In his magnificent book, Law and Public Opinion, A. V. Dicey distinguished between the trend of legislation on the one hand and the trend of opinion on the other. Legislation, he argued, is dominated by the underlying current of opinion, but only after a considerable lag. Men legislate on the basis of the philosophy they imbibed in their youth, so some twenty years or more may elapse between a change in the underlying current of opinion and the resultant alteration in public policy. Dicey sets 1870 to 1890 as the period in which public opinion in England turned away from individualism (Manchester liberalism) and toward collectivism; yet he points out that economic legislation was not strongly affected by the new trend of opinion until after the turn of the century.
In most of the world, legislation is still largely dominated by the trend of opinion toward collectivism that Dicey documented some forty odd years ago. True, there have recently been a whole series of elections in which the Right has gained at the expense of the Left—in Australia, England, the United States, and continental Europe. But even if a political trend to the right were to develop out of these small beginnings, which is by no means certain, it would probably mean simply collectivist legislation of a somewhat different kind to be administered by different people. The men of the conservative parties, no less than those of the left, have been affected by the underlying current of opinion. Men may deviate in emphasis from basic social values and beliefs but few can hold a thoroughly different philosophy, can fail to be infected by the intellectual air they breathe. By the standards of nineteenth century individualism, we are all of us collectivists in smaller or greater measure....
According to Friedman, at any given time there is what he calls the (a) "trend in legislation;" there is also (b) "the trend in underlying public opinion;" (c) there is the internal development of (policy) science; (d) a "faith" (this reminds us the religiosity of neoliberalism found in Lippmann) that generates a particular orientation behind the trends. On his view, at bottom legislation is determined by the center of underlying public opinion, as articulated by an "intellectual class," but with a delay of a generation, say, about twenty years. The idea being that present public opinion is a consequence of exposure to ideas when one was young and the effects of the often very slowly evolving conventional wisdom that is responsive to cumulative experience or decisive seeming episodes. The change in public opinion can seem glacial in lots of periods, and then after a period of (what Friedman following Dicey calls maximum cross-currents) can undergo a remarkable shift.
On Friedman's view "ideas have little chance of making much headway against a strong tide; their opportunity comes when the tide has ceased running strong but has not yet turned." After the fact, the new conventional wisdom itself seems long-held and robust. (In my life-time something like this happened with perceptions of gay marriage (recall this post))
In this piece (but, recall, not elsewhere) Friedman ignores the ways legislation can itself shape public opinion downstream. (But he does recognize that foreign affairs -- like the cold war or real wars -- can also influence the trend.) It is the role of certain kind of public intellectuals to develop the teachings, which combine science and a faith, that can be taught to the young who may one day be the intellectual carriers of public opinion, even legislation. Friedman's career can be understood as contributing to both the internal development of science in light of his faith, and the development of the faith itself. In fact, the development and articulation of such faiths has its own rhythm(s). Friedman's lecture is devoted to one such articulation:
The doctrine sometimes called neo-liberalism which has been developing more or less simultaneously in many parts of the world and which in America is associated particularly with the name of Henry Simons is such a faith. No one can say that this doctrine will triumph. One can only say that it is many ways ideally suited to fill the vacuum that seems to me to be developing in the beliefs of intellectual classes the world over. Neo-liberalism would accept the nineteenth century liberal emphasis on the fundamental importance of the individual, but it would substitute for the nineteenth century goal of laissez-faire as a means to this end, the goal of the competitive order. It would seek to use competition among producers to protect consumers from exploitation, competition among employers to protect workers and owners of property, and competition among consumers to protect the enterprises themselves. The state would police the system, establish conditions favorable to competition and prevent monopoly, provide a stable monetary framework, and relieve acute misery and distress. The citizens would be protected against the state by the existence of a free private market; and against one another by the preservation of competition...The state would of course have the function of maintaining law and order and of engaging in “public works” of the classical variety. But beyond this it would have the function of providing a framework within which free competition could flourish and the price system operate effectively. This involves two major tasks: first, the preservation of freedom to establish enterprises in any field, to enter any profession or occupation; second, the provision of monetary stability.
What is notable about Friedman's analysis is how close his interpretation of Simons' doctrines (recall here) is to a standard interpretation (say Foucault's) of ordoliberalism (recall here; here). As he makes clear, what is characteristic of neoliberalism is that it treats the generation and maintenance of competition among producers and consumers as the key means to promote the emancipation of individuals. And not unlike the Ordos, Friedman insists that all government powers should be "limited in scope and capable of being exercised by general rules applying to all. They are designed to permit government by law rather than by administrative order."
While the focus is rather economic, the neoliberal state on Friedman's view has responsibility for monetary stability, public works, anti-trust law, the removal of barriers to entry, law and order, and (not unlike Hayek) a minimum safety net. For Friedman the safety-net should not interfere with the workings of the market. But he thinks it is legitimate to provide cash-transfer to "people because they are poor." For those familiar with Friedman's later role in developing the negative income tax this is, perhaps, not much a surprise. But here in 1951, Friedman insists that according to neoliberalism, "there is justification in trying to achieve a minimum income for all." Friedman does not tell us what this justification is.**
I close with two observations. Not for the first time (recall) I notice that Friedman's Simons inspired neoliberalism (of the 1950s) is really distinctive from the way Chicago later developed in the hands of Becker and Stigler. But Friedman has little interest in the constitutional and cultural elements of Simons' analysis. Second, Friedman's interest in establishing basic income predates his more famous work on the negative income tax. The two points are connected because later Chicago understands income (as Foucault also emphasizes) as a return to (human) capital or work whereas Friedman treats access to some income as a human entitlement. One wonders if this is an idea whose time has come in an age when, as I think has happened, the trend of public opinion is rejecting much else of neoliberalism.
*Later Hayek (1979) echoes this phrasing (recall Matt Zwolinski); Hayek defends “a certain minimum income for everyone, or a certain floor below which nobody need fall even when he is unable to provide for himself.” (Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 3)
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