Popper on the Collapse of Social Democracy and the Rise of Fascism

Modern totalitarianism is only an episode within the perennial revolt against freedom and reason. From older episodes it is distinguished not so much by its ideology, as by the fact that its leaders succeeded in realizing one of the boldest dreams of their predecessors; they made the revolt against freedom a popular movement. (Its popularity, of course, must not be overrated; the intelligentsia are only a part of the people.) It was made possible only by the breakdown, in the countries concerned, of another popular movement, Social Democracy or the democratic version of Marxism, which in the minds of the working people stood for the ideas of freedom and equality. When it became obvious that it was not just by chance that this movement had failed in 1914 to make a determined stand against war; when it became clear that it was helpless to cope with the problems of peace, most of all with unemployment and economic depression; and when, at last, this movement defended itself only half-heartedly against fascist aggression, then the belief in the value of freedom and in the possibility of equality was seriously threatened, and the perennial revolt against freedom could by hook or by crook acquire a more or less popular backing.--Karl Popper The Open Society and Its Enemies (one volume edition, p. 272).*

The quoted passage is really an aside in Popper's argument in chapter 12. He discusses the complex relationship among the rivalry between communists and social democrats, their differing attitudes toward Marxist prophecy and tactics, and the rise of fascism much more at length later in ch 18 and especially ch. 19. Popper confronts here the sordid fact so discomfiting to all true democrats: that despite their lack of democratic commitments fascists and would-be-fascists can gain widespread support (even if that falls short of a majority). And while such widespread support should probably not be reduced to a single cause, or exaggerated at all times, Popper calls attention to a feature that has had enduring significance: the collapse of social democracy is somehow an enabling condition, perhaps cause for the rise of fascism.

As an aside, something like this idea has been researched in political science going back to seminal work by Seymour Martin Lipset, who, in a 1959 article (in which Popper goes unmentioned) focused on authoritarian tendencies in the working class, found that "It is probable that organized social-democracy not only supports civil liberties but influences its supporters in the same direction." My direct colleagues --see this paper by Eelco Harteveld; and this paper by Brian Burgoon, Sam van Noort, Matthijs Rooduijn, and Geoffrey Underhill-- do fascinating empirical work trying to tease out the conditions under which authoritarian parties attract voters.

Popper's idea is the rise of fascism and faith in its program is, in part, a rational consequence of the loss of faith in social democracy and its program. Unlike most liberals, Popper treats social democracy as committed to genuinely liberal values (freedom and equality). That is compatible with the thought that there is no agreement between social democrats and liberals on how how freedom and equality are conceptualized or best realized.

The significance of Popper's observation is that the success of social democracy stabilized liberal democracy; its failure necessarily undermines it. So lurking in Popper is an empirical hypothesis that certain voters, a part of the population, is won for liberal democracy by social democratic parties. My (contestable) interpretation of the empirical literature is that Popper's hypothesis is not far off the mark.* In my view this sets Popper apart of most other neoliberals (with the exception, perhaps, of Lippmann and Peter Drucker) of his generation.+

Popper points to three distinct failures of social democracy that account for its popular collapse: its inability to combat the slide into world war (even embrace it), its inability to tackle the great depression, and in its unwillingness to fight fascism decisively. The third of  these is the subject of the later chapters where Popper traces the role of the effect of Marxist ideology about historical necessity on a kind of social democratic fatalism. Popper is, perhaps, too hasty in treating social democratic failure in each of these case as wholly in the hands of social democracy. But the cumulative effect is an ineffectual movement on the big questions of the day despite many relatively smaller but not insignificant emancipatory successes. (One may well suspect that the smaller successes on labor legislation, union legalization, child protection raised expectations that were frustrated in these larger defeats.) 

One may feel this all sounds too rational; that voters evaluate movements in terms of results. But one should emphasize that Popper treats the defeat of social democracy in the eyes of its supporters as an undermining of the values -- freedom and equality -- that social democracy pursues. That is, the perceived defeat of the movement undermines its fundamental commitments. And this is why in its defeat liberal democracy is threatened. Even if we don't find Popper's analysis fully convincing, the problem he points to seems threateningly real enough.

 

*This post echoes a point Nils Karlson made about the contemporary scene at a lecture I heard in November 2018. And while he may disagree with my reading of Popper,  I view my post as converging with his claims then.

+In a forthcoming paper, I explain how for Lippmann non-liberal, even anti-liberal parties are a necessary condition for the survival of a liberal polity. I owe the mention of Drucker to the description of his work in Erwin Dekker's brilliant study, The Viennese Students of Civilization.

 

Comments

[John Quiggin]

In the end the social democrats delivered decades of full employment, and became the strongest force for liberalism (in the Mill rather than Locke sense). The supporters of free markets have been the first to embrace authoritarianism when it is on their side - Hayek being the clearest example.

[Eric Schliesser]

I don't think your claim is right. I don't deny that there is a recurring temptation (it's visible in physiocrats, utilitarians, and, yes, alas Hayek) that at times the benevolent dictator seems attractive to economists (of various stripes). But for every Hayek there is an Eucken. For every Chicago boy there is a Gerhard Tintner.

[Matt]

On a non-substantive note, Eric, how do you find reading _Open Society_? I ask because, a couple of years ago, I picked up _The Poverty of Historicism_, which I thought I'd enjoy reading given some interests of mine, and found it just unbearably dull and impossible to get in to. I gave it a few tries, but only got about 25 pages because I just kept finding it so unpleasant to read. Did OS seem at least minimally readable to you, or is it just a slog?

[Eric Schliesser]

Hi Matt,
Open Society is not boring/dull! It is sprawling, digressive, polemical, creative, uncharitable, badly edited, and some of the major arguments are dispersed in footnotes that refer to each other chapters apart. But it is really packed with insights, and even many of the unfair and badly argued dogmatic claims, are worth reflecting on. And every so often there is just a gem of a page. It's also crazy topical.
Even so, I find it hard to read in one go. And I admit to having skipped a few discursive footnotes. I think it is perfect for certain department reading groups, but almost irresponsible to teach to undergrads (I feel that way about Nietzsche, too).

[Matt]

Thanks, Eric - I may give it (or parts of it) a go if I can find an inexpensive used copy.

[dmf]

adam tooze on soros, investment, and open society might be on interest:
https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/ones-and-tooze/the-economic-philosophy-of-GWR0aytrmdY/