The Confucian conception of the ideal political relationship is one of mutual trust and commitment. Political authority is a kind of relationship or bond between the ruler and the ruled. What makes political leadership truly authoritative is not just the ruler’s ability to protect and promote the people’s well-being, but the willing acceptance of his rule by the people. That is to say, authority to lead is not merely externally justified but also internally constituted by a mutual commitment from both sides—the ruler’s commitment to care for the people and the people’s willing acceptance. Early Confucian masters used words such as min fu (that is, the people sincerely follow) (Confucius 1979:bk 2, sect. 19; hereafter Confucius 1979: bk 2.19), and min yue (that is, the people delight) (Mencius 1970: bk 1B.10) to describe the idea of people’s willing and glad acceptance of political rule. These ideas can often be found in passages from The Analects and Mencius. The authority of political leaders ultimately resides in the ‘hearts of the people’—true authority can only be accepted, recognized, and willingly complied with by the people. External forces such as sheer power will not give a ruler true authority. Even an institutional office of authority cannot guarantee the office-holder true authority.
Precisely because authority is constituted by the attitudes and commitment of the ruler and ruled, early Chinese thinkers thought that political authority is a precarious and fragile relationship. Any one side of this relationship can easily harm or undermine it by withdrawing the attitudes that constitute authoritativeness. These thinkers believed that the ruler rather than the subjects should play an active role in forging and maintaining this relationship—he should care for the people, gain their trust, and win their hearts. Only leaders who have proper virtues and abilities can command the voluntary submission of the people, and only they can develop and sustain the ideal ruler–ruled relationship. In other words, leadership is an important foundation for political order and authority.--Joseph Chan and Elton Chan (2014) "Confucianism" The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership, p. 58. [HT Amanda Greene]
A nice feature of this Confucian account is that authority can come in degrees along different dimensions based on the intensity and nature of mutual commitment. This allows for the natural thought that the very same authority can be recognized to solve (recall Sabl on Hume) a coordination problem, while being treated as a nuisance in other respects. Authority is not a binary matter.
Of course, because taking another's authority over oneself on trust seems gullible, or childish, it's easy to assume mistakenly that this Confucian conception of authority is based on a naive or idealistic conception of politics. To see why this is not so, let's accept the implied contrast (in the quote) between the false authority based on office, function, or mere power and the true authority grounded on mutual commitment. As Joseph Chan notes in his book, Confucian Perfectionism, such a conception of true authority is based on a "service conception" of authority. That is, a ruler's authority is a means toward the flourishing of his (or her) subjects, or ruled. And if these flourish they have reasonably solid (epistemic and psychological) grounds to find the leader authoritative.
Of course, in the background there is a controversial empirical assumption (familiar from other posts on Mencius here and here) that rulers are in a non-trivial sense ultimately causally responsible for social outcomes. By this the Confucians clearly do not mean that rulers should be tyrants. Rather, they are responsible for the proper functioning of laws and for the appointment and oversight of inferior magistrates and rulers. This is less implausible than it sounds because good government for the Confucians is from a practical perspective little more than maintaining impartial justice, keeping taxes low, and facilitating public works conducive to the common good/trade (etc.).
As an aside, it is a bit peculiar to see Joseph and Elton Chan appeal to Mencius 1B.10. Yes, I know they are doing so to provide a source text for the idea that min yue means the people delight. But at 1B.10 the underlying issue is whether conquest is wise. To be precise, the question is about how to maintain a conquest. And Mencius' answer is that depends on how you treat the occupied. But, of course, what makes the initial conquest possible is "ten thousand chariots" (that is, force).* So, the passage itself is at odds with the overall spirit of the Chans' interpretation of Confucian authority.*
Okay, with that in place let me now turn to a reservation. I do so by noting a virtue of this account of true authority. Such authority is grounded in the care for the people, and their perceptions of it. This means that social unrest, anger, protest, or social turmoil are all signs that authority is not functioning well. I take this to be a feature, not a bug, of this account. But this account presupposes -- somewhat democratically -- that what serves the people, by the lights of the people, is good.
By this I do not mean to express distrust (familiar from Plato) about the people's ability to embrace true good for themselves. I grant that the service conception presupposes the idea of a moral community. One is not meeting the demands of service merely by preference satisfaction of the people.
Let me explain. Rather, I worry that the "voluntary submission of the people" to able leaders can come at the expense of those who may not be intended to be served be the leader. Those may be people in places beyond the king's authority, transients within the border, or, perhaps, structural minorities. Now, clearly if the people in places beyond the king's authority or transients/structural minorities within the border can make their displeasure or resentment felt, then the king's lack of service undermines his authority.
But there are going to be cases where those most in need of one's service and protection, are least likely to complain or protest when one is derelict in one's service to them. These are not hypothetical cases, but the very definition of precariousness. It's pretty clear, as Joseph Chan emphasizes, that for (say) Xunzi (7.1) a true king ought to assist the most vulnerable. But here the empirical and normative elements of the theory may well come apart: if "the people" approve of one's leadership (perhaps not in virtue of one's mistreating the very vulnerable, although that cannot be ruled out, but) because one is of true service to the people, then one's subjective authority may well be very robust even if those who are not counted among the people are ignored. But I hesitate to call it 'true' authority.
*Now, one may suggest that a king that can command ten thousand chariots successfully has at least some non-trivial authority. Fair enough, but it is not true authority over those he conquers. Of course, he can gain true authority over time and that is the yunde
Comments