The moderate wages for the first branch could only be a bait to little demagogues. Three dollars, or thereabouts, he supposed, would be the utmost. The Senate, he feared, from a similar cause, would be filled by certain undertakers, who wish for particular offices under the government. This view of the subject almost led him to despair that a republican government could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible, at the same time, that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form. In his private opinion, he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinion of so many of the wise and good, that the British Government was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. He hoped gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which had taken place, and was still going on. It was once thought, that the power of Congress was amply sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud as any in declaiming against the vices of democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as himself, would join in the praise bestowed by Mr. NECKAR on the British Constitution, namely, that it is the only government in the world “which unites public strength with individual security.” In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few and the many. Hence, separate interests will arise. There will be debtors and creditors, &c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the power, that each may defend itself against the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper-money, instalment laws, &c. To the proper adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of their constitution. Their House of Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest, by means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier against every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness enough to answer the purpose...Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from the different estimates they form of the human passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the Senate an adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great object of government is pursued, which seizes the popular passions, they spread like wild-fire and become irresistible. He appealed to the gentlemen from the New England States, whether experience had not there verified the remark. As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on republican principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question; for can there be a good government without a good Executive? The English model was the only good one on this subject. The hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the nation, and his personal emolument so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad; and at the same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controlled, to answer the purpose of the institution at home. One of the weak sides of republics was their being liable to foreign influence and corruption. Men of little character, acquiring great power, become easily the tools of intermeddling neighbors. Sweden was a striking instance. The French and English had each their parties during the late revolution, which was effected by the predominant influence of the former. What is the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far, in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life, or at least during good behavior. Let the Executive also, be for life. He appealed to the feelings of the members present, whether a term of seven years would induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of public trust would require, so as to insure the services of the best citizens. On this plan, we should have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer essential purposes. But is this a republican government, it will be asked. Yes, if all the magistrates are appointed and vacancies are filled by the people, or a process of election originating with the people...An Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of power. It will be objected, probably, that such an Executive will be an elective monarch, and will give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of government. He would reply, that monarch is an indefinite term. It marks not either the degree or duration of power. If this Executive magistrate would be a monarch for life, the other proposed by the Report from the Committee of the Whole would be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being elective was also applicable to both. It had been observed, by judicious writers, that elective monarchies would be the best if they could be guarded against the tumults excited by the ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He thought this character of elective monarchies had been taken rather from particular cases, than from general principles...Might not such a mode of election be devised among ourselves, as will defend the community against these effects in any dangerous degree? Having made these observations, he would read to the Committee a sketch of a plan which he should prefer to either of those under consideration. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return he would ask, will the people adopt the other plan? At present they will adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving, or already dissolved — he sees evils operating in the States which must soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies — he sees that a great progress has been already made, and is still going on, in the public mind. He thinks, therefore, that the people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices; and whenever that happens, they will themselves...be ready to go as far at least as he proposes.--Monday, June 18, "Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787" (by James Madison)
I have noted before (recall) that even in the face of the risk of demagoguery, Hamilton has a dangerous fondness for executive power (cf. Federalist 70). But I had not quite realized the extent of his fondness for the British constitution and his flirtation with hereditary and elective monarchy. Echoing Hume's argument in the Treatise, he sees in a law-governed, monarchy (heritable or elected) the indispensable institution of generating a government which serves the general interest in large states that may otherwise become riven with divisive economic/class interests. The idea being that a wealthy monarch's interests -- in a world of competitive, independent nations, coincide roughly with the general interest of a state. A growing flourishing economy will allow the self-interested monarch pay for defense and other trappings of greatness.
I call attention to two features of his argument; these are both responding, I think, to concerns that excessive presidential power would turn into tyranny. First, that in the face of a strong and dangerous executive a countervailing senate (modeled on the House of Lords) with life-terms is required. The most recent impeachment trial has revealed that a regularly and democratically elected Senate can become incapable of holding a transgressive President to account once subject to dangers of partisanship (or faction to Madison and Hamilton). Of course, it is not obvious that a Hamiltonian Senate filled with the very rich with life terms would not be riven with faction.
Second, Hamilton recognizes that a powerful executive would generate permanent unrest ("tumult"). Legislative opposition to an imperial presidency would be weak, and so such opposition would be redirected to the streets. Now, a natural way to read Hamilton is to think that he thinks such such tumult is only a co-occurrence of badly designed institutions (in context he mentions "the election of Roman Emperors..... in Poland the election is made by great rival princes" etc.) That's not the whole story, however.
For, Hamilton also seems to suggest that such unrest can be turned into a feature, and not a bug. As he puts it, "might not such a mode of election [of an executive] be devised among ourselves, as will defend the community against these effects in any dangerous degree?" So, the key is to allow for non-dangerous, but executive-checking street tumult. This is, I think, clearly inspired by (reall) chapter 4 of Machiavelli's Discourses on Livy. For in the truly innovative moment in Machiavelli's, Machiavelli had suggested that some street tumult, in the right institutional context, could be conducive to good government (and even its productive evolution).
Let me sum up. True democrats may note Hamilton's disdain for the fickleness of public opinion and his lack of confidence in many democratic experiments. But in our post impeachment age, Hamilton's true insight can be summed up in a simple slogan: if the imperial presidency cannot fear the senate it must fear the streets.
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