Mr. Morgenthau's positive proposals as to how social problems ought to be approached exhibit an irresponsible romanticism. He rejects "scientism" because its universalist conception of social laws is allegedly unhistorical--though already J. S. Mill, for example, was entirely clear that the principles of Ricardian economics are applicable only under certain historical conditions. But what is sauce for the goose is evidently not sauce for the gander, for as the passage cited above shows, Mr. Morgenthau has no scruples in affirming "eternal" laws, provided that "more-than-scientific" man asserts them. There can be no mistaking Mr. Morgenthau's low opinion of what controlled inquiry can contribute to the understanding of social processes, or his enthusiasm for men of "higher insights." He has the courage to say that "There is no indication that the trained social scientist as actor on the social scene is more competent than the layman to solve social problems, with the exception of technical problems of limited scope"; and he does not hesitate to assert that "while fundamental social problems are impervious to scientific attack, they seem to yield to the efforts of ill-informed men who, while devoid of scientific knowledge, possess insights of a different and higher kind." Advances made through institution of rational methods of inquiry into such matters as public health, treatment of the insane, administration of the law, or education of the young, are apparently insignificant and merely technical achievements in his eyes! Just what social problems exist which are not specific and technical, is not clear from Mr. Morgenthau's rhetoric. And it is worth at least passing mention that the high esteem he exhibits for the daemonic "ill-informed" man endowed with a "higher kind" of wisdom, involves a fundamental surrender of critical intelligence to dogmatic authority. For to accept an insight simply because it is claimed to be a higher wisdom, is to declare as out of bounds the demand for a critical public appraisal of policies arrived at by such insights.
The pinnacle of political wisdom, Mr. Morgenthau contends, is recognition of the tragic character of life. Life is necessarily tragic, according to him, simply because all action is inherently "sinful" and "evil"-sinful and evil, since the springs of action are "irrational" forces, and the consequences of our actions can be neither calculated in advance nor controlled. However, political success must be measured by the degree to which one can and increase his power over others; and accordingly, "To know that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is Mr. Morgenthau does not realize that his supposition that inherently irrational is intelligible only on an anthropomorphic nature. For the term "irrational" is meaningful only if the term is-and how is one to conceive of "rational forces" if not on the hypothesis an over-all plan and design? Indeed, Mr. Morgenthau's entire conception human nature is built squarely on Calvinistic foundations, though benefit of Christian theology. He defines the good life (with, despairing "alas!") in terms of domination over others; but he himself of any basis for evaluating political behavior except successful assertion of power. His political ethics is thus inherently and in his conception of things the anguish of those who have the struggle for power must simply be accepted as part of the sinful character of the world. That Mr. Morgenthau should think higher wisdom is certainly good reason for adopting a tragic view.
Morgenthau's Scientific Man vs Power Politics is one of the founding documents of the so-called realist stream in international relations theory. IR theory has a kind of shadowy existence within contemporary analytic philosophy. In so far as there is any engagement with it, it tends to come through a Kantianized global justice perspective (with more recent work on ethics of immigration, global justice, global environmental ethics, human rights law, etc.) or various utilitarian approaches. I have found, for example, no mention of Morgenthau in Rawls, who is incredibly well read, in Nozick, or Amartya Sen.* Unsurprisingly, Shklar does cite Morgenthau.
I don't wish to claim that the hostile review Nagel gave of Morgenthau can explain such a pattern of silence. But it may be instructive for the mutual indifference. It also opens a window into Nagel's larger political theory. A key part of Nagel's response to Morgenthau is to claim that Morgenthau is criticizing "the dead duck of 19th century individualistic liberalism;" Nagel agrees with Morgenthau that it had a "shallow optimism" and "tidy rationalism of what is essentially the philosophy of the Enlightenment." Nagel agrees that mere "appeals to reason" won't solve humanity's problems. (LWM 378). Much of the best parts of Nagel's review expose the dated (implicit) philosophy of science of Morgenthau.
The mention of Mill, above, signals that for Nagel liberalism can take on board not just a more historicized understanding of social explanation/science, but also, romanticism's insights into human need and individuality. That is to say, against Morgenthau's "irresponsible romanticism" (indebted to Nietzsche), Nagel places a more responsible romanticism indebted to Mill.**
In fact, the previous paragraph alerts us to the fact that for Nagel, liberalism itself has changed character. In a companion review of a political history (of A Generation of Materialism: 1871-1900) by Carlton Hayes it becomes clear that Nagel shares in the liberal self-understanding (familiar from people as broadly apart as Hobson, Mises, Hayek, and Lippmann) that "traditional liberalism" (LWM 383) was defeated by the rise of "neo-mercantilism" and "imperialism" amongst other isms (not the least racialized eugenics) at the end of the nineteenth century. And while Nagel's own views should not be confused with the neo-liberalism that can be traced back to the 1938 Lippmann colloquium, he understands his own liberalism as new, too. And while it is tempting to call his pragmatist liberalism, I am going to use 'scientific liberalism' as a term of art for Nagel's version.
Unlike other liberal friends of technocracy, Nagel's scientific liberalism is not oriented toward (possible) consensus. As I have noted (recall) it embraces pluralism, and this pluralism is rooted in a pluralist metaphysics in which no single perspective is ultimately privileged. In addition this metaphysics provides a kind of template for society: each individual has objective existence, but is simultaneously socially embedded. For Nagel, science is exemplary for, and instrumental to, how societies can progress in light of an be responsive to reasoned criticism. This is echoed in the criticism of Morgenthau's great man politics, when Nagel hails the "advances made through institution of rational methods of inquiry into such matters as public health, treatment of the insane, administration of the law, or education of the young." (LWM 380)
Now, much can be said about Nagel's diagnosis that Morgenthau's anthropology is de facto Calvinist. And that the recognition of a tragic character of life is no more than a mild cover for treating domination over others as the true end of politics. It is a tricky question to what degree this is a misreading.
Nagel clearly thinks that a scientific politics ground in rational methods of inquiry is possible. And the implication of his argument is that Nagel thinks this is also possible in international affairs. It is unclear, however, whether Nagel believes that this is so because the international arena is not characterized by "the ineliminable struggle for power" (LWM 378) or whether he thinks, more likely I think, that rational methods of inquiry are also capable of properly analyzing such a struggle.
Somewhat surprisingly, part of Nagel's response to Morgenthau is to claim that Morgenthau confuses what may be called the context of origin/discovery from the context of validity/justification. And Nagel is happy to grant Morgenthau that non-scientific methods can be good sources of, what we may call, political nous. But Nagel denies that we should ground policy on them. Public policy should be guided by claims/theories have has survived the stringent testing and experimentation of science.
It is a bit of shame that Nagel does not say a bit more about how scientific practice can develop experimental knowledge of international affairs. And one wonders to what degree he has developments at the Rand Corporation in mind. But let's leave that aside. While one can heartily embrace Nagel's #noheroes. Nagel's argument against Morgenthau is weaker than he may have realized, even on its own terms.
For, science is by its very nature a slow and at times frustrating process. Even if one grants that science is the only "reliable method for establishing claims to knowledge," it does not follow that the knowledge one would like to be guided by is ready at hand. (I am also leaving aside the question to what degree the values of public policy are aligned with the assumed values in the scientific community.) International crises and emergencies, or new technologies or diseases may cause new circumstances, that may unfold more rapidly than science can handle at first. As we have learned this year, fast science may create its own political challenges that call for forms of ungrounded- decisions. In conditions of radical or even moderate uncertainty it is possible that Morgenthau's statesman have to rise to the occasion. To say that is not to slide into the dark side of obscurantism, but it is to recognize the possible present imperfections of our best forms of knowledge.
*Sen did give the Morgenthau Memorial lectures. Even Pogge barely engages with Morgenthau.
**This is not the place to explore how fair Nagel's reading of Morgenthau is. Given Morgenthau's obvious debts to Max Weber, the question of responsibility is much more complex than Nagel allows.
if we had something like an actually scientific (with real predictive powers and all) social science can't see how it could tell us what ought to be done as opposed to just telling us what is the case currently or what means might produce what ends.
On the broader issue I doubt if one can actually isolate out the "political" or the "economic" (or other department titles like Religion) from broader human doings...
Posted by: dmf | 12/12/2020 at 01:20 AM
on the to-do list
https://newbooksnetwork.com/pragmatisms-evolution
In Pragmatism’s Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy
(University of Chicago Press, 2020), Trevor Pearce demonstrates that the philosophical tradition of pragmatism owes an enormous debt to specific biological debates in the late 1800s, especially those concerning the role of the environment in development and evolution.
Posted by: dmf | 12/15/2020 at 05:49 PM