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Enzo Rossi

I'm going to sound like a broken record here after the lengthy exchange on Twitter last weekend, but I can't resist noting this small point: (i) Sleat doesn't refute the view that political norms must be nonmoral, he shows (correctly) that most realists don't hold it. (ii) He also (wrongly) says that nonmoral normativity must be distinctly political (a mistake he imports from Leader-Maynard and Worsnip's paper). Whereas I other radical realists use epistemic normativity, others use prudential normativity, others a combination, etc.


Hi Enzo,
Fair enough. But on (i) in virtue of showing that most realists don't hold the view that political normativity must be non-moral, he shows it's not required by political realism on a natural self-understanding. Nobody has argued, I think, that such a realist is or has to be inconsistent on this point. On (ii) I agree with you that there are other kinds of normativity. And that one could go as you go with with epistemic and prudential normativity. In fact, (iii) what makes Lazar's book so important, I think is that she shows that these other kinds of normativity themselves are among the sources of value conflict in ordinary political life. And so, it's not just radicals or anti-liberals who might wish to make this point. Of course, (iv) she also claims that there is non-liberal moral normativity that is also a source of such conflict which as far as I can tell is distinctive of her view.

Enzo Rossi

That all seems about right.

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Here's a link to my past blogging (and discussions involving me) at: New APPS.


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