As a rule, man is able only to comprehend the causes that are natural and obvious and that present themselves to our perception in an orderly and well-arranged manner, because nature is encompassed by the soul and on a lower level than it. The range of perceptions, however, is too large for the soul, because they belong to the intellect, which is on a higher level than the soul. The soul, therefore,can scarcely perceive very many of them, let alone all of them. This shows the wisdom of the Lawgiver (Muhammad) when he forbade (us) to speculate about causes and to stop with them. Such speculation is a field in which the mind becomes lost and gets nowhere, nor gains any real insight. "Say: 'God,' and then let them amuse themselves with their idle talk." Man often stops (to speculate about causes) and thereby is prevented from ascending to the next higher stage. His feet slip. He becomes one of those who go astray and perish. We ask God for protection against disappointment and obvious perdition.--Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah translated by F. Rosenthal. Chapter 6, Paragraph 14.
Let's make a distinction between metaphysical Spinozism and political Spinozism. Metaphysical Spinozism is committed to necessitarianism and the (sort of pantheist) identification of god with nature. Political Spinozism is committed to the idea that revelation is authoritative in practical philosophy or ethics, but leaves the nature of reality behind the appearances we are familiar with to science and/or natural philosophy (broadly conceived). The two forms of Spinozism are separable because a political Spinozist need not embrace (or can be agnostic about) metaphysical Spinozism and a metaphysical Spinozist may reject political Spinozism.
As it happens, Spinoza is naturally read as a political and metaphysical Spinozist. In particular, Spinoza is clear that revelation teaches the (ethical) path to salvation. If we lacked the "testimony of Scripture, we should doubt of the salvation of nearly" everyone. (TTP, Ch. 15) By contrast, Scriptures do not teach, and is not in competition with, scientific truth.* It does not mean Scriptures is compatible with any metaphysics. In particular, Spinoza is adamant that political Spinozism must, in practice, be supplemented with a popular "universal faith" which has a number of metaphysical commitments that may not be known to be false. (Things are not so simple because some of these more providential commitments, in turn, violate metaphysical Spinozism.)
Okay, Ibn Khaldun is a political Spinozist, even though he rejects metaphysical Spinozism.** The passage quoted above is from his treatment of speculative theology. He understands the existence of that discipline as a contingent mistake. Al-Ghazali had in his debate with the philosophers shown how reason can be used to refute speculative ideas that threaten the articles of faith; this had inspired his followers to develop a whole positive program of speculative theology. I don't mean to suggest that Ibn Khaldun is not perfectly aware that (a) there was earlier speculative theology, and that (b) Ibn Rushd has serious philosophical responses to Al-Ghazali. But for present purposes we can leave that aside.
There are four clear components to Ibn Khaldun's position. First, he, too, asserts that revelation fundamentally teaches practical matters. (Revelation is the "laws and precepts of the religion...and which their firmly rooted (belief in) the truth of the articles of faith caused them to observe.") It is not a book of science.)Second, revelation also teaches a very limited number of speculative doctrines that need to be accepted on faith. Third, there is, thus, (against those who have misunderstood Al-Ghazali's legacy) no subject matter for speculative theology and seems, anyway, forbidden by Muhammad ("he forbade (us) to speculate about causes and to stop with them.") That is to say, Ibn Khaldun thinks no positive program of speculative theology is possible (due to our limited cognitive capacities and our imperfect epistemic position), and he believes this helps explain the rationality of the injunction against it: "the intellect should not be used to weigh such matters as the oneness of God, the other world, the truth of prophecy, the real character of the divine attributes, or anything else that lies beyond the level of the intellect. That would mean to desire the impossible."
By speculative theology, Ibn Khaldun means that sub-set of metaphysics that presupposes God's design and studies particular existing entities (see also Ch.6, par 14). This science was the invention of Al-Ghazali. Ibn Khaldun treats it as apologetics because the articles of faith are assumed to be true. By contrast, a non-theological metaphysics "studies existence as such and what it requires for its essence." Metaphysics and science are natural by-products of the advanced division of labor and accumulation in sedentary civilizations.
Now, in Ibn Khaldun's scheme, the articles of faith and the results of metaphysics may conflict just as in Spinoza's approach the "universal faith" and his metaphysics can conflict. Ibn Khaldun treats the conflict as follows: When metaphysicians speak of existence as such their utterances are so general that they are irrelevant. But Ibn Khaldun also thinks that when it comes to particular existing entities metaphysical argument is not demonstrable, and so metaphysicians either become unjustifiable dogmatists when they pontificate on such entities or they are self-aware that exact conformity between the results of thought and concrete/existing individuals may not be assumed ("conformity between the results of thinking - which, as they assume, are produced by rational norms and reasoning - and the outside world, is not unequivocal.") And even if there is such conformity, it still relies on (fallible, non-demonstrable) observation.
So, metaphysicians either understand their own limitations or they overreach. Ibn Khaldun is pretty adamant that the essences of spiritual individuals are unknowable to human intellects. Appealing to the authority of Plato (!) Ibn Khaldun argues that "no certainty can be achieved with regard to the Divine" and to other spiritual essences, and so is a topic for conjectures. Ibn Khaldun is well aware, and explicitly acknowledges, that later metaphysicians (e.g., "of Aristotle, al-Farabi, and Ibn Sinna") had been more optimistic about reason's capacity. But he asserts, even argues, they are mistaken. So, whatever metaphysics is possible, it is fallible in character. The same is true for any (empirical) science.
Ibn Khaldun does not think metaphysics is wholly useless: "it sharpens the mind in the orderly presentation of proofs and arguments, so that the habit of excellent and correct arguing is obtained." But while the (hubristic) mistakes of metaphysics may well be pernicious, it need not be forbidden as long as it is restricted to those "saturated with the religious law and...the interpretation of the Qur'an and jurisprudence."
So, to sum up: Ibn Khaldun's political Spinozism creates genuine space between revelation and science/metaphysics. In Ibn Khaldun' this is achieved by a polemic against speculative theology and by re-inventing metaphysics in a Platonic tenor. Not unlike Spinoza, there is a middle, grey zone where articles of faith and metaphysics may come to conflict; but by treating one as a matter of faith and the other as a matter of conjecture, the conflict is contained.
*I do not want to deny that that there are complexities I am ignoring. Some things are manifestly not in accord with scientific truth and how to handle this is not always straightforward In Spinoza.
**I think most of his utterances suggests he is not a metaphysical Spinozist, but at times his position is a bit more ambiguous. But I leave that aside here.
Comments