It is important to recognize that legitimacy, though not the same as authority, still depends on it. Since the overall relation between the two concepts is somewhat complex, let me review again. The state must seek to justify its rule if it is to achieve the authority, the acceptance of the right to institute binding rules on society, that is necessary if order and social cooperation are to be possible to any significant extent. For that reason, it must address its claim of legitimacy only to those within its territory whom it considers to be full-fledged members of society, for it is their allegiance alone that it seeks. From others (e.g., resident or visiting aliens) it demands merely submission.--Charles Larmore (2020) What is Political Philosophy? Princeton UP: 98.
l had not seen or spoken to Charles Larmore, one of my wonderful supervisors, for more than a decade when a visit to Brown brought us together a few years ago. Since I had not read his (2013) article, I was surprised by the direction of his thought (because unaware by his engagement with the revival of political realism in the reception of the (recall) posthumous works of Bernard Williams). Since I had then just taught Enzo Rossi's pro-seminar to the graduate students (Rossi is one of the contemporary leaders of this new type of political realism), and working with Paul Raekstad (another colleague and himself developing a version of political realism) on a paper, I was by accident fully immersed in the political realism literature ((recall here; here; here). I was also surprised by Larmore's resigned pessimism about the future of liberalism.
The engagement with political realism and the resigned pessimism are on display in What is Political Philosophy? A lucid and focused work that is simultaneously metaphilosophy and political philosophy. Larmore agrees with the political realists that the question of legitimacy is constitutive of political philosophy and helps distinguish it from moral philosophy (e.g., p. 5). He also claims it has priority over other questions in the field. In addition, in virtue of addressing the question of legitimacy, "political liberalism," and here Larmore also speaks for, and (simultaneously) corrects, Rawls, undertakes "a refoundation of the liberal tradition." (151)
Larmore's political realism responds to, and simultaneously accepts, reasonable disagreement as a feature of modernity. That is to say, and Larmore is explicit about this, he treats liberalism as a latecomer in the history of political theory (16; 123; 169). In addition, this entails that Larmore explicitly accepts Carl Schmitt's "important truth" that "every principle of political inclusion" is "also a principle of exclusion," (166-7) that is, consensus on the content of legitimacy is impossible.
At this point, one may well wonder what is so liberal about Larmore's political liberalism since it gives up on liberalism's universalism and the thought that each individual counts. (Recall that Schmitt's claim presupposes the existence of collectivities.) For, in Larmore's hands, while the principle of justification of legitimacy -- a "principle of respect" for persons -- is supposed to be moral in character, it is addressed to those who are or taken to be "citizens" or would be citizens and their "reasonable agreement," (77; see also 158-162).* Larmore is admirably frank about the (possible) exclusionary implications of this in some contexts (102-3/ 116).
Now, as an aside I consider the question of legitimacy, while important, a dead-end for the revival of the liberal tradition. You may ask why; short answer: liberals should stop focusing on justifying the state's coercion of people, and rather focus on articulating theoretically salient, emancipatory solutions to concrete problems individuals face in contemporary (political) life in light of an ambitious theoretical vision and, thereby, help re-invent the tradition.
Be that as it may, here I focus on what is, for lack of a better phrase, a mistake of articulation. For,, in the quoted passage above (and other places in his argument), Larmore conflates the nature and needs of political philosophy with the nature and needs of political life. For, let's grant, for the sake of argument, that Larmore is right about the centrality of legitimacy to political philosophy. And let's also grant him that "political rule" is the "solution" to the "need for cooperation and the basic human tendencies that render it difficult if not impossible." (82) This need and difficulty "form...the circumstances of politics." (82;** his "impossible" conveys a sense of Larmore's pessimism.) If true, it also gives a heroically, tragic quality to political life.
For, Larmore assumes without argument that authority and legitimacy presuppose an articulated attempt at justification. His reason for this presupposition is that Larmore wants to distinguish (again, let's stipulate), correctly, between mere (psychological) acceptance of a state's legitimacy by its citizens and the fact of legitimacy. And the fact of legitimacy must, according to Larmore be ground in some moral principle. He thinks a failure to do so muddles Williams' argument (and confuses Max Weber's readers). So, in what follows my objection is not to Larmore's attempt to ground the authority of political power in moral principles of some sort.
There are really two mistakes here: (i) Larmore assumes that a state can only be legitimate if it offers some kind of legitimation story, what Larmore (repeatedly) calls "a justification," (e.g., 105; 97, etc) for its authority; (ii) Larmore assumes that such authority is de facto required if the circumstance of politics are to be solved (" if order and social cooperation are to be possible to any significant extent.") While the first claim (i) can be interpreted as a conceptual claim, the second claim (ii) is a claim in political sociology or psychology. It is notable that Larmore offers no evidence for (ii). Machiavelli, who knew something about the circumstance of politics (in Larmore's sense), would deny (ii). For Machiavelli authority is maintained if "property nor...honor" of citizens "is touched."
Now in treating (i-ii) as mistakes I do not wish to deny that legitimations are recurring features of political societies. But to establish the legitimacy of a state (from a liberal perspective), the question is not what they say, but what they do (do the oppress, silence, terrorize, etc.). That is, what matters for liberal legitimacy -- say from the perspective of liberalism of fear -- is how people are treated, and can be expected to be treated, over time. It is odd that Larmore does not note this because as he says, the "guiding conviction of liberal thinking" really is "with how we should treat others." (12)
Now Larmore may response that since legitimacy involve the justified imposition of "enforceable rules" (e.g. 5)-- and enforceable rules must be articulated -- what is said is essential. The reason why Larmore would claims something like this is that he considers only two possible options to tackle the problems generated by the circumstance of politics: (a) reliance on "moral convictions." (39) This he (correctly) rejects because, as Mozi has taught before him, moral disagreement is (also) the predictable effect of the use of our reason. And if all people were systematically capable of acting from moral conviction no state would be needed among them. And (b) "the binding authority of laws, arrived at by legally established procedures." (39) Since he endorses (b) it means that for Larmore authority, and the legitimacy it helps generate, is essentially juridical in character (even if it is, in turn, secured by appeal to moral principle). And this is why Larmore slips, without commenting on it, between conceiving authority in terms of binding rules and in terms of binding laws. Once one thinks of authority as juridical in character, it might seems self-evident that justification of their authority has to be verbal.
Now, liberalism does have a fundamental commitment to the rule of law. And its absence is indeed a way in which a state may be (partially) illegitimate. (Larmore nicely argues that legitimacy comes in degrees.) But it does not follow that the justification for the rule of law is required for its authority. That is while liberalism is self-consciously philosophical in character (this is partially a feature of its lateness), it does not require the state to be philosophical in this way for it to have authority and be legitimate.
As Hume teaches, for rules to function as rules they do not require or originate in justification (even if they can be justified post facto). All effective authority may require is the coordination and stimulation of the right sort of rules long before they give rise to 'legally established procedures' or generate skilled citizens to justify them. Of course, once authority presents itself as principled, the principles appealed to can be evaluated and judged "by the moral assumptions on which they rest." (49) But Philosophy even political philosophy is a true human need, but it is not required for (liberal) authority.
*Larmore does not address who (or what) is a person, and here, too, one senses that he accepts further possible acts of exclusion.
+ Of course, in chapter 19 of the Prince, Machiavelli is not talking about republics. The key point here is that people may experience "a claim on their allegiance" (82) without it being justified to them, but that may be (rightly) authoritative. So, I think it is a mistake to claim that "the state must seek to justify its rule if it is to achieve the authority, the acceptance of its right to institute binding rules in the society." (98) On my view, the tacit or explicit acceptance of this right may occur before the state even tries to justify its rule without this being a moral mistake. (Cf. p. 105)
**I should note that Larmore treats "pervasive conflict about what should count as the terms of social cooperation and thus the need for authoritative, enforceable rules constitute the elementary facts of life." (4) Larmore takes such conflict as given not produced (see also p. 21).
Dear Eric,
Thank you for reading my book and taking the time to write this review of it. Controversy is welcome, especially by someone with views such as mine. However, I think that on a number of points you have misunderstood what I wrote.
(1) You say that I "give up on liberalism's universalism and the thought that each individual counts". I do not believe I use the term “universalism” in the book. Such a term, by the way, can mean many different things. I say that political liberalism excludes, as does any conception of political legitimacy, since its fundamental principles are ones that some reasonable people – “reasonable” in my minimal, non-tendentious sense – see reason to reject. But I also say (p. 168-69) that those it thus excludes it also includes in a qualified way. For it allows their perspectives, minus the views that lead them to reject the defining principles of liberalism, to play a role in determining the terms of political association. And I add that this is what makes liberalism unique among forms of political association. So it is not true that I have given up the thought that “each individual counts”. What I reject is the Enlightenment faith that all those who oppose the defining principles of liberalism are either benighted or confused and that ultimately the whole world is destined to become liberal. It is why I believe (p. 95) that there is no solution to Rousseau’s problem of devising a form of political association that reconciles political authority and the liberty of each citizen. If the possibility of such a solution is what you mean by “univeralism”, then I reject it in this sense.
(2) You say that "Larmore assumes that a state can only be legitimate if it offers some kind of legitimation story". This seems not quite right for two reasons. First, even if a state offers a legitimation story, this does not make it legitimate. Only if the legitimation story is indeed correct and only if a substantial number of people accept the story as correct (p. 97), will the state be legitimate on the basis of the story it itself issues. (I add that second condition since, though legitimacy and perceived legitimacy are not the same thing, a state cannot be legitimate unless it succeeds in securing order and the conditions of social cooperation, and that requires most people perceiving it to be at least somewhat legitimate). Second, people may consider a state to be legitimate for reasons quite distinct from those the state itself promulgates, as when they think its rule is better than nothing (pp. 42, 85). So to the extent that perceived legitimacy is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for actual legitimacy, a state may be legitimate even if its own legitimation story is neither correct nor perceived to be correct.
(3) You say that "Larmore assumes that authority is required if the circumstances of politics are to be solved" and that Machiavelli would disagree since for him "authority is maintained if "property nor...honor" of citizens "is touched"." I do not understand your point here. Property is a legal institution, and it requires some source of authority, such as a state, to set down the rules for property's acquisition, transfer, etc.
(4) You write that "to establish the legitimacy of a state (from a liberal perspective), the question is not what they [states] say, but what they do (do they oppress, silence, terrorize, etc.). That is, what matters for liberal legitimacy -- say from the perspective of liberalism of fear -- is how people are treated, and can be expected to be treated, over time. It is odd that Larmore does not note this." This, I think, is completely wrong, since I emphasize throughout that legitimacy is not the same as perceived legitimacy (or what I term authority). A state may say all it wants that it is legitimate. Whether it is indeed legitimate is a matter of whether its way of treating its people is in fact justified.
(5) You write, as a point against my views, that "As Hume teaches, for rules to function as rules they do not require or originate in justification (even if they can be justified post facto)." I’m not sure what you mean by rules “requiring or originating in justification”. But I address at length (pp. 81-82) Hume’s “teaching” about rowboaters who devise implicit rules about what each should do and argue that such rules are far too simple to be of the sort on which social cooperation generally depends. And once more complicated rules become necessary, they also become controversial, whence the need for an authority, such as the state, to determine what exactly these rules will be. And that, in turn, will pose the question of the right with which such an authority imposes this kind of determination. Whence the question of legitimacy.
(6) You write in a footnote that "Larmore does not address who (or what) is a person, and here, too, one senses that he accepts further possible acts of exclusion." This is false, since I develop a concept of the person at pp. 152-54.
best wishes,
Charles
Posted by: Charles Larmore | 10/23/2020 at 04:31 PM