It is striking in this light that the first surviving visible expression of an explicitly “Phoenician” identity was imposed by the Carthaginians on their subjects as they extended state power to a degree unprecedented among Phoenician- speakers, that it was then adopted by Tyre as a symbol of colonial success, and that it was subsequently exploited by Roman rulers in support of their imperial activities. This illustrates another uncomfortable aspect of identity formation: it is often a cultural bullying tactic, and one that tends to benefit those already in power more than those seeking self-empowerment. Modern European examples range from the linguistic and cultural education strategies that turned “peasants into Frenchmen” in the late nineteenth century, to the eugenic Lebensborn program initiated by the Nazis in mid- twentieth- century central Europe to create more Aryan children through procreation between German SS officers and “racially pure” foreign women. Such examples also underline the difficulty of distinguishing between internal and external conceptions of identity when apparently internal identities are encouraged from above, or even from outside, just as the developing modern identity as Phoenician involved the gradual solidification of the identity of the ancient Phoenicians.
It seems to me that attempts to establish a clear distinction between “emic” and “etic” identity are part of a wider tendency to treat identities as ends rather than means, and to focus more on how they are constructed than on why. Identity claims are always, however, a means to another end, and being “Phoenician” is in all the instances I have surveyed here a political rather than a personal statement. Josephine Quinn (2018) "conclusion" in In Search of the Phoenicians, 203-204
Quinn's book ranges widely over all kinds of evidence from the ancient world, as well as more recent musings on the 'Phoenicians.' It is admirably clear of disciplinary jargon, and it is a lovely example of consilience in science. One nice effect of the book is to make you go back to texts you think you know well. So, for example, I had, I thought, distinct memory that the Phoenicians are mentioned in the Hebrew Bible. But when I checked out the passage in Ezekiel 26:16, the phoenicians are turned back into נְשִׂיאֵי הַיָּם, lords of the sea.
One thing I learned is that Carthaginian child sacrifice really was a thing (chapter 5). In fact, Quinn makes a good case that Carthage, or at least some of its most notable religious practices, probably have their origin in a group religious extremists that left the Levantine for better, or more hospitable, climes west. She compares this to "the exodus of the Puritans to the New World." (100) But she does not note that this echoes or anticipates Abraham's trek to the west (לֶךְ-לְךָ מֵאַרְצְךָ) in Genesis 12.+
Although I am inclined to agree with her -- as regular readers know I even hesitate to claim that A=A is self-identity --, Quinn has not proven that all identity claims are always means to another end. I am not sure she could do so by inductive enumeration. But she has given a startling example of how others have imposed and projected an identity on humans who may, despite their linguistic connections, never have experienced or contemplated such an identity.
I want to make two other claims about the quoted passage.
First, it is noticeable, however, that at the end of the quoted passage, Quinn deploys a neat separation between the personal and the political--that looks quite (ahh) liberal to me. Earlier in her conclusion, she had claimed that "Even personal identity, a strong sense of one’s self as a distinct individual, can be seen as a relatively recent development, perhaps related to a peculiarly Western individualism." (201; see also the texts of notes 1-2 attached to it.) It is not at all clear from her account how her subjects did understand themselves. That's partially due to the incomplete nature of the evidence. And it may be due to our conceptual apparatus. From her evidence it is reasonably clear they identified with their town/city and at least some of their ancestors and children for various purposes. They also seem to have identified with their occupation (at least when abroad) and, in some contexts, their rites/religion. Whether they did so as individuals or households is left a bit ambiguous (but I may have misread one or another).
But if there is no clear distinction between the personal and the political to be had prior to a certain age of modernity, then one can't also say categorically that “Phoenician” is..."a political rather than a personal statement." If the evidence suggests that identity claims are political (as Quinn successfully shows) it may also well be (but need not) personal in a way for them. I mention this not to play gotcha. But rather to note how difficult it really is, even for those most specialized, to talk and write about cultures not one's own with the evidence quite fragmentary; we, even the experts, slip into familiar categories.
Second, I wonder to what degree this account misses when identity formation may be initially, in a certain sense, defensive in character as a reaction to threats or domination from others. This is not to deny that even then, in conditions of vulnerability and threat, identity formation may still be cultural bullying tactic that tends to benefit local elites first and foremost. For the interests of elites, with the cultural and technological capital to shape identity, may not be identical to those they want identification with that identity from. The thoughts in the previous two sentence were prompted by recent reading of Olufemi O. Taiwo, who points out , how "identity politics is the victim of elite capture." (Boston Review, May 2020) As Taiwo notes, elite capture is endemic to political life.*
I do not deny that imperial Carthaginians were bullies (and had it coming). And I agree that bullying is constitutive to identity formation. But in a zero sum world, politics and conflicts over resources cannot be eliminated, and it seems that identity formation is, in some sense, required for survival, perhaps even 'personal' survival (if the alternative is genocide or slavery). As I noted (recall this post on Graeber& Wengrow), there has been considerable winnowing in the kinds of social-political units that have survived in the last few thousand years. And the problem with Quinn's use of 'bullying' is not that it is empirically inadequate. But because it is negatively valenced, it may obscure that any resistance requires or can require coordination and that assigning shared identity may facilitate that, and so is necessary to resistance to bigger bullies.
+One other fun feature of reading the book; is that in their language, Phoenician roots often seem close to Hebrew roots. So, I could often guess what the evidence would show in Quinn's hands.
*Taiwo is more optimistic than I am, it seems, that elite captured can somehow be prevented in ways one focuses on shared oppression. I am unconvinced. But go read his essay!
Comments