It's been almost thirty years since the United States has had a President, George H.W. Bush (41), who was skilled in foreign policy, and knowledgeable about the strategic and political challenges it faced. He had, in fact, served American governments abroad and in key strategic positions long before he became President. To say this is not to ignore his limitations or failures (or to approve of his policies). To observers of the nature of liberal democracy, it should come as no surprise that he has few genuine admirers among the citizens of that proud nation.
Since, the foreign policy of the most powerful nation of the globe has been hijacked by war profiteers, adventurers of the liberal humanitarian, neo-con, and Christian kinds not to mention the outright corruption of the previous administration. Among the longer-sitting, elected senators and members of the House, there are few with the curiosity and background to help steward and steady foreign policy. One need not treat the Fulbright's, Nunns, Lugars, Proxmires as saints or wise, to recognize they have no obvious counterparts today. It is not obvious they would flourish (recall the sad spectacle of Rex Tillerson).
The effect has been notable: a steady erosion of American alliances such that notionally American allies were aiding different sides of the Syrian civil war and undermining official American policy. Another notional ally, Pakistan, aided and abetted Bin Laden and the Taliban. Last I checked the assassination of a US citizen-journalist ordered by the leader of a key ally has had no consequence at all. Meanwhile there has been retreat from free trade (the Doha round has been languishing forever). Liberal democracy and human rights are in retreat (not infrequently cheered on by the occupant of the White House). Until there is multilateral policy, we can expect covid to linger and cause problems. And American leadership in the most important collective action problem, the environmental crisis, is lacking for decades now. (Feel free to add your own issues to the list.)
It's pretty clear that there is no institutional reason to expect this drift to change any time soon. Leaving foreign affairs to the military or the experts means competent stewardship, but de facto no real policy at all. For policy involves facing tough trade-offs and mobilizing support for long term aims. And because the many advantages the US enjoys on the world stage, it is doubtful that foreign policy challenges will become salient to informed American voters and party leaders any time soon.
The shameful ending to twenty years American involvement in Afghanistan with betrayal of local allies and dependents is, thus, no accident.* It's been long known that insurgencies can outlast occupation when the occupier is a liberal democracy (and, to be sure, not interested in colonizing the occupied land). At some point, and often years too late, voters and their politicians simply lose interest. Even those that profit big time from continued occupation lose heart.
There is another recurring pattern: that the salience of foreign policy is discovered by US Presidents after their initial domestic agenda has been defeated or frustrated. (It is, after all, an area in which they are less constrained than other policy areas.) But, by then they are in search of quick results, and so easy prey for advisers that promise too much and foreigners that can smell a good opportunity. And while this occasionally means a worthy deal, it rarely shapes long-term policy for the better. The net effect is not just drift, but also the capture of foreign policy by rent-seeking interests who have the expertise and financial focus to shape the highly technical features of international patent law and technological collaboration or localized military interventions.
Perhaps all of this is to be expected in a continent wide republic without a clear military threat or a dire emergency. But I suspect it's also the effect of the tendency to disregard the Constitution, which tries to provide a unified framework for domestic and foreign policy, when it comes to foreign policy (and war) during the last century--arguably since United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp (1936)). The imperial, unchecked presidency has been a long time coming. But this lack of true checks on the American President (when it comes to foreign affairs, border control, and the very grey zone of US illicit security activity abroad) has had the perverse effect of less government by discussion and more impulse decisions.
Given that the US has military bases with rapid response teams spread around the world, and that it has military contractors pursuing profit under their protection, it is to be expected that the next foreign policy disaster will occur with the same stupidity and opportunity costs before long. Perhaps, it's unfolding already.
*Full disclosure: I thought -- and still think -- that the Taliban made a legitimate military target for shielding and supporting Bin Laden. After the Battle of Tora Bora, a strategic withdrawal would have been advisable, especially because without clear Pakistani support none of the immediate aims were achievable I did not support any of the grander missions later.
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