Digressions&Impressions

Ibn Tufayl and the Three Kings

§3.  they say, that there lay, not far from this our Island, another Great Island very fertile and well peopled; which was then govern'd by a Prince of a Proud and Jealous Disposition: he had a Sister of exquisite Beauty, which he confin'd and restrain'd from Marriage, because he could not match her to one suitable to her quality. He had a near Relation whose Name was Yokdhân, that courted this Princess, and Married her privately, according to the Rites of Matrimony then in use among them; it was not long before she prov'd with Child, and was brought to Bed of a Son; and being afraid that it should be discovered, she took him in the Evening, and when she had Suckled him she put him into a little Ark which she closed up fast, and so Conveys him to the Sea shore, with some of her Servants and Friends as she could trust; and there with an Heart equally affected with Love and Fear, she takes her last leave of him...  

§98. They say that there was an Island not far from that where Hai Ebn Yokdhan was born (no matter according to which of those two different Accounts they give of his Birth) into which one of those good Sects, which had some one of the ancient Prophets (of pious Memory) for its Author, had retir'd. A Sect which us'd to discourse of all things in Nature, by way of Parable and Similitude, and by that means represent the Images of them to the Imagination, and fix the Impressions of them in Men's Minds, as is customary in such Discourses as are made to the Vulgar. This Sect so spread it self in this Island, and prevail'd and grew so eminent, that at last the King not only embrac'd it himself, but oblig'd his Subjects to do so too.'--Ibn Tufayl  The Improvement of HUMAN REASON, Exhibited in the LIFE of Hai Ebn Yokdhan [also known as Philosophus Autodidactus], translated by Simon Ockley (1708).

Regular readers know, I think of Ibn Tufayl's book as one of the great gems of the history of philosophy with great thought experiments, a beautiful account of humanity's place in the order of things, and a serious reflection on the tensions between a philosophical life and living in society. It's also a book that invites a lover of riddles to try to unravel the many little mysteries lodged in the book. (Ibn Tufayl  closes the book with a reminder that it contains "hidden Knowledge." §120) Today's post may be a garden path, and evidence for the kind of scholarly chase that Umberto Eco ridiculed so well in Foucault's Pendulum (and lovingly described in The Name of the Rose). But here goes; it presupposes, alas, some knowledge of the narrative. 

Ibn Tufayl's text mentions three kinds of kingship. I have quoted the pertinent passages of two of these in passing. The first kind of kingship is tyranny. The sister of this tyrant, Hayy's mom (in the version of his origins that emphasizes ordinary birth--in the other (recall) he is generated spontaneously), is not allowed to marry. The underlying politics are barely disguised: the tyrant wishes to use his sister for his dynastic ambitions. In addition we can infer that he clearly lacks off-spring, and so his sister's progeny are  a danger to his throne. I call him a tyrant because his court his characterized by fear. It is also characterized (and this is even more speculative) by political faction because Hayy's mom is said to have friends she can trust. (In the context of a tyranny the personal is, to adapt a famous slogan, political.)*

The second kind of kingship is mentioned very briefly, but it is, in the terms of Islamic political philosophy, a democratic king, that is, one whose rule is grounded in the opinion of the people. This king adapts to their changing views on religion, and once he is confident that the majority is one his side he is willing to use force to convert the rest of his population.

I am assuming that this democratic king is the same king under which Absâl and Salâman grow up together. (That's not entirely clear because it could also be a king who lived longer in the past; I think not because it is explicitly said that Absâl and Salâman meet with the religious sect, and the wording implies that they do so before it is state religion.) So, if this is correct, than prior to establishing a state religion, this king permitted religious diversity (and again, this fits with calling it a democracy--see Al-Farabi.) In addition, he allowed freedom of movement, in particular, the right to exit. That this is so is established by the fact that Absâl is allowed to leave the island undisturbed. That this is significant, is made clear by the fact that when Salaman becomes ruler, he thinks a right to withdrawal is explicitly un-lawful.** 

The third king is Salaman. He is explicitly one of the three characters we are instructed to focus on by the narrator/Ibn Tufayl in his introduction. The name is significant of cause because it echoes King Solomon, the Biblical king who is also venerated in Islam, (in New Atlantis, Bacon uses (recall) a similar device) and recalls a famous companion of Muhammad. We are not told how he gains power. We are given some information that he rules in his own image: he is disinterested in further religious innovation and he focuses on the literal meaning of Scriptures, showing a marked lack of intellectual curiosity. He himself follows the religious rites strictly (§99). He is outgoing, and sees society being in society as a means to (useful) self-disciplining (§100). He has a clear dislike of pluralism -- and this is the cause of his falling out with one-time friend, Absal-- and this makes him intolerant.++  

It's not entirely clear how to evaluate Salaman. From the perspective of political order, he is a very successful king: his subjects echo his attitudes and they are obedient. They reject abstract and mystical knowledge, sticking to material world and sensory evidence. This is not a society that will produce great innovations in knowledge and science. Moreover, his people are described as small-minded, committed to acquisitiveness and show little regard for the (possibility of) the afterlife (§115-116). These are observant, but not godly people, slaves to their appetites. 

I want to close with a reflection. The book naturally raises the question what role a (mystic) philosophy can have in society. Hayy's and Absal's return to exile is dramatic. In so doing the book also clearly demonstrates the political limits of theoretical knowledge absent understanding of political rhetoric and the ways one can rule through the effective use of symbols (Al-Farabi calls this 'religion'; see also here.) The means of the "true religion," which is the one that forces the conversion of the second king, succeed where Hayy's methods of preaching fail (see the quote from §98 above). The truth is not self-vindicating among those not made receptive toward it. 

But the question that Ibn Tufayl pursues is more subtle. In Deliverance from Error (a text mentioned by Ibn Tufayl at the start of his book), Al-Ghazali had grandly and self-confidently rejected a form of inherited religious, servile conformism un-grounded in inquiry. And after some time in self-imposed exile and contemplation of Sufi mysteries, he re-entered society in order to teach again (and call people to God's way). One way to understand Ibn Tufayl is to see in him the suggestion that religion is a tool for strict conformism, which generates political order and stability. If one values such stability, then, perhaps, the costs (no science, knowledge, etc.) may be a price worth paying. But, perhaps, the more remarkable observation lurking here -- and this is very much in the spirit of Al-Ghazali -- is that such conformist religious practice, focused on rule-following and obedience, is also fundamentally hollow when it is not a means toward further spiritual development and the only end it serves is political stability.

 

 

 

Ibn Rushd and Functional Explanation of Scriptures

Copulation ought not to be permitted them [the guardians] whenever they wish and with whomever they wish, since we wish that this activity be human among them and that their copulations not be of any chance character. The arrangement of their procreation will be the best possible with respect to their conditions of guardianship, but at fixed times an with determined individuals and characteristics. This is, as it were, common to the other conventions and Laws [Shari'a], though as it appears the adherents of the Laws differ from one another in the force of the statements. We ourselves will here briefly what Plato asserts about these things.---Ibn Rushd on Plato's Republic, the first treatise, 54.20-8, translated by Ralph Lerner.

At the start of the quoted passage, Ibn Rushd is referring to the breading program of the guardians of Socrates's Kallipolis (see Republic, 457-8). It is part of a larger passage, which is explicitly presented as a what "he said" (see 54.19).* But at the second to last sentence of the quoted passage he has slipped into his own voice, something he then calls attention to in the last sentence. The next paragraph then starts with a "we say,"and Ibn Rushd is officially speaking in his own voice. But what concerns me here is the second to last sentence {This is, as it were, common to the other conventions and Laws [Shari'a], though as it appears the adherents of the Laws differ from one another in the force of the statements.} This claim is not in the Republic, and it's Ibn Rushd's addition. 

But to see what's at stake we must first turn to the first sentences of Ibn Rushd's commentary on Plato's Republic; these tell us that Ibn Rushd's "epitome" only presents the scientific, that is, demonstrative elements of the Republic. (Ibn Rushd claims to have  removed the dialectical arguments.) To be clear, Ibn Rushd does not present a summary of the Republic, but rather only conveys the bits that can be taken to be true,+ and useful (because it is a practical science).  So, this is an epitome in both senses: it's the best parts of the Republic and a synopsis.

As an aside, the most immediately striking omissions are that Book I of the Republic is skipped almost entirely (because as he says at the of the  third and final treatise, "it is entirely dialectical arguments") and the contents of Book 10 are barely conveyed. In addition, the dialogical structure of the Republic is entirely effaced. Socrates himself is only mentioned once, en passant, to remind the reader that Socrates chose death when he could not serve the polity anymore.** Ibn Rushd mentions this to convey accurately one of Socrates's claims (that physicians should not cure those who can't contribute in their functional role to society anymore), but this detail is absent in the Republic.

Okay, let me return to the main point. Two key claims of Ibn Rushd's Decisive Treatise are (a) that the hidden meaning of allegorical interpretation of Scriptures should not be shared with the masses, and (b) that (recall) such hidden knowledge can only put in texts that are demonstrative treatises, but these may only circulate among the cognitive elite. As I noted, the reason for (a) is that Ibn Rushd thinks this is the cause of (religious and political) faction; the reason for (b) is that the demonstrative sciences are recondite, and so ordinarily of little interest to the masses. (One can imagine him thinking that a text about Plato would be of even less interest!) Of course, the commentary on the Republic, does not advertise itself as offering evidence of the hidden meaning of Scriptures as revealed by allegorical interpretation. And, now we can return to the point at hand.

In the passage, Ibn Rushd is claiming that Kallipolis is not the only political constitution in which constraints on copulation serve an eugenic or domestic/artificial selective purpose. He says that this is also the point of other polities, including Islamic Sharia. And, in fact, the Quran and the Haddith, regulate, for example, when sex is and is not allowed. De facto, Ibn Rushd is offering a functional explanation of the meaning behind some of Scriptural practices.++ Another function of Sharia is to point (or to use the language of the Decisive Treatise, indicate) to the significance of good governance and good counsel (48.17).

A very important instance of Ibn Rushd's engaging with a kind of functional interpretation of Scripture occurs just after he has explained why woman ought not just be, in principle, guardians (as they are in Kallipolis), but that there is empirical evidence that they can be quite capable warriors (praising the Berber, female warriors of the dessert). And just before he goes on to explain (recall) that the institutions of his own time have the effect of dumbing down women (and causing economic hardship), he briefly pauses to note that Sharia has a tendency to prevent women from being part of the clerisy. He explains this fact as a consequence of an empirical regularity in which -- presumably in the time of revelation -- there are fewer capable women. But as the next page makes clear this regularity is itself a consequence of badly designed institutions. So, here, Ibn Rushd comes extremely close to saying that Scriptures didn't know any better based on the empirical evidence available; and that [the author(s) of] Scripture lacked the demonstrative understanding to correct for this. So, this is a case in which the hidden functionality of Scriptures reveals a defective understanding of nature.***

 

Íbn Rushd and the Meaning of Scripture

[A] So we affirm definitely that whenever the conclusion of a demonstration is in conflict with the apparent meaning of Scripture, that apparent meaning admits of allegorical interpretation according to the rules for such interpretation in Arabic. [B] This proposition is questioned by no Muslim and doubted by no believer. But (a) its certainty is immensely increased for those who have had close dealings with this idea and put it to the test, and (b) made it their aim to reconcile the assertions of intellect and tradition. [C] Indeed we may say that whenever a statement in Scripture conflicts in its apparent meaning with a conclusion of demonstration, [C*] if Scripture is considered carefully, and the rest of its contents searched page by page, there will invariably be found among the expressions of Scripture something which in its apparent meaning bears witness to that allegorical interpretation or comes close to bearing witness.--Ibn Rushd, Decisive Treatise, Chapter 2, Translated by George Hourani. [Letters added--ES]

Earlier in the Decisive Treatise, Ibn Rushd had established that Scripture cannot conflict with demonstrative knowledge/science. The first sentence of the quoted passage [A] is an implication of Ibn Rushd's tendency to rationalize scripture. So, that allegorical interpretations of Scripture are invited whenever these are required to have Scripture come out true by the lights of demonstration/reason and when the apparent meaning of the text would seem to violate it. (Spinoza scholars are familiar with this position because it is the one Spinoza attributes to Maimonides and criticizes; I ignore here the tricky question to what degree, if any, Ibn Rush influenced Maimonides or the other way around.)

As an aside, it is notable that [A] is explicitly treated by Ibn Rushd as a kind of political axiom, and so perhaps constitutive, of the Muslim community: [B] "This proposition is questioned by no Muslim and doubted by no believer." And he goes on to point out that while the axiom [B] is accepted unquestionably, those few, the cognitive elite,+ that put it to work (a) both come to hold it more firmly [suggesting that unquestioned acceptance is perhaps more fragile than it seems] and (b) end up being committed to a reconciliation project between science and revelation/traditional religion. the ways in which inherited religion and reason can be reconciled. (What the exact relationship between (a) and (b) is, is left unclear--perhaps the Arabic makes clear if this conceptual, logical, or contingent.)

This reconciliation project by the cognitive elite presupposes that Scripture is (and this anticipates Spinoza) primarily aimed at the masses who require opinions to be "guided." That is, Scripture is fundamentally a work of social, ethical, and political significance. (In the first sentence of this paragraph, I say 'primarily' because Ibn Rushd also claims that the apparent tension between reason and Scripture are deliberately there "in order to draw the attention of those who are well grounded in science to the interpretation which reconciles them,"--that is to say, Ibn Rushd claims that Scripture has an esoteric message for those that can understand.) The reconciliation project is explicitly not in the service of public Enlightenment because Ibn Rushd argues later in the Decisive Treatise that (recall) allegorical interpretations by the cognitive  elite should not be shared with ordinary folk. This may entail that the reconciliation project is merely for private edification of the cognitive elite.* 

The final sentence [C] is extraordinary. And it can be taken in (at least) two ways: first, the pious way affirms the miracle of Scripture, which is a holistic work in which any passage can, when taken literally be used,to illuminate some  obscure or evidently false passages, which require allegorical interpretation by the cognitive elite. Second, the scandalous way, which suggests that Scripture can be made to say literally just about anything that, in the hands of the skilled cognitive elite, can support the truths they already know!** 

 

On Public Philosophy and Transgender Rights Campaign

During the past year professional philosophers have struggled with controversies pertaining to transgender issues (recall the Tuvel/Hypatia affaire here and here; and again involving language in journal articles [recall my piece on the open letter to the editors of PPR at Dailynous here;] the debate between Talia Mae Bettcher and Kathleen Stock;[1] the language of the APA philosophy blog [see Leiterreports]), etc. These debates have intersected with wider society and have even led to campaigns to to have faculty removed from their positions in the UK. While I am no friend of calls for civility in debate (recall this post among many), the way this debate is conducted is unedifying and I have already expressed despair that even the philosophers party to the debate seem to be unable to recognize explicitly each other's vulnerabilities. 

I start this post with two preliminary comments. First, as regular readers know, I support so-called public philosophy (recall; which comes in many varieties [see here]) and philosophical activism (which comes in many flavors and in support of many different kinds of causes) of society and the profession. I have long admired the service philosophy of Kristie Dotson (recall), Hugo Bedau's activism against the death penalty, and John Corvino's work on same-sex marriage. (I am sure readers can add to this list their own favorites.)* Such cause/ideal-promoting political activism is both self-justifying and a useful means of discovery of truth. While philosophy can benefit from a measure of distance, cool reflection, and impartiality, it's also the case that engagement with the messy details of lived experience and the arguments generated by political conflict can also be a useful constraint on and source of creativity for philosophical discovery of the nature and properties of an ideal. 

However, I have  long thought that it seems unwise, or at least imprudent, when philosophers qua being philosophers support active politicians and political parties. (That's compatible with doing so qua being citizens of a particular polity). It seems best if one's pursuit of truth and the good is not sullied by and subject to the many tactical compromises and fatal injustices that accompany political life pursued by imperfect beings like us. I rarely see philosophical excellence in support of a politician or party,+ and much that I find cringe-worthy.

Second, transgender people are subject to bigotry, discrimination, harassment, and violence. This is well documented in the UK and US. The evidence also suggests that many transgender victims are also (intersectionally) members of other historically discriminated minority groups, I assume here that the violence occurs in virtue of their being transgender, and that belonging to it means one belongs to (all other things being equal) a vulnerable category of people. So,

• I wholeheartedly support the campaign for transgender rights and protection under the law.***

Regular readers know (recall this post on MLK Jr.) that I also think that human imperfection, self-interest, and bigotry often undermine enforcement of the law and can even make the most beautifully written laws a tool of oppression. What's needed is, thus, also sufficient popular support or opinion and the right dispositions in favor of such rights. Political campaigns are, therefore, crucial to generate such support.** Of course, there is something of a paradox lurking here, because where such support exists the right would not be necessary.

One important feature of new rights is that the costs and (new) down-side risks of these need not be distributed evenly on the population. That's of special concern if these fall on other vulnerable groups. I understand the present campaign against trans rights, which includes some high profile self-described feminist philosophers -- where not informed by or leaning on bigotry -- as aiming to articulate some such risks to vulnerable women, especially those in prisons and among the homeless. I think such concerns eminently reasonable, but that's because there is a reasonable fear of violence and degradation within prisons and fear of violence against the homeless (see here). But rather than fighting transgender rights, the proper response to such concerns for the very vulnerable is, I would think, to join the coalition for thoroughgoing prison reform and better/more resources and conditions for the homeless.++ 

So my preliminaries have turned into a blog post, which was prompted by my momentary reconsideration of my stance on public philosophy.+++ It's true that there is no reason to believe that philosophical activism will always be beneficial. And I am reminded of the fact that even in the pre-internet age (which, let's stipulate, can make any bad thing worse), there was and never is a golden age of civility (as those of us old enough to recall philosophical debates over abortion, LGBTQ rights, or if one pays attention to debates over Zionism/BDS, etc.)---I have often remarked upon the fact that as a discipline we have an all-too-human fondness for philosophical debates as blood-sports and the delicious take-down.

It's a familiar fact that the pursuit of a worthy cause can turn into fanaticism and unpleasant and vindictive (moral) righteousness. And it is known that friends of worthy causes will find it difficult to condemn the excesses because they do not wish to be seen as undermining the worthy cause. For, it's also all-too-common that critics of the worthy cause will use such excesses as a tactic to undermine a cause, and shift debate away from consideration of the underlying evils. Savvy intellectuals recognize the temptation they may benefit from escalation and from hyping an otherwise unworthy critic, inviting abuse from their anonymous followers, with the cycle being renewed etc. And so it can often happen that wisdom is pushed aside or found crouching unnoticed in the margins of the arresting debates. 

In light of such facts people of good will may prefer to retreat to the ivory tower, and pursue their worthy work in undisturbed quiet. Others will note that these facts are part of the eternal return of life's carnival, and will will them...one tweet at a time eternally.  

 

 

Sleepwalking into disaster

Theresa May has been left fighting to defend her Chequers plan and her authority as PM after EU leaders bluntly declared her proposals would not work. Emmanuel Macron poured fuel on the fire, calling Brexiters “liars” for telling the public Britain could easily leave the EU and save money. The French president had also reportedly urged other European leaders to take an uncompromising stance with May.--Friday, September 21, 2018.

Intra-EU political crises have a predictable pattern: decisions are postponed until the problem goes away (at least from the headlines/news-cycle) or bureaucrats prepare a compromise where issues and topics are bundled and un-bundled behind the scenes which gets bargained out in infamous all night sessions among political leaders of the member-states. What makes this patterns possible is the institutional fact that all the parties know there are simultaneous bargaining processes under way on other topics and there will be repeated bargaining rounds into an open-ended future. Even when there is quite a bit of personal dislike and ideological rivalry, there is a well-grounded trust that within this system one's interests can be promoted. This also involves a co-optation into permanent pacification of political conflict and turning these into non-zero-sum outcomes. (One way to understand the rise of populism is a rejection of such pacification and the embrace of permanent agonism.) 

The complacency surrounding Brexit negotiations involves a strange faith that it will conform to such previous patterns. In one way this makes sense because in virtue of facts of geography and path-dependency due to the UK's decades' long EU member as well as ongoing other forms of cooperation (including in military) there will new rounds of bargaining between the EU and the UK in the future. There are shared permanent interests among the EU and the UK and there are also shared values. 

But in other sense this makes no sense at all. Brexit is a zero-sum situation where a lot of decisions will have to be front-loaded. And those decisions will structure a future relationship. In fact, the inability to agree on those issues (the Irish border, rights of UK citizens within the EU and the other way around, etc.) also risk souring the relationship for a very long time. So, even under best circumstances this would be a difficult negotiation. (For a good technical analysis, see this piece.)

But these are not the best circumstances because the British political class seems to have imploded and it is so divided that at this moment there is no reason to believe the UK government can agree to any deal and then, in turn, expect it to be accepted in parliament. There is then a further question if such a decision will then gain wide acceptance by the British public or a future government. The Tories are hopelessly divided, while Labour is cynically (and perhaps rationally) gaining tactical advantage throughout, because its current leadership seems to think that inheriting post-Brexit UK is worth the price of even a badly bungled Brexit.+ 

The problem is that the state of the British political class means that the political leaders of the EU have no short-term incentive to negotiate in good faith and make the tough decisions necessary to reach a compromise worth having for both sides. Instead they are focused on maintaining unity, trying to make leaving the EU costly [which is the way in which the EU makes Brexit zero-sum), trying to gain tactical advantage of UK weakness, and playing to home audiences (they are politicians after all). In addition, with the demise of colonial rule and being  a de facto protectorate of the US, most EU countries lack a culture of serious reflection on foreign affairs--those have been delegated to the EU. That the Europeans are close to giving up altogether is visible in the remarks and stance attributed to President Macron above; these are more about intra-EU and intra-French signaling than keeping open the possibility of a negotiated Brexit. (And, in fact, these reveal that even the French President is willing to do things that, if they become a pattern, will harm future relations with the UK.) Ordinarily, Germany would take the lead here, but (sometimes there is bad luck) it's widely understood we're in the twilight of Angela Merkel's rule--and the German political scene is in so much flux that little leadership can be expected.

Even if there were secret negotiations that have prepared a compromise, it seems that final Brexit negotiations will be decided under conditions in which neither the political classes nor the public(s) have been prepared for the contents of a negotiated outcome. This means that there will be a period of political instability and revisionism. Of course, that may be preferable to a no-deal Brexit, which will be incredibly disruptive economically -- for the UK and its major trading partners I expect it to be worse than the six month period when financial markets froze in 2008/9 --, and will generate enormous immediate human costs, including fear of deportation, loss of economic self-sufficiency, family break-ups, etc. 

I hope I am wrong, but after closing a half a decade commemorating the war that caused the collapse of European civilization (so much worse for that the colonial subjects rightly said), European polities are sleepwalking into a new disaster they are unwilling to contemplate.*

On Socrates's ethno-nationalist political theology

Yesterday, I noted that according to Socrates the Kallipolis has permanent natural would-be-friends and permanent, natural would-be-enemies (see also the long quote from the Republic). Inserted in this analysis is his a call for the natural would-be-friends to treat each other with (what we might call) humanity in war and to promote fraternity among them (presumably also outside war). In fact, in its dealings with its natural would be friends, the Kallipolis is supposed to "correct them, then, for their own good, not chastising them with a view to their enslavement or their destruction, but acting as correctors, not as enemies.”  (Republic 471a) So, among the natural, permanent friends, the Kallipolis should act a kind of moral beacon or political exemplar that can guide political reform. 

One might wonder (i) who the natural allies of the Kallipolis are, and (ii) what makes a natural friend and natural enemy, and (iii) why Socrates rejects the possibility of fluid political alliances in foreign affairs. Now, on (i) Socrates is explicit: the permanent natural allies of the Kallipolis are the  fellow Greeks (470c). Anticipating Machiavelli (in the closing page of The Prince), Plato inscribes in his text a call for a form of political unity that transcends both the best realizable polity itself and then present political realities (which is one of political war among the Greeks). And this political unity is characterized (as I noted in the previous paragraph) by a kind of spiritual hierarchy in which the Kallipos is first among equals. Socrates gives an instrumental reason for such permanent unity, namely, to prevent being being enslaved by barbarians (469c; in this instance the Persians).

Now, as Socrates makes explicit (i) presupposes that the inhabitants of Kallipolis are going to be Greek (470e). So, this is a clear rejection of what we could multi-nationalism/culturalism (of the sort that Plato's Laws does explore). The reader of the Republic has to confront here the question whether Socrates's position is chauvinist: that other national/ethnic/linguistic (etc.--I return to below) cultures cannot have their own Kallipolis. Because of the use of 'barbarian,' my students assumed that Socrates is such a chauvinist that only one kind of people are culturally or ethnically capable of philosophical polity. (I have a tendency to interpret Aristotle as a cultural/national chauvinist.) My own reading of Socrates is (recall this post on 592) that his position, while perhaps rhetorically drawing on shared sense of cultural superiority, does not require such national/cultural superiority, and that a non-Greek Kallipolis elsewhere is, in principle, possible.* As it happens, I think Locke's views on toleration are structurally similar; we tolerate in virtue of our shared protestant theism; others (born say in Istanbul) may tolerate in virtue of their shared theism, etc.

Socrates does not really explain what makes a natural friend. But he does provide sufficient hints to offer an account for (ii). In addition to shared language, and, perhaps, sense of people-hood, a key binding factor is what we would call religion or religious practices. This is signaled by Socrates, when he asserts that how to treat fallen Greek soldiers (temporary enemies), is not up to philosophy, but rather should be inquired from “Apollo then, how and with what distinction we are to bury men of more than human, of divine, qualities, and deal with them according to his response." (469a) I am not suggesting religion is the only consideration at play: Socrates is keenly aware that ordinarily soldiering is done, in part, for profit (because the fallen enemies are a source of material goods). But Socrates emphasizes that what the Greeks have in common is something religious.+  

And, in fact, Socrates had explicitly noted that the founding of Kallipos would have to defer to the instructions of Appolo:

“For us nothing, but for the Apollo of Delphi, the chief, the fairest and the first of enactments.” “What are they?” he said. “The founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond to keep them gracious. For of such matters  we neither know anything nor in the founding of our city if we are wise shall we entrust them to any other or make use of any other interpreter than the God of our fathers. For this God surely is in such matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of their fathers who from his seat in the middle and at the very navel of the earth delivers his interpretation.”  [427bc]

Kallipolis is explicitly part of a political-theology in which deference is shown to the pre-existing religion. This is especially so in matters of rites and worship. Of course, this religion is cleansed from immorality and internal contradiction by the censorship laws of Kallipolis. So, one sense in which Kallipolis is a beacon to other Greek cities, is in having an improved version of the stories and symbols associated with the pre-existing religion. And the Greek natural friendship is constituted by this shared theological horizon.** 

I suspect that absent true religious innovation, the boundaries of religious communities explain for Socrates why (iii) there are social groupings that are natural friends/enemies. Religion and political groupings are on this account mutually supportive in creating coherent enduring political bonds of friendship, and enduring possible enmity. Even those of us that do not accept clash of religious ethno-national civilizations have to take Socrates's position seriously.

 

On Plato and Kant and War-Conduct

[I]f we are at all concerned to preserve friendly relations with the other Greeks. Rather we shall fear that there is pollution in bringing such offerings to the temples from our kind unless in a case where the god bids otherwise...And in the matter of devastating the land of Greeks and burning their houses, how will your soldiers deal with their enemies...In my view,...they ought to do neither, but confine themselves to taking away the annual harvest...In my opinion, just as we have the two terms, war and faction, so there are also two things, distinguished by two differentiae. The two things I mean are the friendly and kindred on the one hand and the alien and foreign on the other. Now the term employed for the hostility of the friendly is faction, and for that of the alien is war...Consider, then, if this goes to the mark. I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian...We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature, and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred. Greeks, however, we shall say, are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction, and faction is the name we must give to that enmity...Then observe,” said I, “that when anything of this sort occurs in faction, as the word is now used, and a state is divided against itself, if either party devastates the land and burns the houses of the other such factional strife is thought to be an accursed thing and neither party to be true patriots. Otherwise, they would never have endured thus to outrage their nurse and mother. But the moderate and reasonable thing is thought to be that the victors shall take away the crops of the vanquished, but that their temper shall be that of men who expect to be reconciled and not always to wage war.” “That way of feeling,” he said, “is far less savage than the other.” “Well, then,” said I, “is not the city that you are founding to be a Greek city?” “It must be,” he said. “Will they then not be good and gentle?” “Indeed they will.” “And won't they be philhellenes, lovers of Greeks, and will they not regard all Greece as their own and not renounce their part in the holy places common to all Greeks ?” “Most certainly.” “Will they not then regard any difference with Greeks who are their own people as a form of faction and refuse even to speak of it as war?” “Most certainly.” “And they will conduct their quarrels always looking forward to a reconciliation?” “By all means.” “They will correct them, then, for their own good, not chastising them with a view to their enslavement or their destruction, but acting as correctors, not as enemies....They will not, being Greeks, ravage Greek territory nor burn habitations, and they will not admit that in any city all the population are their enemies, men, women and children, but will say that only a few at any time are their foes, those, namely, who are to blame for the quarrel. And on all these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste the soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the suffering of the innocent.” “I,” he said, “agree that our citizens ought to deal with their Greek opponents on this wise, while treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks.” “Shall we lay down this law also, then, for our guardians that they are not to lay waste the land or burn the houses?” Plato, Republic, Book 5 470-1, Translated by Paul Shorey.

In Context Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the Guardians's behavior toward foreign enemies. Socrates anticipates here an argument that I think of the less dominant strain in Kant's Toward Perpetual Peace: (recall) a kind of argument from enlightened self-interest to the conclusion that one must be willing to restrict voluntarily one's conduct in war. The enlightened self-interest of restraint in war, makes possible decent relations after war. And, in fact, Socrates anticipates a key point of Kant's that the way one conducts oneself in way is a means toward looking forward to a reconciliation. For, conduct in war is a signal toward the kind of outcome one (is willing to) foresee(s).

Now, in my piece on Kant's Toward Perpetual Peace, I noted that there is a more dominant strain of argument (clearly indebted to Hobbes) in Kant's work: to take Hobbes's idea that the very point of a state is to escape from the state of nature seriously and to adhere to that even in the conduct of war (and so to prepare a durable escape from the state of nature). That conduct in war (say of the stronger party), can become self-undermining because it facilitates an outcome which is a permanent state of nature. 

Socrates also anticipates the spirit of this second Hobbesian argument. (I say 'spirit' because in context he is not connecting the argument to a social contract.) But he does so in terms of a principled distinction between self and other, or a version of would-be-friends and would-be-permanent-enemies (along what we would call civilizational, ethnic, religious, or even nationalist lines). And hostilities among one's own are for Socrates really a form of civil war, which undermines the whole point of having a state. That is, Socrates comes extremely close to treating intra-Greek war as undermining the very rationale of the polity.

The last sentence of the last paragraph is probably too speculative for most. But notice that Socrates quietly inserts a useful myth (one that anticipates a Kantian position), which Plato's readers know can barely sustain scrutiny even if it appeals to a self-conception that one may wish to have about one's fellow citizens: that the wars among the Greeks are always and everywhere caused by minority factions (who have a self-interest in war) and that the majority of each polity wishes to have friendly relations with others.* The last comment by Glaucon quoted above suggests that in reality Greeks are savage with each other. And in Book VI, when discussing the greatest corruption of would be philosophers in a democracy at say 494ff, Socrates makes clear that moderation is incompatible with nearly all political life. So, what I am calling Socrates' myth is a normative idea (would the world be like that the majority of wars are caused by minority factions.)

I have mentioned Hobbes and Kant a few times already, because Socrates assumes that relations between Greeks and non-Greeks is one of permanent would be enmity (the Hobbesian state of nature). And while I am not claiming that Socrates anticipates Machiavelli's dream of national (Italian) unification (recall), it is notable for Socrates the relationships among Greeks should be governed by an ideal of fraternity (470A).+

Socrates and Plato are often treated as idealist who demand a reform of human nature and peddle unattainable ideals (and (recall) one sees comments to this effect in, say, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Hume, and Kant--sometimes More's Utopia is the target sometimes Plato). One can understand the charge when one focuses on the internal order of Kallipolis. (The previous sentence leaves open that the charge is mistaken.) But once international relations are brought into the picture a more distressing (or realist) feature of Socrates's analysis emerges: if there are would-be-permanent enemies, this entails that (preparation for) strife is permanent.

On Inductive Risk and Moral Luck (in Plato)

The fear is not of being laughed at, for that is childish, but, lest, missing the truth, I fall down and drag my friends with me in matters where it most imports not to stumble....For, indeed, I believe that involuntary homicide is a lesser fault than to mislead opinion about the honorable, the good, and the just. This is a risk that it is better to run with enemies than with friends, so that your encouragement is none.” And Glaucon, with a laugh, said, “Nay, Socrates, if any false note in the argument does us any harm, we release you as in a homicide case, and warrant you pure of hand and no deceiver of us. So speak on with confidence. “Well,” said I, “he who is released in that case is counted pure as the law bids, and, presumably, if there, here too.” ”---Plato Republic (book 5), 451a-b, translated by Paul Shorey.

In context, Socrates is about to explain his proposals for the co-ed education, rule, and military life of the guardians and his eugenic breeding program of them (etc.). But before he does so he raises the question of inductive risk, which, according to Hempel, is the chance that one will be wrong in accepting (or rejecting) a theory (quoting Douglas 2000: 561).* What's interesting about Socrates's remark is not that he realizes he may be wrong about the view he is about the propose, but that in virtue of being wrong he will harm others. When I use 'inductive risk,' I tend to be focused on such risk of harming others or oneself.

In fact, Socrates ranks this risk in light of the importance of the subject matter: the honorable, the good, and the just are the most important subjects. That they are the most important subjects to get right is not defended in context (although one can read the whole Republic as offering that defense).  But it is a natural enough thought because getting these wrong in theory, and then acting on false theory, affects everybody (given that we're all part of a-would-be-society which is regulated by such institutions).**

Of course, this is not the only possible harm way consequent of inductive risk. And, in fact, Socrates also explicitly notes that if he gets things wrong his friends, in particular, are harmed, too. Now it's not entirely clear who here he means by 'friends' his direct companions/interlocutors/students or philosophers more broadly. If the former, he is worried about misleading those that look up to him as a kind of magisterial authority (despite his general concern to avoid the role as magisters). If the latter he is worried about reputational risk to his intellectual faction (in the contest with the sophists). In the quote, it is clear that Glaucon understands Socrates as saying that Socrates is worried about harming him (and his fellows).

The two options are not as disconnected as it may seem: Athens's charge against Socrates was (inter alia) that he corrupted his students. This is no surprise given that (if we ignore the special case of Alcibiades) some of his prominent students were among the thirty tyrants and many of the proposals of the Republic are often taken to be more Sparta friendly than Athens friendly. Even so, the Republic subtly reminds its audience that not all of Socrates's students betrayed democracy: one of the interlocutors, Polemarchus, was put to death by the thirty tyrants. Teaching one's students badly may harm them and consequently the polity.

Above, I noted that Socrates takes the harms consequent inductive risk very seriously. He does so explicitly by treating such harms as worse than accidentally killing somebody. That to be the victim of such bad moral luck is worse than to be mislead about a philosophical argument may seem perverse (especially from the vantage point of the victim). But it makes sense if we think of the philosophical argument as not being a mere game, but being about institutional design that people are expected to live by/under. A bad design can lead to civil war, which is certainly the worst outcome, or widespread suffering. (Of course, to help Socrates's case, I am ignoring here cases of bad institutional design of which the outcome is not so dramatic.)   

Before I close with  a reflection on Socrates's treatment on moral luck, I want to stress how very notable it is that here Socrates and Glaucon perform an ideal of responsible speech: those affected by the potential harms of inquiry have a say in whether such research should proceed. Glaucon is here a kind of representative of all those affected -- and one may well wonder on what authority he can speak on their behalf, and whether he takes his own words seriously enough  -- and his approval is required before the theoretical exploration can continue. 

That Glaucon is a kind of representative is the implied by the analogy of (involuntary) killing case. It's not the deceased themselves who can let the (accidental) killer off the hook. It's those that can speak on his/her behalf and that themselves have suffered loss (their friend/family member is dead).  The latter is, in fact, (recall) how Adam Smith treats what he calls the piacular, which requires some kind of compensation to the victims and their kin, who thereby help purify the stain (for my version of the details, see here or my book). 

My previous paragraph may be misleading if is taken as a description of what Socrates/Glaucon think of how to response to bad moral luck of accidental killing. For that is unclear here. The reason for this is because Glaucon had muddied the situation by tacitly switching from Socrates's example of bad moral luck (involuntary homicide) to a case of actual killing.+ In those cases the purification by the victims's is a means of retrospectively switching the interpretation of the act itself: (quoting from Plato's Laws) "in the case of the murder of a father shall hold equally good in all such cases—if any man voluntarily acquit any culprit of this charge, the purifications for the culprit shall be made as though the murder were involuntary, and one year of exile shall be imposed by law," [869DE; emphasis added]. That Glaucon was confused about the nature of the case, does not change the fact that Glaucon is treated as a kind of representative of those that would be harmed by the inquiry, because Socrates goes on to do so.++

 

On Teaching How to Ask Philosophical Questions (of Complicated Texts)

While complaining about Socrates, Thrasymachus claims that "it's easier to ask questions than to answer them." (Republic 336b) The claim seems self-evident because answers seem to be preceded by questions and we are all familiar with questions that have not been answered. In addition, it can huge take huge amount of resources to answer what appear to be straightforward questions. 

Even so, one reason why I have always been impressed by Newton's contributions is that his theory is full of answers to questions previously un-thought of. (For example, how do Saturn and Jupiter influence each other's orbits?) This suggests -- as a certain kind of Kantian might insist -- that some questions are only made possible by having the right cognitive structures (including the answers) in place.

Be that as it may, experienced instructors of philosophy are all familiar with the experience that some students ask interesting questions of the material we teach and other students, equally hardworking, ask questions that do not generate interesting discussion. Now, sometimes this can be explained in virtue of the  fact that some students have taken philosophy courses before and, through osmotic imitation and example, have acquired a style and genre of question-asking. But that pushes merely the issue back a layer.  I have a strong aversion to the idea that there is innate philosophical genius, so I prefer thinking that one might teach asking questions as a skill. In what follows I explain how I teach that.*

Below is an exercise I have used for more than a decade and a half in teaching. As I have  noted before I don't think of myself as a very gifted teacher, and I am not one of the folk that wins prizes for teaching. I do consistently get high marks for feedback, and that's partly due to what I am about to share.

I am pretty sure the exercise originated in frustration over students not doing the assigned readings. And I strongly suspect I was introduced to a version of it at Wesleyan (a place where teaching is taken very seriously) by a senior colleague (mea culpa for forgetting). But the assignment has evolved, and with learning software it has become more functional. Here's the exercise that I use in all my courses.

This assignment requires about 150 words (per assignment). The question should be submitted ahead of each seminar meeting on Canvas by 10am the morning of the class-meeting. It has two parts. 1. In the first line, formulate a focused question about the assigned text (and which we will discuss in class). It should consist of one question only. 2. Motivate this question on the basis of an analysis of the text, and provide proper references, quotes, and citations each time.

You need to go beyond the occasion of your question, that is, what prompts it, and explain the source or the reason behind the (conceptual/empirical) puzzle or the textual problem motivating your question. Do not answer your own question. Do not reason by way of further questions. Do not ask rhetorical questions. Try to avoid turning your question into a (thinly) disguised objection. Try not asking the same question as one previously posted.

The assignment has three main purposes: (i) to make sure everybody does the reading and is prepared to discuss it in class; (ii) to teach you the art of close reading; (iii) to teach you how to ask research questions.--Handout by Eric Schliesser

The students can read each other's questions. I always (try) to read them ahead of class (it helps me see what students  found problematic), and I use them in leading discussion. This adds to my prep time, but I find it very useful to have some insight into what my students are thinking ahead of class. Sometimes I let one of the students lead of discussion with their own question.  

In some courses, I require students to answer at least one of each other's questions after the class meeting (and ahead of the next one). This is especially useful if the course only meets once a week. I have had courses where this generated permanent online discussion by students about the course material. (In most courses, it's clearly just treated as a requirement.) This requirement requires additional instruction on the hand-out (they must cite their sources, make their evidence explicit, etc.); in particular, norms of politeness. I always monitor the discussion, but tend not to comment on it. (I do not correct mistakes, unless these interfere with my learning goals of a course.)

During the first weeks of a course, I provide detailed feedback on my students' questions without answering them. The majority of my feedback has a kind of formal character, e.g., 'you must include a bibliography;' 'remember, you can only ask one question;''notice that your question really involves three distinct issues;' 'you have given the occasion of your question, but you have  not explained it yet;' 'notice how the last three sentences of your explanation are not grounded in the text;' 'the way you have  phrased this question exhibits vagueness/or lacks focus,' etc. Sometimes I spend time on exhibiting the implied logical complexity of a question.

I never use my feedback to answer these assignments. But sometimes I make explicit a conceptual or textual confusion the student exhibits.  After a few weeks, most students get the assignment, and I reduce the feedback I provide. (Sometimes, in the second half of a course, I need to do a refresher week of feedback.)

In the past, my feedback to the students' assignments was always private. But  this year I am experimenting on sharing most of my feedback on canvas (it's like blackboard) so they can all learn from these.  (I do have option to send a private message in case i have a concern about the student's prep/participation, etc.)

In the past I did not grade the assignments individually, but used them to help shape (upward) my class participation grade. Because I now work in a more legalistic environment, which demands fuller transparency of grading, I now do give them a (rough) grade. (That is private!)

I don't claim all students  benefit from this assignment. But I believe it makes class discussion better than it would be. Students learn some writing skills: it teaches them to focus, to be explicit about the steps in their train of thought, and to learn to discover what the nub of the matter is. I also would argue that they learn to become better at helping themselves understand texts. 

In addition, I would argue the assignment teaches them how to read: by explaining their confusion(s) in this way, they discover their own hidden presuppositions that they (we all!) tend to project on the text; they learn to pay attention to dissonances and steps in an author's argument.

It's possible that this assignment works best with the kind of material I routinely teach: culturally and historically distant and rhetorically and conceptually complex texts about subjects my students may not encounter daily. But I have also used the technique in courses that were focused on arguments on fairly standard topics, and found it just as useful in that environment.

The downside (for some) is that this is a time-consuming way to teach. It also is rather demanding on the students -- many of which have, of course, very busy lives. But because the course is already rather writing intensive, I tend to require very short papers in order to establish the final grade.

One important effect of the assignment is that I can avoid having students trying to game me. (We all know instructors whose students basically echo what they say [including on exams].) The assignments are focused on the course material.

Does it teach students how to ask questions? I can't say for sure, given the confirmation bias I have. It obviously detracts from the possibility of doing different things with my students--the opportunity costs are not negligible. But when the assignment works well, the student has asked an interesting question, which is both well motivated by and grounded in the text and one that is not answered by the explanation of it as well as generates (in principle) fruitful class discussion about it. Is that sufficient evidence that it's interesting? I can't say for sure, but the assignment keeps me highly motivated to explore the course material jointly with my students.

Do you have ways or techniques to teach your students to ask interesting questions?

 

Ón the Passions Being Slaves of Practical Reason; On Teaching for High Stakes

1. You have promised to be a good man; you have enlisted under oath; that is the strongest chain which will hold you to a sound understanding. Any man will be but mocking you, if he declares that this is an effeminate and easy kind of soldiering. I will not have you deceived. The word of this most honourable compact are the same as the words of that most disgraceful one, to wit: "Through burning, imprisonment, or death by the sword." 2. From the men who hire out their strength for the arena, who eat and drink what they must pay for with their blood, security is taken that they will endure such trials even though they be unwilling; from you, that you will endure them willingly and with alacrity. The gladiator may lower his weapon and test the pity of the people; but you will neither lower your weapon nor beg for life. You must die erect and unyielding. Moreover, what profit is it to gain a few days or a few years? There is no discharge for us from the moment we are born.

3. "Then how can I [obtain] myself [Quomodo ergo' inquis 'me expediam]?" you ask. You cannot escape necessities, but you can overcome them

By force a way is made.

And this way will be afforded you by philosophy. Betake yourself therefore to philosophy if you would be safe, untroubled, happy, in fine, if you wish to be, – and that is most important, – free. There is no other way to attain this end. 4. Folly is low, abject, mean, slavish, and exposed to many of the cruellest passions. These passions, which are heavy taskmasters, sometimes ruling by turns, and sometimes together, can be banished from you by wisdom, which is the only real freedom. There is but one path leading thither, and it is a straight path; you will not go astray. Proceed with steady step, and if you would have all things under your control, put yourself under the control of reason; if reason becomes your ruler, you will become ruler over many. You will learn from her what you should undertake, and how it should be done; you will not blunder into things. 5. You can show me no man who knows how he began to crave that which he craves. He has not been led to that pass by forethought; he has been driven to it by impulse. Fortune attacks us as often as we attack Fortune. It is disgraceful, instead of proceeding ahead, to be carried along, and then suddenly, amid the whirlpool of events, to ask in a dazed way: "How did I get into this condition?" Farewell--Seneca, Letter 37 (quoted in full), translated by Richard Mott Gummere (with one correction).

According to Seneca wisdom (sapientia) is effective because through reason , an active principle or power, it is capable of ruling (or banishing [dimittit]) the passions. That reason is an active power was famously denied by David Hume (Treatise, 3.1.1.7), who claimed that reason is and should be an instrumental tool, a slave, of the passions (Treatise 2.3.3.4). Famously, Adam Smith responded to Hume by insisting that reason could be an active power (as I document in my book). Of course, the situation is not simple because what 'reason' means may differ among the authors.

But what may escape notice if we focus on these familiar matters is the claim that wisdom is the only (authentic) freedom (sapientia, quae sola libertas est). I add 'authentic' because it is quite clear that for Seneca other things are more usually called 'freedom.' At first sight he seems to anticipate here the view we often find among rationalist-friendly early moderns (certainly in Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz) who claim that acting from reason is freedom (recall this post). And I would not be surprised if Seneca and (Plato-influenced) Stoicism is the source of some such position. 

But Seneca's position is not really in the first instance about action.+ In context, Sapientia can be a disposition or an embodied state of affairs that is the consequence or destination of following philosophy's path. And it's that (disposition/embodied state) that is constitutive of freedom. For in that state one has gained oneself because inauthentic desires are purged. Of course, we moderns wouldn't find it authentic at all because for Seneca to be in the state of wisdom, to be free is to lack individuality and personality.  Of course, attaining such freedom is manifested in our comportment (lack of fear, lack of cravings) and some of our steadfast actions, so I do not wish to deny it is irrelevant to agency.

This notion of freedom is not altogether uncommon. We do sometime say about some people that they are free souls, by which we do mean that they seem un-peturbed by our ordinary petty concerns (for money, fame, etc.) and anxieties and in virtue of that are capable of meaningful choices. In my view that is, in fact, at the root of Smith's conception of liberty, which, I argued, presupposes a kind of self-ownership that allows one to exercise one's judgment in order to make meaningful choices.

I want to close with a final observation. Seneca also insists that if one is free in this way, ruled by reason, one one may be able to rule over many. This puzzled me because up until now, in his Letters, Seneca had reiterated that the true life of reason, of necessity, turns its back on worldly affairs or, at most, legislates for the future.

But, of course, Seneca is addressing himself to a very particular personality/soul: one that is literally insatiably eager to lord over everything (si vis omnia tibi subicere). To avoid euphemism, this desire to be god-ruler of all is characteristic of an imperial soul. Lucilius is in this sense a generic type. It's hard to avoid thinking of Seneca's failed mentorship of Nero, and not conclude that Seneca shows himself as repeatedly willing to engaging in teaching for extremely high stakes.