On American Empire today

Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.--Machiavelli, The Prince Translated by W. K. Marriott,Chapter 5, ("CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED"

In recent weeks, we saw the effects of American empire in action. President Maduro has been in power for more than five years; even if you truly dislike the Monroe doctrine, the effects of his disastrous rule have been clear for a few years now with unprecedented mass migration in peace time. But in that period the EU has responded largely with benign indifference, despite the effects of this human caused disaster being felt in European territories off the coast of Venezuela. Late in 2017 symbolic sanctions were introduced (see here). But only after President Trump recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim president (on January 23), did the EU suddenly follow suit and throw its "support" behind the national assembly.

It is quite amazing to see the EU act like a puppy here because (i) nobody among EU leaders believes President Trump is acting in good faith, and (ii) it is patently obvious that the US will promote its own oil and arms-sales interests, and (iii) it's unclear what EU strategic objectives will be served through Trump's policy of escalation (with non trivial risk of widespread civil war). The only explanation for the EU's behavior is the felt need among its member states to fall in line with the hegemon. In so doing the EU strengthens President Trump's hand.

Of course, the previous paragraph kind of implies that EU leaders could act differently. But this is  to misunderstand the nature of the longevity of Pax Americana in an age where there is no common enemy to remain united. I think Machiavelli's observations at the start of chapter 5 of the Prince help illustrate the state of affairs. After American conquest of western part of Europe in 1944-5, this was plausibly presented as a liberation (not so difficult given that these states were previously under Nazi and Fascist control). And while Americans did create army bases in the liberated bits, they followed the third option proposed by Machiavelli. Discerning that states accustomed to freedom can be held more easily by the means of their own citizens. The Marshall plan, Nato, Bretton woods, etc. anchored this rule. 

The key innovation of early American leadership in Pax Americana was to forego extracting a financial tribute.* Because liberal leadership understands itself as generating a win-win framework, it could practice a form of Enlightened hegemony. And, in fact, by being indifferent to European re-armament it could maintain overwhelming superiority without effort. The Europeans can pretend not to be protectorates;** and this is how it was until even after the Berlin Wall fell.

Because President Trump instinctively understands the world in zero-sum ways, he reverts back to type, and encourages equal burden sharing and forms of tribute. Yet, while this is a non-trivial change to the surface-level of Pax Americana, American hegemony is, for the time being, equally effective. It relies on democratic oligarchies and local strong men abroad understanding their self-interest in following his example. If Machiavelli is right then the new surface form of Pax Americana can be quite stable until it accidentally nudges its own allies into a more profitable arrangement with its would be competitors.  

*This option was used, however, in the Gulf War.

**A lesson learned the hard way by once proud colonial powers in the Suez crisis.

Comments

[ajkreider]

This analysis seems strained. One wonders in what sense EU countries are "held". It is not just "early" US leadership that decided to forego tribute. The US runs, and has run, a large trade deficit with the EU. Despite Trump's tantrums, this shows no signs of abating.

One also wonders into whose arms EU nations might run? In what world would the Baltics or Poland embrace Russia? What wild fantasies would prompt EU nations to look to China to protect themselves from the US?

What the Venezuela situation* highlights, yet again, is the moral bankruptcy of European foreign policy without US leadership.

*The "it's the oil" claim makes little sense, pace Bolton. If anything, the self-induced collapse of the Venezuelan oil sector helps US frackers. And anyway, such concerns in Iraq amounted to nothing. None of this is to suggest that Trump is acting in good faith.