The revolution of a gifted people which we have seen unfolding in our day may succeed or miscarry; it may be filled with misery and atrocities to the point that a right thinking human being, were he boldly to hope to execute it successfully the second time, would never resolve to make the experiment at such cost—this revolution, I say, nonetheless finds in the hearts of all spectators (who are not engaged in this play themselves) a wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm, the very expression of which is fraught with danger; this participation, therefore, can have no other cause than a moral disposition of the human race.—Kant "The Contest of the Faculties" (AA 7:85), translated by Nisbet.
Before I get to the famous passage from Kant let me situate it briefly in the overall argument. Kant explicitly frames the Contest of Faculties in terms of contrast between true and false prophecy (recall this); he starts his discussion by offering examples of a priori history: these all involve what we might call self-fulfilling prophecies. The self-fulfilling prophecies Kant discusses all have a distinct character: warning against a bad outcome while sticking to a course of action that necessitates will make the bad outcome happen.* These are all too common.
By contrast Kant is interested in forecasting a positive outcome of a special kind, namely open-ended progress. The obstacle here is that one cannot assume human nature -- understood as a collective property [it is allowed there may be good individuals] -- is naturally good (which may secure the positive outcome). So, what is needed, then, is a particular kind of existence proof that a collective is capable of generating the conditions of self-improvement and acting on them (and so can then figure into a self-fulfilling positive prophecy). Such an event would provide evidence of, a sign, of the possibility of progress.
Readers knowledgeable with Kant know that he wishes for something stronger: such an event would be the kind of cause that the "inevitable consequence of its operation, that mankind is improving." But as Kant explicitly acknowledged elsewhere when discussing an objection by Mendelssohn ("mankind constantly fluctuates between fixed limits"), this presupposes commitment to divine providence. Our lives are not just the possible amusement to Epicurean Gods or fit for the existentialist's absurd.
It's not that luck does not enter it into it at all; Kant allows that experiencing such an event that would be a sign of the necessity of progress is a matter of probability (we can't all be so lucky to live in interesting times). In addition, Kant is also willing to allow that any particular event that is taken as a sign may itself not be the cause of future progress (and so not necessitate it).
What is notable about Kant's next move is that he takes Adam Smith's theory of the impartial spectator, which is primarily designed to apply to judgment of characters and individual situations,** and turns it into a social device. (For my musings, first prompted by Sam Fleischacker, on the connection between Kant and Smith see here; cf. here). I quote the passage (which precedes the famous one quoted above):
We are here concerned only with the attitude of the onlookers as it reveals itself in public while me drama of great political changes is taking place: for they openly express universal yet disinterested sympathy for one set of protagonists against their adversaries, even at the risk that their partiality could be of disadvantage to themselves. Their reaction (because of its universality) proves that mankind as a whole share certain character in common, and it also proves (because of its disinterestedness) that man has a moral character, or at least the makings of one. And this does not merely allow us to hope for improvement; it is already a form of improvement in itself.
It is notable that the significance here is not so much the French revolution itself -- Kant was notably (to use an understatement) lukewarm about revolutions --, but the reaction of the impartial spectators. That is, Kant is more interested here in the existence of an international public opinion than in the events in Paris (cf. Mill here and Lippmann here on national public opinion). The existence of a disinterested and what we might call robust and impartial public opinion is for Kant significant evidence that progress has been made and so is possible.+ Importantly impartiality does not entail neutrality; it is also compatible with, after due consideration of all the facts, taking sides in a conflict.
The way public opinion takes sides is by a kind of sympathetic identification which, in the case of French revolution, borders on enthusiasm [eine Theilnehmung dem Wunsche nach, die nahe an Enthusiasm grenzt]. Now, enthusiasm is, as Kant explicitly notes, itself a dangerous emotion. In Smith it always (recall) involves a heightened admiration, but sometimes this is misplaced and so can lead to bad decisions (something Sophie de Grouchy emphasized when discussing the bad political consequences of acting on enthusiasm (recall here; here; here, and here). Kant probably shares in fears over acting enthusiastically. But the consensus and disinterested nature of the spectators's attitudes are a different kind of event.
I have already noted that the events in Hong Kong occur at a moment when the elected leaders of the world's liberal democracies seem to identify more with the Chinese government than with the brave people of Hong Kong. They can do so in virtue of the absence a countervailing international public opinion.
Now, the existence of an enthusiastic international public opinion can, at times, be a contributing cause to bad outcomes. When it encourages the weaker side with a kind of implied material support and then does not (or cannot) deliver or deliver less than needed material assistance, it may generate worse outcomes than if it had not existed. [Hungary 1956; Syria more recently] spring to mind as examples. So, political leaders need not be craven if they refuse to go along with or encourage international public opinion.
It is tempting to close with the thought that when one is unlucky enough to live in times when democratic leaders are craven and international public opinion is uninterested and silent, it is hard not to feel, despairingly, that Kant did not give Mendelssohn's position its full due.
Even so, the actions of the people of Hong Kong are themselves a source of a more slender hope. Their courage, in the face of overwhelming odds, to defend the rule of law and resist the imposition of arbitrary power is a sign that liberty's flame has not been extinguished, yet. And seeing this, no dictatorship can feel secure.
*It is notable that Kant goes over territory here that Spinoza had made especially salient in TTP.
**Why, you may ask, primarily? I have argued that Smith also appeals to judgments of impartial spectators as a device to help explain scientific judgments.
+It's a shame that Kant does not discuss Burke's reaction.
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