When a Continental Philosopher Hasn't Heard the News that The War is Over

This leads me to my conclusion concerning the present volume. It could have profited from an in-depth investigation into the conceptual and philosophical architecture of existentialism and existential thought as they have developed over the last two hundred years. This would have led to the insight that neither neuroscience nor the interaction of empirically grounded psychology and physics with the existentialist tradition are anything very recent. This is not just a matter of historical negligence on the part of the volume; it leads to a very shallow understanding of both existentialism and neuroscience among the majority of the contributors. Many of the older contributions of existentialists to the mind-body/mind-brain-problem, or to articulating the role of modern science for our self-understanding as human beings, are so much more sophisticated that the current volume as a whole does not live up to the standards of first and second-wave of existentialism. More significantly, though, I think we ought to deny that there is even such a thing as "neuroexistentialism". Yet, whatever the validity of this negative existential assertion, it seems clear enough that neuroexistentialism is in pretty bad existential shape.--Markus Gabriel, reviewing Gregg D. Caruso and Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience, Oxford University Press, 2018@NDPR

A decade ago, I think, analytic philosophers grasped that they had won the fraternal war with continental philosophers over jobs in the discipline. While continental philosophy maintained some of its cultural capital -- especially (recall) in the lucrative art market -- its students were increasingly consigned to seeking positions in shrinking humanities programs, whereas philosophy was tapping into science-friendly interdisciplinary programs. Perhaps coincidentally, simultaneously, analytic philosophers turned against the bullying and blood sport culture within the profession. After all, bullies, who are especially status conscious, are  useful to create dominance over other factions and to police unity within the ranks. With the war won, the costs of the toxic culture have become increasingly apparent and intolerable.

The previous paragraph is of course a stylized representation of a messy reality. But one nice consequence of this new state of affairs is an increasing interest among folk to draw on resources from outside one's own traditions -- this is, in fact, how analytic philosophy always replenishes itself -- and a willingness to collaborate with folk, including Continental types, who previously would have been outside the margins of respectability. Another potentially healthy feature is that various sub-field-echo-chambers can draw on wider pool of reviewers and referees. 

Problem is, Markus Gabriel, a mediagenic and high-profile (non-analytic) philosopher in Germany, has no desire to play nice. In the quoted review that raised considerable eyebrows for lots of reasons, he basically charges that (primarily analytic) folk use the term 'existentialism' in a shallow way and have no business messing with that 'tradition.'* (For the record Gabriel doesn't frame the review in terms of the contrast between analytic/continental--so what I am doing is kind of uncharitable.) Now, Gabriel's range of charges is wider than this, but one of his claims is that the third kind of existentialism (articulated by Flanagan and Carusso) seems to "more or less the opposite of the two other forms of existentialism" that constitute the existentialist tradition.  One may say then, cheekily perhaps, that Gabriel objects to a form of intellectual appropriation that ends up undermining the very tradition that is being appropriated (so there is no criticism of appropriation as such, although the spirit of the review is so uncharitable that one wonders if the appropriation itself generated the hostility). Because of the stakes involved, Gabriel is unwilling to review most of the contributions to the volume on their own terms. 

I don't have much evidence for the spin I am putting on the review, but notice that it relies on a distinction between "actual existentialism" and (let's say) fake existentialism. The fake existentialism is the one introduced/coined by Caruso and Flanagan. I offer two observations.

First, Gabriel here tacitly assumes that extending a tradition always must involve a form of continuation such that no essential features of the tradition are undermined. But of course what is thought essential in the tradition is, often, a matter of (quietly or more explicitly) retrofitting of the tradition to the newly extended version of it. The previous sentence is, of course, natural to analytic philosophers, who have a hard time articulating any necessary and/or sufficient condition of their own tradition at any given time, and to those that have reflected on the change course of some traditions in the past.

Second, Gabriel claims the authority to distinguish between the actual and fake versions of existentialism. This reveals his commitment to the tradition. And he does so in a way in which he denies others the right to speak on its behalf and extend the tradition. Such boundary policing can be quite entertaining to those who enjoy blood sports, and, even for those of us who may find this less than tasteful, can provide an opportunity for learning about deep-seated, otherwise submerged differences. (It tends to be more instructive about the polemicizing reviewer than the work reviewed.) It exhibits what above (and in the title of the post) I call the state of 'war.'  Despite this being an age of global and instant communication, news of the armistice has evidently not reached Bonn.

 

*I have some skin in this game because I liked using the term analytic existentialism.

Comments

[Taylor Carman]

Why do you say, “Gabriel here tacitly assumes that extending a tradition always must involve a form of continuation such that no essential features of the tradition are undermined”? I don’t see how his criticism of the book commits him to any such general assumption or principle. His objection is very specifically to the editors’ use of the term “existentialism,” which he maintains – correctly, I think – is both historically and conceptually confused.

[Taylor Carman]

“(For the record Gabriel doesn’t frame the review in terms of the contrast between analytic / continental – so what I am doing is kind of uncharitable.)”

You’re right about this. I really think the Continental / analytic frame is a red herring (if a frame can be a herring) and should be dropped.

[dmf]

you should take this up with Babette Babich
‏@babette_babich
Nov 27
Night of Philosophy again. Only analytic philosophy needed last year.
Only analytic philosophers need apply this year.
So neat.

[Thomas Nadelhoffer]

Taylor,

A genuine question: Have you read the volume?

[Taylor Carman]

Yes, but — why preface a question by calling it “genuine”?

[Chris Stephens]

In his review, Gabriel writes "Another weakness of the book is editorial. There are frequent mistakes which could easily have been repaired, such as the repeated claim that homo sapiens has been around "for some 250,00 years" (p. 27, 29)"

If you're going to be the kind of reviewer that's picky about this kind of thing (I guess he doesn't like that she says "some 250,000 years" rather than, what, "300,000"? Then you should at least be aware (or perhaps the weakness of his own review is "editorial" as it were,) that it isn't "homo sapiens" its "Homo sapiens". ("Homo" should be capitalized). Churchland gets it right. Gabriel gets it wrong.

Not that I'm completely unsympathetic with his remarks about existentialism. But I agree that this framing often seems to keep him from engaging with the articles on their own terms.

Like Taylor, though, I'm not sure it's about the "continental/analytic divide" - he happily praises works like Jenaan Ismael's that are squarely in the analytic tradition.

[eric Schliesser]

Good point about the reference to Jenan's book, Chris. Even so, Modern continental phioosophers are often happy to cité analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science; that is compatible With resenting intellectual appropiation of their tradition(s).

[Michael Kremer]

Chris Stephens: the point is, as Gabriel says, editorial. There is a missing zero in "250,00" (yes, that actually occurs in the book, and yes that would be nitpicking if it were a critique of the author, but it is here a criticism of the press and the copy-editors -- ok, it's still nit-picking).