Dewey’s vision is one of “synthetic philosophy.” The philosopher’s reading is not limited to the writings of contemporary specialists in their home sub-branch of the academic profession, but should draw widely from many areas—as the greatest figures in the history of the subject, from Plato to Rawls, have all done. The first task is to understand the questions posed for us by the circumstances of our lives and by the conditions of contemporary inquiry, and that task is unlikely to be undertaken by those whose attention is confined to what a handful of specialists have said about some technical issue. Digging deeply into a particular place can have large and important rewards—but before you choose where to dig (and, perhaps, after you have started but before the treasure has been found), you would do well to reflect on why that specific location is so promising. The fact that generations of predecessors have been excavating in the neighborhood is not a conclusive reason—indeed, you might well reflect on the record of successes they have, or have not, achieved.--Philip Kitcher (2012), Preludes to Pragmatism, ("Introduction"), p xi
By synthetic philosophy I mean a style of philosophy that brings together insights, knowledge, and arguments from the special sciences with the aim to offer a coherent account of complex systems and connect these to a wider culture, policy, or other philosophical projects (or both). In particular, the synthetic glue tends to be a general theory or theories. When I first started blogging about synthetic philosophy, Max Hayward noted that Philip Kitcher had also used the term in a lovely, polemical interview (reproduced here). Since I made it clear I traced my use back to Spencer, I did not think more of it. Synthetic philosophy is a potentially powerful meme, and it is no surprise it would infect both Kitcher and me. After my Biology & Philosophy (hereafter B&P) piece went viral, more people mentioned Kitcher's use in somewhat accusatory tones. And I realized he had been using the phrase for a while. So, recently (in a forthcoming Dutch piece), I decided to think through our contrasting uses.+
Before I get to the differences, I want to emphasize that one can be a synthetic philosopher in his (Deweyan) sense and my own at the same time. So, there is a clear family resemblance between the two notions, and sometimes -- for the Darwinian synthetic philosophers this is not trivial -- one can trace the same lineage of thinkers and problems back. In particular, both approaches feed on the impulse that within philosophy we should be reading widely and aspire "to know a lot of different things and to forge useful synthetic perspectives."
First, for Kitcher, "synthetic philosophy" ought to "replace" analytic philosophy. I don't think that necessary at all; they can be reciprocal and mutually supportive enterprises. As I noted in B&P, synthetic philosophy can provide analytic philosophy with the data/input that enter into its arguments. Analytic philosophy can provide a home to and train would-be synthetic philosophers and, more important, be a place where would-be-synthesizing theories are tried out and developed. The previous two sentences do justice to the recent history.
I do not mean to deny that the ambitions of synthetic philosophy are a response to the cognitive division of labor and specialization within the sciences that contrast to those characteristic of analytic philosophy response. To simplify: analytic philosophy has both tried to become scientific and a specialist discipline, and it has tried (in Neurath's orchestration and Quine's regimentation) to propose being steward of a specialist language that might unify the sciences (and metaphysics). Synthetic philosophers aspire to play a more a more activist role in the sciences (and beyond).
Second, Kitcher strongly identifies synthetic philosophy with "naturalism." (That's in the next paragraph after the one I quoted above.) But as I clarified (or conceded) in response to a fine post by Martin Lenz, I don't think that necessary. All that is required is that there is a body of knowledge that can be taught, shared, and criticized (in neighboring fields) by others. This is, in fact, compatible with anti-naturalism, and the kinds of projects one can find in continental philosophy, what the Germans call geisteswissenschaft, and theology. None of this is far removed from what Kitcher writes about embracing the 'methodological canons of science of the day'; but he is adamant it rules out all kinds of beasts (e.g., Aristotelian essences, a priori truths, etc.) to be found in ''the philosophical zoo." And my kind of synthetic philosopher probably shares a lot of Kitcher's suspicions, but nows that its tasks are too urgent and difficult to rule out, a fortiori, useful tools and approaches.
Third, and most important, I think the synthetic 'glue' in synthetic philosophy is provided by one or more generalist theories (e.g., Darwinism, Bayesianism, information theory, game theory, actor network theory, etc.) Such theories provide a form of unification and explanation, and frame the kind of puzzles and research questions that can be pursued within the special sciences, a new synthetic special science, and/or philosophy (and public policy). They also provided a species of discipline (for reasons Timothy Williamson has emphasized in a different context). Kitcher quite clearly rejects the very idea (he calls it a "myth") of philosophical "expertise" (219, and elsewhere).*
Why do I emphasize this? Kitcher's version of synthetic philosophy risks trapping philosophy in the great man of genius syndrome, where the synthetic glue is an act of creative synthesis; it is no coincidence that Kitcher quotes Dewey's gloss on "great innovators" (xi-xv; 172) confronting the problems of their own times approvingly. This is distinct from mastering skills and the (sometimes fine) drudgery of working through and becoming comfortable of a theory within the give and take of academic discussion (as Liam Kofi Bright would say, #noheroes). I am the first to admit that understood like this I am more likely to be (somewhat self-aggrandizing and delusional) synthetic philosopher in Kitcher's sense and not my own (and that Kitcher clearly could be quite excellent as a synthetic philosopher in my sense)! The synthetic philosopher as I understand her responds to the division of labor among the sciences, by standing within and among them.
To be sure, I do not mean to deny the possibility of intellectual freedom in the synthesizing process. Nor do I mean to reject the hybrid and sometimes eclectic nature of the cosmopolitan, synthetic philosopher (who rejects nativism in all forms). Like Kitcher, I value the possibilities of roaming free exploring desert landscapes and the rich aquatic life below.
A reader sympathetic to Kitcher, and impatient with mine, may note that Kitcher's reasons for rejecting philosophical expertise are ethical. Kitcher's motives are egalitarian, and he wants to block a cognitive hierarchy in which philosophers are superior in the joint ethical practice we must engage in. Regular readers, familiar with my views on methodological analytic egalitarianism, would expect me to agree. But for Kitcher ethical practice (on the value axis) is orthogonal to synthetic philosophy which operates on a "knowledge axis" (xxv; 214ff). By contrast, fourth, I do not see the axes as opposed, and more important, synthetic philosophy can operate at sites where knowledge and values intersect in complex fashion (and draw on expertise in ethics and metaethics and other value-apt sciences). How to do so responsibly is no simple matter and Kitcher himself has important things to say on the topic.
Fifth, there is a more subtle distinction (connected to the third) between Kitcher's approach and my own. The way I understand synthetic philosophy, it is really about the construction of a scientific image that may influence the development of the special sciences, philosophy, public policy, or the manifest image, and in turn be influenced by these. Integrating the various scientific and manifest images into a single picture, let's call it integrative world-making, probably goes beyond synthetic philosophy. I don't deny that some synthetic philosophers -- think of Dennett's use of the universal acid of Darwinism -- may aspire to such a project. In Kitcher's hands integrative world-making (systematic philosophy) is constitutive of synthetic philosophy: "Setting aside any further ventures in philosophical midwifery, societies and individuals continue to need an integrated picture of nature that combines the contributions of different areas of inquiry, and different fields of investigation can be assisted by thinkers whose more synthetic perspective can alert them to missed opportunities and provide them with needed clarification." (215)
Since I like the sentiment in these last words, I think in practice, this may be merely a matter of emphasis. But the way I understand a synthetic philosopher, she may, in principle, more comfortable with a dappled, disunified, and pluralist world than Kitcher's integrative world-maker. While I personally feel the pull of a Jamesian reconciliation between the scientific and manifest image, I do not see why this should be the mission of synthetic philosophy. Kitcher (and Kitcher's Dewey) also deny that this should be the main project. But they do continue to embrace integrative world-making.
Finally, for Kitcher synthetic philosophy belongs to pragmatist philosophy. And pragmatism in its beautiful, broad variety does involve non-trivial philosophical commitments about the purpose(s) of philosophy and the nature of meaning and truth. I don't see why synthetic philosophy must involve commitment to pragmatism understood in a doctrinal sense even if I grant that synthetic philosophy of all stripes can thrive in such a variety.
+After fruitful conversation with Helen de Cruz and Jan-Willem Romeijn; and reading an excellent methodological chapter by Walter Veit (which I hope to discuss in the future).
*Given my usual animaversations against philosophy as normal science, one might have expected me to agree with Kitcher. Synthetic philosophy as I understand is a response to normal science, but not a rejection of range of expertises within philosophy.
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