First, in this post I do not address the merits of the underlying dispute whether 'TERF' is a slur -- except to express skepticism that any term can be a "neutral counterpart"* -- nor the more substantial dispute over the relationships of trans-rights and the critique of these by some feminists. I am, however, struck by what seems to be a lack of mutual recognition in the debate. And I wonder if well-meaning bystanders can't promote some such recognition and, thereby, help facilitate mutual dialogue. In an age where (various intersections of) feminist and trans agenda's are in retreat and threatened with worse, it seems likely that this dispute will leave all parties to it worse off. In what follows I focus primarily on the editors' response.
Second, the editors of PPR are to be congratulated for responding in a timely, direct, and carefully worded manner to concerns over their publication standards. I am, especially, pleased that they did not resort to an empty, proceduralist stance.+ I hope they, thereby, set a standard for other philosophy journal editors. These controversies are (perhaps awful to the participants and those with an interest or identity at stake) useful to the profession because they allow us to look under the hood of editorial practices and ask probing questions. I hope they receive the following comments in the spirit of friendship with which they are written.
Third, I understand the temptation of the editors to assert that "empirical falsity of claims in an article published in PPR cannot be a condition of retraction, correction, or apology." Philosophy papers are full of empirically ludicrous toy examples, thought experiments, fictional circumstances, and mythic histories (and worse). In many cases these are mere bugs of the argument, facilitating focus on the relevant conceptual (etc.) issues. The empirical falsity is non-intrinsic to the underlying insight or argument. More important, quite a few normative philosophy papers wish to change the world or explore normative standards in a nearby possible world--empirical falsity is not a bug, but a feature. So, empirical falsity is never sufficient grounds for correction or retraction (etc.)
But I wish to raise four concerns with the editors's stance: as stated, [I] the editors' assertion is too strong, and is too strong especially in cases like the ones under dispute. Quite a bit of philosophy draws on empirical sciences or empirical facts to advance the argument. There are sufficiently many cases where getting the empirical facts right is, in fact, central to some feature of the argument. For philosophers who grew up with the idea that philosophy is fundamentally conceptual analysis this is, perhaps, a discomfiting idea. (And, no, I don't want to rule out from my blogchair papers on zombies, unicorns, etc.) But in cases where empirical adequacy matters to the spirit and argument of the article, there are good -- including enlightened self-interest -- reasons to prevent philosophy journals from knowingly allowing empirically false claims to be legitimated by publication in philosophy journals. Philosophers have a collective interest as not being hospitable to, say, medical quackery (fill in your favorite example), young earth creationists, phlogiston chemists, or racial eugenicists.
To be sure, philosophers need not farm out evaluation of empirical falsity, say, to the sciences. (I resist the division of labor in which philosophers are, say experts of the normative and social sciences of the factive.) Part of our role may well be to challenge status quo bias within and foundational assumptions of or (yes) conceptual confusions within the sciences. But in such cases the controversial nature of what empirical falsity is, is not disguised. But we should not assume that the empirical effects of philosophy are neglible and shrug our collective shoulders about the infiltration of (relevant) empirical falsity in philosophy papers.
I don't mean to suggest that good faith mistakes are -- even when central to the argument -- grounds for retraction. But [II] the editors unnecessarily conflate retraction, correction, and apology. Especially now that publication and readership is primarily electronic, correction is, where appropriate, something we should encourage. Where a normative argument, say, relies for its feasibility on appeal to (what turns out to be) a badly designed empirical study, or for its intuitiveness on discredited science, it would be quite useful, especially if you care about the advance and progress of philosophical positions, to have modest corrections attached to papers. Because non of us can be expert on everything, we should aim to prevent the infiltration of empirical falsity into the bits of philosophy that may crucially rely on it.
In effect, the editors kind of agree with the spirit behind my [I&II] because they go on to say "we are not persuaded that it is inconsistent with the letter of the author’s carefully worded claim, and whether it is turns again on an academic issue – namely, who is to qualify as ‘trans’." This is, in fact, [III] the right kind of response to folk demanding retraction here. (Whether it is the correct response depends on the judgments about the underlying issue that I promised not to engage in.) Here the editors take the kind of responsibility the community expects from them. Further scrutiny and time will tell if it was the right decision, but their grounds are at least explicit and clear.
There is, however, one other dissonant in the editor's letter. In response to the first criticism, they say, we "consulted with several senior distinguished scholars in the relevant field, whose consensus view was..." There is nothing wrong with consulting other experts -- that's one intrinsic reason why editors have referees--, and the editors of PPR are to be congratulated for due diligence and (politically savvy for) being alert to the problem in advance, but this is a classic case of buck-passing. Problem is the experts are unnamed and there reasons unreported. More important, [IV] unintentionally perhaps, the editors of PPR promote the philosophy and sociologically pernicious (yes, sorry) view that expert consensus is, in philosophical debate, authoritative grounds to settle disputes.1 (Long time readers are familiar with my arguments against the importation of Kuhnian normal science standards into philosophy.) The expert consensus model may at times be useful in some policy areas, and in philosophy it may be informative to learn when there is such a consensus, but the predictable and usual function of the model is to silence opponents without having to answer their substantive arguments.**
Let me sum up, regular readers know (recall) that I use our professional controversies to advocate for and encourage editors to engage in more experimentation among philosophical publication strategies. That's because I think philosophy can make enormously important contributions to public life, and I think our present, rather static and risk averse and non-transparent publication models are liable to inductive risk. Developing standards such that correction can become an ordinary part of publication is one way to take our public and mutual responsibilities seriously. ++
*I fear that the idea that any term or position can be fully neutral once a topic has been politicized is fantasy. Note, too, that 'neutral' and 'slur' are not proper contraries.
+Too often in philosophy the editors's proceduralism is either a naked appeal to power or a thinly-disguised 'trust us' (because they never reveal the referee reports that they claim exist and justify their decision).
**I am also dubious that such consensus can exist about the case at hand. In the internet age, the valence of words, including 'slur' itself, seems to be especially unstable or at least capable of rapid shifts.
++Yes, I have been quiet on apology. Sorry.
1. UPDATE: Neil Levy (on facebook) rightly called my attention to the "difference between appeal to consensus to establish truth (raise credences) and appeal to consensus to help establish professional standards." For some it is important to distinguish between these--one may believe, for example, that the latter is reasonable even if one agrees with my misgivings about the former. It should come as no surprise that I am ambivalent about uniformity in standards, too, but about that some other time more.
Comments