Master Mo on Political Choice During Pandemics

“They object: Is it permissible as a way of selecting officers, but not permissible as a way of selecting rulers?

[Master Mo said:] …Suppose there are two rulers. Let one of them hold partiality and the other universal impartiality. [In context of emergency]: Then the partial ruler would say to himself, how can I take care of the people as I do of myself? This would be quite contrary to common sense. A man's life on earth is of short duration, it is like a galloping horse passing by. Therefore when he finds his people hungry he would not feed them, and when he finds them cold he would not clothe them. When they are sick he would not minister to them, and upon their death he would not bury them. Such is the word and such is the deed of the partial ruler.

[Master Mo continued] The impartial ruler is quite unlike this both in word and in deed. He would say to himself, I have heard that to be an upright ruler of the world one should first attend to his people and then to himself. Therefore when he finds his people hungry he would feed them, and when he finds them cold he would clothe them. In their sickness he would minister to them, and upon their death he would bury them. Such is the word and such is the deed of the universal ruler.

These two rulers, then, are opposed to each other in word and also in deed. Suppose they are sincere in word and decisive in deed so that their word and deed are made to agree like the two parts of a tally, and that there is no word but what is realized in deed, then let us consider further: Suppose, now, that there is a disastrous pestilence, that most people are in misery and privation, and that many lie dead in ditches (Under such circumstances) let us inquire, if a person could choose one of the two rulers, which would he prefer? It seems to me on such occasions there are no fools in the world. Even if he is a person who objects to universal love, he will choose the universal ruler. This is verbal objection to the principle but actual selection by it - this is self-contradiction between one's word and deed. It is incomprehensible, then, why people should object to universal love when they hear it.“ Master Mo, Universal Love, III. (4:3), translated by W.P Wei [HT:Helen de Cruz]*

The thought experiment occurs in the midst of a defense of Master Mo's impartial consequentialism (recall this summary). And in context, he is responding to objections that concede the normative attractiveness of the position, but that think it impractical. The particular objection that selecting for impartiality may be useful in lower ranked officials and not the head of state (the emperor/son of heaven) goes to the heart of the matter because, like many other early Chinese political theorists, Master Mo embraces a normative and practical trickle down theory--where the ruler is a standard setter/unifyer and oversees the implementation and maintenance of impartiality and the benefits (lì 利) it brings from the town down. Among the good benefits the ruler brings are public works, low taxes, fair administration of justice, virtuous mores, and, public health. So, if Master Mo concedes the objection, his project is a non-starter.

Of course, the objection itself presupposes a familiar thought. That when push comes to shove, we prefer family, kin, tribe (etc.) over the unknown and distant (perhaps unborn) stranger. And for some this preference may well be thought moral. Master Mo is vulnerable on his score; let me explain. Because his theory is ground in an empirical claim: that impartiality has the best consequences (in terms of li). But if it can be shown that better consequences result from people promoting their kin (tribe, etc.) then his empirical argument for impartiality fails on consequentialist grounds. 

Okay, with that in place. Master Mo responds to the objection by producing a thought experiment about political choice in the context of a "disastrous pandemic." This is a high stakes decisions for ruler and ruled alike. For the ruled it is high stakes because bad governance entails higher mortality and more famine, perhaps breakdown of public order, during the pandemic. For the ruler it is also high stakes because he may forfeit (recall) the mandate of heaven as a consequence of the pandemic.

As a non-trivial aside, that in the thought experiment Master Mo (430 BCE) adopts the bottom up perspective signals something of his (what we may anachronistically call) democratic sensibility. The thought experiment involves the criteria of ruler selection from the perspective of the people. This is not ad hoc in Master Mo; this strain is also visible (recall here; here and here) in his presentation of the escape from the state of nature by way of a social contract. And part of the persuasiveness of the thought experiment, if any, is this democratic sensibility.

In the thought experiment we are presented with two ideal-types of rulers: one sees the world in zero-sum terms: political power and political hierarchy is zero-sum: there are winners and losers, and his gain is somebody else's loss. And the objection assumes that it is rational to prefer such a ruler. For, while you may not wish to hang out with ruthless friends, a gangster-style leader at a distance, at the top of the political hierarchy, who secures the goods needed to survive an emergency is worth having.+ If there is a distinct -- let's call this a realist political morality -- it assumes something like the (Schmitian) thought expressed in the previous sentence. 

The objection should remind you (recall) of those who think that the rule of law and other impartiality promoting institutions can constrain authoritarian (zero-sum adhering) rulers bending the the rule of law toward their ends. If the normative and political trickle down theory of governance is correct then the objection cannot succeed. I actually think this is a non-trivial part of Master Mo's underlying response to theobection, but that's not how he puts it.

The other kind of ruler finds ways of making state institutions work for to solve the people's people's problems during hard times. In the thought experiment this is expressed in terms of sacrificing the priority of his own desires for those of others. This may seem also a kind of zero-sum logic. But I think Master Mo does not mean to suggest that the ruler should serve the people at his own expense (although there are passages that suggest it). Rather, by taking care of the people in an impartial fashion, he himself, as a consequence, also benefit (stable rule, legitimacy, prosperity, etc.) This is why I treat the impartial ruler as a non-zero sum leader.

So, on my reading of the thought experiment, Master Mo assumes that (1) in high stakes environment people behave differently from low stakes environments; (2) we learn people's -- as it were -- true preferences in high stakes environments; (3) we can infer how they ought to behave in any environment from their true (counterfactual) preferences in high stakes environment. (If you want to deny Master Mo's commitment to (1) & (3) that's fine; he clearly needs (2). In defense of (2) ythere is empirical, political science evidence that when people are afraid—a natural response during a pandemic—they become more politically attentive and seek out high quality information; they also become more willing to cooperate and compromise in order to help each other and get things done.** 

Okay, with that in place, Master Mo's response to the objection is that when reflecting on high stakes environments, it is not just idealistic to prefer the impartial ruler, but straightforwardly rational (the alternative is straightforwardly foolish). Master Mo, thinks this is so obvious he barely explains why.

The main explicit argument one can draw from his presentation of the thought experiment (and one does need some awareness of culturally salient background conditions) is that only rulership that cares for all will address "misery and privation" and help ensure orderly burial of the dead during the pandemic. This presupposes, I think, also the tacit assumption that (and this fits the wider discussion of mandates of heaven) in order to be able to do so, one must have prepared for such challenging circumstances in advance and only an impartial ruler is likely to discount present satisfaction to have the resources and plans and drilling in place to tackle a pandemic.  

Notice that the argument does not require that impartial rulers don't make mistakes during a pandemic. The thought experiment only needs the assumption that we expect impartial rulers to care about the consequences of mistakes that fall on others and learn from those. 

One may grant that the thought experiment shows that, in principle, preferring the impartial ruler can be defended under conditions one may well have thought favor realist political morality. But one may still wonder if, during an pandemic, it is irrational to prefer a zero-sum ruler. After all, during such times vital goods may be very scarce, and a ruler that is willing to throw around his weight on behalf of his people [America First], as opposed to foreigners, may well be thought attractive.

While Master Mo is active during the warring states period, and so the objective is highly salient, this objection does not quite arise in Master Mo's set up because he is assuming (recall) world government: the Son of Heaven rules over an empire (now quoting Ivanhoe's translation, an 'entire world' which is 'so vast" across many "different regions"). Somewhat surprisingly, this reveals the true force of his thought experiment: to prefer the partial ruler is, when given the option, to prefer to be/remain in the state of nature. And this is, indeed, to be a fool.

*I am grateful to Helen who helped me find a neat passage in Chinese political thought that reflects on the significance of pandemics. I am grateful to her daughter for an astute question, and Loy Hui-Chieh for excellent discussion. (I have also reflected on a concern expressed by Neil Levy.) I used the passage in a public lecture here. I also thank Shen-yi Liao for catching a bad mistake.

+It's not entirely clear this is presupposed by the objection, but I think it makes sense.

**I thank Gijs Schumacher for suggesting this material.