Digressions&Impressions

RIP: Richard "Red" Allan Watson (February 23, 1931 - September 18, 2019)

I have been exploring caves in the Mammoth Cave region of Kentucky for over fifty years. The Mammoth Cave System is now more than 365 miles long, and will probably reach 500 miles.

THE LONGEST CAVE (written with Roger W. Brucker, published in 1976 by Alfred A. Knopf) has never been out of print. Roger and I fancy that it never will be out of print as long as there are people who read adventure books.

My novels and, as far as that goes, all my books, are grounded in obsessions. UNDER PLOWMAN'S FLOOR is about caving; THE RUNNER running; and NIAGARA the passion to do something no one else has ever done: to be the first to walk across Niagara Falls on a high wire, and the first to go over the Falls in a barrel. These are philosophical novels, but they are absolutely non-didactic.

The translation of NIAGARA into French led to my being invited to the Saint-Malo Etonnants Voyageurs Festival International du Livre in 1997, where an award was given to its French translator, Jacques Chabert. That was year the Montana writers were invited to the festival, and I rode on the train from Paris to Saint-Malo in a seat beside William Kittredge, who told me what a fine place Missoula, Montana is for writers. The result of that conversation is that Pat and I now live and write in a passive solar earth house bordering the Lolo National Forest on a mountain slope above Missoula.--Richard "Red" Watson, "Autobiography"

Eric Brown informed me that Red Watson died September 19, 2019.

Red Watson taught me to write. In the Summer of 2003, I arrived, with a freshly minted PhD, in St. Louis after a glorious year at Wesleyan. I was struggling on the job market and with journal editors and their referees. I spent two unhappy years in St. Louis.

While there, I learned from Larry May that it might help to 'situate' my papers 'in the literature' in the first footnote(s). I learned from Red to cut 30% of the word-count and improve clarity. I arrived in town with one publication. I left with eight acceptances, and a tenure track job in a wonderful department (Syracuse).  Red insisted I should keep sending him my draft papers. He would use his pencil simply deleting sentences and sentence fragments, revealing, like a sculptor chipping away marble, the underlying thought to my astonished eyes.

Once, he felt I needed an extra scolding:

Remind me to attack you for your picking up contemporary misuse of the word 'share'. A share is like a piece of pie. Keep this story in mind. A woman of my acquaintance was asked if she would like to share her telephone number. "Why I'd be delighted," she said. "Which digit would you like to have?"

At one point, long after we stopped expecting to see each other again, he complained that I had stopped sending him draft chapters. (By that time I was a father and a research professor.) I explained I had stopped because he had made such a point of complaining about the email connection in the library. (This was 2010.) He responded by sending me his (snail) mail address in Missoula. 

Red was proud of his wife (Patty Jo Watson, a world class scientist) and daughter, his writing (fiction and philosophical), and his students--in that order. He was the first professional philosopher I met who presented himself as a writer. For many years, he tried to enlist me as an agent to get his quirky Descartes biography translated and published into Dutch. No professional failure has weighted more on me.  

When he was not talking about spelunking or his better half, Red understood himself as a student of Popkin, and he belonged to that pioneering group of historians of philosophy who used archives to help shape philosophical understanding. I didn't think of him of as analytic philosopher, although at times I thought of him as the last living logical positivist. He helped contribute to the polemical atmosphere in the WashU department. 

In 2005, Red authored (with Harry Bracken) a "few paragraphs" which "are meant to be neither an obituary nor an adequate memorial. We were Dick's first two PhDs, and we were barely five years his junior. He treated us from the beginning as colleagues and he became a lifelong friend. He changed our lives, as he did the lives of many other aspiring scholars. We miss him." In 463 words they were able to convey the significance of Richard Popkin's life and scholarship. 

One of our last exchanges (in 2010) was about the title of a book manuscript, Descartes and Pascal: Faith And Reason. I expressed surprise at the coupling. He explained:

Descartes is the man of faith (so unworried) and Pascal is the man of reason (so worried to death). 

 

Treating the Republic as Statecraft and how to do Social Theory.

As for' their [women] sharing in the art of war and the rest, why this is made clear from the inhabitants of deserts and the "City of Women" [Daghuda]. Similarly, too, since some women are formed with eminence and a praiseworthy disposition, it is not impossible that there be philosophers and rulers among them. Since it was thought that this class existed only infrequently among them, some Laws ruled out women's being priests-i.e., the high priesthood. Some [0ther] Laws however, not ruling out [the possibility] of this existing among them, rejected  this.--Ibn Rushd, Commentary on Plato's Republic, The First Treatise (p. 58 in Lerner's translation) 

It is not uncommon to treat Plato's Republic as a foundational text in normative political philosophy. While some may agree with (recall) Myles Burnyeat that it anticipates the concerns of Rawls, my students tend to discern both totalitarian and quietist strains in it. It is also not rare to see it treated as a popular introduction to metaphysics. 

By contrast, at the start of his Epitome of Plato's Republic, Ibn Rushd divides the demonstrable part of political science in two: (i) one we might call social theory (a general theory of the relationship among habits and volitions); (ii) the other governance or statecraft, or a science of the legislator. Ibn Rushd goes on to understand the Republic as a contribution to the latter, that is, the demonstrable part of statecraft. (He asserts that in his Epitome he leaves out the other parts of the Republic--so he ignores Socrates' exchange with Thrasymachus.) He does so he tells us because Aristotle's Politics is unavailable (it "has not yet fallen into into our hands"). Ibn Rushd treats Aristotle's Ethics as a paradigmatic exemplar of (i).* And in line with many thinkers in late antiquity, he presents Aristotle and Plato as fundamentally in agreement. 

As an aside, Galen's commentary or synopsis on Plato's Republic is available to Ibn Rushd, but (to the best of my knowledge) not us, and clearly a sparring partner for Ibn Rushd. From at least two of Ibn Rushd's (critical) remarks one can infer that Galen is also treating the Republic as a book in statecraft. This means it is not impossible that Ibn Rushd's interpretation of the Republic is itself developing a long tradition. There are is another source of evidence for this. When Al-Ghazali criticizes (recall) "the philosophers" in his Deliverance, he explicitly allows that "in the political sciences all that the philosophers [Al-Farabi and Ibn Sinna] have to say comes down to administrative maxims concerned with secular affairs and the government of rulers. They simply took these over from the scriptures revealed to the prophets by God Most High and from the maxims handed down from the predecessors of the prophets." This does not mention the Republic, so it does not settle the case.

Either way, if Ibn Rushd is right, one could treat Plato's Republic and, say, Machiavelli's Prince as contributions to the same genre of writings, but reliant on different underlying social theories. I'll try that out some time.

Okay, with that long introduction, let me turn to the passage quoted above. It occurs just before some of the most striking material (that I have dubbed Platonic feminism) in Ibn Rushd's Epitome, and so can easily be overlooked. The passage jumps off from a reflection on what it would take to "preserve" the desirable "qualities" in the guardians "through procreation" over different generations. It clearly is inspired by reflection on Socrates' breeding program, but in the passage I quoted Ibn Rushd has moved to adding his own reflections, including what he presents (moving away from demonstrable science) as empirical evidence about women warriors (among the Bedouins) familiar to his readers (at least by reputation).**

In the quote, Ibn Rushd is comparing different political orders or constitutional. To understand it fully, we must realize that (recall) the passage presupposes Ibn Rushd's commitments about demographic structure of talents distributed between men and women and within the male and within the female population. We can summarize his position (which is similar to Socrates'), roughly, that naturally, both women and men exhibit a hierarchy of talents (with more on the bottom than on top), but that one average men are slightly more talented than women, but (and this goes beyond Socrates, but anticipates (recall) Van Schurman) that the best women can be better than the best men. Let;'s call this a 'natural distribution.' It's unclear if knowledge of natural distributions is part of the demonstrable part of political science, but I will stipulate it belongs to the social theory part of political science while leaving open if it is demonstrable. (I honestly don't know; perhaps Ibn Rushd thinks that can be derived from theoretical science.) 

Given this 'natural' distribution, there are four kinds of  constitutions/political orders [Laws]: (i) polities that allow full expression, even cultivation, of natural possibility--this would be a best kind of state; (ii) polities that through (to be anachronistic) misogynist institutional structures+ -- Ibn Rushd is explicit this is the situation in his own community (let's say Al-Andalus) --, actively suppress women's potential and turn them (recall) into 'plants' only  good for (unscientific) breeding. In the second kind of polities "the competence of women is unknown." Here his social theory prevents empirically grounded status quo bias.

The third kind of state (iii) is the one in which there is knowledge about natural demographics, but there is doubt about the frequency of exceptional women occurring (viz, "since it was thought that this class existed only infrequently among them, some Laws ruled out women's being priests-i.e., the high priesthood,") In virtue of this doubt, women are barred from leadership positions. Ibn Rushd doesn't endorse this, but he does not deem it worthy of more comment. This deserves a bit of comment.

It is notable, that Ibn Rushd is willing [A] to infer from an observed constitutional order (iii) to a commitment by a lawgiver about demographic frequency. That means that he assumes that in polities like (iii) there is knowledge of what I have called natural distributions. Presumably this means that there is some kind of political science in polities like (iii). But the Legislator has chosen to ignore it.  One can imagine some such legislator reasoning that religion is too important to be left to the chance occurrence of excellent women, and all the men agreeing!

One may (correctly) think that the evidence for my [A] is rather flimsy. But as it happens, shortly thereafter, Ibn Rushd is explicit all political orders regulate procreation in some fashion (and so exhibit views about underlying demographics): "the arrangement of their procreation will be the
best possible with respect to their conditions of guardianship, but at fixed times and with determined individuals and characteristics. This is, as it were, common to the other conventions and Laws, though as it appears the adherents of the Laws differ from one another in the force of the statements." (In class I joked that Ibn Rushd, not Foucault, is the inventor of bio-politics.) And so given this fact one can try to reason backwards from observed phenomena to views about demographics and intentions.

The fourth kind of polity (iv) is a patriarchy, where knowledge of natural populations is simply ignored. Perhaps in practice such polities are not very different from (ii). Ibn Rushd shows little interest in discussing (iv), while the point of the subsequent passage is to discuss in (ii). But we can infer one difference obliquely. Ibn Rushd makes clear by appealing to enlightened self-interest of his compatriots, that the polities of Al-Andalus exhibit self-defeating behavior of a certain form: in "these cities," the Laws clearly exhibit a pattern of valuation that focuses on power and riches, but by not permitting women's educational and economic development, they (unintentionally) impoverish the state and -- given the revival of Christian might,  put their own survival at risk.++ If that's right than one possible difference between (ii) and (iv) is the international context.*** 

Okay, let me end on that, and keep the implied criticism of the (foundational) legislation of Ibn Rushd's polity for another time.  

On the State of the British Constitution after the Supreme Court Ruling

57. Such an interruption in the process of responsible government might not matter in some circumstances. But the circumstances here were, as already explained, quite exceptional. A fundamental change was due to take place in the Constitution of the United Kingdom on 31st October 2019. Whether or not this is a good thing is not for this or any other court to judge. The people have decided that. But that Parliament, and in particular the House of Commons as the democratically elected representatives of the people, has a right to have a voice in how that change comes about is indisputable. And the House of Commons has already demonstrated, by its motions against leaving without an agreement and by the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, that it does not support the Prime Minister on the critical issue for his Government at this time and that it is especially important that he be ready to face the House of Commons. --British Supreme Court, pp. 20-1

I suspect most analytic philosophers -- the ones interested in philosophy of language and social ontology -- and all lovers of (apparent) paradox will be naturally drawn to paragraph 69 in order to reflect on one of the key findings of the court: an "actual prorogation" is simultaneously, "unlawful, null and of no effect,"* despite, of course, having genuine effects in time--parliament did suspend business, etc. They would not be wrong to do so because even our most trained intuitions get a reality check when authorized judges, with the (apparent) backing of state power, decide the status of speech acts. 

I am not wholly uninterested in the status of that speech act, and will return obliquely to it below, but here I focus on what we may call the constitutional significance of the content of the ruling. The court explicitly understands itself as belonging to a four hundred year tradition of courts that protect the "principle of Parliamentary sovereignty." (par 41, see the whole paragraph.) It quotes Lord Browne-Wilkinson approvingly, “the constitutional history of this country is the history of the prerogative powers of the Crown being made subject to the overriding powers of the democratically elected legislature as the sovereign body.”

As an aside, that very history is also presented as one one of development or change that can be characterized in terms of different practices. Because in considering the "limit upon the power to prorogue," the court refers to "modern practice" (without explaining when we became moderns--I am not critical of this).  It then adds, "A prerogative power is therefore limited by statute and the common law, including, in the present context, the constitutional principles with which it would otherwise conflict." (par 49) Somewhat strikingly it does not mention custom/practice, despite going on to rely on evidence (from a former prime minister no less) about the nature of such custom. 

Okay, let me turn now to the heart of the matter. In reflecting on the lawfulness of the prime minister's advice to the Queen, the court explicitly reflects on the "foundations of our constitution." It then writes:

We live in a representative democracy. The House of Commons exists because the people have elected its members. The Government is not directly elected by the people (unlike the position in some other democracies). The Government exists because it has the confidence of the House of Commons. It has no democratic legitimacy other than that. This means that it is accountable to the House of Commons - and indeed to the House of Lords - for its actions, remembering always that the actual task of governing is for the executive and not for Parliament or the courts. (Par 55)

At first glance, this statement represents the pre-Brexit (2016) referendum conventional wisdom. It also helps reminds us why the British practice has a claim to being the modern (17th/18th century) inspiration of the doctrine of the division of powers. Even so, it is not without obvious peculiarity. I note three: (i) in this account it is wholly mysterious why the Government is also accountable to the (unelected) House of Lords. (ii) Because of the (2011) Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which the court discusses in par. 5, it is now possible to have Governments that de facto (but not de jure) lack the confidence of the House of Commons. When a blocking minority prevents a new election and the house is unwilling to pass a motion of no confidence, a Government can soldier on without being able to pass legislation. This is not a hypothetical possibility, but reality now. Unfortunately, the court ignores this. (III) The paragraph also draws on a contrast between representative and direct democracy, and clearly implies that both can be sources of democratic legitimacy.+ I am unsure this would have been widely accepted prior to the 2016 Referendum.

That it does this, that representative and direct democracy are both sources of democratic legitimacy (in Great Britain), is also evident in the paragraph 57 quoted above. Much to my surprise, it treats the 2016 Brexit referendum not merely as advisory, but as authoritative expression of the people's will. This suggests that the Court views the referendum as more than merely advisory. It seems to be saying that with the referendum, the British constitution has two sources of democratic legitimacy: representative and direct.** To the best of my knowledge this is an innovation in the British constitution (but, perhaps, legal historians will judge otherwise). This innovation will accelerate (recall here; and here; and here, with comments by Helen de Cruz here) the implosion of that constitution. 

Let me explain. The court is explicit that it is responding to what it takes to be "exceptional" circumstances. (The use of that word undoubtedly will generate a scholarly industry with references to Carl Schmitt.) And in such circumstances innovation may well be required to keep the Constitution afloat, but great haste can also lead to great mistakes. In my view the Court's reasoning will lead to predictable future problems. For, when referendums occur frequently and with well thought through procedures, including the way the referendum question is posed, they are, indeed very important sources of democratic legitimacy. But unless it's a post-revolutionary founding act, the rare use of a referendum merely destabilizes representative democracy.

For, the Court asserts that Parliament has a voice, even a right to be heard, but it does not explain how the different forms of democratic authorization are to be reconciled.** In my view it's decision is a Pyrrhic victory for representative democracy. The Supreme Court is basically saying that parliament is sovereign because, and as long as, the executive is willing to respect the opinions of the high court; and absent a willingness on the part of the executive to act in defiance of Parliament on the expressed will of The People, who are, it seems, simultaneously constituted by the result of the referendum. It strikes me that this combination of commitments makes parliamentary sovereignty fragile. ++

 

 

On Progress in Science and Revelation

And again it is clear that in the study of beings this aim can be fulfilled by us perfectly only through successive examinations of them by one man after another, the later ones seeking the help of the earlier in that task, on the model of what has happened in the mathematical sciences. For if we suppose that the art of geometry did not exist in this age of ours, and likewise the art of astronomy, and a single person wanted to ascertain by himself the sizes of the heavenly bodies, their shapes, and their distances from each other, that would not be possible for him-e.g. to know the proportion of the sun to the earth or other facts about the sizes of the stars­ even though he were the most intelligent of men by nature, unless by a revelation or something resembling revelation. Indeed if he were told that the sun is about 150 or 16o times as great as the earth, he would think this statement madness on the part of the speaker, although this is a fact which has been demonstrated in astronomy so surely that no one· who has mastered that science doubts it.--Ibn Rushd, The Decisive Treatise, Chapter 1, Translated by George F. Hourancy

One important conception that makes (the possibility) of progress possible, is the idea that those who arrive late on the scene are likely to be in a better position than ancestors and other originators. The temporally later can draw on a wider intellectual division of labor and the historical record of success and failure.  One striking effect of progress is, as Ibn Rushd makes explicit, that the naturally most intelligent person may know less than an average inquirer or student of a later period. Newton and Einstein really know less about physics than some students because the latter can take advantage of textbooks and other mechanisms by which existing knowledge is aggregated and transferred.* 

A really neat version of such mechanisms is discussed by Al-Farabi at one of the most esoteric points of his metaphysics. It has a very tantalizing implication, so I hope you keep reading.

A key concept of Al-Farabi's metaphysics is the active intellect. When it is introduced, Al-Farabi adds, "of the active intellect, it ought to be said that it is the trustworthy spirit and the holy spirit." (Political Regime, par 3) From the perspective of the overal; argument of Ibn Rushd's The Decisive Treatise, We may say that Al-Farabi introduces an allegorical reading of his metaphysics. (This is notable because Ibn Rushd ignores the possibility; for him allegorical readings of the Quran are introduced to make sense of passages that taken literally are obscure in some way.) Presumably Al-Farabi does so to make that metaphysics more acceptable to those that wish to reconcile demonstration to revelation. (Spinoza also has a tendency to use religious sounding language to explain his metaphysics. And in the interest of understanding, I will make Al-Farabi sound like Spinoza despite the fact that Al-Farabi's jargon is generally far removed from straight Spinozism.  

Now, in Al-Farabi's system the active intellect is a key intermediary mechanism between the eternal celestial worlds and human affairs. To simplify even more, when we reason successfully in a certain way, we turn ourselves into a truly rational being and become the active intellect and, simultaneously, we are eternal in a certain way. I quote the relevant passage so you have an idea of how Al-Farabi expresses the point (and also the added complications):

Consequently, the rational intellect by which a human being is a human being is not in its substance an intellect in actuality. It is not endowed by nature to be an intellect in actuality, but the active intellect causes it to become an intellect in actuality and makes the rest of the things intelligible in actuality for the rational faculty. When the rational faculty attains to being an intellect in actuality, that intellect it now is in actuality also becomes similar to the separate things and it intellects its essence that is [now] intellect in actuality. And what is intellected of it becomes what intellects. At that point, it comes to be a substance that is intellected in that it is an intelligible insofar as it intellects. And, at that point, what intellects, what is intellected, and intellect come to be a single thing itself in it. Through this, it becomes such as to be in the rank of the active intellect. And when a human being obtains this rank, his happiness is perfected. By means of that thing, the rational soul intellects the active intellect; and by means of it, things that are potentially intellected become intellected in actuality. By means of it, a human being, who is potentially an intellect, becomes an intellect in actuality and in perfection until he
comes to be in proximity to the rank of the active intellect. So he becomes an intellect in his essence after having not been like that and an intelligible in his essence after having not been like that. And he becomes divine after having been material. This is the function of the active intellect, and for this it is called the active intellect. (Political Regime par 8-9).

As it happens truly perfect happiness is only attained after earthly, material existence has ended. If one thinks that truth is in some sense correspondence, Al-Farabi makes no sense. But if one allows oneself to see that truth is a special instance self-identity ("what intellects, what is intellected, and intellect come to be a single thing itself"), he does make, despite the jargon, sense. 

Now, I have mentioned before (recall here and here) that for Al-Farabi when a magnanimous soul (that is still alive) joins the active intellect,  he describes this as either a philosopher-king or revelation (see par. 80). It's true that this can only be called revelation because the active intellect "emanates from the existence of the first cause." (Par 79-80) It's pretty clear that for Al-Farabi, the content of revelation just is the practical wisdom by which polities are ruled on a sound (theoretical) foundation. 

Because Al-Farabi is so explicit that revelation comes to a magnanimous soul, I had failed to notice the implication of the following passage shortly thereafter:

When a group passes away, and their bodies are nullified, and their souls are delivered and made happy, then other people follow after them, take their place in the city, and perform their activities; the souls of these [people], too, are delivered. When their bodies are nullified, they come to the rankings of those in this group who have passed away. They are neighborly to them in the way that what is not corporeal is neighborly. And they join with the similar souls of the people of the single group, some with others. Whenever the similar separate souls multiply and some join with others, the pleasure of each one increases. Whenever one of those who came after attaches to them, the pleasure of the one now attaching increases due to his encountering those who passed away. And the pleasures of those who passed away increase through joining with those who attach to them because each one intellects his essence and intellects the same as his essence many times. What is thereby intellected increases as the ones now present attach to them in future time. So there will be a boundless increase of pleasures for each one with the passing of time. That is the condition of each group. This, then, is the true ultimate happiness that is the purpose of the active intellect. (Political Regime, Par. 85)

Now, the core claim here is that in the afterlife, there is a community of souls that join in or fuse with each other in/and with the active intellect. That is to say there is a kind of (what I'll call) posthumous intellectual, disembodied fellowship. This is presented as pleasing. And over time, as new souls join the fellowship, pleasure increases. (I think Al-Farabi is also committed to the claim that there is a cognitive hierarchy of such fellowships.)

Now, this is an extraordinary (ahh) uplifting image.  But it has a two-fold further effect, one explicitly noted by Al-Farabi. First, "what is thereby intellected increases as the ones now present attach to them in future time." This means that the fellowship, which is a kind of fusions of souls, expands over time. So, second, the fellowship conjoined or fused with the active intellect is not just more pleasing, but a larger, more complex and more powerful unity as time passes.

But this entails -- this is my tantalizing conclusion, that revelation that comes later has the benefit of drawing on collective wisdom of rational minds that have come before. (See also this post for significance of this.) So, later revelation ought to be better revelation. Not for the first time I am left wondering if Al-Farabi doesn't open the door to a new prophet.** 

Chicago Economics, Simons, American Irresponsibility, and World System

If multiple collectivism or large-scale nationalisms promise everything bad, no mongrel system is likely to give us much peace. Peace is the limiting case at both extremes. Rejecting more government and more power concentration as the cure for our ills, we must move far toward the other extreme to find security. However, an extreme application of traditional liber­alism, if hard to attain, is not politically impossible. It involves the kind of order in which the democracies can most easily assume their places. It affords the only kind of world system congenial to democracies, and the only kind they can hope continuously to operate and to control. While its establishment does not permit gradualist measures or diffident procedure, it requires initially the close adherence of only a few democratic nations. A democratic, free-trade block comprising the United States, Great Britain and the Dominions, the Low Countries, Norway, and Sweden would represent a magnificent and ade­quate beginning. Adhering to the rule of equal or nondis­criminatory treatment and inviting the widest national par­ticipation, it need not and should not induce other nations to form rival and hostile blocks. Moreover, other nations need only be asked, in return for free access, to maintain equal ac­cess and to avoid gross discrimination. Along these lines may be established an economic and political integration of nations which, resting on dispersion of power and responsibility, is indefinitely extensible and capable of enlisting all nations, either as full partners or as increasingly responsible par­ticipants.
The essence of this postwar program, in its crucial economic aspect, is free trade among nations. On the political side, inci­dentally, a major purpose should be that of preserving and protecting small autonomous nations. The Low Countries and Norway and Sweden rather than great national states are the ideal elements or nucleus for world organization. It is our great good fortune that such nations will now demand and attain an important role in postwar reconstruction. In them democratic institutions have their deepest roots and free-trade tradition remains relatively uncorrupted.

The important specific features of a liberal world program are fairly obvious and familiar. Four requirements may be noted as fundamental and minimal: 

1. Dismantling of tariff barriers by all the democracies, and elimination of quota restrictions, import preferences or discrimination, export subsidies, and bilateral or barter trading.
2. Organization for co-operative or united action in matters of monetary and fiscal policy.
3. Preparation and execution, by parallel and united national measures, of effective antimonopoly policies, involving systematic industrial decon­centration, dissolution of giant corporations and cartels, and effective prohibition of private monopolistic restraint of enterprise and trade.
4. Establishment of inclusive, supranational government, limited in its sphere of action but strong within that sphere, and designed specially and primarily (a) to prevent military aggression or resort to force in connec­tion with international disputes and (b) to promote parallel action and to implement united action in the three areas of policy listed above.----Henry C. Simons (1943) "Postwar Economic Policy" originally published in the American Economic Review, Supplement reprinted in Economic Policy for a free Society (Chicago 1948), pp. 242-244.

Ever since Adam Smith proposed (recall) an Atlantic parliament unite and equalize the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the American colonies, and to prevent war with the colonies, and, I suspect inspired by Smith, Kant (recall) proposed regional federations of free trading, liberal democracies (he called them republican), a strain of liberal thought (recall also Mazzini) has embraced interstate federation as either a means to peace, or presupposing peace.* After the failure of the Wilsonian League of Nations, I had assumed that liberal hopes in the 1930s had retreated toward plans for (partial) European federations (recall this post on Mises; this one on Hayek; and, looking ahead in time, Buchanan). There were ambitious, cosmopolitan plans for world federations in the 1930s and 40s [proposed, for example by Lionel Curtis and Clarence Streit--then both quite famous], but these tend to assume Angl0-Saxon exceptionalism and superiority.**   

These days "world system" connotes neo-Marxist ideas associated with (the recently deceased) Immanuel Wallerstein underdevelopment, and exploitation of the periphery by the so-called core. In the 1930s and early 1940s, the term was not common. And while there are Marxist usages of the phrase in the period, "world system," also often involves (non-Marxist) discussion of trade economics (see here for a very interesting and pertinent one by K.W. Rotschildt), or balance of power politics, or the failure of WWI settlement. 

Simons, who helps (recall for the complexity of this claim) originate the Chicago school of economics, was clearly not immune from reflections on world system. (The term is not indexed, although it's used again in the chapter.) The particular proposal is notable because it is explicitly designed to preserve and protect "small autonomous nations." This fits with Simons' broader understanding of liberalism, which is oriented toward devolution to the lowest political unit (preferably the provincial or local  units (see "A Political Credo" in Economic Policy for a free Society, pp. 12-13)). Unlike some other liberals of the day, there seems to be no racial motive for this (but see below).

Simons does not argue from a right or fact of national self-determination. Rather, his motive is political; he thinks the moral consensus required to facilitate collective action is more like at the smaller (more homogeneous) political level (p. 12). He also conjoins to this commitment (a) historical and normative claim(s): "

Democratic process is an invention of local bodies. It has been extended upward and may be extended gradually toward world organization. In any case, modern democracy rests upon free, responsible local government and will never be stronger than this foundation. Free, responsible local bodies correspond, in the political system, to free, responsible individuals or families and voluntary associations in the good society. A people wisely conserving its liberties will seek ever to enlarge the range and degree of local freedom and responsibility. In so doing, it may sacrifice possible proximate achievements. (13)

Simons thinks about local democracy as a kind of Lockean voluntary association of individuals or families (he routinely freely moves back and forth between family and individual without commenting on the waffle). This means there is a right to exit. But he does not emphasize this.+ He is explicit that where there is a trade-off between local democracy and, say, (supra)-national efficiency, the collective action should strengthen local democracy. Not unlike other liberals of the 1930s, Simons is quite worried about the capture of the national and supra-national institutions by economic, special interests (he calls them "articulate minorities), he is firmly committed to democracy. In this he sounds a bit like Lippmann, except (recall) that Lippmann is more enamored of large national government with its system of checks and balances (and here).

Simons is self-consciously foreseeing that American might will "determine" (258) the post-war "world system." The problem he faces squarely is that "America, save in gravest crisis, is irresponsible." (259) For, he thinks that the US was very much responsible for the economic and political collapse of the 1930s. Now, like other neo-liberals of the day, he hopes that supranational institutions will help constrain national practices (he offers anti-trust and patent law as examples). But he does not rely on this.

Rather, he wants the US and the UK to federate with the Low Countries and Norway and Sweden in particular because "democratic institutions have their deepest roots and free-trade tradition remains relatively uncorrupted." That is to say, he hopes that in virtue of collaborating with the smaller states, the US and UK will become better players on 'team democracy.' So, somewhat unusually, and not together plausibly, Simons hopes that economic and political exchange will allow the weaker and smaller states to moralize the more powerful ones. It is notable that unlike Hayek's celebration of British common law, Simons does not flatter his audience here. 

I close with two observations. First, Simons  is ignoring that Holland and Belgium ran rather large colonial empires in the 1930s. Interestingly enough, if we look again at the list of countries included in his democratic free trade block, we note that "Great Britain and the Dominions,"(in 1943) de facto includes, "Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, South Africa, and the Irish Free State," but not other (less Anglo-Saxon) parts of the British empire. So, while Simons' argument is different from the ones articulated by Curtis and Streit, it is not wholly dissimilar in outcome. 

Second, Chicago did not create the post-WWII settlement. But if we look at Bretton Woods, then we may say that its failures and demise in the early 1970s are, in large part, due to the fact of allowing the United States with unique ability and flexibility to wage war and to undermine common monetary and fiscal policy. Here Simons seems prescient. With the United States returning to illiberal policies, we can expect the world system to unravel; collapse may come suddenly. 

 

RiP: Myles Burnyeat (1939-2019)

Michael Morris informed me that Myles Burnyeat has died (see also Leiterreports). Burnyeat was a visiting scholar at The University of Chicago* in 2001 (or so) and gave a most memorable seminar on the Republic. (He also gave some eventful public lectures.) I was struck by his ability to make the Republic seem completely relevant to our age (we spent quite some time on advertising and the welfare state )--and have been marked forever by this. During the seminar, there  was amusement (recall) that this great anti-Straussian+ could seem so close to Bloom (then dead only a few years) in many of his interpretations.

During his stay in Hyde Park he made himself available for lengthy discussions with graduate students (at Jimmy's), snorting his tobacco snuff while engaged in sustained argument and sharing stories about other scholars/philosophers. He could also be very kind: I told him I was sad I had never met Isaiah Berlin before he died. He looked at me for a moment and said slowly, you would have liked listening to him.

At Chicago he treated our own (recall) Ian Mueller with great deference. But he had a tendency to treat Ian primarily as an expert on Greek mathematics (and so, simultaneously, not quite important on a lot of other stuff). I mention it not because I think there was any personal animosity or a sense of ill will (or to start a polemic of my own). But because it was also emblematic for a wider limitation of that generation of analytic, 'ancient' philosophers to have overly firm, and in part merely fashionable, views about what mattered. Stephen Menn has made the point in more sophisticated fashion (see here).

He was, among his generation of analytic ancient scholars, unusual for his deep interest in the evolution of views about and canon-formation of ancient philosophy. I remember once an exchange with him about the impact of Plato's Laws (a text I was then obsessed with) on early modern. To burden shift, but also from genuine curiosity, he asked me for a list of references. This was pre-google era, so it took me a while to compile it. When I handed it to him -- without making a copy for myself, I now regret! -- he was genuinely pleased. I then learned about his immense knowledge of Plato reception, and we spent quite some time discussing the impact of Plato on Berkeley's Siris (the subject of a famous paper of his).   

Others can judge better the lasting influence of his scholarship. Burnyeat was a great scholar, a polemicist, and à personality.  He was also a terrific stylist; I always enjoy checking out his papers when i am researching a topic he has written on.

I close with one of my favorite paragraphs:

Plato’s ability to move between two worlds, giving each its due, is evident on every page of his writing. James Mill, like Cicero, remains firmly down here on earth. Plotinus is constantly eager to get away to a better place. Plato, inspiration for all three, illuminates both poles of the universe into which he draws his readers. That is why he is altogether larger, more imaginative, richer in ideas, more amusing and more inspiring (even to those who are not philosophically minded), more fruitful to think with, more challenging, more outrageous—in short, more philosophical—than any of the diverse followings that came after him. Plato remains a powerful presence because he opens our mind to thoughts it was not aware it needed.

 

On Inventing the Chicago School

Except for "A Political Credo," the essays in this volume have all been published before, mainly in professional jour­nals. [Henry C.] Simons' work has not as yet received the attention it merits either in semipopular discussions of public policy or among professional economists. The former is not surprising. Although Simons was passionately interested in practical af­fairs, he was not a popular writer, believing as he did that short-run issues are-resolved almost before they are discussed. He addressed himself to members of the economics profession in the belief that the first task of economists is to arrive at a "consensus of opinion" as the only possible method of in­fluencing both short-run and long-run public policy. The failure of professional economists to appreciate his true worth may in part be due to the fact that he was not a writer of books. It is hoped that this collection of his essays in combina­tion with his work on taxation will facilitate an examination of his work as a whole and contribute to a wider appreciation of his remarkable achievement.
Professor Simons occupied a unique position in American economics. Through his writings and more especially through his teaching at the University of Chicago, he was slowly establishing himself as the head of a "school." Just as Lord Keynes provided a respectable foundation for the adherents of collectivism, so Simons was providing a respectable foundation for the older faith of freedom and equality....There may once have been substantial merit in the notion that the free-market system would steadily gain in strength if only it were freed of widespread state interfer­ence. By 1934 it became evident that a combination of the negative attitude, which permitted the proliferation of monopoly power, and promiscuous political interference, which strengthened such power, threatened "disintegration and collapse" of the economic organization. And only the "wisest measures by the state" could restore and maintain a free-market system.--Aaron Director, "Prefatory Note" Economic Policy for a Free Society, by Henry C. Simons, Chicago (1948)

One fascinating rhetorical and institutional feature of Aaron Director's account is the the teleological meaning given to the life of Henry Simons [1899 – 1946]: while alive, "he was slowly establishing himself as the head of a "school."" But death cut short his ascent. What makes the rhetorical move so adroit is that it leaves the reader with the impression that during this ascent in the 1930s there was already a distinct "Chicago" school of economics. In recent scholarship (e.g. here) these sense has been strengthened because admirers of Frank Knight, James Buchanan, or Coase (sometimes grouped together) have emphasized a distinction between 'old  Chicago' and ''new Chicago' (often such a distinction is also used to try to track a development in the history of Chicago law and economics which can in certain but not all respects be mapped onto the old/new school of Chicago economics). As it happens  Simons started the tradition of Chicago school economists teaching in the Chicago law school -- and Aaron Director is a central example -- it is not a contingent fact that the two old/new Chicago schools (of economics and of law and economics) are intertwined in complex personal, institutional, and content fashion.

But, while certainly there were other notable broadly free market economists at Chicago in the 1930s (with Frank Knight and Jacob Viner being pre-eminent), the department was by no means homogeneous, including the formidable communist, Oskar Lange,  but also Henry Schultz and Paul Douglas (later Senator). And to the best of my knowledge it was not understood as a school at the time.* So, Director (the brother and law of Milton Friedman who had married Rose Director) here invents a school, backward projects it into the 1930s, and simultaneously leaves a vacancy at its head. Director makes no suggestion about the identity of the new leader of the school.

I had previously thought (in print) that the first person to describe a 'Chicago school of economics' had been a critic, Martin Bronfenbrenner (in 1950 here)--Bronfenbrenner was an eminent economist in his day. But I had missed the significance of Simons because he treated Knight as the intellectual godfather and Simons as a "publicist":

The so-called Chicago School of economic policy, whose intellectual parent is Frank H. Knight, but whose best-known publicist is Henry C. Simons, author of Economic Policy for a Free Society, believes these optimum conditions would, in fact, be realized quickly and painlessly in a free economy, despite the complications raised by economic progress and the possible multiplicity or instability of equilibrium conditions, if three conditions were satisfied. (1) Elimination of all seriously monopolistic  restrictions on the supply of goods and labor. (2) Monetary policy devoted to maintaining a stable price level, or, alternatively, a stable level of government expenditures, without any guarantee of full employment for products and resources which priced themselves out of their markets. (3) Mitigation of inequality by taxation (particularly the progressive personal income tax) rather than by interference with the pricing of goods and services.

Later this had become conventional wisdom. For example, writing in 1972, in the New York Times, Leonard Silk writes "It is Frank Knight who has come to be regarded as the founder and dominant influence in the development of the Chicago School" Simons is mentioned -- as an intellectual influence on Milton Friedman --, but he is not given the most prominent place. 

But I now realize the very idea of a school is itself a Chicago product, and presumably Director's vision.* Bronfenbrenner's treatment of Simons as a publicist is in contrast with Director, who claims that Simons was oriented  more toward if not articulating then building a consensus among fellow economists not the larger public. Admittedly by pairing Simons with Keynes (who was a popular and influential public figure), Director suggests that Simons could have become a publicist, too, (in the way that Friedman became one).

What is important to note in Director's treatment of Simons, is that the very purpose of such consensus is to influence policy (Stigler also notes it). In fact, it seems that on Director's presentation Simons thinks that such consensus is the only way economists qua economists could influence policy. This idea has roots in Sidgwick, J.N. Keynes (the father of), and Robbins, but it is to the best of my knowledge distinctive. 

I want to close with noting one other key difference between Bronfrenbrenner's presentation and Director's. Bronfenbrenner's presentation emphasizes the significance of mitigating economic inequality. While this may be surprising to recent debates about the Chicago, this is indeed quite present in Simons (and puts him in the tradition of Smith and Mill). In fact, Bronfenbrenner misses that attacking business monopolies has priority over attacking labor monopolies in Simons. Even so, in Bronfenbrenner one can see already the contours of the future trajectory of Chicago economics (even though it misses some of the methodological commitments). 

By contrast, Director associates the Chicago school with an idea that is now primarily attributed to the rival school of free market political economists, the Ordoliberals. For Director insists (correctly) that Simons was committed to the idea, prominently articulated (recall) by Walter Lippmann in (1938 the Good Society, that laissez-faire was bankrupt. Rather, what is required is the "wisest measures by the state" in order to "restore and maintain a free-market system." As George Stigler later (1974) noted this was extremely far from Knight's position. For Simons, that is to say, when the Chicago school was founded, liberty and properly functioning markets presupposed state activity of a certain (wise) type.+

On The "Sheer Strangeness" Of British Politics

Where to start with the sheer strangeness, let alone the danger, of the current situation in British politics? One place would be with the three characters at the centre of events....

There is a more fundamental reason why, as far as many Westminster insiders and much of the public are concerned, Corbyn cannot become prime minister, and it has nothing to do with putting workers on company boards: he is ideologically opposed to the use of violence. This is why questions surrounding national security and nuclear war will always dog him, and why, when push comes to shove, even many centrists would prefer the chaos of no deal, overseen by a mendacious man-child, to Prime Minister Corbyn. At least that mendacious man-child will be willing to use the full range of tools at the state’s disposal.

Weber saw modern political leadership as a balancing act between commitment to ultimate goals, and responsibility for the potentially devastating tools that the state uses to pursue them. Too much of the former (‘an ethic of ultimate ends’) and you have delusional zealotry, oblivious to the harm that is done in the service of idealism. Too much of the latter, and you have machine politics, where energy is focused on questions of efficiency and delivery. But whatever the circumstances, the ultimate tool of the state is always violence, and a ‘responsible’ politician is one who keeps this brute truth in mind.

By Weber’s definition it isn’t clear that a pacifist can ever be a politician, let alone a national leader. Or rather, it isn’t possible to remain a pacifist once you have taken charge of a modern state. You either assume ‘responsibility’ for the violent operation you are leading, or continue reciting your dogma of ‘ultimate ends’ while turning your back on the consequences. It’s well known that on the day a new prime minister takes office their duties include writing a letter to nuclear submarine commanders, giving them instructions on what action to take in the event that Britain has been wiped out in a nuclear attack. There is a deathly substrate to the state and its highest offices that seems almost ontologically incompatible with Jeremy Corbyn’s image of himself. This is the reason his followers adore him, and the reason too that the (far larger) ranks of sceptics will never accept him as part of a compromise. --William Davies "How to Be Prime Minister" @LRB  [HT Chris Brooke]

Like other writers among the British intelligentsia, Davies (the author of a very interesting book, Nervous States: How Feeling Took Over the World) decides that the root cause of the present Brexit crisis --which i think of (recall)as a constitutional and elite implosion (and here) -- is neoliberalism. Unlike most such authors he recognizes that neoliberalism was itself a democratizing response to an earlier crisis in authority due to democracy and consumerism.  And he faces up to the fact that the financial crisis itself has "contrary to the initial hopes of the left...[not restored] confidence in government or democracy." It should be noted that with 'democracy' Davies means parliamentary or liberal democracy, not the ''referendum" (which he associates with a "populist instinct").

The problem with Davies' account (which is worth reading because it has a lot of fine observations) is that he, like most political commentators, has not come to terms with the fact that what seems "sheer strangeness" is the political norm. Underlying it is a misplaced faith (which can be traced to Hume's "Of Politics") that modernity has solved the problem of political instability in ways favorable to democracy. But like the American who conveniently forgets the civil war and Jim Crow (war by other means), the collective experience of mankind reveals that Democratic politics, perhaps all politics outside dictatorship, just is the movement from one crisis to the next.

That is to say, the period of relative political tranquility requires explanation not the present turmoil. True friends of democracy must not concede to the despair familiar from the traumatized Weimar intellectuals who saw in every mass protest the germs of fascism, but we must simultaneously understand that securing the stability of parliamentary democracy is, as of yet, an unfinished project.

Now, one may think that Britain's very extensive history of parliamentary democracy proves that liberal democracy can deliver stability. And this sense that things are basically stable has clearly left those in the midst of daily parliamentary maneuvering and reporting and commenting unprepared for this crisis at hand. Even those that profit from it politically look foolish. 

But even leaving aside the restrictions on the franchise, for much of the (purportedly stable) period Britain was a parliamentary democracy that ran an (aristocratic) empire. That is, it was in quasi Machiavellian terms an imperial republic. (If a republic has no foreign enemies, domestic divisions will multiply.) And this allowed potential, domestic turmoil be redirected abroad or, more commonly, made subject nations bear the burdens to buy off domestic troubles. That is, Davies is right to remind us of the deathly substrate of the state, but fails to recognize that such violence (abroad or at home) is also a means to stabilize the state (and has been practiced by the British state long before the rise of neo-liberalism).* 

The British constitution has been unbalanced by Cameron's referendum and the democratizing elements of the primary system of Labor and Tories. And so one may be tempted to blame the increase of democracy in generating the crisis. (Just like the American system has been unbalanced by the increased use of genuinely democratic primaries.) Yet while these are triggering causes for a more general transformative, political realignment (recall here, and here) the British constitution was already vulnerable due to a more systematic problem that is now out in the open.

For, one contributing cause to the rapid implosion of British politics -- and it shares this with the United States, Brazil, Poland, and Hungary -- is as my colleague, the political scientist, Tom van der Meer pointed out to me in conversation that a true minority can acquire political control. In the UK that's the product of first past the post, in some of the other countries I mentioned it is due to features of the system that generate an automatic bonus for the party with the most votes/seats, or with regionally concentrated votes, or that have high thresholds for gaining seats in parliament. When political elites are committed to making the system work (alternating governments, treating each other as competitors/rivals not enemies) such systems can be highly functional. But when that is absent, determined minorities can govern in ways as if there is no tomorrow. If one is a minority, this may well be the rational position.

So, because the state has a deadly substrate, one should ensure that no faction is incentivized to control to state. Somewhat paradoxically, a liberal democracy must both protect minorities and be protected from minorities.  

 

 

On Al-Ghazali The Pre-History of Ibn Tufayl and Transformative Experience

103. The first thing created in man is the sense of touch: by this he perceives certain classes of existents such as heat and cold, wetness and dryness, smoothness and roughness, etc. But touch is definitely unable to perceive colors and sounds: indeed, these are, as it were, nonexistent with respect to touch.
104. Next the sense of sight is created for man, by which he perceives colors and shapes: this is the most extensive of the “worlds” of the sensibles.....

109. Now if a man born blind did not know about colors and shapes from constant report and hearsay, and were to be told about them abruptly, he would neither understand them nor acknowledge their existence. But God Most High has brought the matter within the purview of His creatures by giving them a sample of the special character of the prophetic power: sleeping. For the sleeper perceives the unknown that will take place, either plainly, or in the guise of an image the meaning of which is disclosed by interpretation.
110. If a man had had no personal experience of dreaming and someone were to tell him: “There are some men who fall down unconscious as though they were dead, and their perception, hearing, and sight leave them, and they then perceive what is ‘hidden’,” he would deny it and give apodeictic proof of its impossibility by saying: “The sensory powers are the causes of perception. Therefore one who does not perceive such things when his powers are present and functioning a fortiori will not perceive them when his powers are suspended.”
111. This is a kind of analogy which is belied by factual experience and observation. Just as the intellect is one of man’s stages in which he receives an “eye” by which he “sees” various species of intelligibles from which the senses are far removed, the prophetic power is an expression signifying a stage in which man receives an “eye” possessed of a light, and in its light the unknown and other phenomena not normally perceived by the intellect become visible.'--Al-Ghazali, Deliverance of Error

For Al-Ghazali (recall) prophecy is a form of guided intuition (an inner faculty (or "eye" beyond reason), which makes otherwise unknown phenomena available. According to Al-Ghazali truth-apt prophecy is not entirely uncommon: it also occurs, for example, in the context of scientific discovery, when scientific theories (that go beyond the direct empirical data) are developed. I argued that Al-Ghazali's main argument is abductive.

In the context of discussion of prophecy, Al-Ghazali introduces the man born blind as a thought experiment. This person has no sense experience of colors.* Notably, this blind man also does not accept the authority of testimony. (Anachronistically: the blind man is a hard-core empiricist.) The blind man stands for those of use who lack first hand knowledge of prophecy and who may doubt testimony about it.

We are, however, given indirect access to the plausibility of prophecy by the existence of dreams which foretell the "unknown...either plainly, or in the guise of an image the meaning of which is disclosed by interpretation." I ignore here how plausible this really is. By analogy, if dreaming were in color perhaps we are supposed to understand that the blind man would then accept the testimony about the existence of colors on faith (or treat it as evidence). What is notable is that Al-Ghazali does not return to the blind man despite the significance of vision metaphors and analogies in his overall discussion.  One could stop here and just remark that Ibn Tufayl saw better what to do with the underlying idea. 

That unperceived colors stand for a potential vision of reality is, of course, not wholly original with Al-Ghazali. In fact, it has been developed by one of his explicit targets. For, when, Al-Farabi explains the role of the active intellect in human life, he writes the following in the Political Regime:

The status of the active intellect with respect to the human being is that of the sun with respect to vision. For the sun gives light to vision so that, through the light procured from the sun, vision becomes actual viewing after having been potential viewing. By that light, it views the sun itself, which is the cause for it having vision in actuality. Moreover, the colors that were potentially seen become seen in actuality, and the vision that was potential becomes actual vision. Similarly, the active intellect provides a human being with something it traces on his rational faculty, the status of that thing with respect to the rational soul being the status of light with respect to vision. (Par 9), translated by Butterworth.

Without the active intellect we are like men in the dark, or like a blind; either way, colors are merely potentially visible. Now, as I have noted before, according to Al-Farabi one may call the active intellect that "it is the trustworthy spirit and the holy spirit." (Political Regime 3) And when a great soul joins the active intellect, and thereby founds the laws that guide society, "he is the one of whom it ought to be said that he received revelation." (Recall also here.)

So, perhaps Al-Ghazali decided not to develop the example of the blind man because it would have brought him a bit too close to his target.** 

On Al-Farabi's Democratic City and the Transition Problem

115. Of [all] their cities, this [democratic city] is the marvelous and happy city. On the sur­face, it is like an embroidered garment replete with colored figures and dyes. Everyone loves it and loves to dwell in it, because every human being who has a passion or desire for anything is able to gain it in this city. The nations repair to it and dwell in it, so it becomes great beyond mea­sure. People of every tribe are procreated in it by every sort of pairing off and sexual intercourse. The children generated in it are of very different innate characters and of very different education and upbringing.
Thus this city comes to be many cities, not distinguished from one another but interwoven with one another, the parts of one interspersed among the parts of another. Nor is the foreigner distinguished from the native resident. All of the passions and ways of life come together in it. Therefore, it is not impossible as time draws on that virtuous people emerge in it. There may chance to exist in it wise men, rhetoricians, and poets concerned with every type of object. It is possible to glean from it parts of the virtuous city, and this is the best that emerges in this city. Thus, of the ignorant cities this city has both the most good and the most evil. The bigger, more prosperous, more populous, more fertile, and more perfect it becomes for people, the more prevalent and greater are these two...

117. According to them, the virtuous ruler is the one who is excellent at deliberation and fine at using stratagems to gain them their different and variegated desires and passions, preserving that from their enemies, and not depriving [them] of any of their money but restricting himself only to what is necessary for his power.
The one who is virtuous in truth-namely, the one who, when he rules them, determines their actions and directs them toward happiness-is not made a ruler by them. If he chances to rule them, he is soon deposed or killed, or his rulership is disturbed and challenged. The same holds for [102] the rest of the ignorant cities: each of them wants only to be ruled by someone who sets its choices and desires before it, makes the path to them easy, gains them for them, and preserves them for them. They reject the rulership of the virtuous and censure it. However, it is more possible and easier for the virtuous cities and the rulership of the virtuous to emerge from the necessary and democratic cities than from the other [ignorant] cities.--Al-Farabi, Political Regime, Translated by Charles Butterworth.

Regular readers know that Al-Farabi's treatment of the cosmopolitan democratic city/polity has not lost its relevance (recall here and here). Today, I treat a matter of great significance obliquely. I do so, by focusing on how he treats the transition problem (recall last week; see here and here on Ibn Rushd; recall and here), that is, is how to create an ideal political future with a population raised under bad institutions (or worse, that is, bad breeding). As the last sentence of the quoted passage suggests, Al-Farabi thinks the democratic city is one of two kinds of regimes from which the best regime can emerge. This is puzzling because Al-Farabi is clear that while democracies are tolerant enough of the virtuous in their midst, they turn murderous ("deposed or killed") toward would-be truly virtuous rulers. This made me think that, perhaps, he thought Muhammad was the last prophet, even though there is no reason to think that in his metaphysics the possibility of further revelation had ended.

Yet, in light of some other passages, I had also thought that Al-Farabi could also be taken to suggest that a would be virtuous ruler would have to go into exile with would be virtuous followers and start a virtuous regime elsewhere. Think of Muhammad's exile from Mecca to Medina; or Moses in the dessert, etc. But the evidence for this possibility is thin.

But in addition to exile, I now think there are two other options to solve the transition problem.* First, Al-Farabi notes about the cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic democratic city that it "comes to be many cities" (see  the paragraph from 133). This is due to the fact that without constraints human beings have a natural tendency toward multiplicity. (According to Al-Farabi, when people don't mix sexually and are stationary, they are under influence of environment. And then their differences are marked by ethnicity and language.) In one sense this -- that a the democratic city "comes to be many cities" -- is quite damning because it means that the democratic city is not a unity; it is even in a certain sense a kind of contradiction (one is many, etc.). 

But in another sense it means that a virtuous community, ruled by a virtuous leader, could live in a kind of self-governing, inner exile amidst the splendor of the democratic city. (I think of this as the pre-1979-Shia or the pre-1948-Jewish option.)+ The problem with this reading is that Al-Farabi seems, when discussing why a village or a neighborhood is a "defective" political association, adamant that a certain form of self-sufficiency and independence is required for true political life (see par. 64). So, I doubt think that this option really solves the transition problem. But it may be an intermediary step to solving it.

For, second, the key passage -- "If he chances to rule them, he is soon deposed or killed, or his rulership is disturbed and challenged" does not say that a would be virtuous leader is always killed. A lucky would-be virtuous ruler of the whole polity may find his rulership "disturbed and challenged;" but that's compatible with the thought he can (after a rocky start) survive it. I missed this option because I have a tendency to read this passage in light of Plato's parable of the cave, where the cave dwellers kill the person who has access to the truth [517a]. The would-be-virtuous leader is more capable of surviving democratic resistance to his rule if, within the democratic city, there is another, more 'virtuous city' laying dormant to take over.**

If that is so, democracy's greatest strength -- to live and let live ["every one of its inhabitants is unrestrained and left to himself to do what he likes" (par. 113)]++ --, mutual toleration, becomes its greatest weakness. Then again, how to preserve a democratic polity without undermining its freedoms, has not lost its urgency.