On Shklar and Adam Smith on Politicians (Society and anarchism)

With the exception of monopolists, Adam Smith spoke of no one with greater contempt than of politicians. Beneath his accusation lies the common anarchism of the Enlightenment, which essentially amounts to the belief that society is inherently good, but that governments, and they alone, prevent it from flourishing.--Judith Shklar (1957) After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith, 10.

I don't have access to the relevant pages of Cannan's (1937) edition of Wealth of Nations. But there is, indeed, no doubt that Smith is very critical of monopolists and that "insidious and crafty animal," a politician. But his use of 'politician' picks out a particular kind of politician: namely those "whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs." (WN IV.2). Such politicians are called 'statesmen' by the uneducated. Smith very explicitly contrasts these false statesmen with (true) statesman who "deliberates" with "general principles." (Smith sometimes calls these 'legislators.')

In context, the crafty politicians are those that treat trade conflict in terms of tit for tat without regard of the economic and political consequences of their behavior. A key point Smith makes is that often the logic of retaliation in trade conflicts ends up hurting those who are purportedly being defended twice over (first by the tariff of another country, then by our own tariff which ends up, perhaps, helping other workers, but not the original victims for whom goods become dearer).

Smith's underlying aim in the passage (and larger chapter) is to reveal the contradictions at the heart of mercantilism, which sees the world in zero-sum terms. Smith's economic argument is impeccable. But his claim that the mercantilist inspired politician is merely reacting impulsively is not entirely fair. It's not, of course, wholly unfair because the mercantilist politician (false statesman) is not helping who he claims to be helping (those suffering the effects of foreign tariffs). But that does not need to entail that the vulgar/false politician is acting without principles. After all, and as Smith's translator, De Grouchy, notes, trade barriers facilitate the creation of (what we may call) artificial monopolies, which enrich the well-connected few at the expense of the many. It's quite possible that some mercantilist politicians knows that his trade-policies enrich his well connected friends. Mercantilism is a coherent worldview if you embrace zero-sum logic (as Smith shows).

Be that as it may, Smith's insistence that true politicians act on principles is not an aberration. He makes (recall my critique of Jacob Levy) the same claim in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: that “some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the statesman.” (emphasis added).  What acting from principles and general or systematic idea amounts to is a further question. But Shklar fails to note that for Smith there can be good kind of politicians.

Now, one may be tempted to say on behalf of Shklar: 'sure those true statesmen are those politicians that recognize that government corrupts society and stay out of its way.' I think this is mistaken for two reasons: first, Smith thinks that the roots of corruption of any society are contained in the very mechanism that gives it stability:

"This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments." (TMS 1.3.3.1)

So, even a wholly anarchist society would not be inherently good because we naturally admire the rich and powerful. In fact, Smith's depiction of anarchism -- the 'savage' state of development characterized by hunters and fishermen -- is while not uniformly negative (he admires the heroic magnanimity made possible) certainly not approving: such peoples "are frequently reduced, or, at least, think themselves reduced, to the necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning their infants, their old people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be devoured by wild beasts." This is a passage from the Introduction of the Wealth of Nations. It sets up the key argument of Wealth of Nations -- one partially directed at folk like Rousseau (or at least a caricature of Rousseau) that developed civilizations can (but need not be) moral improvements over savages. (Hume tends to think they are always better; Smith thinks that mercantlist, imperial conquest generates a 'spirit of war' and undermines the ways they could be better.)

Second, Smith thinks that government needs to take an active role in providing or helping to facilitate quite a number of public good (transportation, education, military, public health, even some arts, etc.); see George Stigler's somewhat grudging analysis.  

There is a deeper, less superficial problem underlying Shklar's analysis. While she is not wrong to think that for Smith society is an important analytic and historical reality. What she misses is that in many ways government constitutes the orders and ranks which compose society. Smith explicitly makes this claim in The Theory of Moral Sentiments:*

Every independent state is divided into many different orders and societies, each of which has its own particular powers, privileges, and immunities. Every individual is naturally more attached to his own particular order or society, than to any other....

Upon the manner in which any state is divided into the different orders and societies which compose it, and upon the particular distribution which has been made of their respective powers, privileges, and immunities, depends, what is called, the constitution of that particular state.

Upon the ability of each particular order or society to maintain its own powers, privileges, and immunities, against the encroachments of every other, depends the stability of that particular constitution. That particular constitution is necessarily more or less altered, whenever any of its subordinate parts is either raised above or depressed below whatever had been its former rank and condition.

All those different orders and societies are dependent upon the state to which they owe their security and protection. That they are all subordinate to that state, and established only in subserviency to its prosperity and preservation, is a truth acknowledged by the most partial member of every one of them. 

In fact, the passage does not merely show that society is dependent on the state, but this very dependence is for Smith constitutive of a state's constitution. This point suggests that for Smith a constitution is not so much a political-legal document, but the underlying structure or (he would say) order which gives a particular state its stability.  Interestingly enough, for Smith, the identity of the state can stay the same while its order and constitution -- that is, the relationship between society and state -- can change.+

*I suspect Shklar may have been unfamiliar with TMS when she wrote After Utopia.

+The last few paragraphs were inspired by a very interesting talk by Glory Liu and Barry Weingast.

Comments

[Michael Kochin]

Smith's critique of mercantilists and mercantilist politicians would be more persuasive if The Wealth of Nations had considered fiscal questions such as how: How do tariffs contribute to revenue? What costs of collection and externalities do tariffs impose compared with other taxes? Do measures to route trade or protect local industry increase or decrease TAXABLE wealth? Smith's defense of the Navigation Acts can be reframed in fiscal terms: more efficient to protect the British Merchant fleet from foreign competition and impress sailors than tax foreign shipping and hire sailors. But Wealth of Nations never does that.