On Presidents

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.--Federalist 70, Publius (Hamilton).

One of the amazing elements of Hamilton's argument in favor of a unitary and vigorous president is that he treats the "refuge in the absolute power of a single man" as a good feature. The Romans recognized that exceptional circumstances (primarily military emergencies) could require a mechanism that stood, in some sense, outside their ordinary form of government. Inspired by (recall) Livy's treatment of Cincinnatus and his admiration of decisive action by Johan de Witt, Hume, in turn, proposed to regularize the mechanism and internalize it in his constitution for an ideal government. If political life is one state of emergency after another, if indeed the "community" is routinely threatened by "foreign attacks" and there is a permanent danger of "seditions of whole classes of the community," then Hamilton's move is the logical culmination of constitutional improvement.

Of course, one may well wonder why someone as perceptive as Hamilton could argue for an elected dictator as a bulwark against "tyranny" and miss that such a dictator could also be an electoral route to tyranny. And, in fact, he is aware of the problem and raises it as follows:

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side.

So, rather than lodging power of the unitary executive in a single man (which it recognizes could lead to tyranny) the tradition of republican thought advises to lodge power in a number.  Hamilton's cost-benefit response is striking: he acknowledges the risk of tyranny, but thinks that risk is worth taking given the advantages that follow from a unitary executive with power lodged in a single person. (Here I ignore discussion of those benefits.) What is notable about Hamilton's response is that he is not tempted to argue naively that separation of powers or an electoral college are adequate safeguards against tyranny from a dictatorial executive. It evidently is not. Instead he offers an ingenious argument inspired by De Lolme (whose work I have not read yet):

But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious,'' that "the executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE''; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is not attainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number, were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

Before I get to the details of this argument, it is worth noting that Hamilton ignores the possibility of a unitary executive whose support is lodged in a majority of the "numerous legislature." He is not tempted by what we would call a parliamentarian system. My own view is that parliamentarian systems with proportional representation are a much more solid bulwark against tyranny than Hamilton's proposals. In such parliamentary systems coalition formation is a natural obstacle to the usurpation of power by any figure. In a Presidential systems the people explicitly vote for their (temporary) leader; the habit of thought and dispositions created by voting for a leader undermine the very ideal of republican (understood as non-domination) government.  

Be that as it may, the Hamiltonian argument is that in virtue of the fact that the executive is unified in one person, monitoring costs are reduced. The argument assumes that the people would not elect a tyrant willingly and are in a position to monitor.* In addition, it assumes that a president who develops tyrannical ambitions cannot sustain sufficient popular support and "unite a great a mass of influence" because he would be held responsible by the people. Hamilton's willingness to bet on such faith in the people is touching. What Hamilton misses is that an elected dictator without reverence for constitutional government can work to prevent the recurrence of free and fair election and  be admired for it by many of the people. 

I wish our Brazilian friends much wisdom, and luck.

 

 

 *The practice of Congressional oversight inspired by Madison's Federalist 51 suggests that the founders did not really trust the Hamiltonian argument to be presented in next paragraph.

Comments

[Renato Fonseca]

Thanks for the wishes, Eric. We Brazilians will need a lot of luck and wisdom next Sunday (the second round of the elections) and in the times to come (even if Bolsonaro loses, the prospects of our democracy are terrible).