How much better and more excellent than the doctrines of the aforesaid writer are the reflections of Thales of Miletus, appears from the following argument [redenering]. All the goods, he says, are in common among friends; wise men are the friends of the gods, and all things belong to the gods; therefore all things belong to the wise. Thus in a single sentence, this wisest of men accounts himself most rich, rather by generously [edelmoedig] despising riches than by sordidly seeking them. In other passages he shows that the wise lack riches, not from necessity, but from choice. For when his friends reproached him with his poverty he answered, "Do you wish me to show you, that I could acquire what I deem unworthy of my labour, but you so diligently seek?" On their answering in the affirmative, he hired every oil-press in the whole of Greece -- for being a distinguished astronomer he knew that the olive harvest would be as abundant as in previous years it had been scanty --, and sub-let at his own price what he had hired for a very small sum, thus acquiring in a single year a large fortune, which he bestowed liberally as he had gained it industriously, &c.--Spinoza to Jarig Jelles, The Hague, 17 Feb., 1671. Translated by R. H. M. Elwes (with modest modifications).+ [Here is the Dutch version in De Nagelate Schriften.]
In today's post, I am primarily interested in the third quoted paragraph (although the first two are definitely fascinating). I have noted before (recall) that in his Natural History of Religion, David Hume explicitly treats Thales as an "atheist" and, by implication, a proto-Spinozist, who treats cosmogeny without recourse to a deity. Presumably Hume's account of Thales was influenced by Diogenes Laertius, who presents Thales as a kind of pantheist (although not a monist about gods) and Cicero, who, in De Divinitatio (1:111), treats Thales as an exemplary natural philosopher with the skill to have rational foresight of nature.
This matters because Hume treats Thales kind of as the founder of philosophy, especially natural philosophy.* In this -- that Thales is the first real philosopher -- he kind of follows the presentation of Diogenes Laertius, who also attributes to Thales the saying, 'know thyself.'
And, as regular readers know (recall) I am quite fond of the story of Thales, and its variants in Aristoteles, about Thales' monopolizing oil-presses. Thales shows up in these digressions more regularly (recall here; here; here; here; here); and even in my scholarship (and also here).
I was reminded of the quoted passage by Spinoza by a Dutch learned (non academic) correspondent, Marco van Heugten, in response to a handbook chapter I published on "Spinoza and Economics." Van Heugten correctly noted I had missed its significance. This is a shame because it could have nicely supported the general claims in the chapter in which I had argued that that Spinoza thought the open‐ended pursuit of wealth is a species of madness (Ethics 4, p44S), even though he did not reject moderate desire for the conveniences of life (Ethics 4, p45c2s). (Most of my chapter is on how he diagnoses a political problem of luxury, and the institutional mechanisms by which it can be managed.)
Spinoza's version of the story of the olive presses is close to Aristotle's version. In one important respect Spinoza's version of the Thales story deviates from Aristotle's. Aristotle very strongly implies that Thales knowledge of the heavens is irrelevant to his source of wealth (regardless what Thales and his friends or the common people may have thought). Monopoly is a decidedly terrestrial feature (and, as Aristotle claims, knowledge and use of it widespread), and any correlation between celestial phenomena and harvests an irrelevant aside. As it happens this nicely fits Aristotle's tendency to treat the heavens and terrestrial matters as relatively distinct.
Spinoza, who lived in an age of commerce, and whose Political Treatise is full examples that he understands the nature of monopoly, the role of incentives, and mechanism design just fine, does not treat Thales' astronomical knowledge as an aside. Post Galileo and Descartes, one may say, the heavens and earthly matters are re-integrated and so the idea that one could forecast (the directionality of) harvests based on astronomical observations was not wholly implausible. (Of course, Spinoza also recognizes that Thales was a monopolist.)
The point of the previous passage is nicely illustrated by Gassendi's (1649) treatment of the anecdote in volume 2 of the Animadversiones. My former (Ghent) colleague, Steven Vanden Broecke called my attention to it.+ Gassendi, who is a critic of judicial astrology, cannot take the relative decoupling of the heavens and terrestrial matters for granted because the new science is re-integrating them (which opens the door to certain forms of astrology still familiar to casual readers of the newspaper). And so he adds more detail about the kind and historical basis of empirical knowledge Thales would have possessed.
As an aside, if I were Justin Smith, I might report to you the contents of seventeenth century almanacs on seasonal forecasting here. But I'll stick to what I know and mention that in the nineteenth century, the economist-logician, Jevons, tried to model, like a modern Thales, the correlation between sun spots and grain harvests. As I learned from my friend Sandra Peart, Jevons thought that the sun spots shaped economic moods (and expectations). Jevons treats Thales as "the father of philosophy."
Interestingly enough, Spinoza does not treat the anecdote about Thales to criticize the vulgar who mock the learned (which is common feature in the story about Thales). Rather, in his rendering it's Thales' own circle of friends who need persuading. And this makes me think that the letter to Jelles was partially intended for Spinoza's circle.
This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that I have been unable to find the source of the 'argument' attributed to Thales, who is presented here as an exemplary, generous wise man (and it seems to me worth comparing it with (Ethics IV, P45S)). Since Spinoza lived a life very much in the spirit of the 'argument,' it was undeniably important to him. It's psychologically interesting that Spinoza volunteers the story after suggesting he will write a pamphlet (which he never did) against the doctrines of Homo Politicus. And the implication is that he, too, could be rich if he had wanted to be. This would have appealed to Jelles, who was a merchant, but who had turned his back on the business world and had been devoted to his studies. But judging by Spinoza's request to him (in the first paragraph), Jelles was taken to be still influential in worldly affairs.
So, let me wrap up. Of course, in Spinoza the real point is that if one has wealth one should bestow it on noble causes. This echoes the account of liberality in Book IV (I think, please correct me) of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. And this is either a hint to his friend (who was wealth), or, perhaps more kindly, a thank you to his generous friend.
We know that Adam Smith very much lived in the spirit of the argument attributed to Thales by Spinoza. (I don't have any reason to think Smith was influenced by Spinoza's depiction of Thales on this score.) But Hume does not. Hume explicitly defends the pursuit of (non-excessive) riches for the wise man and offers himself as an exemplar in his autobiography.
As regular readers know, I think Spinoza is not very far from Hume's pre-occupations at key points in his works. Paul Russell has offered solid reasons for thinking that this idea is a natural effect of the presentation of the Treatise.** In that light it is worth remarking, again, that in Hume's hands, at the start of his own philosophical project, Thales is treated as a natural philosopher and not a moral philosopher. This is, in fact, revisionary because it goes against Thales as one of the exemplary Greek wise men (and the presentation in Diogenes Laertius). And so a Spinozist, free-thinking reader of the Treatise is also alerted to the fact that Hume is no slavish follower at all.
+One of my more important changes is that Elwes has 'astrologer' where I have 'astronomer'; the Dutch of De Nagelaten Schriften says literally 'experienced in the orbits of the stars,' that is, an astronomer. (In his translation, Curley translates directly from NS, and uses "very experienced in the movement of the stars.") Since the original was in Dutch this seems the right way to go. Somewhat surprising, the Latin of the Opera Posthuma says 'Astrologus,' which seems to have influenced various other translations (including Akkerman's Dutch one). 'Astrologus' is ambigious between astronomer and astrologer, although I believe that in late the seventeenth century 'astrologus; was rarely used to convey an astronomer. Unfortunately for my present argument, as Steven Vanden Broecke alerted me, Gassendi does use 'astrologis' in vol. 2 of the (1649) Animadversiones (pp. 940-941). In correspondence with me, Piet Steenbakkers suggested that OP reflects the idea Spinoza was describing Thales as practicing juridical astrology in the sense of the art of inferring from the heavens practical consequences. But on my view this was probably part of meteorology for Spinoza.
*As I have noted (here) Hume's friend, Adam Smith, denies these claims about Thales without mentioning Hume.
**In my own work I have offered other grounds for thinking that Hume is going after Clarke's 'Newtonian' criticisms of Spinoza.
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