The ratio of parliament rests, according to the apt characterization of Rudolf Smend, in a “dynamic-dialectic,” that is, in a process of confrontation of differences and opinions, from which the real political will results. The essence of parliament is therefore public deliberation of argument and counterargument, public debate and public discussion, parley, and all this without taking democracy into account.--Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, pp 34-5. [HT. Chantal Mouffe "Pluralism and Modern Democracy" in The Return of the Political, p. 118]
It is sometimes thought, by friends and enemies alike, that liberal democracy presupposes as a public norm that the truth can be arrived at through public discussion. Among friends, this view is often – mistakenly (recall, where I also cite Jill Gordon, and here) I claim! – attributed to Mill’s Of Liberty; among enemies, it’s well known that Schmitt claims that liberals mistakenly assume this. Schmitt argues that this has the unintended, but foreseeable effect of creating conditions of ever-deferred truth within liberal states. My suspicion is, in fact, that Schmitt is the source of the misreading of Mill.*
Unlike contemporary epistemologists, who tend to think that some simple, the so-called Moorean truths, come cheaply, philosophers of science (of the sort that have more than superficial knowledge of the history and sociology of science) and some political philosophers (ahh) know that it requires a complex, very fallible, institutional apparatus to establish truth. For example, Hannah Arendt (no liberal) claims, quite plausibly (recall here; and here), that only science and justice are such (rather costly) institutions who have shown themselves to be capable of reliably producing truth. Since Arendt was plenty familiar with the history of gross miscarriages of justice, we must assume that Arendt is thinking in terms of ideal types when she makes such claims.
Arendt echoes the classics in thinking that politics is the realm of opinion. In particular the good opinion of (non-trivial part) of the public. An important implication of Arendt’s view is that from the vantage point of modern politics, revelation and the Church(es) must be denied their claims to truth.
There are, I suspect, three exceptions to Arendt’s claim that may occur to the reader. First, some parliamentary systems have mechanisms that may seem capable of also producing truth. This example proves the rule: these are mechanisms that avail themselves of juridical methods (subpoena power, hearing of witnesses, etc.)
Second, one may well think that a free press should also be counted a truth-generating mechanism. It is certainly the case that some of the press tries to be factual, reliable, even objective; and one might think this "prompts" (to quote Schmitt on Guizot) citizens to "seek the truth" themselves (35). One can grant the claim about citizens; yet one still must note that the vast majority of even the bread and butter reportage is produced under very time sensitive conditions without the resources and practices required to generate truth and that it is to be doubted citizens will find the truth this way. (To reiterate, when the press avails itself of juridical methods it is quite capable of producing truth.) More important, leaving aside all the sources of bias that are presupposed in the normal functioning of the press, it is a category error to conflate news with truth.
Third one may well be tempted into thinking that bureaucracies presuppose commitment to the truth. One may even argue that if bureaucracies would embrace paradoxes or the false, they would ground to a halt having to execute simultaneously, say, A and not A. There is an important insight lurking in this thought. But ideal type functioning of bureaucracies is rule-following not truth-following.[1] Many of these rules presuppose truth or pay lip-service in establishing the truth. But one need not be Kafka to recognize it is no more than lip-service.
For some readers this is all way too ‘cynical’ or too concessive of those politicians who lie routinely (and, recall, the voters that support them--this position never makes me friends). But it is important to be clear what not’s being claimed: it’s not the case that on the present conception of liberal, political life anything goes. (This is also the kernel of truth about bureaucratic rule following—the rules need to be reasonably coherent and capable of being followed in relatively efficient matter.) Nor am I claiming that the rhetoric and self-conception of liberal politics is mere ideology, will to power, or the mechanical effects of group-polarization.
Before I answer the charge of cynicism, I am not denying that there are liberal thinkers who see political life as the locus of truth--who think, at least for normative purposes, that there are in principle reliable mechanisms of rational consensus building that can guide public life. And, as even Mouffe acknowledges, these liberal thinkers need not be naive; what makes an overlapping consensus possible for such liberal thinkers is the (often desirable) privatization of many of the worst sources of conflict. As regular readers know, I think such liberalism (and the liberal democracy characterized by Schmitt), while noble, rests on a mistake about the proper self-understanding of liberalism.
A skeptical liberal recognizes that humans are imperfect; that the conditions under which folk are likely to be generous, decent, and even virtuous are (while not impossible) reliably fragile in politics. The functionality and intelligibility of democratic institutions (separation of powers, the rule of law, minority rights, free press, regular elections, the large role for bureaucracies, private/public sphere, secret ballots, etc.) all point in the other direction: they are all imperfect responses to the reality of imperfect human nature. If politics were the site of truth and reason (if philosopher-kings were possible), we wouldn't need all these liberal institutions, we could then risk the identity of rule and ruled that democracy at its purest promises.
That is to say, while liberalism does not encourage deception and lying, liberalism need not require belief that public opinion, public reason, and parliament is generally truth conducive. The way I read Guizot -- even the passages quoted by Schmitt -- Guizot need not believe the "unrestrained clash of opinions" uncovers truth. (It's notable that the quoted passage is Schmitt, not Guizot!) Rather (as Schmitt kind of recognizes) Guizot's own thought is more committed to the idea of unending conversation, government by discussion.
Now, this idea -- government by discussion -- has its problems, including obscuring the role of power and riches in political life. I am not here defending it. But one can be committed to this ideal even if one doubts it generates truth. For one can talk for all kinds of solid reasons (persuasion, coalition building, create hope, etc.), not the least in order to avoid fighting.
*In context, Schmitt explicitly names Guizot. (And so I am not claiming he is confused.) But in his introduction Schmitt lumps Mill and Guizot together as the true source of the principled arguments behind parliamentarism.
[1] There is an interesting, tough question to what degree science and justice go beyond rule-following.
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