Few men have ever engaged in controversy, religious, political, or philosophical, without being in some degree chargeable with misconception of the adversary's meaning: That I have never erred in this way, I dare not affirm. But I am conscious of having done every thing in my power to guard against it. The greater part of these papers have lain by me for several years. They i have been repeatedly perused by ſome of the acutest philosophers of the age, whom I have the honour to call my friends, and to whose advice and assistance, on this, as on other occasions, I am deeply indebted. I have availed myself all I could of reading and conversation; and endeavoured, with all the candour I am master of, to profit by every hint of improvement, and to examine to the bottom every objection , that others have offered, or myself could devise. And may I not be permitted to add, that every one of those who have perused this essay, has advised the author to publish it; and that many of them have encouraged him by this insinuation, to him the most flattering of all others, That by so doing, he would probably be of some service to the cause of truth, virtue, and mankind? In this hope he submits it to the public. And it is this hope only that could have induced him to attempt polemical disquisition: a species of writing, which, in his own judgement, is not the most creditable; which he knows, to his cost, is not the most pleasing; and of which he is well aware that it will draw upon him the resentment of a numerous, powerful, and fashionable party. But, If these pages, which he hopes none will condemn who have not read, shall throw any light on the first principles of moral science; if they shall suggeſt, to the young and unwary, any cautions against that sophistry, and licentiousness of principle, which, too much infect the conversations and compositions of the age; if they shall, in any measure, contribute to the satisfaction of any of the friends of truth and virtue; his purpose will be completely answered and he will, to the end of his life, rejoice in the recollection of those painful hours which he, passed in the examination of this most important controversy.--James Beattie [1770] 1774 (fifth corrected edition) An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism, Introduction 26-28
Beattie's response (recall) to Hume's racist footnote has been in the news recently (see this fine editorial by Robin Mills.) It is worth noting that Beattie's response to the infamous footnote is introduced as a "short digression" (p. 462 in the fifth edition) in which Beattie illustrates that he is "no blind admirer of antiquity." This digression occurs near the very end of the book (p. 483; in my edition there is also a formal postscript dated november 1770, which sheds much light on Beattie's thinking.) And in context of the digression, Hume is treated as a kind of misguided modern metaphysical scholastic in this sense as misguided as Aristotle. All of this occurs in a chapter that defends the idea that metaphysics is "something worthy of contempt or censure" (p. 396); and, after discussing Spinoza, Berkeley, and Mandeville, the main charge against Hume is that "every part of philosophy becomes metaphysics in his hands." (407) Since Hume has been successfully and repeatedly re-branded and presented as the fiercest and best critic of metaphysics for over a century now,* we should not expect Beattie's argument to be intelligible at once to any of us. But about Beattie's short digression some other time soon more.
Rather, here I want to call attention to the fact that Beattie introduces his Essay as a polemic ("polemical disquisition"). The quoted passage above are the closing lines of the introduction. And in fact, from what he says this polemic simmered for a long time ("have lain by me for several years"). In reading these lines by Beattie, I realized that I tend to think of polemics as of the moment and (thereby) intemperate. And in recognizing a species of writing as polemical, I am willing to discount certain argumentative short-cuts, rhetorical flights of fancy, or even a well-placed intellectual dagger. In my initial estimation, polemics are more like crimes of passion rather than careful (ahh) scientific treatises, or principles.
But Beattie is explicit that a polemic can be well crafted, and re-crafted ("repeatedly"), and nursed over time in light of informed criticism by esteemed others. Now, the official aim of Beattie's Essay is to shed light on the "first principles of moral science" and to instruct the young away from sophistry and skepticism. And at this point the reader already knows that Beattie's target is Hume, whom he grants is an "excellent politician, financier, and historian." (17-18) And yet, Beattie also believes strongly, that "his philosophy has done great harm." (19)
Polemic is probably derived from πολεμικός (warlike or hostile). And the grounds for Beattie's hostility, the intellectual and moral grounds for his willingness to draw intellectual blood, his willingness to suffer a bad reputation, too, become clear throughout his Essay. He really thinks that Hume is an irresponsible philosopher who helps perpetuate and generate great moral harms in the world.
But as Beattie must have felt, these moral and political reasons for Beattie's polemic do not explain its tenor. And by it, I mean the long simmering, carefully crafted, and polished nature of the work, which, after all, succeeded in eliciting from Hume, who momentarily dropped his mask of calm politeness, a vehement non-response. For, in the postscript, Beattie adds the following thought: "My design in the his book was, to give others the very same notions of the sceptical philosophy that I myself entertain." (507) And it is pretty clear that he "detests" the skeptical writings and "despises" their authors' "talents." But that's not all of it.
Beatty is a warm defender of "liberty of speech.' (p. 513) And he is quite explicit long before Mill that banning even the most pernicious speech will do more "hurt than good," predictably benefitting the "party" that is being suppressed. (513) But Beattie thinks that one may oppose genuinely pernicious speech with other speech that intends to make the pernicious writings "detestable in the eyes of others." (515) And this is demanded from us as "good citizens." (p. 515)* Beattie recognizes there is a complex line between making writings detestable and making an author of such writings detestable. He prefers the former, but knows that involves something of the latter.
Let me wrap up. It's possible that Beattie is rationalizing or reconstructing his motives for writing his polemical, Essay. But his words ring true to me and explain, I think, some of his rhetorical and presentational choices (including his treatment of Hume's racism). I think he really does try to make Hume's position detestable (motivated from some principled duty as a citizen or, more likely, a deeper personal "disgust" (424).) In philosophy, Beattie's reputation has -- thanks to Kant's chiming in -- not fared well because of this until, perhaps, last week; because we now recognize he really spoke up against racism. (It's not ad hoc; he has a distinct argument about the role of modern philosophy in facilitating imperialism--about that some other time.)
But here I want to leave you with a question: is he right that the institution of free speech can only be sustained if we see it as our duty not just to refute pernicious and false opinions, but to make them detestable to others? And if the answer is yes, we must craft within liberty of speech a space for a kind of war.
*Hume himself calls his own philosophy a 'true metaphysics;' in recent times Don Baxter, and Stefanie Rocknak; Don Ainslie (amongst others) have done important work in treating Hume as a metaphysician.
Interesting stuff. Thanks for the mention. Beattie’s framing of the Essay as a polemic is, I think, reflective of his sense that that is what he can achieve with his book. I probably exaggerate this aspect of it—primarily, it is an attempt at a learned philosophical treatise?—but he is aiming to fight the good fight, act as a ‘friend of mankind’ and undo the pernicious influence of a philosophy that he thinks is going to destroy all morals, religion and society itself.
I think of this in psycho-biographical terms (shouldn’t say that out loud): he hates Hume, he hates philosophy, he’s a poet who has got appointed as a philosopher, it’s not his calling, and he finds it very difficult not to let his emotion get in the way of his arguments. So, to go back to your point about a well-crafted polemic, I wonder if this is Beattie trying his best to turn his real anger at Hume, Berkeley et al, into something productive. I get the impression, as you do too I think, reading the Essay that, very often, he isn’t thinking straight (or ‘philosophically’), he’s thinking passionately.
You can trace Beattie’s emotional reactions and the sheer misery he experiences writing the Essay in his correspondence.
Beattie’s falls into ‘controversy’ I think with the Essay—I’m using that term to describe the sort of attack on Hume you discuss, making Hume ‘detestable in the eyes of others’. See also Warburton & Hurd’s Remarks on Hume’s Natural History of Religion. This distinction between Hume the text/author and Hume the man, where you think you can vehemently attack the former without harming the latter, seems very alien to me now and I’d like to know if there’s been any research done on it. I know that Beattie’s friends got him to remove those passages in drafts of the Essay where he really crossed over into attacking Hume the man. (Interesting use of ‘financier’ though, in Beattie’s list of praise for Hume… that doesn’t feel like a praising choice of words, the word has negative associations for someone of Beattie’s politics).
Certainly. you could argue that a lot of Hume’s positioning himself as an author, a correspondent etc, is about separating as much as possible the argument from the author. And the ‘bigoted’ Beattie epitomised the kind of authorly behaviour Hume hated.
Not being as clever as you philosopher types, I don’t know if Beattie merits the dismissals amongst philosophers he has received. I do know he was very successful for several decades in making Hume’s opinions appear detestable to others.
Posted by: Robin Mills | 09/25/2020 at 12:08 PM