As God hath contrived all the works of nature to be useful, and in some manner a support to each other, by which the whole frame of the world, under his providence, is preserved and kept up; so among mankind our particular stations are appointed to each of us by God Almighty, wherein we are obliged to act, as far as our power reacheth, toward the good of the whole community. And he who doth not perform that part assigned him toward advancing the benefit of the whole, in proportion to his opportunities and abilities, is not only a useless, but a very mischievous member of the publick: because he takes his share of the profit, and yet leaves his share of the burden to be born by others, which is the true principal cause of most miseries and misfortunes in life. For a wise man, who does not assist with his counsels; a great man, with his protection; a rich man, with his bounty and charity; and a poor man, with his labour; are perfect nuisances in a commonwealth. Neither is any condition of life more honourable in the sight of God than another; otherwise he would be a respecter of persons, which he assures us he is not: for he hath proposed the same salvation to all men, and hath only placed them in different ways or stations to work it out. Princes are born with no more advantages of strength or wisdom, than other men; and, by an unhappy education, are usually more defective in both, than thousands of their subjects. They depend for every necessary of life upon the meanest of their people: besides, obedience and subjection were never enjoined by God to humour the passions, lusts, and vanities of those who demand them from us; but we are commanded to obey our governours, because disobedience would breed seditions in the state.--Jonathan Swift 28 February 1718, Sermon on Mutual Subjection, printed in 1744. [Bold added]
The passage in bold is discussed quoted up until "the publick"in Isaac Kramnick's excellent (1968) Bolingbroke & His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole, pp. 214-215. The book is interesting to this because it contains a majestic treatment of the origin of the conservative ease with populism and nationalism. When Kramnick introduces the passage, it is meant to illustrate that Swift is "an apologist for the aristocracy and gentry...[he] could not conceive society without degree and place, without authority and submission. Beneath the humanist prince, at the apex of authority, stood the virtuous and public-spirited nobility and gentry, and below them farmers, merchants, traders, artisans, workers, and servants." (p. 214) Indeed, there is no doubt that the passage is a kind of defense of social hierarchy. But Kramnick recognizes that this does not exhaust the passage because after quoting it he adds, "God sees no station as more honorable than another. Submission and authority, Swift wrote, were not necessary to flatter the vanity of the governor, but to prevent sedition through disobedience. Servants obey masters, children their fathers, wives their husbands; otherwise, there would be only great confusion." (215)
I was so surprised by Kramnick's reading that I decided to look up the whole sermon. The reason I was surprised is that the quoted passage in bold reminded me of one of my favorite passages (see here) -- which I have dubbed heroes without dazzlement -- from the second treatise (and third section of) Hutcheson's (1725) An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises,+ In the margin of this passage,+ Hutcheson himself prints its moral: "Heroism, in all stations." I have discussed Hutcheson's passage back in the day at NewAPPS, and won't do so again. I suspect Hutcheson was not back in Ireland when Swift preached the sermon, so I am not suggesting mutual influence.
Hutcheson's passage is an important, foundational text in the history of mathematical and classical utilitarianism [see Julia Driver]. And, anybody who has read (1729) A Modest Proposal realizes that Swift would not endorse Hutcheson's position without qualification. But where they agree (while tacitly relying on a principle akin to ought implies can) is that there is a (high enough) vantage point from which our duty to contribute to our community is equalized in light of the constraints and opportunities of action we face (qua individuals). And this duty fits in both into a larger consequentialist scheme. In Swift the consequentialist analysis is manifestly part of a providential story, maybe even a theodicy.
Kramnick also misses that for Swift the argument is not merely a defense of social hierarchy and obedience. It is clearly also an attack on free-riding by any member of the community. ("And he who doth not perform that part assigned him toward advancing the benefit of the whole, in proportion to his opportunities and abilities, is not only a useless, but a very mischievous member of the publick.") And because the rich, smart, and powerful have more opportunities to contribute to the social good, their (attempts at) free-riding is objectively worse. [Swift also claims explicitly the rich and powerful of his day tend to be objectively badly prepared for their obligations. So, it's de facto quite critical of the status quo.]
So, in so far it is a defense of hierarchy and obedience it is also more than an exhortation to noblesse oblige. It is clearly also a criticism of those who squander their privilege in non-socially beneficial activities and, thereby hurt not just others but generates social disorders. That's especially clear in the sentence after the end of the part quoted by Kramnick: "because he takes his share of the profit, and yet leaves his share of the burden to be born by others, which is the true principal cause of most miseries and misfortunes in life."
More generally, Swift's position is a complex mixture of political-economic and gender hierarchy combined with a strong moral equality. The defense of obedience is entirely in consequentialist terms; a fear of revolution. The underlying argument is really a choice between two evils: obedience to superiors and political revolution.* And in the social and economic division of labor we all depend on each other, and (while I don't want to claim Swift adheres to relational equality) from this fact those who happen to be at the top of the hierarchy can claim no moral superiority.
Be that as it may, I think Swift and Hutcheson has something to teach to us about the underlying reality and nature of moral economy. Beneath any social division of labor and its financial and status rewards, there is another and in a sense truer system of duties and recognition. (I use 'recognition' because they presuppose an impartial/divine spectator.) This is the system of duties that asks us to contribute to our communities to the best of our abilities given our capabilities and opportunities.
We (sorry, some of us) tend to have little eye for this system of duties and recognition. But during emergencies and crisis situations the spot-light reveals it clearly. This is clearly exhibited each time when fire-brigades, nurses, the police, and physicians risks their lives for the rest of us. But it is even more revealed in the present pandemic: when supermarket cashiers and delivery people are at work while the rich and powerful (and middle classes) stay at home.
I could stop here, but I want to close with a remark on the significance of this. What I have called "the system of duties and recognition," which takes any existing inequality for granted, sits uneasily with rewarding people in light of a market logic or their contribution to marginal productivity as well as those who claim that we should reward financially in terms of the "contribution to society" or "positive externalities" as Lisa Herzog has recently argued in New Statesman. Let me say something about the latter.
Herzog also notes that in the crisis we see people acting from duty and the desire for social recognition. "Many individuals want to make a meaningful contribution to society through their work – and work should be organised so that they can do that." One may think, thus, that what Herzog is proposing is to bring rewards in the market place more in line with the contribution to society (so much is right) -- to recouple "contributions to society, income and status" -- and, thereby, to bring these rewards in line with the system of duties and recognition.
There are four subtle issues here. Herzog treats the measure of meaningful contribution in subjective terms. (This is presumably so because she respects people's autonomy.) But the system of duties and recognition is meant to be objective (relative to particular circumstances--so objective in the way Aristotle's moral theory is objective). Second, she thinks that we can democratically agree on the nature of these positive externalities. (I think this is very optimistic.) But, by contrast, for better or worse the "system of duties and recognition" is grounded in skilled (perhaps omniscient) perception of an impartial spectator.
These two point to the more important third issue: The system of duties and recognition is always a moving target because it is meant to reflects real underlying political and economic facts of the matter. So, if society were to adopt and agree on Herzog's proposals to re-organize financial rewards for occupations in light of need this would shift what would be expected from each of us, and so on, in light of the system of duties and recognition.
My point is not that there is an infinite regress lurking here. Nor that we should avoid altogether rewarding richly those who risk their lives on behalf of the rest of us. Herzog has every right to argue for redistribution given the status quo. But rather that the contested discussion of redistribution should not prevent us from recognizing that something like the system of duties and recognition marks correctly the pull each of us feels, or ought to feel, to act from duty to the best of our abilities and opportunities when others in society really depend on us.**
*While Swift's implied argument is dogmatic; Kramnick's response is no less so.
**I thank Erwin Dekker and Matt Lord for suggestive comments on Lisa Herzog's esay that I read while reflecting on Natalie Eggermont's report.
+The applying a mathematical Calculation to moral Subjects, will appear perhaps at first extravagant and wild; but some Corollarys, which are easily and certainly deduc’d below,* may shew the Conveniency of this Attempt, if it could be further pursu’d. At present, we shall only draw this one‖, which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the lowest rank of Mankind, viz. “That no external Circumstances of Fortune, no involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the most heroick Virtue.” For how small soever the Moment of publick Good be, which any one can accomplish, yet if his Abilitys are proportionably small, the Quotient, which expresses the Degree of‖ Virtue, may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the Prince, the Statesman, the General, are capable of true Heroism, tho these are the chief Characters, whose Fame is diffus’d thro various Nations and Ages; but when we find in an honest Trader, the kind Friend, the faithful prudent Adviser, the charitable and hospitable Neighbour, the tender Husband and affectionate Parent, the sedate yet chearful Companion, the generous Assistant of Merit, the cautious Allayer of Contention and Debate, the Promoter of Love and good Understanding among Acquaintances; if we consider, that these were all the good Offices which his Station in the World gave him an Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we must judge this Character really as amiable, as those, whose external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into an Opinion, “that they are the only Heroes in Virtue.
Comments