[This is an excerpt of a commissioned book review that became a victim of the pandemic.--ES]
Julian Baggini’s (2018) How the World Thinks: A Global History of Philosophy is wonderfully written and provides a highly compelling comparative introduction to philosophy, including philosophical traditions rarely discussed. (It does suffer from gendered pattern of exclusion, alas.) Baggini, whose experience in journalism is apparent, has organized the book around his own curiosity, exploring alternative traditions all over the world. Because he has an eye for marvelous quotations, the book is a gem to read and re-read together. For example, in preparing this review I would often stop to read some quote to my (then) ten year old son. And these would always inspire further reflection by him. Throughout the work Baggini manages to appeal to our natural sense of wonder, and I warmly recommend it.
But I do not recommend it unconditionally. And what follows articulates my growing unease as I reflected on the book. So before I continue, I want to stress that I admire Baggini's achievement.
The underlying conceit of the book is that philosophies reflect the deeply embedded cultural values, the sediment of a major cultural tradition. (Baggini studiously avoid using ‘civilization.’) Understanding the philosophy of another culture is then a way to see how to see the world differently as shaped by other intellectual assumptions and so a way to understand their culture. Underlying this approach is an idea of culture where philosophy trickles down to the masses and their less reflective practices. Baggini does not stop to investigate this (elitist) idea, which itself has a long history (some version of it can, for example, be found in Mencius, Al-Farabi, Margaret Cavendish, and Bishop Berkeley).
Baggini practices what he preaches and so travels all around the world talking to philosophers and artists alike. Baggini’s most fascinating passages are when he tries to get his head around ideas and cultures where there is a commitment to a relational self (Japan) or a metaphysics of no-self at all (Buddhism). The focus on Japan is itself welcome, and Baggini manages to entice this reader to look up a number of fascinating Japanese art works that Baggini mentions to illustrate some of his claims about Japanese culture.
However, at times Baggini’s willful neglect of ethnographic methods and anthropology also makes him come across as naïve. At various moments it is quite clear that Baggini’s informants are recruiting him into essentially national even nationalist enterprises romanticizing sometimes lost organic and unified cultures (recall this post by Liam Kofi Bright; and my response). Even Bertrand Russell would not have been surprised that university professors peddle in such dubious ware.
Baggini shows no interest in the developing experimental research program of so-called X-PHI. This program increasingly explores in experimental fashion how people across the world make moral judgments. And while it sometimes finds genuine comparative differences it also finds commonalities among people’s moral evaluations and the process by which they reach them.
Often Baggini’s own eyes tell him such cultures do not exist anymore, but he does not seem to allow that culture may be more hybrid than he allows. At other times Baggini’s interest in other cultures is highly selective. For example, he is clearly and explicitly very taken by the meritocratic defense of social hierarchy to be found in Confucian thought.
But why the Confucian school is more authentically Chinese than the much more egalitarian Mohist school is never explained. That gentleman-scholars and rulers found it more congenial to promote Confucianism in all its demandingness than Mohism never seems to occurs to Baggini. Perhaps I found him to be unconvincing because I happen to read Baggini’s fond quotes of Daniel Bell on the merits of harmony over the value of freedom while the citizens of Hong Kong were daily risking their careers and lives courageously defending their civil rights.
Baggini does not really alert the reader that his book embraces a Kantian relativized a priori best known in the work of another great philosophical anthropologist, Cassirer (who goes unmentioned). Not unlike Cassirer, Baggini’s interest in other cultures is cosmopolitan in character.
The Kantianism in Baggini is not ad hoc. When confronted with Indian views that suggest that our linguistic understanding of the world are in non-trivially ways misguided and limited, and their practices to overcome such limitations, Baggini marshals a soft-Kantian defense of the idea that our cognitive capacities structure our experience of the world, which “still has to come through the lens of human nature.” This may be true, but it does not follow that an alternative is incoherent (as he argues). Baggini never confronts the possibility that he has reached the limits of argument.
Be that as it may, it is peculiar and odd that Baggini identifies the Kantian position as intrinsically western, even though the position he ascribes to Buddhism has more than a family resemblance to Spinoza’s philosophy; not unlike the Buddhist thinkers discussed by Baggini, Spinoza also treats the highest form of knowledge as a kind of immediate identification with or union with nature. Spinoza's suspicions of the role of language in our thinking is already familiar in Plato’s Phaedrus and was widespread among early modern philosophers. Leibniz, who shared the suspicion, thought that Spinoza went too far by turning everything but God/Nature into transitory ephemera.
Baggini briefly treats Spinoza as an arch rationalist. It is hard to complain about that. But even so, even Russell noticed that Spinoza offers a philosophy capable of consolation to the cosmic loneliness in an infinite universe felt by an atheist in times of great distress. The more important point lurking here is that Baggini does not live up to his own promise to use the encounter with other philosophical traditions to explore his own assumptions and the complexity of the tradition he has inherited. To travel with a firm sense of self unchanged through the trip is characteristic of tourism. For all his genuine inquisitiveness and sense of wonder, Baggini does not allow himself the risk of transformation.
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