I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates.
Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these councilors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt.
I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of affairs to Maximilian, the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.
A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.
And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take away his state from him.
There is a common, undoubtedly self-serving, albeit sometimes heroic, understanding to think of the role of intellectuals in function terms: 'as speaking truth to power.' In some contexts the phrase became associated with various civil rights and liberation movements, in other contexts it became a way for the intelligentsia to carve out a niche for itself as a moral compass for a society/state. Whatever the origins of the actual phrase, the underlying problem, the awkward relationship between power and truth, has been theorized in the context of policy-advice.
I do not wish to claim that Machiavelli is the first to hit upon the idea of designating a privileged category of truth-to-power-tellers. One can find variants of his solution in the Chinese philosophical tradition, the Arthasastra, and Ibn Rushd (recall)*; and reflection on this solution in More's Utopia (recall). But it is notable, I think, that Machiavelli attempts to solve the problem of flattery by way of carving out a protected area of speech for a select group. Obviously, by denying the permissibly of unsolicited advice, Machiavelli should not be thought of as championing free speech for the learned. But he does carve out an area of political life where truth is thought welcome and, in so doing, anticipates some of the justifications of academic freedom.
As an aside, in the previous paragraph I distinguish academic freedom from free speech, because the kind of speech I am focusing on here is unrelated to formation of public opinion or holding the powerful to account. As the quoted material shows, Machiavelli assumes that with genuine free speech for everybody it follows that respect for political authority is reduced dangerously ("when every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates.")
Be that as it may, Machiavelli clearly assumes that philosopher-kings are unlikely. So his is a second-best solution. For the Machiavellian approach to work, the powerful must have, in addition to being inquisitive and patient, three skills: first they must be good judges of character, so that they can evaluate who is likely to abuse the status of truth-to-power-teller for personal gain and who will serve the public good loyally.** Second, they must be able to know how to choose the wise. For this they require a generalist, Socratic skill to unmask false pretenses to knowledge. They must also have a certain kind of character that is not needy for flattery. (One can understand the mental and physical exercises of the king advocated in the Arthasastra as a means to cultivating such a character.) So, obviously Machiavelli's solution will rarely work in practice.
Obviously, there is more to Machiavelli's solution. It's quite clear the powerful need to offer incentives for the would be truth-to-power-teller not to devolve into flattery. This is why praise and anger are important in managing truth-to-power-tellers. (Again, one can find in other traditions more on how to manage these incentives.) How to set the right incentive structure (Machiavelli's constraints) is not an easy matter.
It's notable that even in the context of a structure of a regime of truth-to-power-tellers, Machiavelli thinks that when you have more than one expert, disagreement will follow. Unlike our modern defenders of technocracy, Machiavelli recognizes that experts will disagree when they are brought near power. And the reason for this is that there is always incentive for them to distinguish themselves from other experts. Machiavelli's point here is not a claim about knowledge. Rather, Machiavelli is implying that when the powerful bring more than one expert to testify on the same subject, they create a demand for disagreement.+
What is notable is that Machiavelli denies that such disagreement can be turned into the kind of creative turbulence he (recall) diagnosed as a good feature of the Roman Republic in his Discourses on Livy. I think that's because for Machiavelli the function of truth-to-power-tellers is action guiding in real time.++ When it comes to such utterances, Machiavelli clearly thinks the (opportunity) and search costs in evaluating competing bits of advice, is not worth the expense and effort. Before you reject Machiavelli's position it is worth noting that he thinks that one of the main benefits of asking an expert for advice is that it communicates one's plans and so creates expectations and commitment that can help coordinate delegated activity. If you ask too many experts (who will disagree), such benefits disappear or dissipitate over time.
*I am grateful to Liam Kofie Bright for discussion.
**If you object to the use of 'public good' here, substitute 'power' for it.
+From a Machiavellian perspective the attempts to forge scientific consensus for consumption in political sphere is naive. But it is compatible with his view to have a reservoir of truth-to-power-tellers (even with the same kind of expertise) one could call upon as needs must.
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Posted by: Matt | 03/06/2019 at 10:45 AM