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"...Ballantyne after the method of counter example..."

I feel bad asking, as it's not the main topic of your post, and because I _could_ read the book itself (it's not going to happen soon, though, even if I really wanted to), but can you say a tiny bit about this? I ask because I've been writing for some time - mostly in asides, but once more directly - about how the way philosophers try to use counter-examples in legal and political philosophy is, at least in many cases, confused and unhelpful, and would love to see if there's some overlap. (my own discussion come in pages 315-18 in this paper: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2922721 )


Hi Matt,
I added a modest correction after Neil Levy commented on this post on twitter (before I noticed your comment). I think it is more accurate to say of Nathan's book that he thinks the method of cases should be supplemented with other methods. This is, in part, so because for Nathan the method of cases cannot really guide inquiry in specialized domains (which is what he is after). But I will think about your question as I revisit the material. I intend to use my blogs on Millgram as a framework to discuss Ballantyne.

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Here's a link to my past blogging (and discussions involving me) at: New APPS.


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