Macron, Disenchantment, and Charismatic Leadership

The disenchantment of politics, that is to say, the gradual elimination of politics as an instrument of this-worldly salvation (once embodied in the enchanting political projects of Nation-State Building, Democracy and the Welfare State, and the elite mission of European Integration), is causing the decline of political allegiance, that is to say, a deteriorating relationship of exchange and power between the rulers (political elite, government) and the ruled (people, citizens, voters). Disenchantment occurs, because of the failure, the growth beyond limits, the success, and the unintended effects of interaction of the projects.
Pondering over the possible consequences of waning political allegiance, we might hypothesize that the disenchantment of politics causes a political void in contemporary democratic societies, an emptiness of collective power, which exerts a pull on various political enterprises, experiments and escapades. Some of these, such as Obama’s charismatic leadership and his impressive performance so far (as of June 2009), may be beneficial to democratic governance and an inspiration for politicians and citizens around the globe. Still, his unspecified conception of “change” and his overemphasis of political primacy and capacity (“yes we can!”) may have generated expectations that are hard if not impossible to satisfy and are therefore bound to disappoint.
Other political ventures — to a lesser or greater extent — could imperil the very existence of democracy. We could think of the decomposition of the political center and the increasing importance of fringe (flank) politics that many advanced democracies are currently experiencing. As a result of this, coalition building, and effective government on the basis of beneficial exchanges are becoming increasingly difficult. The resulting ungovernability not only would contribute directly to the further disenchantment of politics, but would also reinforce the image of a, by and large, impotent elite that seems to have only one rationale left to govern: the protection of its own petty profitable position.
Here, both the toothless elite and the frustrated public become an easy victim for populist entrepreneurs. Populists effectively turn around the blame-the-citizen explanations of political disaffection and when these political adventurers manage to link the existing general frustration about politics with concrete problems of social and cultural integration, an explosive mix occurs that seriously stirs up normal democratic politics as we know it.-- Kees van Kersbergen (2009 [2010] "Quasi-Messianism and the Disenchantment of Politics," Politics and Religion, 3(1), 49-50 [HT Gijs Schumacher]

One notable feature of Macron's recent, successful election is the implosion of the main political parties that have defined France's fifth republic. In 2017 this implosion was masked by the so-called Fillon affaire, which undermined the standard bearer of the French republicans (Les Républicains, formerly known as UMP) the main center right party in recent years. This year its candidate, Valérie Pécresse, ranked fifth in first round voting.

French national politics is now largely organized around charismatic leadership with sizeable groups admiring Macron and (Marion) Le Pen more than their movements/parties. According to the prediction of Van Kersbergen (a Dutch distinguished political scientist now at Aarhus in Denmark) such charismatic politics is what remains when projects of this-worldly salvation are abandoned (or completed). The passage quoted above is the start of his concluding section.

While the French case is, perhaps extreme, in most continental European countries the parties that helped define the post WWII mainstream electoral system have seen steady (and correlated) erosions of support and membership of over the last few decades. In many places (Italy, Belgium, Holland, and now Germany) once powerful Christian Democratic parties are a shell of their former selves. Social democratic parties have been doing worse for longer. 

According to Van Kersbergen (who is clearly and explicitly indebted to Max Weber and Mair's "Ruling the Void"), the politics of this-worldly salvation is characteristic of modernity; it is the effect of secularization in which "something of the religious past is transcribed into the secularized political ventures of modernity." And such projects re-enchant politics. Often, Christian democracy was a vehicle for this (such that the enchanting project was itself explicitly motivated by religious commitments), but that's not required.

And while the enormous sympathy for Ukraine suggests that nationalism has not run out of steam as a this-worldly project, the only new existing this-worldly salvation project that has some continent-wide resonance is the Green project. The German Greens are part of the German coalition government (where they got about 15% of the votes), which is the heart of European power. So they are by no means irrelevant. In addition, with most European governments reconsidering their dependence on Russian energy sources after Putin's attack on Ukraine, it stands to reason that clean energy will grow in importance during the next decade. But we're still far from seeing the greens as a truly popular movement anywhere; even though the old main-stream parties collapsed, the candidate of the French Greens scored under 5% in the first round, which actually is less than during the 2017 Presidential election.

And while, say, in the UK and USA, there are structural barriers to the rise of green parties, this is not the case in proportional representation systems. So, as the effects of climate change become harder and harder to miss, the absence of a massive green movement and rising Green parties, suggests the (somewhat worrisome) possibility that it might become another elite mission alongside the European Union driven by technocratic solutions and popular rejection (think of the Yellow jerseys). 

Europe's cathedrals are a useful reminder that widespread shared commitments can engender centuries' long (building) projects. I have long thought that the Greens need to find a way to orient their project not in terms of diminishment (less consumption, less growth, less fun), but in terms of something that can be created (clean air, but then visible).

Other than such a Green project, I am unfamiliar with new this-worldly projects that might create mass mobilization and long term political movements. Writing more than a decade ago (and really before the series of financial crises that paralyzed the EU), Van Kersbergen himself is rather pessimistic:

the success of contemporary Western populism insinuates that popular sentiments and political enthusiasm predominantly hover around the edges of the radical right. In the context of the imperfect integration of religious and ethnic minorities and continuing migration, there is no guarantee that political firebrands will not find ways to tap into xenophobic undercurrents too. (50)

His way of expressing this undoubtedly earnest concern already reveals ("imperfect integration") the success of these xenophobic undercurrents infecting purportedly dispassionate analysis. For this is the frame that is de facto victim blaming, and unable to specify and locate the true sources of the problems in the political system (see Lea Klarenbeek's work on relational integration here, here, here). The idea that migration is the source of the problem leads more or less without remainder to the radical right's this-worldly project: closed borders and deportations, that is, a police state. 

Okay, let me wrap up. First, after a decade of financial crisis and low growth, Brexit, pandemic, the rise of authoritarian nationalism in Hungary (and Poland!), European democracy has turned out to be surprisingly resilient. Even so Van Kersbergen has been fairly prescient. My own suspicion, second, is that alongside the elite projects of the EU and Green future, we'll see a lot of charismatic politics often authoritarian and nationalist in character but mostly within democratic institutions.* Third, what Van Kersbergen misses, I think, is that we're also living in an age of great experimentation with sexual, family, personal, and technological identities and that these experiments in living may well -- once attacked by an overconfident, overreaching nationalist (hierarchy embracing) authoritarians -- give rise to a new, more liberal inclined great society. Or so, I'll argue soon.:)

*While the academy is seeing a true, fascinating revival in Marxist thought, I don't think it is resonating in the wider culture. But maybe I am wrong about this.

Comments

[Benjamin Geer]

The idea that the rise of authoritarian nationalism results from the "elimination of politics as an instrument of this-worldly salvation", or that "charismatic politics is what remains when projects of this-worldly salvation are abandoned", seems incoherent and ahistorical to me. Nationalism *is* a project of this-worldly salvation and has always involved a great deal of charismatic leadership, which has often been used to legitimise authoritarian rule.

Scholars of nationalism have pointed out again and again that the concepts and social relations involved in nationalism closely follow religious models. Since you're talking about France, I should point out that the 18th-century architects of French nationalism consciously and explicitly sought to design a cult of the nation that could take the place of Christianity (see, for example, David Bell's book _The Cult of the Nation in France_). Their efforts were swiftly rewarded with the messianic worship of the military dictator Napoleon Bonaparte, establishing a pattern that would be repeated in many other countries.

Charismatic leadership makes the leader appear to have the prophetic ability to see truths that that others do not have access to (and must simply accept on faith). It is thus incompatible with the scientific outlook that is the basis of environmentalism. So I think a real disenchantment of politics, which would involve the widespread rejection of charismatic leadership, could only be a good thing for the environmental movement.

[Eric Schliesser]

We agree that nationalism is a this-world worldly project, and so does Van Keersbergen (see the quoted passage). And that it has often been driven by charismatic politics. Not sure why you think I deny that.

[Benjamin Geer]

In the quote above, Van Keersbergen says that the project of "Nation-State Building" (i.e. nationalism) has been a victim of "gradual elimination" along with all other projects of "this-worldly salvation". This is false, because nationalism is stronger than ever.

Moreover, you and Van Keersbergen argue that disenchantment is leading to a rise in charismatic politics. This is a contradiction, because charismatic leadership is a symptom of enchanted politics, i.e. politics based on religious models.

You refer to Green politics as a "salvation project" that might "re-enchant" politics. This is a misinterpretation of Green politics, which is precisely a disenchanted politics, a politics that requires people to accept scientific knowledge rather than the enchanted myths that charismatic leaders offer.

[Eric Schliesser]

Your last paragraph, Benjamin, is precisely why I call it an elite mission, alas.