In this post I argue that according to Smith there are three kinds of bad politicians: (i) a decisionist type; (ii) an ideological type; (iii) a factional type. In practice the qualities that belong to each can be blended. I discuss them in turn and that point to some commonalities. Consider the following passage:
To insist upon establishing, and upon establishing all at once, and in spite of all opposition, every thing which that idea may seem to require, must often be the highest degree of arrogance. It is to erect his own judgment into the supreme standard of right and wrong. It is to fancy himself the only wise and worthy man in the commonwealth, and that his fellow-citizens should accommodate themselves to him and not he to them….This arrogance is perfectly familiar to them. They entertain no doubt of the immense superiority of their own judgment….they seldom see any thing so wrong in it as the obstructions which it may sometimes oppose to the execution of their own will. They…consider the state as made for themselves, not themselves for the state. (TMS 6.2.2.18, 234)
In context Smith is describing the dangers of acting from the ‘idea of perfecting of policy and law’ (that’s ‘that idea’ in the first quoted sentence). But the problem that is diagnosed is not unique to it. Rather, what’s being rejected is what we would call ‘shock therapy’ (“establishing all at once;”) when it comes to policy and institutional change, Smith promotes gradual change. He worries that fast economic changes will generate dislocations that are inhumane and disorderly (WN 4.2.40, 469.) But he also thinks that shock therapy shows an arrogant lack of respect to other people’s opinions (‘in spite of all opposition.’) Such political arrogance generally presupposes a moral arrogance: one’s ‘own judgment’ is turned ‘into the supreme standard of right and wrong.’ This is a moral failing because this standard – the ‘idea of exact propriety and perfection’ (TMS 6.3.25, 247) – can only be set by the feelings of impartial spectator (TMS 7.2.1.49, 249).
The arrogant leader assumes that fellow-citizens will accommodate themselves to him. Smith presupposes here that leaders are not rulers over subjects, but their servants We can discern here a commitment to a species of republicanism, where non-domination is a ruling virtue. What’s key for my present purposes is that such arrogant leaders detest delay (‘at once’), constitutional process, and compromise; they are fond of unitary authority, which facilitates their decisiveness (‘obstructions which it may sometimes oppose to the execution of their own will.’) In context Smith is clear that such arrogance comes naturally to royal princes (“imperial and royal reformers” (TMS 6.2.2.18, 234) and, perhaps, also those with great inherited wealth).[*]
The second kind of bad leader, the ideologue, is one who has excessive fondness for a particular ‘system’ of thought. To understand Smith’s criticism we need to be clear about the role of aesthetics as a legitimate political motive to action in his thought. A key passage is the following:
The same principle, the same love of system, the same regard to the beauty of order, of art and contrivance, frequently serves to recommend those institutions which tend to promote the public welfare. When a patriot exerts himself for the improvement of any part of the public police, his conduct does not always arise from pure sympathy with the happiness of those who are to reap the benefit of it. It is not commonly from a fellow-feeling with carriers and waggoners that a public-spirited man encourages the mending of high roads…The perfection of police, the extension of trade and manufactures, are noble and magnificent objects. The contemplation of them pleases us, and we are interested in whatever can tend to advance them. They make part of the great system of government, and the wheels of the political machine seem to move with more harmony and ease by means of them. We take pleasure in beholding the perfection of so beautiful and grand a system, and we are uneasy till we remove any obstruction that can in the least disturb or encumber the regularity of its motions. All constitutions of government, however, are valued only in proportion as they tend to promote the happiness of those who live under them. This is their sole use and end. From a certain spirit of system, however, from a certain love of art and contrivance, we sometimes seem to value the means more than the end, and to be eager to promote the happiness of our fellow-creatures, rather from a view to perfect and improve a certain beautiful and orderly system, than from any immediate sense or feeling of what they either suffer or enjoy. There have been men of the greatest public spirit, who have shown themselves in other respects not very sensible to the feelings of humanity. (TMS IV.1.11, 185)
Smith clearly thinks that the love of system can be aesthetic, and this also includes systems about “those institutions which tend to promote the public welfare.” Aesthetics has motivational pull because it is “pleasing.” What is notable is that according to Smith such aesthetic judgment can compensate for a lack of (or ‘imperfect’) sympathy with those aided by one’s institutional reform project. True public spirit may, in fact, be more a consequence of such aesthetic motives than concern for the lives of those one claims to be helping; this fact does not undermine (recall) the reality of ‘public spirit.’ (Again, there are republican sensibilities here.)
I do not mean to suggest the significance of the passage is only in its focus on the nature of aesthetic motivation. The key point is that there is a mismatch between why one may desire to improve the constitution of a state – recall from section 1 that this refers to the underlying social structures which give a particular state its stability -- and the proper normative grounds or justification for doing so. For constitutions “are valued only in proportion as they tend to promote the happiness of those who live under them. This is their sole use and end.” That is, when it comes to social affairs, Smith is an egalitarian consquentialist. Imperfect motives, the aesthetic pull of the harmony or fitting-ness of intellectual systems, can lead to good outcomes. Smith also allows that “the perfection of police [that is, public policy], the extension of trade and manufactures, are noble and magnificent objects.” The aesthetic pull of a system that aims to achieve such ends is not illusory; these really are noble objects worth pursuing. This helps explain the comment quoted above that the ““some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the statesman.” (TMS 6.2.2.18, 234) Smith thinks (recall) policy must be governed by an ideal vision of society.
The problem is that the aesthetic pull of an intellectual system can displace the public spirit it should be animating: “This spirit of system commonly takes the direction of that more gentle public spirit; always animates it, and often inflames it even to the madness of fanaticism.” (TMS 6.2.2.15, 232) Smith thinks that such an aesthetic attachment to an ideology is dangerous. For Smith fanaticism is always associated with violence (TMS 3.3.36-7, 152-3; TMS 6.3.26, 249). Not all fanaticism is associated with an ideology taken too far, Smith often treats religion and faction as likely sources of violent fanaticism. Either way, fanaticism enhances readiness to use violence and undermines the working of our moral sentiments: “Of all the corrupters of moral sentiments, therefore, faction and fanaticism have always been by far the greatest” (TMS 3.3.43, 156). So, Smith warns against certain kind of political leaders, of an intellectual kind, who are in the grip of a beautiful ideology and turn violent to achieve their ends.
As the passage reveals (TMS 3.3.43, 156), Smith clear also thinks that the spirit of faction, we would say partisanship, is very dangerous. Smith concern with faction runs through TMS (for example):
The animosity of hostile factions, whether civil or ecclesiastical, is often still more furious than that of hostile nations; and their conduct towards one another is often still more atrocious…It is needless to observe, I presume, that both rebels and heretics are those unlucky persons, who, when things have come to a certain degree of violence, have the misfortune to be of the weaker party. In a nation distracted by faction, there are, no doubt, always a few, though commonly but a very few, who preserve their judgment untainted by the general contagion. They seldom amount to more than, here and there, a solitary individual, without any influence, excluded, by his own candour, from the confidence of either party, and who, though he may be one of the wisest, is necessarily, upon that very account, one of the most insignificant men in the society. All such people are held in contempt and derision, frequently in detestation, by the furious zealots of both parties. A true party-man hates and despises candour; and, in reality, there is no vice which could so effectually disqualify him for the trade of a party-man as that single virtue. The real, revered, and impartial spectator, therefore, is, upon no occasion, at a greater distance than amidst the violence and rage of contending parties….Even to the great Judge of the universe, they impute all their own prejudices, and often view that Divine Being as animated by all their own vindictive and implacable passions. (TMS 3.3.43, 156)
For Smith factions are cohesive because they are echo-chambers of mutual sympathy (“general contagion”).[**] And in so doing they create a robust form of partiality which does not respect, even comes to loath (“hates and despises”) truth and equity. Religious factions are inclined to innovate theologically, and create theological justifications for their own otherwise immoral behavior. Smith notes that it’s very difficult and lonely to avoid becoming factional in the midst of other people’s fanaticism. A key problem of the existence of polarizing partisanship is that a robust willingness to stick with one’s independent and impartial judgment becomes itself a matter of suspicion and antagonism; who has not heard ‘you are either with us or against us.’[+]
And in fact, he thinks that partisan leaders may well themselves be less fanatical and partisan than they let on,[11] but that they cannot reveal their true feelings amidst great partisanship: “Even though the leaders should have preserved their own heads, as indeed they commonly do, free from this fanaticism, yet they dare not always disappoint the expectation of their followers; but are often obliged, though contrary to their principle and their conscience, to act as if they were under the common delusion.” (TMS 6.2.2.15, 233) So, a factional leader will, if she does not willingly encourage fanaticism, be unwillingly be carried along by the zeal and madness (“delusions”) of their fellow partisans. That is to say, while an arrogant leader tramples on the opinions of the people, a factional leader must flatter his followers to stay in power.
These three types of bad leadership have in common some features: they are not impartial, they lack public spirit, and, most notably, they facilitate the corruption of moral life. In sum, they presuppose political life as a zero-sum activity and act accordingly. They also fail to find the right balance between respecting people’s opinions and guiding them. It follows from this that Smith thinks public spirited leaders, who are impartial and promote good morals (or mores) as well as promote policies with (to adopt Jacob Levy's claim about Montesquieu) the grain of society, are laudable.
[*] Smith attacks entails, in particular, on moral grounds (WN 3.2.6, 284)
[**] See Levy, David, and Sandra Peart. "Adam Smith & the Place of Faction." (2007). Forman-Barzilai, Fonna. Adam Smith and the circles of sympathy: cosmopolitanism and moral theory. Cambridge University Press, 2010: 23; 151-9; 180-1. Smith’s mechanism is here akin to Hume’s account of sympathy in “Of National Character.”
[+] I suspect Smith is thinking of Cicero’s Pro Ligario.
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