The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.'*' This provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or one indicative of substantial content. Insofar as it is not derived from other criteria, the antithesis of friend and enemy corresponds to the relatively independent criteria of other antitheses: good and evil in the moral sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on. In any event it is independent, not in the sense of a distinct new domain, but in that it can neither be based on anyone antithesis or any combination of other antitheses, nor can it be traced to these. If the antithesis of good and evil is not simply identical with that of beautiful and ugly, profitable and unprofitable, and cannot be directly reduced to the others, then the antithesis of friend and enemy must even less be confused with or mistaken for the others. The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions. The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible. These can neither be decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party.
Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict. Each participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence. Emotionally the enemy is easily treated as being evil and ugly, because every distinction, most of all the political, as the strongest and most intense of the distinctions and categorizations, draws upon other distinctions for support. This does not alter the autonomy of such distinctions. Consequently, the reverse is also true: the morally evil, aesthetically ugly or economically damaging need not necessarily be the enemy; the morally good, aesthetically beautiful, and economically profitable need not necessarily become the friend in the specifically political sense of the word. Thereby the inherently objective nature and autonomy of the political becomes evident by virtue of its being able to treat, distinguish, and comprehend the friend-enemy antithesis independently of other antitheses. Carl Schmitt (1932) The Concept of the Political : Expanded Edition. Translated by George Schwab, 2007, 26-27
Today's post is part of a larger series in which I confront illiberal thought. Let's stipulate, for the sake of argument, that the collective friend-enemy distinction helps carves out a specific and objective sphere of action.* In this sphere "conflicts" -- in which one can kill and be killed -- with the enemy "are possible." The symmetry is important. An ethno-nationalist police state that terrorizes a minority (and here) is not engaged in politics so understood. Challenging and changing its practice through non-violent, collective action would also not count as Schmittian politics. In fact, most of what we might commonly treat as 'political' is not part of the Schmittian conception of politics.
As Leo Strauss persuasively shows (104) for Schmitt this sphere is conceptually prior to and in an evaluative sense "authoritative" (44) or more fundamental than other spheres.* The quoted passage above focuses on the distinctiveness of the political which is taken to be an objective feature of it. But strikingly, this objectivity is affirmed by way of an existentialist denial of the unity of the virtues (recall here and here). It's part of the intelligibility of the political that it can fail to instantiate other virtues, including not the least (moral) virtue.
That two collectives treat each other as enemies (or friends) is an objective fact available to and known by outsiders. But, (a) the reciprocal decision to treat another collective as an enemy can only be taken by the parties themselves, and (b) they alone can understand it. I have split (a) and (b) for the purposes of analysis (although it is not clear Schmitt would do so). Let me discuss them in turn.
It is pretty clear why Schmitt thinks (a) is true. On his view one can't farm out "kill and be killed" (48) to others. (Of course, once the mutual killing starts outsiders can tell that enmity exists.) It presupposes a form of autonomy or independence--one is not, for example, a vassal or protectorate (which depoliticized forms of life). It is notable -- especially in light of his quiet polemic against Kant throughout The Concept of the Political -- that he tacitly accepts here the Kantian injunction (contra Machiavelli) against the use of mercenaries. The political is co-extensive with a willingness to bear (collective) mortal uncertainty.** The summum malum is not death, but an unwillingness to face (such) existential choice.
I don't wish to disguise Schmitt's polemic against Kantian ideals: (i) as Strauss notes, Schmitt rejects Kant's federative ideal of perpetual peace of a striving toward the abolition of war ("in a realm which embraces the globe" (53)); for that is to affirm the abolition of the political in favor of (inter alia) a life of mere "entertainment." (53 And (ii) one way he does so -- and Strauss is silent on this -- is to quietly reject the Kantian argument that how we conduct ourselves in war can signalsour desire for peace, and thereby escape the state of nature. And the reason for this is that, to put it in Hobbesian terms, the Schmittian thinks the state of nature (that is that conflicts are always "possible") is inevitable and inescapable (if one dares it) from the perspective of political life. That is to say, Schmitt leaves the door wide open to wars of extermination. There is, for him, no possible limitation on the intensity of enmity.
It is pretty clear why Schmitt wishes to adopt (b). For this rules out the possibility of subsuming and, as it were, domesticating the political under the rule of law or (global) public opinion ("norm nor by the judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party.") And, in particular, (b) entails one need not justify one's enmity to outsiders because there is a sense in which they won't be able to evaluate why one is enemies (or friends) with one's enemies or friends.
For, what grounds (b) is the claim that "Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict." That is to say, there are features of concrete political life that are epistemically inaccessible to outsiders. And one of these features is to the directedness of enmity, that is, the perception that an '"adversary intends to negate" one's "way of life."
So, on this view, outsiders are in a bad position to grasp that one's way of life is threatened. I think both parts are crucial: outsiders are in a bad position to grasp what is essential or intrinsic to one's way of life, one's identity (as a collectivity), and in virtue of that they are in a bad position to perceive the existential threats against it. (I return to this below.)
Schmitt's position has unmistakeable affinity with standpoint epistemology, which ordinarily is traced to marxists roots. I understand that comparison can be thought in poor taste. I want to pursue this affinity in order to clarify something about Schmitt's position (and perhaps the standpoint epistemologist). I don't mean to suggest Schmitt's position is identical to standpoint epistemology, which privileges the lived experience of marginalized groups within society. (Schmitt has no interest in that.) Nor do I mean to disqualify standpoint epistemology by noting the affinity with Schmitt's thought; or suggest that standpoint epistemology is irreconcilable with liberal values or must lead to open-ended conflict.++
But standpoint epistemology asserts that marginalized groups have special epistemic standing when it comes to topics that pertain to their subordination (and so including threats to their identity and survival of the group). Often outsiders simply can't understand because their vantage-points are impoverished in the relevant sense.
Now, if you are an empiricist standpoint epistemologist, you will think that the special epistemic standing of the subordinated is a matter of degree, an "advantage," in Liam Kofi Bright's terms, to "be overcome in certain cases." And clearly Schmitt's position is not like such an empiricist. He thinks that when it comes to political decisions the outsider can never understand.
Schmitt need not appeal to something mysterious for why this is so. The outsider ipse facto does not face the question whether a circumstance or situation threatens one's identity and, crucially, so is worth dying for and risk killing another. In the parlance of the contemporary epistemologist, the outsider never faces the very high stakes of the insider. For, if she did face such existential stakes, she would de facto stop being an outsider. (There is nothing in Schmitt's treatment of the political that makes it impossible to join a collectivity as such. It is compatible with Schmitt's account that collective identity is porous even fluid.) For a willingness to experiencing killing and be killed with a collectivity just is to participate in its political life and so to have become an insider.+ So, for Schmitt the epistemic situation is not a matter of degree because killing and being killed is all or nothing.
Now, one may claim that outsiders can know what it's like to make political decisions in Schmitt's sense because they themselves may have friends and enemies in the political sense. And Schmitt can grant this and still claim that outsiders can't judge the "extreme case" of this particular conflict because it is not theirs.
Clearly outsiders may well be tempted to judge by moral and legal norms. But this is precisely what Schmitt wishes to prevent conceptually. And one way he does this - in addition to claiming that the political is distinct from and prior to other spheres -- is by resting his case on the threat to "one's way of life." What counts as a way of life may well be, from the vantage point of the cosmos or equity/law, something accidental like birth or heritage/history or custom. Crucially, these essential features to one's identity will be precisely those things that from the perspective of reason are (even when functional in maintaining a way of life) irrational or without ground, or, in Schmitt's terms, a "profession of faith." (58) That is to say, the development of mutual enmity may, while directed, be partially opaque to outsiders and, perhaps, even ultimately, the two collectivities until the fateful decision.
*Schmittian friends and enemies always involve collectives: "collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity." (28) Schmitt leaves unclear how large a group must be for it to count as a collectivity or 'totality;' a private or lonely enemy is strictly speaking not a political enemy. Schmitt insists that Christianity recognizes the distinction between a political/public enemy and a private enemy, and that it only commands love for the private kind! (28-29)
**"If a people is afraid of the trials and risks implied by existing in the sphere of politics, then another people will appear which will assume these
trials by protecting it against foreign enemies and thereby taking over political rule. The protector then decides who the enemy is by virtue of the eternal relation of protection and obedience." (52; I use 'uncertainty' because I don't think Schmitt intends to take the political with reference to probability.)
+There are complex questions lurking here if this is also the case with participating in the experiences of subordinated groups. Some subordinated groups have barriers (recall) to entry to prevent this.
++There is nothing intrinsic to standpoint epistemology that leads to open ended conflict; if the dominant groups are willing to learn from the subordinated and end their dominion this outcome can be avoided.
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