First, there are those epistemic burdens that, starting from a relatively illiberal context, would-be liberalizing policymakers must overcome in order to realize an effective liberal order. From a political-epistemological standpoint, a complete defense of liberalism (indeed, of any political system) requires more than establishing the relative epistemic simplicity of policymaking within such a system; it must be shown that a political system of the relevant kind can be realized through some combination of deliberate policymaking and spontaneous forces. Without such an argument – which Austrian economists and liberals more generally do not have – the case for liberalism (or whatever) is left ungrounded. In effect, the Austrians are left in the same position with respect to an effective liberal order as their socialist rivals are with regard to an effective centrally planned economy: with few reasons for thinking such a system a practicable, real-world possibility. That policymaking is less epistemically burdensome in more liberal contexts is immaterial if there is no reason to think such contexts can be realized, because policymakers’ epistemic burdens are too heavy for, and extant spontaneous forces inadequate to, their realization. Liberals need a theory of liberal transitions, that is, a theory of how more liberal contexts can be realized starting from relatively illiberal circumstances through a combination of deliberate policy action and spontaneous forces.
Second, there are those epistemic burdens that policymakers within liberal orders must overcome in order to maintain the effectiveness of the existing order. I suggest that the long-term effectiveness of a liberal order hinges on policymakers acquiring the know-how necessary to maintain in perpetuity the rule of law, one of the fundamental institutional conditions of an effective liberal order; however, those who succeed in acquiring wealth and power in an institutional environment of the rule of law, private-property rights, and competitive markets are often able to abrogate the rule of law in their own favor, while those less successful and less powerful remain subject to it, a circumstance that quite naturally fosters resentment and undermines belief in such institutions among the latter classes and tends to eventually lead to calls for the replacement of liberal social institutions with less liberal ones. In order to sustain an effective liberal order, policymakers must surmount the epistemic burden of acquiring the know-how necessary to avoid this outcome.
I argue that Austrians have not paid adequate attention to these epistemic burdens. Indeed, it is not clear that Austrian economists have yet recognized just how burdensome policymaking of the liberalizing and liberal order-sustaining varieties can be. However, the fact that the Austrians’ political-epistemological approach is applicable to the liberal political systems they themselves prefer and thus suggests a lacuna in their case for liberalism is no argument for illiberal government. If the problem of policymaker ignorance is a problem for liberals, it is no less a problem for defenders of other political systems, within which policymakers’ epistemic burdens are necessarily much heavier, because of the more extensive and more difficult objectives they are charged with deliberately realizing in less liberal contexts. Scott Scheall (2020) F.A. Hayek ad the Epistemology of Politics, Routledge 76-77
Scheall offers an excellent, philosophical immanent critique of what is now known as 'classical' liberal political philosophy (or Austrian political economy) and, thereby, renews it. And while some bits involve a creative interpretation of Hayek in context, it would be a shame if only Hayek-friendly folk read this; the book is fruitful to a wider audience interested in both low level public policy and more significant political transitions. This is so, even though at times the fact that it is an immanent critique means it fails to engage with already existing discussions in other parts of political philosophy.* And he lacks discussion of research in public administration.
In particular, I am thrilled that Scheal puts transition problems at the heart of theorizing about political life. Recall that (here, here, and here), I understand the transition problem, as [I] how to move from an unjust status quo to an ideal (or vastly improved) state and, in particular, with a population raised under bad institutions. In fact, as (recall) Serene Khader taught me, there are (at least) three species of the problem: the first version [A] really turns on the challenge of finding or developing the right sort of people (with the right education or dispositions, etc.) to get us from here to there and then to have the skills and temperament to make the new circumstances work out well. The second version [B] is to create mechanisms such that the incentives of policy-makers line up with the goals to be pursued and the true interests of people/constituents. The third version is [C] that a population raised under bad institutions may rationally prefer a bad status quo if getting to the better state involves high costs to them.
Perfectionists, including many illiberal types (Plato, Al-Farabi, etc.) tend to be focused on [I]. The liberal tradition, inspired by Machiavelli, has focused primarily on [B] and judging by recent Nobel prizes in economics is still going strong. And progressives/feminists (including liberal progressives/feminists) focus on [C]. Scheall himself is responding to folks focused on [B] (and he ignores the other versions of the transition problem). But in it he is also very sensitive to the fact that [II] at each step of the way from an imperfect status quo to a better destination involves a transition problem and that [III] even maintaining a status quo over time is, in some respects, similar to a transition problem (in the sense of [II]).+ And this point generalizes to all transition problems.**
Okay with that set up, I can state that Scheall's core claim is that the problem of policy-maker ignorance has logical priority to aligning policy-maker incentives with her constituents or society's needs. The core argument is summarized as follows:
[O]n the assumption that some principle like ought implies can is true and practically useful as a guide to action, then the word “can” in such principles must mean deliberately can. Other candidate meanings for the word “can” render such principles practically useless. Thus, by reductio, “can” in ought implies can (and related principles) means deliberately can. But, by definition, deliberately can just means knows enough to. Therefore, ought implies knows enough to: nothing that we cannot know enough to deliberately realize can be an obligation. The nature and extent of our ignorance place brackets around our potential obligations. Epistemic burdens are logically prior to other normative considerations. Since this is a general fact about human decision-making in all contexts, it follows that ignorance is logically prior to incentives in specifically political contexts. (3; Emphases in original).
Before I get to meat of today's post, two qualifications: (a) I don't think Scheall is right to assume that ought implies can applies to all policy contexts. Some policy decisions and ends are not normative nor obligations, and not understood as such by decision-makers. (Pick your favorite pork-barrel spending!) So, the way feasibility enters into these decisions may be more like other forms of instrumental reasoning (with cost-benefit analysis, opportunity costs, etc.). In addition, (b) it may at times make sense to pursue infeasible/utopian ends in virtue of the fact that in some environments aiming too high is better than aiming at a target within reach. But notice that in (a) and (b) epistemic burdens do not disappear (although how to think about (b) is not trivial). So, let's leave these aside.
Now, I will return to Scheall's set up, but today I close with one line of criticism. Throughout the book Scheall assumes that if policymakers lacks the knowledge to pursue an end, they shouldn't pursue it. For, when, the "do-nothing policy is aimed at no particular end, it bears no epistemic burden." (98) [I am not sure this adheres to his own insight [III] unless we sharply distinguish between do-nothing policy aimed at status quo and aimed at no particular end.] But that raises the problem that we might never discover what works.
Here's a version of what I have in mind. Let's say one agrees with Popper that policy should be informed by the spirit of or guided by trial-and-error. I pick Popper because Hayek and Popper have claimed to be kindred spirits on these matters.++ That is to say, only if errors are permitted can policy-makers and policy-scientist discover empirically what works, what are unexpected side-effects, and make mid-way adjustments. The more subtle point here is that Scheall tends to think of each policy-decision as a one-off: if you have the knowledge (ceteris paribus) you may act for an otherwise moral end, if you lack the knowledge (ceteris paribus) you may not.
But a Popperian treats public policy as many decisions extended over time. And by doing so a public policy is conceived as learning both what the means are and (but some other time more argument) what the ends are. That is to say, and this is in the spirit of Scheall, Popperian public policy treats much policy-making as instances of [II].
One final point, Scheall's approach as articulated has very little space for policy-makers that learn over time. And that's in part because he tends to think of them as elected politicians/officials/assemblies with short time-spans and lots of epistemic burdens. But the modern state has tried to address this: it is full of bureaucracies and dedicated research agencies that are, if institutional memory is allowed to be built up, capable of learning over time.*** This is why some kinds of cutting government can be self-undermining.
And it's not just bureaucrats. Popper was a careful reader of Lippmann. And as Lippmann noted (recall) one benefit of the 'revolving door' is that it would create a kind of permanent circulation of college graduates from universities into government; and technical, government bureaucrats returning regularly to train and teach at universities, etc. Now, it's true that this, in turn, raises other familiar problems (rent-seeking, how to decide which experts to trust), but this is why Scheall's work on [II-III] is so important. To be continued.
*So, for example, there is by now a huge literature on feasibility in political philosophy (Lawford-Smith 2013; Lawford-Smith & Gilabert 2012; Southwood & Brennan, etc.)
+So, for example, recall that Bruno Latour and Graham Harman tend to think of maintaining public goods as a matter of (de-politicized) technique whereas politics is decision under great deal of (Knightian) uncertainty. Scheall's argument suggest this distinction is a matter of degree (or not permanent, as Latour & Harman recognize [recall also here]).
**Scheall does not engage with the voluminous work prompted by the theory of second best (and nth best, etc.) While that literature is not Austrian in character, it gives a sense of how to begin to think about transitions under constraints.
++This is not to deny that Popper's stance is more receptive to a generally more activist policy stance than Hayek's.
***Here the problem of incentives may well be more important than Scheall allows.
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