Kant, Neo-Liberalism, and Migration

This a libertarian must believe, for war is the great threat to his kind of society. There is simply no democratic answer to the problem of external defense, save indefinite extension of federalism, first, into a predominantly powerful supranational federation, and then gradually into inclusive world organiza­tion of all nations capable of responsible participation. Here the important next steps must be taken in the field of com­mercial policies; and the next conspicuous institutional innova­tion will be an international court with compulsory jurisdiction, albeit only among some Western democracies at the start. Libertarian democracy can survive without world order but not without secular movement toward such order.--H. Simons (1948) Economic Policy for a Free Society: A Credo, pp. 15-16 

First, a terminological point. Simons' use of 'libertarian' is a bit confusing. It means, for him, in "the English-Continental sense" liberal (given that in the US context 'liberalism' became associated with the New Deal). In contemporary discourse he would be considered a bleeding heart libertarian. Either way, my interest in Simons (recall) is that he helped shape the Chicago school of economics in crucial fashion.  And that he is one of the founding thinkers of the constitutive schools of twentieth century neo-liberalism, which was at the heart of what I call the second wave of liberalism (roughly 1945-2008).

So, I was a bit surprised to see such a clear statement of the  Kantian program (recall) for perpetual peace. Kant thought that growing regional federated commercial liberal democracies (which he called 'republics' because the term 'democracy' was still reserved for direct rule by the people) were the key to world peace. (The idea that liberal democracies don't fight with each other can also be traced back to Kant and Addison.) 

Simons is clear that such supranational federations -- the idea anticipates the EU -- would be committed to internal free-trade and, ideally, to external free trade. A free trade regime will generate international policy coordination and international laws. That is to say, Simons thinks that international institutions will develop functionally out of a joint commitment to free trade among like-minded peoples. I put it like this to do help explain his relativizing the scheme to 'Western Democracies.'

The point is not that Simons thinks non Western peoples are incapable of democratic federation. Rather, Simons thinks any such democratic, liberal and commercial supranational federation presuppose a"moral consensus." So, shared values are presupposed in any stable government. (This idea has a powerful afterlife in the ideas of his students, Milton Friedman and George Stigler.) While tacitly drawing on Max Weber (Simons' Chicago colleague (recall) Frank Knight had introduced Weber to US readers), he puts it as follows: 

The basic function of central government is to sustain domestic peace. Internal order is prerequisite to external defense and, of course, is the essence of world federation. The good central government will represent a monopoly of violence; it must sustain that monopoly against both its constituent political units and all extra-governmental bodies. It must promote all kinds of peaceful intercourse, intellectual and commercial. It must articulate the prevailing moral consensus and promote enlargement of that consensus by organized, free discussion and legislative-judicial experimentation. (16)*

That is to say, one of the goals of the liberal state (itself ideally a federated state) is to promote moral consensus by being the site of reasoned debate, and by engaging like-minded states to create the international infrastructure that will facilitate more trade and more moral consensus, including a legal regime.

Now, Simons is clear that these are ideal types. The real world is messy and imperfect. And he explicitly acknowledges that liberalism must be possible without it existing everywhere. But he does think movement toward such a Kantian order is required to keep faith in liberal progress. The EU has internalized this idea in its ordinary self-conception. The fact that Brexit has become truly thinkable will be an interesting test case for the survival of this idea (and the EU).

That liberalism must be possible without it existing everywhere is not obvious. Because Simons is clear that the very possibility of war is a threat to a liberal state. For it requires considerable preparedness; and such preparedness involves planning and subordinating individual freedoms to collective survival. The idea is worked out at greater length in an earlier text by Von Mises (1927; unmentioned by Simons), who is clearly indebted to Kant (whom he cites in relevant context a few times in the text):

One would think that after the experience of the [first] World War the realization of the necessity of perpetual peace would have become increasingly common. However, it is still not appreciated that everlasting peace can be achieved only by putting the liberal program into effect generally and holding to it constantly and consistently. "Liberal Foreign Policy" in Liberalism: in the Classical tradition (110-111)

This would be a natural place to end. 

But Mises also complicates the situation. One may well wonder, and critics of Liberalism have wondered, why if Liberalism promotes peace the first wave of liberalism ended in the disaster of first world war.+ Mises himself suggests that it is the rise of nationalism and zero-sum colonial competition that is to blame.+ Mises is quite capable of divorcing colonial/imperial projects from liberalism. But the situation is not so easy when it comes to liberalism's relationship to nationalism:

As long as nations were ruled by monarchical despots, the idea of adjusting the boundaries of the state to coincide with the boundaries between nationalities could not find acceptance. If a potentate desired to incorporate a province into his realm, he cared little whether the inhabitants—the subjects—agreed to a change of rulers or not. The only consideration that was regarded as relevant was whether the available military forces were sufficient to conquer and hold the territory in question. One justified one's conduct publicly by the more or less artificial construction of a legal claim. The nationality of the inhabitants of the area concerned was not taken into account at all.
It was with the rise of liberalism that the question of how the boundaries of states are to be drawn first became a problem independent of military, historical, and legal considerations. Liberalism, which founds the state on the will of the majority of the people living in a certain territory, disallows all military considerations that were formerly decisive in defining the boundaries of the state. It rejects the right of conquest. It cannot understand how people can speak of "strategic frontiers" and finds entirely incomprehensible the demand that a piece of land be incorporated into one's own state in order to possess a glacis. Liberalism does not acknowledge the historical right of a prince to inherit a province.

To simplify: while nations pre-exist liberalism, liberalism makes nationalism politically feasible. (It is worth comparing (recall) Mises with Herzl.) As Mises points out (on the next page) the key mechanism is the plebescite or referendum. Moreover, where national identities must co-exist, and mutual trust is low, the democratic impulse of liberalism also makes nationalism a permanent political problem. Mises is quite frank about this. For Mises cultural and ethnic pluralism is a source of tension. 

Mises' solution to the problems of a multi-national democracy is to double-down and to suggest minimizing government functions to bare (liberal) necessities (rule of law, defense of property rights, and some coordination functions, etc.) such that gaining power becomes of little value to people of ill will. As regular readers know I don't think Mises, nor any of his modern libertarian heirs, can explain how in the eternal presence of rent-seeking, one can attain such a nightwatchman state without a massive change of popular opinion (and the political dis-empowerment of those that benefit from spoils and rents who are by definition very well organized politically). So I view this as unstable. 

But, where liberalism generates homogeneous nation states, and has what Simons will call moral consensus, Mises allows that public provision of public goods (like education) need not cause internal strife. I think this helps predict and explain why in relatively homogeneous liberal democracies welfare states are less controversial (than in the more pluralistic ones). In homogeneous states the moral consensus can be broader. But if they engage in free trade and maintain a liberal economy, these tend to be wealthy and growing and so become, as Mises emphasizes, very attractive to immigrants and, thereby, become multicultural/national. So, by Mises' own lights -- he is for open borders [Simons is more reserved about this]-- this is a recipe for more internal tension and so turns out not to be stable either.**

I have gone on long enough. But the problem is that the early neo-liberals did not develop a genuinely pluralist conception of moral and political life; and so their commitment to open borders and democratic liberalism are a source of tension.     

 

 

*For Simons it is key that a federated government has the Weberian monopoly of power and guards it zealously against other monopolistic contenders (private armies, large corporations, unions, etc.); yet simultaneously in other ways the federated government must learn to maintain this power in potentia and not express it when not needed. 

+One may also wonder how it could co-exist with the colonial and imperial conquest of the world. But Mises is very clear that such colonial and imperial conquest is an abhorrent perversion of liberalism.

**Karl Polanyi discerns a version of this argument.