant PHD STUDENT’s relationship constituted sexual harassment even though [Northwestern's hired investigator] did not find that Plaintiff’s conduct was unwelcome and even though [investigator] specifically acknowledged that Defendant PHD STUDENT admitted that she and Plaintiff had consensual sex and dated for a number of months before breaking up." Ludlow's complaint does not quote the report, so the reader of his complaint is left without the reasoning, if any, that went into this conclusion. (Perhaps this will become clear when any of the defendants respond.)

So, it seems two separate Northwestern investigations found against Peter Ludlow. We are not told what happened with the South American travel complaint.  

I close with three disconnected thoughts:

Vigilante Justice at Northwestern?

In calling attention to student protest against (Northwestern's) Prof. Peter Ludlow, Brian Leiter, a renowned legal scholar, uses "vigilante justice" to describe what appears to have been intended as a fairly modest protest: "students will sit in on Professor Peter Ludlow's 12:30pm philosophy class and will walk out of his class together at 1:00pm."--Facebook. This is certainly annoying, but even if repeated on a weekly basis -- and then it would certainly be disruptive -- it does not amount to vigilante justice (e.g., according to Wikipedia: "Frontier justice (also called vigilante justice or street justice) is extrajudicial punishment that is motivated by the nonexistence of law and order or dissatisfaction with justice.") Even the fact that Northwestern has now chosen to replace Ludlow for the remainder of the quarter does not amount to more than a serious nuisance (primarily to his replacement, that is, "the chair of the philosophy department," as well as the students who may well have benefited from Ludlow's expertise).

The protesters are certainly right to be angry about Northwestern's attempts to keep its own findings against Prof. Ludlow quiet, thus, depriving his future students, future employers, and his peers in the profession crucial information.  More damaging, from all the newsreports, it appears that Northwestern's administration is more concerned about its reputation than the well-being its students.

As I have said before, Ludlow has made vital contributions to drawing attention to and analyzing the evils of the National Security state. While many will disagree with me over this: it is vital that he keeps a home in an academic environment or, better yet, some kind of think tank away from students. It strikes me as unjust to fire somebody for an offense that apparently was not defined as such [ADDED FOR CLARIFICATION: that is, a fireable offense] when the event took place. More generally, I also believe that all people deserve second chances in life. Few deserve to be vilified forever, Even so, it is very troubling that his legal strategy amounts to suggesting the victim asked for it. Obviously (yes?), universities and the philosophy profession have been too welcoming of perpetrators of sexual harassment; to his credit, Brian Leiter has long been very outspoken about this professional embarrassment. Even so, I think he is mistaken to vilify those that protest this sad fact peacefully.  

Self-loathing in Philosophy

Under no circumstances should this department sponsor or be affiliated in any way with an event that includes alcohol. (Report  on  Site  Visit Conducted  by The  American  Philosophical Association  (APA) Committee  on  the  Status  of  Women  (CSW), p. 12.)

Last night I was reminded of the passage above. I heard a story about a prominent philosopher that I admire, who had groped a graduate student while under the influence of alcohol. I wondered if there was a pattern or a one-off. A few weeks earlier, before the Peter Ludlow story hit the media, the philosopher Abe Stone, asked on his facebook page, "why do philosophers drink so much alcohol in professional contexts?...Even if this had no bearing at all on the issue of sexual harassment (though clearly it does have some!) it would be something we ought to discuss." I think Stone is right about the phenomenon: there is a problematic, drinking culture in philosophy. In some departments it is passed on from one generation to the next. I always found it remarkable that my supervisor preferred Chinese food over beer.  (I am pretty confident that was one of the many subtle reasons why I gravitated toward him.)

This is no surprise, of course. There is a lot of drinking in the societies in which professional philosophy is embedded. But the problem is notable in professional philosophy because it has extremely fluid boundaries between work and not work. (This is a field that has, of course, low tolerance for the very intelligibility of ontological vagueness.) So, even if one were to ban alcohol from all sponsored events (not just the Boulder department, the APA smoker, etc.), the alcohol related problems, including sexual harassment, would not disappear in professional philosophy. (This is no criticism of the CSW Report at Boulder!) For, alcohol is one of the social glues of our profession (which, after all, has a legitimate professional fondness for conversation). For example, I edited a volume where in his acknowledgments, my co-editor promised me a drink.

On Being Complicit with Sexual Predators

Peter Ludlow is one of the few contemporary elite professional philosophers that has distinguished himself by using his analytical skills in high profile, national media in order to clarify and interpret the significance of the expansion of the national security state, the unjust demonization of "Aaron Swartz, Jeremy Hammond, Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden," and the fate of a journalist that has exposed the corruption of the rule of law.*

Yesterday, many in my profession, academic philosophy, learned that Ludlow is mentioned in a shocking federal lawsuit against Northwestern University. According to reports the suit claims that the school mishandled a student's complaint "that a professor sexually attacked her after getting her drunk in 2012."--The Chicago Tribune. According to the suit the university's Office of Sexual Harassment Prevention had found that after investigating, that "Ludlow “engaged in unwelcome and inappropriate sexual advances,” including “sleeping with his arms on and around (the student) on the night of February 10-11.”"--The Daily Northwestern. (The most detailed account of the suit's version of events can be found in the Evanston Review.)

I hope that the case is not settled prematurely, so that undisputed facts will be revealed during the court proceedings or through investigative reporting. 

How a story is framed makes a huge difference. Above I focused on the features in Ludlow's profile that have made him a source of admiration to me.