Suppose for instance that peace is signed to-day, that it is published to the whole world: how do we know that posterity will ratify the articles. Opinions are changeable, and the actions of the men of the present time do not bind their successors. To put an end to this objection, it suffices to remember what we have said about the causes of war, which not being considerable, for the reasons given above, there is nothing that can occasion the rupture of a peace. Nevertheless, to prevent the inconvenience of this, it would be necessary to choose a city, where all sovereigns should have perpetually their ambassadors, in order that the differences that might arise should be settled by the judgment of the whole assembly. The ambassadors of those who would be interested would plead there the grievances of their masters and the other deputies would judge them without prejudice. And to give more authority to the judgment, one would take advice of the big republics, who would have likewise their agents in this same place. I say great Republics, like those of the Venitians and the Swiss, and not those small lordships, that cannot maintain themselves, and depend upon the protection of another. That if anyone rebelled against the decree of so notable a company, he would receive the disgrace of all other Princes, who would find means to bring him to reason. Now the most commodious place for such an assembly is the territory of Venice, because it is practically neutral and indifferent to all Princes: added thereto that it is near the most important monarchies of the earth, of those of the Pope, the two Emperors, and the King of Spain. It is not far from France, Tatary, Moscovy, Poland, England, and Denmark. As for Persia, China, Ethiopia, and the East and the West Indies, they are lands far distant, but navigation remedies that inconvenience, and for such a good object, one must not refuse a long voyage.--Émeric Crucé (1623) The New Cyneas, translated by Thomas Willing Balch, pp. 102-104 [page-numbers of modern translation].
The perspective of modern liberalism tends to be future oriented and too involved with the problems of governing, that liberals tend to forget key episodes from its own history of social activism. This, more than the framing by their Marxist critics, helps explain why Richard Cobden has become associated with the reductive label ‘Manchester liberal.’ But even when liberals remember free-trade and the corn-laws as victories, the liberal tradition tend to ignore his anti-imperialism[1] and his courageous anti-militarism. In addition, even within free-trade, he was creative and instrumental in making most favored nation status as a key device of a liberal trade order. And, finally, in opposing gun-boat diplomacy and militarism, he was an incessant advocate of international arbitration as an alternative to war.
While you, my dear educated reader, have at least heard of Cobden, I am pretty sure that Crucé is almost certainly obscure to you (unless you paid attention to my recent blog post). But while it would be anachronistic to call Crucé a liberal – but perhaps less so than calling Locke a liberal --, Crucé definitely deserves attention for articulating many of the best features of a liberal program long before they were popular (religious toleration including non-Christians (pagans, Jews, Muslims, etc.)), the virtues of commerce, the significance of public works, and the rule of law, low taxes, etc. Crucé’s larger program is founded on cosmopolitan principles of common humanity and sympathy.
Because I started this digression with Cobden, today I want to focus on one of the more technocratic devices, his idea of a truly international court of arbitration. The first thing to notice is that he includes non-Christian and non-European sovereigns in the process. This is very much untainted by the kind of racism that plagues so many of such (later) proposals. To be sure, at times Crucé expresses genocidal hatred of barbarians and savages. And while he may sound like Aristotle (“I place among beasts savage people who do not reason” (52)), but, upon closer inspections, these only involve folk who refuse to play nice with others (and so Crucé is not inclined to treat one approach to political life as superior than others). In general Crucé loathes the admiration of conquerors in the European tradition, and wishes honor and admiration to accrue not “by sackings, massacres, and acts of hostility, but by gentle government, a legitimate and regulated power.” (48)
Crucé is not especially interested in the law. And I understand why lawyers have not treated him as one of their own because he asserts early in the book, “Jurisprudence is also not necessary, and a good natural judgment is sufficient to finish lawsuits, without resorting to a multitude of laws and decisions that only con-fuse cases instead of simplifying them.” (82) So, the arbitration council is, perhaps, better seen as an anticipation of the security council than the international court of arbitration.
The point is not so much to build up, and develop an international case law, but rather to prevent war and maintain peace among those – great powers – most likely to resort to war. And to achieve this, what’s required is not so much knowledge of the law, but good worldly judgment. This is also reflected in the composition of the international arbitration council of ambassadors.
Unlike the modern security council, in Crucé’s arbitration tribunal great powers do not arbitrate their own cases. But like the modern security council, there may well be enforcement troubles. Crucé is probably too optimistic in assuming that collective security is possible if a great power is just adamant on going to war. But it is worth noting that that for the vast majority of states declining to obey the outcome of arbitration, and violate international norms, does tend to come with a steep price. An even know, EU member states have come in the habit of resolving all their disputes peacefully either by law, or very much in the spirit of Crucé’s proposal (with ambassadors in Brussels). So, while he recognizes, repeatedly, that his proposal will be treated as utopian (Plato’s Republic not More is treated as the exemplary work), we ought to pause that we live, partially in such utopian world.
Unlike Kant, Crucé does not think such a scheme is only possible with suitably reformed states (who should be liberal republics with division of powers). From what he writes I suspect Crucé agrees with Kant that such states are more pacific. And much of the book (about which some other time more) is devoted to creating the conditions of peaceful public administration. But from Crucé’s perspective, the urgency of his proposal is precisely that its absolute sovereigns that need to be constrained. This is why it’s clearly more important to have kings and emperors represented in Venice than republics.[2]
I do think there is a democratic sentiment tucked into Crucé’s proposal. For it is quite clear that one ground of inclusion in the arbitration council, is great populous-ness. Admittedly this is easy to miss because shortly after the passage quoted, Crucé addresses the worry about the relative rank of the ambassadors next at great length. But it’s pretty clear this reflects the preoccupation with hierarchy of his intended audience more than his own sensibility. And one cannot help but think that part of his rhetorical strategy is to make such preoccupation seem like a ridiculous species of superstition. Even so, it is pretty clear that Crucé's proposal is a concession to realism; this is a feature not a bug of his proposal.
Anyway, I often intend my digressions as invitations to read the works discussed, but I hope this post has made you intrigued about Crucé to explore his “little book” (350) The New Cyneas (which is easily found on the internet).
I'm hooked! What a fascinating author, and why have I not heard of him before. Shame on me. Anyway, thank you, Eric!
Posted by: Marius Stan | 08/27/2021 at 02:35 PM