On Public Philosophy and the Rejection of Clarity

The promulgation of a world declaration of rights depends, as bills of rights seem always to have depended, on the existence of a broad region of interpretation, within which court decisions and administrative and legislative actions have worked progressively to a practical definition and within which divergent philosophies have worked to less ambiguous or less conflicting theoretic bases. The declaration will not remove the sharp differences in interpretations of civil and political rights, but it will provide a ground within which they may be brought into closer approximation, if economic and social rights are established sufficiently firmly to provide a minimum of welfare and security and if freedom of communication and freedom of thought are advanced enough to contribute to universal well-being and mutual understanding. Agreement can doubtless be secured concerning the list of human rights only if ambiguities remain both because of the absence of a uniform manner of administering them and because of the absence of a single basic philosophy; but that ambiguity is the frame within which men may move peacefully to a uniform practice and to a universal understanding of fundamental human rights.--Richard McKeon  "The philosophic bases and material circumstances of the rights of man." Ethics 58.3, Part 1 (1948): 187.

lt is an article of faith among analytic philosophers that more clarity is better than less clarity. While the argument for this stance is (recall) often consequentialist, the underlying motive is ultimately aesthetic.* We do not hear much about projects that reject clarity. (But recall my posts here and here.) Now that analytic philosophy is rediscovering and embracing the significance (recall) of public philosophy, it may be useful to return to an influential, public philosophy distinctly reserved about clarity.  

This post was prompted by reading chapter 6 of The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and The United States by Or Rosenboim. She calls attention to the role(s) of Richard McKeon in the "Committee to Frame a World Constitution." The members of this committee "were deeply convinced that 'Humanities scholars' should contribute to policy making and public affairs." (207) McKeon is now forgotten, although he was part of a wider pluralist school and he played a significant role in the early development of the modern human rights regime. (The paper quoted above reflects a bit on that role.)

As it happens, McKeon is unmentioned but alluded to, rather unfavorably, when in his autobiographical reflections, Carnap turns to his "personal impressions" about "the state of philosophy" in "the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago." The general impression conveyed by Carnap's remarks is that the department was full of historians of philosophy steeped in the past and unaware of modern philosophical developments. Carnap seems to have been decidedly unimpressed by McKeon. Howard Stein, who studied with both McKeon and Carnap, gives a sense of the nature of McKeon's pluralism "in the politics of the department the single dominating figure - was Richard McKeon, who maintained that differences of philosophical principle are invariably irremediable - to be understood, in terms of a classification of the possible coherent philosophical stances, but never to be resolved: philosophers with divergent principles were doomed to talk at cross-purposes."

The quoted passage above is from an article in which McKeon claims that the "political problems faced in framing a declaration of human rights are basically philosophic." McKeon suggests that this is due to the fact that while there is a broad consensus on the list of human rights, the significance and meaning of these rights is contested. And he suggests that the very articulation of these conflicting interpretations, which will turn on questions of "basic assumption, actual fact, and appropriate implementation" will "make even agreement concerning the bare enumeration of rights impossible." (180) One key point he makes is that discussion of a declaration will "revive" long dormant "differences" about the philosophical assumptions behind any enumerated list of rights (182).

McKeon's argument for a species of constructive ambiguity turns on the idea that the very circumstances that generate, urgent fundamental philosophy disagreement require that "a political frame may be sought within which [strategic/non-philosophic] agreement is possible concerning common action toward common ends, on the assumption that basic disagreements are more likely to be removed when mutual suspicions have been lessened by successful common action. The utility of a declaration of human rights depends on the possibility of separating the political from the philosophic question." (182)

That is to say, public philosophy is turned into a species of diplomacy, where the embrace of constructive ambiguity is an ordinary tool of statecraft. McKeon suggests that this approach -- of enumerating rights, and postponing the precisification of their meaning -- has a long pedigree in the history of philosophy rooted in the experience of early modern enumeration of declaration of rights. Paradoxically, by "stating ideals," which in some fundamental sense were ambiguous, and left fundamental ideological disagreement alone, had the effect of  "improving the relations of men and in advancing the practice of justice." (183) This improvement may result in a clarification of the meaning of the rights.

But McKeon does not believe that with experience, and over time, and evolving political and legal practices, potential conflicts are always eliminated. For it is just as likely that technological and economic changes will generate new challenges to existing the ordering and interpretation of rights. (Cf. what has happened to the very possibility of privacy during the last decade(s).)

McKeon is not arguing that constructive ambiguity is always the rights stance. But he clearly implies that in the context of what we may call substantive pluralism it may well be the wisest course of action. For in such contexts, the very desire to create a common ideal, also risks dangerous disruptions. If McKeon is right -- and I have not argued that -- that in some political contexts public philosophy needs to embrace constructive ambiguous in order to be promote consequences worth having (peace, mutual accommodation, etc.), then analytic philosophers, which trump their own clarity, may well risk doing more harm than good in their efforts to shape political life. 

 

 

*Sometimes the argument for clarity is couched in appeals to democracy.

Comments

[Charles Blattberg]

"Stating ideals," however ambiguous, does not leave fundamental ideological disagreement alone. Hegel long ago taught us that atomism is not metaphysically neutral. And if by "stating ideals" is meant articulating a list of rights, well what is this if not an atomisation of our sense of justice? Lists consist of independent elements, i.e. atoms. This leads to a very specific way of conceiving of their conflict: as a "clash" or "collision" of originally separate entities. Such a highly adversarial conception encourages a strictly zero-sum approach to conflict resolution, i.e. dialogue as negotiation, which strives for no more than compromise or balanced accommodation. What gets ruled out is dialogue as conversation, which is a higher quality form of conflict resolution since it aims for reconciliation rather than mere accommodation. It can because conversation is holistic rather than atomistic, given that it's about the common good. But we cannot converse about clashing rights.

[Heath White]

It is entirely conceivable to me that ambiguity in discussions of human rights might produce better political outcomes, at least in certain contexts. On the other hand, many philosophers might feel that this amounts to changing the game from pursuit of truth to pursuit of political outcomes.

Perhaps worth noting is that Holly Lawford-Smith suggests that trans rights activists are, in effect, doing the same kind of thing. https://quillette.com/2019/09/20/how-the-trans-rights-movement-is-turning-academic-philosophers-into-sloganeering-activists/

Maybe there is a question of what public philosophy is supposed to be: philosophy done at a level and on topics that the layperson can appreciate, or the brainy wing of a political movement. (And maybe there is another question of which episodes in the history of philosophy have been which.)

[Eric Schliesser]

Heath, you assume there is a contrast between tracking truth and tracking good consequences. That contrast is itself not self-evident.
Also, as I note, the defense of clarity tends itself be grounded in consequentialist arguments so the rejection of consequentialism comes at a cost.

[Charles Blattberg]

Eric, you don't accept that truth and justice sometimes conflict? Have you never told a white lie?