I wonder at those men who charge upon Christianity all the evils that superstition, avarice, sensuality, and the love of power, have introduced into the Christian world, and then suppose, that these evils are to be preyented, not by suppressing criminal passions, but by extirpating Christianity, or weakening its influence. In fact, our religion supplies the only effectúał means of suppressing these passions, and so preventing the mischief complained of; and this it will ever be more or less powerful to accomplish, according as its influence over the minds of men is greater or less; and greater or less will its influence be, according as its doctrines are more or less firmly believed: It was not because they were Christians, but because, they were covetous, and cruel, that the first invaders of America, perpetrated those diabolical cruelties in Peru and Mexico, the narrative of which is insupportable to humanity. Had they been Christians in any thing but in name, they would have loved their neighbour as themselves. No man who loves his neighbour as himself, will ever cut his throat, or roast him alive; in order to get at his money.--James Beattie, postscript, 1778 (1770) An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (sixth edition) p. 460
ln his response to Hume's infamous racist footnote, Beattie notes, among other arguments, that "The empires of Peru and Mexico could not have been governed, nor de metropolis of the latter built after so singular matter, in the middle of a lake, without men eminent both for action and speculation." (427) I assume Beattie is here referring to Tenochtitlan the capital of the Aztec empire. In noticing Beattie's use of 'metropolitan,' I wondered whether he was the first to use it in this sense. But it was, according to the OED, not unusual by his time. Not unlike (recall) Descartes, perhaps, Beattie assumes that great imperial cities, or perhaps empires, grow according to some plan. It is notable that Beattie does not imagine the possibility of an Aztec women facilitating the rise of Tenochtitlan.
As can be seen in the quoted passage above, in the postscript, Beattie returns to the empires of Peru and Mexico. And here he is addressing the great, post-Spinozist debate (recall here) of the eighteenth century whether a polity of atheists is possible. This is, in fact, central to the purposes of his book. Beattie de facto grants that it such a society is possible, but asserts that if so it will engage in inhumanity and "diabolical cruelties." And he treats the conquest of the Americas as an example of this.
There is no sign in his Essay (but perhaps elsewhere) that Beattie thought that the conquest of the Americas is any sense providential, or (as Las Casas hoped) itself an opportunity of spreading the gospel, or (as Adam Smith suggested) an opportunity for mutual gain. It's pretty clear he thinks conquest was a disaster for the locals. As I have noted before, it's not entirely clear that Hume rejects the violent extension of civilization.
Now, Beattie asserts that Christian "religion supplies the only effectúał means of suppressing these passions," (emphasis added) that lead to violent conquest. That claim is compatible with two further facts Beattie acknowledges: (i) that many self-described Christians are not true Christians in this sense; and (ii) that even Christians who do not engage in imperial projects and have sincere faith can become so dogmatic in their Christianity (he offers as an example Valla and Scaliger (p. 451)) such that they become inhumane partisan sectarians and develop what he calls a "persecuting spirit" (p. 125).
So, while genuine adherence to Christian doctrine is necessary to suppress the acquisitive passions it is not sufficient for a humane and pacific temperament. There has to be what we may call a 'principle of moderation' such that true Christianity is possible in those that are sincere doctrinal Christians. And it is pretty clear that Beattie thinks that despite presenting himself as a friend of moderation, Hume's skeptical philosophy undermines this very principle of moderation (p. 448; and p. 125).
Even if we were to grant, and not everybody will, Beattie his criticism of Hume (recall also yesterday's post), Beattie does not seem to explain in the Essay how to cultivate the principle(s) of moderation in would-be-true-Christians beyond getting doctrine right (which he admits is insufficient). This is a shame because it might have benefited the would be reader, even a would-be-humanitarian legislator.
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