Just as the royal dignity and power surpasses all earthly powers, so too the man appointed to exercise it should not be base and infamous but should excel others in wisdom, justice and piety as he does in place and dignity. It is necessary, therefore, that the one who is to have charge of all and govern all should display greater virtue than others and should be careful to exercise the power committed to him with a fine balance of equity; for the people do not exalt him above themselves so as to concede to him an unlimited power of tyrannizing over them, but rather to defend them against the tyranny and wickedness of others. However, when he who is chosen to repress evil-doers and defend the just begins to cherish evil in himself, to oppress good men to exercise over his subjects the cruel tyranny that he ought to ward off from them, is it not clear that he deservedly falls from the dignity conceded to him and that the people are free from his lordship and from subjection to him since it is evident that he first broke the compact by virtue of which he was appointed? Nor can anyone justly or reasonably accuse the people of perfidy when it is evident that he first broke faith with them. To take an example from a meaner sphere, if a man hired someone for a fair wage to look after his swine and then found that he was not caring for them but stealing, killing and destroying them, would not the man withhold the promised wage from him and remove him ignominiously from his task of caring for the swine? Now, if this is observed in base things, that a man who does not care for his swine but destroys them shall not be kept as a swineherd, are there not just and reasonable grounds for maintaining that, in proportion as humans differ from swine, so too it is more fitting that anyone who does not strive to rule his subjects but rather to lead them into error should be deprived of the power and authority over men that he has received? Why should we be surprised if this rule is observed under the Christian religion when the ancient Romans in the days of the illustrious Collatinus and Brutus, refusing to endure the pride of Tarquin because of the shameful deed which his son, not he himself, had perpetrated against the noble matron Lucretia, expelled him and his son from the country and from the kingship, and created a government by two consuls holding office for a year to prevent anyone growing haughty through long exercise of authority. ...
The nature of man excels that of all other living creatures in this, that, being capable of treating by reason whatever has not fallen out by fortuitous hazard, it inquires into the causes of things with rational judgement and considers not only what is done but why it is done. Since then no one can make himself an emperor or king, the people raise some man above themselves for these reasons, to rule and govern them by virtue of his just authority, to apportion to each his own, to protect the good, to repress the wicked and to deal out justice to all. If, however, he breaks the compact by which he was elected and ruins and confounds what he was established to order correctly, reason justly considers that he has absolved the people from their duty of submission to him since he himself first broke the bond of mutual fidelity by which he was bound to them and they to him.--Manegold (ca 1080-185) quoted from Brian Tierney (1988) The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300, pp. 78-80. *
Larry Siedentop partially quotes Manegold as one "of the earliest examples of a contractual model for understanding the proper relationship between rulers and ruled" in order to illustrate the idea that is "hardly accidental" social contract theory developed within a Christian context because in it the focus obligation is on individual conscience (249; recall my earlier posts on his Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism; here; here); and here). If one is, say, trying to combat, with a nod ahead to Suarez, the idea that Christianity and liberalism are naturally opposed (as Siedentop is) or, as one could readily imagine, one is trying to undermine the soft-Marxist thought that contractualism as a ruling framework fits or expresses bourgeois ideology (with the rise of property contracts, etc.), then this is attractive thought. And anybody familiar with Locke, and the role Locke played subsequently, will find much that is familiar in Manegold's argument.
Of course, contractualism predates Manegold and is not only to be found in Christianity (recall Glaucon in the Republic; Lucretius.) In fact, some of the most characteristic features of Manegold's argument echo (recall) the writings of Master Mo (also here; here; and here). In particular, both Manegold and Master Mo conceive of the social contract as legitimating elective kingship. In Manegold that is a feature and not a bug because, on behalf of the pope in the so-called investiture controversy, he is criticizing the holy roman emperor who is an elected king (of Germany, but elected by prince-electors).
Of course, when one starts to look more closely at Manegold's argument, one recognizes more distinctive features. First, Manegold explicitly points to (a famous example from) the rebellion that led to the founding of the Roman republic. (And, in fact, initially the two consuls could, not unlike the American Presidency, be understood as elected kings.) I don't know if Livy was circulating then (but here is the story). But either way, part of the significance of Manegold's argument is that Christianity is not itself a source of innovation; that the office of kingship is conditional on good performance in pagan and christian times. Part of the polemical target here is any claim that the king's sacred authority is directly derived from God (through heritable birth-line).
Initially, I wouldn't want to call Manegold's argument 'republican,' but he himself notes its provenance. And if that's right than the contractual features are really illustrative of a deeper insight that rulership is ground in the needs of the people qua people who 'raise' some above them for a functional purpose (the contract, then, illustrates this functional feature). I don't think this is the natural reading for us (post-Hobbesian/Lockean consent). But it would help explain the recurring theme of the people raising/exalting somebody above them.
Of course, unlike many modern republican and contractualist theorists, Manegold thinks the character of the ruler is significant and that the people do not only require a ruler noted for 'wisdom, justice and piety,' but also one that has "greater virtue than others." The nature of this virtue is moral and political: a ruler's task is to defend the people against the tyranny and wickedness of others, "to apportion to each his own, to protect the good, to repress the wicked and to deal out justice to all."
Manegold does not say, in context, how widespread wickedness is, but clearly his approach requires that at least some people are virtuous and capable of being virtuous while being elevated into considerable power. While it would be misleading to say that Manegold is advocating for philosopher-kings, his rulers are clearly exceptional human types. And just as Locke notes that it would defeat the purpose of a ruler if he makes "use of the power" not "for the good of those who are under it," so does Manegold. but for his own private, separate advantage.
One final point, that the ruler should be a good shepherd is, of course, a biblical trope. But the favored herd is generally not swine. In Plato's Statesman the ruler should be a good shepherd, but I don't recall mention of swine. The most famous swineherd belongs Odysseus. but the connection with Manegold strikes me as a bit far-fetched. It would be interesting to know more about the valence of swine in Manegold's time.
But once one thinks about it, it is notable that it's not the swine who pick their own shepherd. And it's not them who contract their shepherd; it's a third party. Rather, an unnamed party (the swineherd's true owners) contract the ruler. Since Manegold is writing on behalf of the pope, it seems natural to assume that his contract analogy is, in part, intended to note the fact that papal authority is one of the interested parties in good rule of the flock. This is, in fact, the natural reading of the material surrounding this passage in the letter (79), which is all about the Church's authority over the king and those that have sworn prior oaths to him.
So, perhaps a better less liberal reading of Manegold's account of the social contract involves a relationship among ruler and people of mutual fidelity characterized by performance of a socially useful function--that's the republicanism. But the ruler's authority is contracted by or bestowed with the blessing/permission of papal authority. If the ruler fails to perform his socially useful function the people have a right to throw of his yoke, but not because they withhold consent. Rather, the Church removes its consent because the ruler forfeits the right to rule by not serving God's plan for him. It seems like a good time to remind ourselves of this doctrine.
*I have not found a latin version of the text. When I do I will revisit the argument of the post.
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