On the Misuse of Science

One of the tasks of history and philosophy of science is to develop awareness of the misuse of science, so that with any luck we can learn from the misdeeds of the past. It is misguided to treat the terrain covered by Cofnas as if no more than an abstract set of hypotheticals, lacking historical precedent, and without probable intended effect on future society.--Mazviita Chirimuuta and Michael Dietrich writing in Dailynous.

My interest today is primarily in the first quoted sentence; it is not in Cofnas' paper. But I need the rest of the second sentence for my purposes, so that's why I quoted the part that included 'terrain covered by Cofnas.' I agree with the spirit of Chirimuuta and Dietrich's excellent essay, but it may be useful to digress a bit on why I disagree with the letter.

I take Chirimuuta and Dietrich to be offering a prescription to fellow historians and philosophers of science: develop tools by which the misuse of science can be studied and be made available as a species of instruction (so that we can learn from the past). I treat this as prescriptive because it is by no means the status quo among philosophers of science (even the historically informed ones). It is also not the norm among historians of science (including the philosophically informed ones). The latter (historians) are allergic to using history as a morality tale, the former are primarily interested in treating science as authoritative or as a baseline of knowledge to be used in other projects.

Of course, I am aware of the existence of the philosophical literature on inductive risk (I hope I even count as contributing to that literature, but see Heather Douglas (science, policy and values), Liam Kofi Bright (on fraud), Cailin O’Connor and James Owen Weatherall on the spread of false beliefs).  And I am also familiar with attempts by some historians to unmask self-vindicating accounts of science (that ignore power, ideology), or where science serves financial interests (see, e.g, Naomi Oreskes & Erik Conway) etc. The inductive risk literature is by no means the most prevalent in philosophy of science--but it is certainly not ignored. And it is not impossible that among historians of science the unmasking practices have even wider currency. (I believe that because of the climate emergency unmasking projects of science have lost their sexiness.)  So, I also don't mean to suggest that the prescription does no justice to existing practice at all. (I also don't take Chirimuuta and Michael Dietrich to be suggesting that their prescription is the only task for HPS.)*

As an aside, unlike them I do not believe there is a unified field of HPS anymore, or that it is even possible. I am familiar with efforts to promote otherwise. I wish such efforts well. Henceforth: I use 'HPS types' to talk about historians of science, philosophers of science, and folk who try to combine the two.

Okay, so much for set up. Given the way they have phrased their prescription, the natural way to understand what they are suggesting is that the "misdeeds" are, when they occur, the result of the "misuse" of science. Certainly many misdeeds do occur because of the misure of science. But I worry that they also presuppose that when science is functioning properly there are no misdeeds (except, perhaps, very contingently). That is to say, that they have a normative conception of science such that the occurrences of misdeeds is prima facie evidence of the misuse of science. 

Notice that this normative conception of science goes against a very appealing other picture of science: that it is a kind of tool or instrument that can be used for good or bad ends. Let's call that the neutral conception of science. (I view the contrast between normative and neutral conceptions as a tool we may need to think about possible misdeeds that are the effect of science.)

Now some scientific disciplines put great effort into ensuring that they live up to a kind of normative conception of science. These are sciences with ethical codes and in which the very practice of research is self-consciously guided or constrained by ethical principles. (In recent years ethnography, engineering, and medicine fit this model.) Other disciplines will pay lip-service to ethical guidelines imposed on them by grant agencies and universities, but they really don't internalize them in the methods (economics and, alas, -- while not a science -- philosophy spring to mind). Obviously, the contrast between a neutral and normative conception of science need not be absolute--blending is possible.

But if HPS types are going to assume the normative conception of science in their apparatus they will misdescribe disciplines with the neutral conception of science. They will then risk mis-describing what can be learned from such cases.*

But all of this assumes that a science that self-consciously serves immoral or unsavory political ends is a conceptual monster. (Hidden here is a commitment to unity of scientific and practical virtues.) For example, Chirimuuta and Dietrich treat race science as a "tool" in the hands of politicians or bureaucrats "that deliberately and systematically oppressed Africans and people of African descent in countries such as South Africa and the United States of America—until quite recently." The folk who developed race science are presented as sometimes "capable capable biologists, psychologists and neuroscientists."  But, in fact, the building blocks of race science was, in part, developed by some of the the most excellent scientists (e.g., Galton, Pearsons, Fischer, Keynes, etc.) for the very purpose to develop scientific eugenics and to administer colonial populations in the context of Anglo near world domination. Yes, I know every word in the previous sentence can be shown to be misleading under one aspect, and simultaneously an understatement under another aspect.  

Of course, the folk who promoted a science with unsavory ends (let's call that the monstrous conception of science?) did not, by and large, think of it that way. In some cases they had a normative conception of science but with bad operative ends. In some cases they had a neutral conception of science with misguided views about how it could be made useful. They could foresee, in the felicitous phrase of Chirimuuta and Dietrich, the probable intended effect on future society of their own research. In such cases, it is deeply misleading to treat many of the worst misdeeds consequent of excellent science as a misuse of science; these are features not bugs.

There is a sense in which I merely agree with Chirimuuta and Dietrich. I certainly want to agree with their stance toward papers that wish to create the grounds for re-normalization of racist ideology.

Even so, my disagreement with them is not merely semantic. Given their position it is natural to say that "If science produces some breakthrough on this topic, then philosophers of science should respond." Given that on their view the possible misdeeds are only contingently related to the breakthrough this seems right. But if certain kinds of breakthroughs predictably serve and thereby facilitate or make available unsavory ends, then by the time philosophers of science and ipse facto the rest of society respond, it may be too late. 

 

 

*I myself have been most interested in what happens to mostly well intentioned scientists (and their audiences) who think they are using and participating in a neutral conception of science in complex policy environments. So my own research fits their prescription.

 

 

Comments

[Matt]

I'm pretty sympathetic with the take here, but I'll say that I'm a bit surprised that no one, as far as I can tell, has mentioned Philip Kitcher's very good discussion of these issues in his book _Science, Truth, and Democracy_, in particular his chapter, where he discusses exactly some of the issues at stake, "Subversive Truth and Ideals of Progress". His conclusion in the chapter, if I'm remembering it right (it's been a long time since I've read it, and I've only skimmed it now) is that it's a dogma to think that scientific research, or other pursuits of truth, will always be good for human flourishing, and he therefore argues that we should sometimes be willing to set some research aside. This, at least, seems like a plausible idea. If it's so, then I think that Chirimuuta and Dietrich's claim is, at least, too fast. It also shows why, I think, why Cofnas's paper needs to be addressed in a very different way than it has been.

[David Duffy]

Cofnas too discusses some of Kitcher's arguments in his 2015 paper...

[Patrick S. O'Donnell]

Eric, Perhaps you and/or your readers would find one of my bibliographies of interest in this regard: https://www.academia.edu/9985005/Sullied_Natural_and_Social_Sciences_A_Basic_Reading_Guide

I am curious as to what readers think of the notion of "indigenous science," as treated, for example, in Warren, D. Michael, L. Jan Slikkerveer and David Brokensha, eds. The Cultural Dimension of Development: Indigenous Knowledge Systems (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995) and Gonzalez, Robert J. Zapotec Science: Farming and Food in the Northern Sierra of Oaxaca (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2001). One sees this topic arise again and again in non-Western forms of medicine and healing as well as agrarian practices in Asia and elsewhere (in which peasants demonstrate a scientific or scientific-like practical knowledge of geographic and ecological variables that is often superior in many respects to modern agricultural practices rooted in contemporary sciences and agribusiness).

Finally, I have found that thinking about the life and work of Otto (and to some extent Marie) Neurath is valuable for thinking through at least some of these questions, but as for the reasons why, I am not yet prepared to attempt a coherent explanation worth sharing. It just so happens that I recently posted a short (English language) bibliography, "Otto Neurath & Red Vienna: Mutual Philosophical, Scientific and Socialist Fecundity," which contains an appended list I hoped would be helpful for assessing his views on science, museums, and infographics. His efforts to bring Isoytpe to the several countries on the African continent are, I suspect, likewise helpful in thinking through some of the questions broached in your post.