The force of words being, as I have formerly noted, too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants, there are in man’s nature but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a fear of the consequence of breaking their word, or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it. This latter is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth, command, or sensual pleasure, which are the greatest part of mankind. The passion to be reckoned upon is fear, whereof there be two very general objects: one, the power of spirits invisible, the other, the power of those men they shall therein offend.--Hobbes Leviathan, Chapter 14.
A discussion in Paul Sagar's very interesting book, The Opinion of Mankind (recall also this post) reminded me of the quoted passage from Leviathan. Hobbes treats the familiar reliance on fear as a second-best, less 'generous' option. Hobbes notes, in particular, that the very people, who need to be held to the contract, the would be wealthy and the would be powerful ("command"), are the least likely to have the psychological dispositions to keep their oath: they are either not afraid to suffer adverse consequences. They are the bold at heart. Nor do they have the kind of self-estimation, glory or pride, that would make them wish to appear as oath-keepers (recall these posts, here, here, here, and, especially here). They lack what one may call, anticipating Adam Smith, a sense of grandeur in their own character. It's this second lacuna that interests me.
As regular readers know (recall here and here, and here), I am fascinated by the following passage from Adam Smith (see also my book):
It is not the love of our neighbour, it is not the love of mankind, which upon many occasions prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues. It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters.--The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
It's a key passage because Smith needs a psychological motive distinct from the love of praise to ground his moral theory. And he is clear that neither Christian charity nor (the too abstract) cosmopolitan attitudes (love of mankind) will do the job. I read him as offering two successful motives: either the love of what is honourable/noble or this elevated self-love (which I called grandeur above), but will call sense of integrity.
There is quite a bit more to say about the underlying moral psychology here. But I want to claim that Hobbes's glory or pride in appearing not to need to break the contract is pretty much the same motive as Smith's idea grandeur/superiority of our own character. Both echo features of ancient magnanimity (see especially these papers by Andrew Corsa). Now, Hobbes's position is pretty straightforward: the social contract cannot rely on classical magnanimity to have the right sort of pull in the people who are most likely to break it.
But surprisingly, Smith asserts that precisely this most un-egalitarian motive can secure the motivational pull that we behave in accord with modern moral values (e.g., equality, impartiality, fairness, etc.) For in much of Smith's moral psychology and moral theory we ought to see ourselves as equal with others; but in order to do so when it matters, we have to take a kind of second order attitude toward our own character that elevates us in a certain sense. In brief: we have to think highly of ourselves, our own dignity, when we act in ways that can be praiseworthy. I suspect that it's this motive that has seemed so awkward to otherwise would be admirers of Smith's moral theory.
Now, one may suspect that Hobbes' pessimism about the efficacy of this motive is fatal to Smith's theory. But I think not. For Smith is not relying on this motive to secure social peace or obedience to the law.* And it is quite possible that the rest of us, who are not in the grip of the love of wealth and power, are capable of acting with integrity/dignity. In fact, Smith's defense of commercial society is precisely that (i) in it the temptations and circumstances to act morally are much better than in alternative institutional regimes, and (ii) that the dangerous types Hobbes worries about can be pacified in alternative ways. But that's for another time.
*Smith's attitude toward social contract is more complex than Hume's rejectionism. But we can ignore that here.
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