From the combination of the two kinds of moral influence thus exercised by women, arose the spirit of chivalry: the peculiarity of which is, to aim at combining the highest standard of the warlike qualities with the cultivation of a totally different class of virtues—those of gentleness, generosity, and self-abnegation, towards the non-military and defenceless classes generally, and a special submission and worship directed towards women; who were distinguished from the other defenceless classes by the high rewards which they had it in their power voluntarily to bestow on those who endeavoured to earn their favour, instead of extorting their subjection. Though the practice of chivalry fell even more sadly short of its theoretic standard than practice generally falls below theory, it remains one of the most precious monuments of the moral history of our race; as a remarkable instance of a concerted and organized attempt by a most disorganized and distracted society, to raise up and carry into practice a moral ideal greatly in advance of its social condition and institutions; so much so as to have been completely frustrated in the main object, yet never entirely inefficacious, and which has left a most sensible, and for the most part a highly valuable impress on the ideas and feelings of all subsequent times.
The chivalrous ideal is the acme of the influence of women's sentiments on the moral cultivation of mankind: and if women are to remain in their subordinate situation, it were greatly to be lamented that the chivalrous standard should have passed away, for it is the only one at all capable of mitigating the demoralizing influences of that position. But the changes in the general state of the species rendered inevitable the substitution of a totally different ideal of morality for the chivalrous one. Chivalry was the attempt to infuse moral elements into a state of society in which everything depended for good or evil on individual prowess, under the softening influences of individual delicacy and generosity. In modern societies, all things, even in the military department of affairs, are decided, not by individual effort, but by the combined operations of numbers; while the main occupation of society has changed from fighting to business, from military to industrial life. The exigencies of the new life are no more exclusive of the virtues of generosity than those of the old, but it no longer entirely depends on them. The main foundations of the moral life of modern times must be justice and prudence; the respect of each for the rights of every other, and the ability of each to take care of himself. Chivalry left without legal check all forms of wrong which reigned unpunished throughout society; it only encouraged a few to do right in preference to wrong, by the direction it gave to the instruments of praise and admiration. But the real dependence of morality must always be upon its penal sanctions—its power to deter from evil. The security of society cannot rest on merely rendering honour to right, a motive so comparatively weak in all but a few, and which on very many does not operate at all. Modern society is able to repress wrong through all departments of life, by a fit exertion of the superior strength which civilization has given it, and thus to render the existence of the weaker members of society (no longer defenceless but protected by law) tolerable to them, without reliance on the chivalrous feelings of those who are in a position to tyrannize.--Subjection of Women, Chapter 4.
Mill (and perhaps Taylor) treat chivalry as a "moral ideal" encouraged by aristocratic women in the context of warring and disorderly societies and to, thereby, transform these societies into more peaceful and just political orders. Such an order would continue to be rather hierarchical -- it presupposes aristocracy, and aristocratic ladies --, but the sword would be used in the service of justice, rather than plunder.
Mill thinks the moral ideal is doomed because it is out of sync with contemporary feudal mores, which are geared toward war, patriarchy, and exploitation of the weak. Here Mill presupposes (recall here and here) both his civilizational and stadial account of the progress of history as well as the eighteenth century historicist idea (to be found in Montesquieu and Adam Smith) that norms and morals have to fit in some sense the material and political circumstances of society.
Of course, because Mill thinks there is (a possibility of) progress, such bottom up attempts -- I almost used 'spontaneous order' -- can drive the progress of history from one stage to the next.* And, in fact, he clearly thinks it is important to have social memory of exemplars of such attempts at social moral improvement by way of the articulation and propagation of 'moral ideals.' Even failed moral projects can generate "highly valuable impress on the ideas and feelings of all subsequent times." And it is easy to see why; it helps combat status quo bias and resignation, and provides inspiration for future times.
To be sure, Mill does not advocate chivalry in his own time. Rather, he sees it as a second-best, ameliorative ('mitigating') institution, in contexts in which women's subordination cannot be altered. It also shows that victims of oppression can be agents in social improvement even if what can be achieved is rather limited.
Of course, the moral of Mill's analysis is that spontaneous order and the operations of public opinion or some other system of recognition of honor are not sufficient to secure a moral society (recall this post and see the references in it). In modern societies, which are characterized by great concentration of centralized power, there is a possibility for the rule of law to back up and strengthen our morality; and if not morality, than at least to eradicate some clear injustices. The thought being that the law should neither promote domestic tyranny and women's subordination nor tacitly permit it.
Thus, hidden in Mill's analysis of stadial and civilizational progress is a claim about modern state capacity. And this is characterized by great, coordinated joint action ("the combined operations of numbers"). He disguises this a bit because he talks about society and modern civilization (not state capacity). But Mill understands by civilization, not unlike Hume and Smith, the capacity to enforce the rule of law. Of course, this presupposes that modern societies are already willing to be or understand themselves as moral communities.** This idea runs through Mill's Subjection of Women. Given that Mill describes innumerable moral horrors, I think it is likely the idea that we are a moral community is intended to be a species of philosophical prophecy not an empirical description of modernity.
*Mill's treatment of the causes of change is too large a topic for present purposes, but he announces on the first page of the book that "the great modern spiritual and social transition" can change institutions, but also that some institutions are resilient against change.
**In fact, Mill's conception of Christianity is that, while it is implicated in many evils, it is a religion that, in purported contrast to Islam, is an engine for historical moral progress: "There have been abundance of people, in all ages of Christianity, who tried to make it something of the same kind; to convert us into a sort of Christian Mussulmans, with the Bible for a Koran, prohibiting all improvement." This needs to be set aside his comments, alas, on India.
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