The demagogue is not a romantic fellow who appears now and then, but...he appears whenever government is not effectively representative. Demagoguery is the falsification of representative government, the cultivation of the transient and apparent rather than of the considered and real will of the people...That is why the Constitutional Convention attempted to set up truly representative government; in order to protect the masses from the hypnosis of the moment, they invented devices for balancing the constituencies and delaying their decisions. They sought to make the people safe for democracy. What they meant to do every civilized people has to do, and if the checks and balances of the American Constitution are now antiquated, others will have to be devised to replace them.--Walter Lippmann (1938) The Good Society, 256. (In context, Lippmann is discussing Madison.)
Unlike most liberals who confronted the worldwide collapse of democracy in the 1930s, and who helped shape reflection on the post war revival of liberalism (under the guise of Pax Americana), Lippmann kept faith in the democratic experiment and had a healthy distrust of those that wished to prevent self-government. He also recognizes, correctly, that in modern conditions no account of legitimacy could ignore that "any government, despotic or liberal, is an organization of power drawn out of the reservoir of popular force." (p. 249; he credits Jose Ortega y Gasset!) And, more important for present purposes, unlike much subsequent liberal political philosophy, he confronted the problem that demagogues pose without complacency and the gravity it deserves. Demagogues are always a live possibility in democratic self-government.
By contrast the inability to take demagogues seriously is visible (recall) even in the response to the Trump presidency. The currently popular approaches center on proposals for abolishing the electoral college and to move toward a more straightforward majoritarian system. But while that addresses the feature in the electoral college that has generated minority presidencies and over-representation of rural areas, it is likely to increase the odds of demagogues attaining the presidency. And while partisan friends of the Democratic party or coastal electorates, may welcome such an outcome, it is not obvious why it's good for the country (or the world).*
The effectiveness of the electoral college as a block to the rise of demagogues has been successfully undermined over time by making party selection of leaders more democratic, while maintaining the effective and [given winner takes all structure of most electoral contests Stateside], natural duopoly of the two parties. (Of course, the existence of a party-system was unwanted when the electoral college was devised.)
As the quote reveals, Lippmann was aware that the intended system of the Founders and American constitutional reality differed. In particular, the system of checks and balances was systematically undermined. As Jacob T. Levy recently has argued (here), the system of checks and balances has been further weakened since. So, while Hamilton (who offers, recall my post, an ingenious cost-benefit, risk-reward analysis) is very explicit that there is a non-negligible risk of a demagogue even under the original system, we must now assume the likelihood is rather high that more demagogues will be elected.
Now, Lippmann's analysis presupposes a distinction between an apparent, false democratic will and a hidden, true democrat will. The former is transient and passionate while the latter is more reasonable and enduring. The true will tracks people's genuine interests, while the false will tracks people's momentary infatuations. For Lippmann it is obvious, perhaps too obvious, that a demagogue appeals to our false wills and not the authentic ones. Lippmann has a lot to say about the conditions under which such a mature (another term he likes) will is possible, but that will not concern me at present.
Like all approaches that rely on such a distinction one may well wonder how the true will can be revealed. (There has been a lively debate over, say, Rousseau's general will.) Lippmann's answer is worth reflecting on. For, Lippmann takes very seriously the temporal features mentioned in the distinction between the true and false democratic will. He thinks an electorate's will can be "refined" ((p. 250; 261), this is Madison's (Humean) terminology). On his view the way to capture the authentic, refined democratic will is to ensure that it is revealed and, then represented, over time.+ He claims the American "founders sought to approximate a true representation of the people by providing many different ways of counting heads" (p. 254) at different times and in different configurations. [Full disclosure: I have learned to pay attention to political time by Elizabeth Cohen (here), especially, and Mathias Thaler (see here).]
The idea being that the democratic will is neither formed instantaneously nor expressed in a given moment. That is democratic representation is not homogeneous, but, in fact, multi-faceted in time (and geographic space). This strikes me as the sound intuition in Lippmann's analysis. It also expresses the liberal distrust of appeals to the people who are taken to be unified and unidirectional by populists (and much worse) without being distrustful of democracy.
Lippmann thinks this fact requires regular elections (and geographically uneven constituencies) with the possibility to focus on different features of representation. We can be represented as citizens of a local place and, say, larger region and at different given times. And indeed the American way of government has, despite a peculiar fondness for November election days, a tendency to fragment the expression of the popular will. To what degree this way of counting heads truly generates an approximation of a true representation may well be doubted. It can also reveal the fact of heteronomy.**
True or not, if temporally separated voting were to reduce the power of demagogues it would be a useful check for that reason alone. But, as we know, it obviously cannot prevent a demagogue by itself.
Now, unlike other political philosophies, democratic liberals are willing to live with some uncertainty. (That's also part of our defense of markets.) So, perhaps one must simply accept that the demagogue is the natural byproduct of democracy--something that cannot be eliminated without undermining democratic self-rule. Regular readers may suspect that this fits my generally skeptical tenor.
As I noted, Lippmann thought part of the answer was changing the nature of how people think about the point of government.+ Something like that attitude is also visible in those with a preference for markets over elections, or a preference for experts over elections (this (recall) tempted Lippmann, too), etc. But it strikes me these do not exhaust the options. One of the problems of the evolution of the American system is that it has (d)evolved into (what used to be called) elective (temporary) kingship ((and it has its defenders recall Al-Farabi; Ibn Rushd); Mozi). But if kingship is the problem, as it was in 1776, then (more) elections alone won't solve it (recall).
What's needed is a more thoroughgoing realization than Lippmann allows that no human should have as much power as an American president. Democracy is the response to human imperfection. If we were truly virtuous and wise we wouldn't need this form of government. But why perpetuate an office that by its nature requires the best instincts of any saint?**
* Moreover, once a demagogue gains power, it would be easier to manipulate the outcome of a national election than the outcome of n-number of state elections.
+I am ignoring here Lippmann's other key claim; that the character of representation must change: "Thus in a free society the
state does not administer the affairs of men. It administers justice among men who conduct their own affairs." (p. 267) More recently, Jason Stanley, who has taken demagoguery seriously (recall), has also been tempted by the idea that voters should change their sensibilities (and vote in common interest).
++That sounds very radical. But a natural expedient would be to move from a presidential to a parliamentary system. This also does not favor one party over the other.
**Another key insight of Lippmann's (by no means unique to him) is (recall) that self-government is an ongoing experiment and so why assume that the appearance of the original division of powers must be maintained if the reality has already shifted?
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