Undertaking the history of regimes of veridiction—and not the history of truth, the history of error, or the history of ideology, etcetera—obviously means abandoning once again that well-known critique of European rationality and its excesses, which has been constantly taken up in various forms since the beginning of the nineteenth century. From romanticism to the Frankfurt School, what has always been called into question and challenged has been rationality with the weight of power supposedly peculiar to it. Now the critique* of knowledge I would propose does not in fact consist in denouncing what is continually—I was going to say monotonously—oppressive under reason, for after all, believe me, insanity (déraison) is just as oppressive. Nor would this political critique of knowledge consist in flushing out the presumption of power in every truth affirmed, for again, believe me, there is just as much abuse of power in the lie or error. The critique I propose consists in determining under what conditions and with what effects a veridiction is exercised, that is to say, once again, a type of formulation falling under particular rules of verification and falsification. Michel Foucault, 17 January 1979, lecture 2 The Birth of Biopolitics. translated by Graham Burchell, 35-36
One strain easy to miss in the fascinating ambitions of lecture 2, is Foucault's polemic with the Frankfurt school. That is to say, I missed it when I taught last year it only to be taken by surprise (looking ahead) in lecture 5. His main criticism above seems to be that ideology critique lacks originality (it goes back to romanticism) and is tired old hat ("etcetera;" "once again;" "well- known;" "constantly" "always"). The more subtle criticism, which is a consequentialist argument from authority ("believe me") is is that if the effect of ideology critique is a regime of unreason or error, it is no better. That is to say, and this has been noted by critics of Foucault, there is a kind of status quo bias built into Foucault's methodology; it is not sufficient to show that the status quo is problematic if you don't have a path toward a better outcome.
It would be tempting now to turn to Foucault's methodology, but, as it happens, the polemic with Frankfurt is not finished yet. A few pages (or since these are lectures, minutes) later he claims that:
We should keep in mind that heterogeneity is never a principle of exclusion; it never prevents coexistence, conjunction, or connection. And it is precisely in this case, in this kind of analysis, that we emphasize, and must emphasize a non-dialectical logic if want to avoid being simplistic. For what is dialectical logic? Dialectical logic puts to work contradictory terms within the homogeneous. I suggest replacing this dialectical logic with what I would call a strategic logic. A logic of strategy does not stress contradictory terms within a homogeneity that promises their resolution in a unity. The function of strategic logic is to establish the possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate. The logic of strategy is the logic of connections between the heterogeneous and not the logic of the homogenization of the contradictory. So let’s reject the logic of the dialectic and try to see—this is what I will try to show in these lectures—the connections which succeeded in holding together and conjoining the fundamental axiomatic of the rights of man and the utilitarian calculus of the independence of the governed. (42-43)
The heterogeneity he has in mind (recall) is liberalism's two traditions/concepts of liberty -- the contractualist-republican and utilitarian ones. And the significance of his claim, to liberalism, and this anticipates structurally something Jacob Levy has recently emphasized (recall;and recall) in a slightly different fashion, is the creative tension, a dynamics of liberty, within liberalism of these non-identical yet coexisting conceptualizations of liberty. And strikingly, Foucault wants to adopt a logic of inquiry that does justice to and can convey precisely these dynamics, "the connections which succeeded in holding together and conjoining the fundamental axiomatic of the rights of man and the utilitarian calculus of the independence of the governed. " As I signaled earlier in the week, by adopting what he calls strategic logic, Foucault's rewriting of the tradition is simultaneously a means of extending it because it facilitates the expression of this creative dynamic.
At this point it is unclear whether Foucault thinks that by so doing one gives liberalism a new lease on life or one helps to push it over the precipice. But he is explicit that dialectical logic (which I take him to associate with the Frankfurt school, especially Horkheimer and Marcuse [both mentioned later in the lecture series)) is both simplistic and incapable of respecting the creativity lodged within the liberal tradition. De facto he is saying that the unity they offer is not worth having.
I could stop here, but it is worth noting what liberalism's rule of reason he is willing to apply strategic logic to is. He writes:
Governmental reason in its modern form, in the form established at the beginning of the eighteenth century with the fundamental characteristic of a search for the principle of its self-limitation, is a reason that functions in terms of interest. But this is no longer the interest of an entirely self-referring state which only seeks its own growth, wealth, population, and power, as was the state of raison d’État. In the principle to which governmental reason must conform, interest is now interests, a complex interplay between individual and collective interests, between social utility and economic profit, between the equilibrium of the market and the regime of public authorities, between basic rights and the independence of the governed. Government, at any rate, government in this new governmental reason, is something that works with interests....In its new regime, government is basically no longer to be exercised over subjects and other things subjected through these subjects. Government is now to be exercised over what we could call the phenomenal republic of interests. (44...46)
The rule of reason is thus the rule of interests, and this is, quite clearly, itself in constant motion a moving target. And in part it is a moving target because as interests are both shaped and pursued, perceived needs and how these perceptions are constituted evolve. So, we may say that in this phenomenal republic there is lodged a further complex dynamics that has, in turn, a complex interplay with the dynamics of liberty.
These complex, multi-faceted dynamics come together in the market which is (recall) a stupendous machine that helps coordinate the pursuit of our needs. I put it like this because here in lecture 2, Foucault has already signaled, without mentioning his name, that Hayek is not an aberration from liberalism but central to the tradition. But the lecture ends on alerting to the reader to the significance of James Buchanan's research program (e.g. Calculus of Consent):
The fundamental question of liberalism is: What is the utility value of government and all actions of government in a society where exchange determines the true value of things? this question encapsulates the fundamental questions raised by liberalism. With this question liberalism posed the fundamental question of government, which is whether all the political, economic, and other forms which have been contrasted with liberalism can really avoid this question and avoid formulating this question of the utility of a government in a regime where exchange determines the value of things. (46)
This is, of course, precisely the research agenda of public choice theory (Buchanan, Tullock), which goes unnamed in the Birth of Biopolitics (and perhaps everywhere in Foucault's work). And, of course, if we look at Buchanan's research project closely it mixes the two traditions noted by Foucault. The contractualist-republican element is (recall) exhibited in the significance to Buchanan of the constitutional moment; this is the part of Buchanan where he is very close to Rawls. But within the constitutional order Buchanan inherits (what Foucault calls) the radical tradition and applies in Foucaults terms the utility value of government and all actions of government in a society where exchange determines the true value of things.* That is to say, Foucault helps explain why the Virginia school is, itself, an expression of the central problematics of liberalism.
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