Consequently, to enter into the political game of the new Germany, the SPD really had to convert to these neo-liberal theses, if not to the economic, scientific, or theoretical theses, at least to the general practice of this neo-liberalism as governmental practice. Thus the famous [1559] Bad Godesberg congress with its absolute renunciation of the most traditional themes of social democracy certainly was the break with Marxist theory, with Marxist socialism, but at the same time it was—and this was not just a betrayal, except, if you like, in general historical terms—the acceptance of what was already in the process of functioning as the economic-political consensus of German liberalism. It was not so much the renunciation of this or that part of the program common to most socialist parties as entry into the game of governmentality...
This is, for sure, one of the reasons, and not the least, but I think we should try to examine further this problem of the relation between German socialism and the neo-liberal governmentality defined by Erhard in 1948, or at least by his counselors about whom I spoke a little last week. We can try to understand a bit better what happened and why it happened in this way. Actually, there is no doubt another reason than this kind of tactical stranglehold in which the German socialist party found itself after 1948. It is often said, well, at least by those who know his work, that there is no theory of power in Marx, that the theory of the state is inadequate, and that it really is time to produce it. But is it really so important to provide oneself with a theory of the state? After all, the English have not done so badly and, at least until these last few years, have been tolerably well-governed without a theory of the state. At any rate, the last of the theories of the state is found in Hobbes, that is to say, in someone who was both the contemporary and “supporter” of a type of monarchy that the English precisely got rid of at that time. After Hobbes, there is Locke. Locke does not produce a theory of the state; he produces a theory of government. So, we can say that the English political system has never functioned, and liberal doctrine has never functioned on the basis of, or even by providing itself with a theory of the state. They have adopted principles of government.
In short, whether or not there is a theory of the state in Marx is for Marxists to decide. As for myself, I would say that what socialism lacks is not so much a theory of the state as a governmental reason, the definition of what a governmental rationality would be in socialism, that is to say, a reasonable and calculable measure of the extent, modes, and objectives of governmental action. Michel Foucault, 31 January 1979, translated by Graham Burchell, Lecture 4, The Birth of Biopolitics. 90-92
Lecture 4 could have been titled, Why I am not a Marxist. And given his deep knowledge of Hayek, I am sure it tempted Foucault if he had been inclined to give his lectures titles. Kidding aside, Foucault clearly and explicitly distinguishes himself from the Marxist tradition. And given that he seems uninclined to provide social democracy what it lacks -- a socialist governmentality --, and, thereby, to reinvigorate its tradition, it stands to reason he is no social democrat either. The world-historical significance of this is that he pronounces, in ideal typical terms, social democracy and marxism comatose a decade before the Berlin Wall fell, lecturing while both German states were ruled by the heirs of the original Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands.
I use 'comatose' because Foucault is quite explicit that there is no theoretical or conceptual reason why there couldn't be a socialist governmentality. He is, however, quite clear that neither Marx (for the left-wing) nor Keynes (for the right-wing) provides it. Let's stipulate he is right about this. The significance of this is that until it generates a socialist governmentality, despite the obvious intellectual hunger and energy on the political left, the conundrum it faces remains straightforward: how, after gaining power, to avoid creating a police state or kleptocratic state capitalism with socialist slogans (or both).*
The previous paragraph is an invitation to be pointed to work that proves Foucault wrong. Of course, I am not unfamiliar with the efforts to develop a prefigurative and democratic (non-representative) politics. Some other time, I return to why I think these do not overcome Foucault's challenge (yet).
Of course, Locke's 'art of government' is a kind of step-child of Lockean philosophy. It is largely ignored by the most vocal and famous Lockeans today: the rights loving libertarians and those (sometimes the same) that have him as the founder of the liberal version of the social contract. It's also ignored (recall here; here) by most critics of Locke's philosophy (who see in him the godfather of imperialist, colonial racist exploitation). Even Foucault, who repeatedly hints at Locke's significance and his art of government, in the previous three lectures, does not go to Locke's texts or spell it out in light of them (but recall my post on Locke; and Toland's use of Locke). To simplify greatly, while embracing forms of self-limitation, it's oriented toward population and economic growth in the service of ever cheaper consumption goods and, thereby, a species of emancipation. It's key strategy is always to turn zero-sum conflicts into win-win pacifications (by redirection, log-rolling, bundling, etc.).*
As I noted earlier in the week, Foucault gives short-shrift to the emancipatory element, but he is absolutely right that in the German neo-liberal variant, the state gains output legitimacy -- he repeatedly (85, 90) uses the language of "consensus" [again making me think he is reading Buchanan]-- through economic performance and, the state, in turn, commits itself to constituting a site of freedom (to echo Erhard) where rights-bearing individuals can consume and choose occupations without others' direction. (This means robust anti-trust law, the embrace of rule of law, etc.]
This is so, even if we grant Foucault, and here he disagrees with the Ordos, that the liberal state itself becomes a kind of empty shell. All that is left is a "number of practices." (77) The Ordos (and even Arendt) all think in terms of an independent state (an arbiter) with its own distinct ethos and independence. I do not think Foucault is wrong empirically. Even the ORDOs will grant that, in practice, the state is at permanent risk of being taken over by rent-seeking clubs and their representatives. On this the Marxist (cf. Communist Manifesto) and the Ordo agree.
But in ideal typical terms, according to the Ordo, the state has a thin normative conception such that its independence makes possible the emancipatory constitution of freedom (which generates state legitimacy, etc.). And its art of governmentality requires from politicians a two-foldness: winning elections out and in government and simultaneously ensuring through the cycle of victory and defeat that the state lives up to this thin normative conception. The tension between these two features is essential to liberal statecraft, or art.*
*What this entails is that we should not exaggerate the barriers to the elaboration of socialist governmentality.
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