Digressions&Impressions

Historicizing the Collapse of Kantianism; on Speculative Realism and Knee-Jerk Realism

In 2007 or so, Continental philosophy caught up with the knee-jerk-realist-mood of Analytical metaphysics (recall here), when the four horsemen (Meillasoux, Harman, Brassier, and Hamilton Grant) of Speculative Realism were united in order to reject the Kantian heritage (or correlationism) which had constrained and informed the tradition through phenomenology and its critics. (I learned about this movement from Cogburn here and here.) If we telescope away from the inner logic of technical arguments and rhetorical gestures that led to such rejection, we can still ask the question what might such rejection signify given that it occurs on both sides of the analytical/continental divide?

Kant and Kantianizing tendencies made the intellectual world safe for science while respecting our human craving for the existence of normativity, human freedom, and a mindful God worth having. At bottom Kant's project respects cognitive limits by pleasing our ego's vanity; Kantianism reconciles the individual to being law-governed. Its demise marks the assertion of two opposing tendencies: a self-confident theism -- one that does not hide itself in fideism -- and a self-confident scientism. Obviously, these two tendencies need not be opposed which is why they can act so much in concert.

The theists take heart from the fact that secularization is not inevitable. It exposes the inner contradiction at heart of narratives of modernity, which purport to reject providence and final causes while embracing a myth of progress. Religion is, in fact, not dying off with the aged brought up in fading traditions. In fact, in a world in which capitalism and modern technologies make old linkages and boundaries seem obsolete, transnational, theistic religions, which offer the promise of transcendent justice and order are manifestly attractive to many young.  That is to say, while most Christian Metaphysicians are happy to focus on Christianizing metaphysics, they benefit from the renewed vitality of a sincere, political Islam in the face of centuries of colonialism and political defeats.  

The scientistic or technocratic double down on accelerating technological change fueled by both an open-ended scientific process as well as the massive stream of data and the availability of cheap computing power that can handle it.* They are exhilarated by the universal acids lurking in the sciences which respect no imposed limits. The scientistic embrace meritocracy and are at home with the selection procedures and the implicit cultural superiority or genetic hierarchies that accompanies it. Massive economic and educational inequality is, then, both the material and ideological source of their confidence as well as a feature that demands technocratic amelioration.

That is to say, both streams are at bottom not liberal (but not necessarily illiberal), which is about the individual's submission to impartial law which, in turn, recognizes the individual, even though they are the consequence of the victory of liberalism marked by 1989. Each stream can be reconciled with liberalism, but their tendencies ultimately strive toward the absolute (not just understood as God or the PSR, but also absolute contingency, etc.). This is undoubtedly apt for an age of unfolding man-made environmental catastrophes. 

Why Ukraine Matters...(On Nuclear Proliferation)

My philosophical colleague, Thomas Sturm, has been calling attention to the significance of the Budapest Memorandums. This 1994 treaty encouraged Ukraine to give up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons in exchange for territorial and security guarantees by Russia, USA, and the UK. Whatever one's views are about the legitimacy of the annexation of the Crimea by Russia, its creeping military involvement in Eastern Ukraine is a clear violation of the treaty. (Something predicted, in effect, by John Mearsheimer two decades ago.) Rather than entangling myself in the variety of debates over the quality of Ukrainian and Russian democracy, I call attention to two terrifying consequences of these events:

1. We cannot expect countries that have nuclear weapons or weapons-making capacity to voluntarily give these up (unless, perhaps, when they are surrounded by weaker and relatively impoverished neighbors (e.g., South Africa; maybe Brazil)) and very distant from spheres of influence of nuclear powers.)
2. Security guarantees by the USA/UK are ultimately worthless if the aggressor is another nuclear power. (An exception is allowed for countries that have clear, strategic mineral wealth.)

From 1 it follows that the age of nuclear disarmament  is over.* Iran, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, and India will not be enticed to give up their nuclear weapons.

From 2 it follows that nuclear proliferation is very likely; it is pretty much inevitable that as China grows in economic and military power, several of its neighbors will decide either to submit to its influence or that they need their own independent nuclear deterrent; in the latter group, I have in mind most obviously Japan (which is also in a territorial dispute with Russia). But with simmering border disputes all over Asia, it is an open question how long the security blanket of American naval power will be trusted in light of the events in Ukraine. In the Middle East, one can now expect Saudi Arabia and Egypt to explore the 'nuclear option' more seriously.

Of course, one need not assume that nuclear proliferation is an unmitigated bad (again, see Mearsheimer). Perhaps, nuclear powers are more cautious and more prudent around each other (as well as in their domestic affairs). But even if that is so on average, any outlier will have devastating consequences. In light of humanity's capacity for folly, if not mutual misunderstanding, it is likely that this will not end well. 

 

*Arguably, this was already a likely consequence from the fate of Qaddafi.