Digressions&Impressions

On Operatic (and political) Desire and Celebrity

And then I savour the subtle
longing in their eyes
when, from my visible charms,
they guess at the beauty concealed.
This onrush of desire
surrounds me.
It delights me, it delights me.--From Puccini's La Boheme (Musetta), libretto Luigi Illica en Giuseppe Giacosa.  Translation: William Fense Weaver 

We went to La Boheme at Covent Garden last night. It was a true gift from my wife (who generally finds nineteenth century music insufferable). It was a warm Summer evening, and after a day of grading all I wanted to do is sit in the garden and eat crackers with cheese (with honey). My wife has been suffering from migraines, which made me uneasy about the crowds in town. Besides my concern, and modest guilt about my lack of gratitude, I was sad to miss the Brazilians play. But when we grabbed a quick bite of pizza, my wife spotted a copy of Lampedusa's The Leopard (recall) in the  window frame next to the bar area. It was clearly put there, with fake nonchalance, part of the restaurant's marketing. I took it as a good omen.

I had never been inside before, and after an appreciative look at the new atrium we found our way to the main hall. While nothing beats an opera staged in an ancient ruin -- my dad introduced me to opera in Veroná's arena when I was a doubting fifteen year old --, I love houses that keep the audience close to the stage and packed up high. Before I eased into the music, I had a moment of anxiety about the effect of the pungent smell from all the perfume on my wife. 

It was a simple and aesthetically tasteful, (and given the bohemian subject matter) perhaps too tasteful, production. The audience, too polite--I missed the rowdy Italian commentary. The stage, during the second act in Quartier Latin, showed signs of shops that echoed a sanitized image of Parisian storefronts to be found in the streets outside of Covent Garden; on our way I had noticed that the Balthazar Bistro had been franchised to London. On our way home, we bumped into the homeless. Seeing the stage design I wanted to tell my wife about how we would get free steak frites at midnight from the bartender at Balthazars on Spring street because one of my college housemates would bake their bread.

I have quoted from the show-shopping moment in Musetta's great comic scene (sung marvelously in an upbeat waltz** by an athletic and hysterically funny Vlada Borovko). La Boheme figures longing poets and philosophers without much to say. (I learned a new term for such philosophers, they are bearish.) A disquieting recognition took hold of me. Even in the rare moments of self-knowledge, they fail to act on their ideals or desires.

The action of the second scene takes place inside Café Momus (while writing this post I was pleased to discover it really existed once). Momus is the god of satire; but I suddenly remembered, from researching Hume's interest in Lucian, that Lucian presents Momus as a xenophobe who postures frank directness in the name of a kind of common sense morality (indeed, see here). I made a mental note to re-read Lucian soon.

In the version I saw, Musetta is standing on the tables at Café Momus, outside and inside crowds, are watching her every movement. Musetta adores being the subject of other people's desire. Earlier in the scene, the insatiability of rather sterile desire for commodities -- personified by Christmas shopping --had been thoroughly mocked. But the desire for Musetta is made to feel vital, even (ahh) inspiring.

Since Amia Srinivasan's now famous piece, I have been made to feel my meekness on the politics of desire (recall). In consumer culture desire is shaped to secure and directed at the profitable fruits of commodification. This much is familiar enough. But because the end of desire is thought in terms of (impersonal) goods, subjects of desire are often left out of the equation (or made to appear gendered [Kate Mann is very good on this in her Down Girl] passive, submissive, attentive and malleable). To be the subject of unwanted desire is unpleasant, and often worse. 

But to be the agent and shaper of welcome desire may be thrilling and empowering. I don't deny there is a petty version of this that is a needy even narcissistic desire for celebrity which follows from self-loathing or worse. This focuses attention on dazzling surface properties to disguise the emptiness within.

But there is another kind which redirects attention -- as Musetta proudly notes -- from the surface to hidden qualities. This other kind, which, in the eternal overflowing now, it's its own reward because (as Spinoza -- acquiescentia in se ipso sit-- noted) it may instantiate a vibrant self-acceptance.*

 

 

 

On Changing experiences

My son (now eight and a half) has become an avid reader, so I have grown cautious in sharing impressions about him. Not unlike other kids his age, he adores Christian Ronaldo (CR7); consequently I have increased my admiration for Messi. It's not a question of identification: my boy is rather tall and his natural talent is at goalie (or basketball) [and I at bench-warming]. For him, the world cup so far has been a celebration of Ronaldo's skills [and Modric's], although Messi's heroics last night have redressed the balance a bit.

But I also have noticed that he finds the world cup games a bit boring--this despite the fact that there have almost been no scoreless and dull draws (France-Denmark excepted [this reminded me a bit of that shameful Germany/Austria match of you my youth]--but he missed that), many spectacular goals, and thrilling finishes. That he finds the games boring does not surprise me not just because ninety minutes of attention is a long time for a boy his age (or anybody), but also because even when he is playing his own matches I can see his mind wonder off at times. 

It's not that he is bored with football as such. He is constantly quizzing my knowledge of the game, can rattle off any statistic about players, is completely up to date on the transfer-market, and is regularly caught practicing his skill-moves when he is supposed to brush his teeth (undoubtedly to the chagrin of the people living below us).

His babysit (who has been watching a few of the world cup games with him), a senior, offered an explanation. Your son's experience of football is shaped by fifa18. In the EA Sports world, the flow of the game is different. It's not just compressed, but the very rhythm of the game is altered such that there are no dull moments--you are given the illusion of full control.

I reflected on this a bit. I had already noticed that the probability of winning any game or a series of games is much higher in the EA world (unless you played against others online) than in reality. But it's also centered on play-making (rushes with the ball, skilled moves, and shots on goal). There is enormous amount of regular feeds of modest gratification (goals, wins, skilled play, etc.) in the game world. I wouldn't be surprised if they are timed and calibrated to create some kind of dopamine/reward habits. That is to say, viewed from the point of view of the rules, the EA game is the same game as football or, at least, a good model of it. But viewed from the point of view of experience it is not: not just in virtue of a different kind of embodiment [i ignore this], but also in virtue of the different kind expectations it generates.

By contrast, a lot of the tactics and strategy of a game in real life, even at the highest levels, involve moment away from and off the ball. This movement is easily perceived as fruitless unless you understand the significance of marking (zonal or man-to-man) and the utility of shifting positions to force (marking)  decisions on defenders, etc. What makes great teams fascinating to watch is their ability to control the movement and tempo of the game against skilled opposition--Brazil and Spain (who play very differently otherwise) go through periods where they clearly slow down the game before they accelerate it again. 

My underlying point here is not to castigate AE games. But the aesthetic and attentiveness it (as well as the youtube fan channels associated with them) generates creates both great familiarity with the strengths and weaknesses of the players and tactics in the real game, and at the time a kind of alienation from the rhythm of a match in real life. 

These things are not fixed, of course. My son has been only once to a professional match. If he were to go more frequently, and see the game in its full range from the bleachers in a stadium, he would become more attuned to appreciating the aesthetic of professional tactics, which are in no small part very spatial and not fully appreciated on a TV screen unless one knows to project them onto the screen (which is what I suspect we adults do all the time). I see no reason to doubt that it's fully possible to enjoy both AE Fifa18 and the real game.

But it's also possible that a steady diet of AE Sports FIFA18 (19, etc.) early in life will shape the expectations of kids such that when they become adults -- players and consumers -- they will become a force to reckon with and nudge the rules-making bodies into changes to the rules such that the reallife game will be made to conform to the experiences of the gamer-footballgame.*

 

On the Crisis of Liberalism (I)

Regular readers know (recall) that I believe the second wave of liberalism+ has ended and that it may not survive the present darkness. (In brief: first long wave: 1776-1914; second wave: 1945-2009. Some readers will say, good riddance, and to you I say, I hope you do better.) The present crisis is much visible in our daily politics (and headlines), shifting public norms, and the rising confidence of regimes and thinkers who, again, openly espouse hierarchical, ethnic, zero-sum, eugenic, and violent solutions to present conflicts.* While there is much urgent, practical work to be done to salvage institutions that may be at the core of a renewal, some reflection away from daily politics is also required. Perhaps, a way forward can be found if we articulate and invite reflection on unresolved short-comings of the liberal tradition today. I think this is urgent not just because we need polities that make minimal decency possible,** but also because we need (or so I assume today) liberal institutions to meet humanity's great challenges -- environmental disaster, genetic engineering, drone warfare -- ahead. 

Before I do so I mention two qualifications: first, even though there is no shortage of criticism, much of it has been calling attention to features not bugs of liberalism: that it is disruptive of tradition, that it embraces markets, that it is cosmopolitan, that it prefers muddling through and compromise over decisive action, that it requires living with uncertainty, and that it effaces any distinction between higher and lower pleasures and goods. The critics who complain about these features can show us what is found unattractive in liberalism, and surely teach us much about the costs of embracing liberalism, but they cannot point the way to a better, revived form of liberalism. 

A second is offered by two kinds of self-described friends of liberalism; some claim ignorant voters are the problems (for a series of posts see here). This is peculiar because liberalism is, in fact, the response to that very same diagnosis--liberalism learned from the failures of direct democracy and elected kingship. Representative democracy (an elected aristocracy), judicial review, separation of powers, and technocratic control over major policy areas are, in fact, the status quo not some distant ideal. Of course, it's possible that voter ignorance is fatal to liberalism, but that's just to say it will end in this crisis.

Others claim that the state needs to do a better job educating its citizens into democratic values.*** This is especially notable in Europe with rising panic over the presence of an Islamic population. That this is a panic is betrayed by the eagerness by which the state is marshaled to undermine once cherished, individual freedoms (of religion, association, asylum, etc.); the panic betrays a complete lack of confidence in the vitality of liberal ideas, that if children are left free to discover their own way in the world they will fail to find a liberal way of life attractive. Instead, conformism to a narrow way of life is promoted even coerced in the curriculum (or as a requirement on full citizenship). What's missed by such false friends is that the liberal experiment consists precisely in the ever-present-possibility that our children will reject our ways, and that in their vital conflicts over ends, they will discover new paths. 

What follows, then is the start of an attempt to display the existential challenges to liberalism that arise from within. I do not offer solutions to these challenges and so invite readers to chime in.

For profit media. Liberals value a free press and commerce. It's not obvious the combination is fruitful when the press is subsumed under a business model that consists in attracting eye balls by way of outrage and in order to outrage. Cycles of outrage undermine even minimal mutual trust (recall) and the possibility of keeping even a stuttering conversation going. Outrage displaces and distorts hope, which is the central emotion of liberalism. As Mill already noticed with admirable frankness, even despair, outrage (because founded in the sense of justice) is an important political weapon against the powerful, but manufactured and facilitated outrage can be a dangerous conformist and oppressive tool when wielded against minorities. There is no reason to assume that competition among media companies with such a profit model will produce good outcomes and every reason to expect it to cheer us into mutual hatred or civil war. (Mill himself did not share in the providential optimism often attributed to him.) I don't know of a good response given well-founded liberal suspicion of state oversight of the press. 

The free press was once sustained by a political economy which was completely upended by the internet (which changed viewing habits and undermined the subsidy of [classified] advertising to the press). But the more fundamental problem is the inability of a set of values (focused on objectivity, reporting news, exposing malfeasance, etc.) to sustain itself (such that the life-styles of the rich and famous passes for shaping public opinion).  And that's because of the following challenge.

Financialization of the economy. When this started the greatest danger of such financialization was already perceived by Hume, Smith, and Kant: it made open-ended warfare possible (because cheap) and it would distribute the costs of war away from those that benefit. In recent decades we have also seen that because of rent-seeking and the intellectual power of financial interests, the financial sector continues to socialize risk for relatively narrow private gain. This means that in many economies in good times the increase in general welfare primarily accrues to those with assets, and in bad times social services and public goods are cut (in order to pay for bail-outs). This state of affairs offends a sense of fair play and almost certainly is a contributing cause in stagnating productivity. When fair play seems naive, people embrace zero-sum frameworks. 

It's clear that existence of central banks, lenders of last resort, facilitates this state of affairs. Liberal alternatives, such as free banking or the Chicago plan (100% reserves on demand deposits), have serious drawbacks. Advocates of crypto-currencies have not yet offered a truly workable alternative that will address the problems mentioned here. 

Ideally, there would be competing interests that can systematically resist financialization. But most of the institutions and great intermediary social orders that may be once thought so capable -- military, law, health, education, research, clergy, press, etc.++-- are all embracing or have already been embraced by financialization. I think that's not just due to self-interest or capture by extrinsic interests who disrespect experts. For reasons that are worth exploring some other time, financialization often enters a social order under the guise of meritocracy (recall my reflections). This suggests that prior to financialization, hierarchy and status within such orders must have come to be felt unearned or inadequately rewarded (or both). Critics of neo-liberalism are surely right, then, that the public sphere and the great intermediary social orders have been undermined by financialization. But they have misdiagnosed the problem; these great intermediary social orders lacked the self-confidence and we may say (ahh) spiritual will-power to resist encroachment. This matters for those orders themselves, but also undermines the pluralism and moderation that is constitutive of a liberal political order. 

That's to say, and to get to a preliminary and my first conclusion -- this digression has been too long anyway -- that one of the roots of the crisis of liberalism is a spiritual or, if one dislikes such elevated language, a value crisis. So before one can articulate an institutional response or a political program, this crisis must be better diagnozed. To be continued... 

 

Some Elements of De Grouchy's Political Economy: On Physiocrats and Adam Smith

The kind of pressing need which is nearly always stronger than fear of revenge or remorse can also occur in the working classes, either because of a want of wage, or because of a temporary mismatch of their wage with the necessities of life; and even, it is most common among these people. For agriculture is, after all, the most productive of all professions for individuals, while for states, it is the unique source of real and lasting wealth.  

But now we have conclusive evidence that lack of wages or insufficient wages were caused nearly entirely by prohibitive laws hampering commerce and industry. Those laws, at the same time, were harming the well-being of all by collecting, little by little, in the hands of a few, wealth that then became in those hands a means of oppression, and which otherwise, through the free movement of interests would have remained if not equal, at least common to all. The unequal division of taxes at last overwhelmed the inferior class who, with no property and no liberty, was reduced to rely on fraud and would cheat remorselessly, because our conscience cannot survive when it is in chains. The incentive to behave unjustly, when it is based on need, is therefore extremely rare in the absence of bad laws, as even when they are present, this incentive is weak, its effects are the least widely spread, and it is to be feared the least.--Sophie de Grouchy, Letters on Sympathy, Letter 7, translated by Sandrine Berges (with minor modifications by me). 

The 1798 Letters on Sympathy (Letters) were attached to De Grouchy's translation of the last, posthumous edition of Smith's The  Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and his Dissertation on the Origin of Languages. Sandrine Berges has argued persuasively that the Letters would have been written in the early 1790s and may well pre-date both De Grouchy's translation of TMS and her decision to publish them jointly. So, the relationship between Smith's TMS and De Grouchy's intentions for the Letter's is not straightforward. In this post I bracket that, and look at De Grouchy's relationship to Smith's political economy in light of the two quoted paragraphs. (The context is De Grouchy's philosophy of law and program for legal reform [recall here, here, and here.]) The larger claim is that a proper legal structure will generate fewer crimes; because good laws deter  individuals properly and do not creative incentives for more crimes and the system of "reasonable laws can both increase the personal desire to be just and strengthen the power of conscience, even towards such objects that are governed and punished by conscience alone." (Letter VIII)

I have discussed the quoted passage before a few weeks ago with an eye toward discussing De Grouchy's political analysis of trade barriers. (I apologize for overlap.) She closes the first quoted paragraph above with an embrace of a two-fold Physiocratic doctrine: "agriculture is, after all, (i) the most productive of all professions for individuals, while (ii) for states, it is the unique source of real and lasting wealth." Physiocracy was a distinctly french political economy, which aimed to redress the economic backwardness of French countryside, which had suffered at the mercantile-imperial policies pursued since Colbert. They promoted free trade, including in agricultural products, in order to enrich the agricultural sector and to reduce the  prevalence of famine. (In addition to Quesnay, Turgot and Rousseau developed importan themes of the school.) While Smith admired many Physiocrats personally and intellectually, and may be open to the idea that (i) is true in some circumstances, he would reject (ii). Smith devotes the whole of chapter IX of book 4 of Wealth of Nations to criticizing it.

In the second paragraph, she is responding to an implied critic, who might suggest that the lack of income of the poor is due to their laziness. In this she echoes (as Sam Fleischacker has argued) Smith. That the poor were deserving poor -- due to some defect in moral character -- was then (and still is, alas) a popular trope, especially among defenders of social hierarchy (be it on meritocratic or conservative grounds). De Grouchy notes that the lack of purchasing power among the poor is due to bad institutions. She believes that political economy has demonstrated this.  And when we look at her argument for this we see that she is only in a very qualified sense a Physiocrat.

For, her first claim --  "lack of wages or insufficient wages were caused nearly entirely by prohibitive laws hampering commerce and industry" -- is, in fact, as my sometime co-author, Spencer Pack, noticed in correspondence a Smithian criticism of physiocracy (which promoted laws that hampered "commerce and industry" and promoted laws that favored agriculture). The underlying idea is that laws that promote one sector of the economy depress effective total demand for labor and, thereby, depress wages. More important, such laws also depress growth (because "commerce and industry" contribute to that), which according to Smith is key to stimulate higher wages, and such laws stimulate inefficiency (because they favor investment in parts of the economy beyond the point of increasing returns). 

But the criticism of physiocratic policies does not exhaust her explanation for the existence of low wages. Her second criticism is an attack mercantile trade policies (which hamper "the free movement of interests"), which have regressive economic and political effects (that was the topic of my earlier post on this passage so won't repeat the argument). This is clearly indebted to Smith's Wealth of Nations, Book 4, chapters i-viii. 

Third, she points out that existing tax policies are regressive and so de facto reduce the effective demand that the wages of the working poor can support. For, a central feature of De Grouchy's analysis of feudalism is that under it the aristocratic rich (and clergy) are exempt from all kinds of taxes (so called 'privileges' and 'exemptions'). Because these rich benefit dis-proportionally from public goods like justice, defense, public works, and from economic policies which favor their interests, the feudal tax code effectively redistributes from the bottom to the top. (This is a point she returns to in Letter VIII.) This means that that the tax code undermines the effective demand of and helps to impoverish the working poor.*

I think a natural way to reconcile the first two paragraphs is as follows: she agreed with Physiocrats that agriculture was the unique source of real and lasting wealth for states. It would be interesting to learn how she evaluated the political economy of relatively small trading or industrializing nations. But she seems to h ave agreed with Smith that policies which favored one sector in the economy over another end up being a tax on the wages of the working poor (over the medium term). Even industrial/agricultural policy which is meant to promote long term wealth of the state may impoverish the working poor (then the vast majority of inhabitants). Such a policy is not just immoral (it hurts the vulnerable), but also undermines public order and public virtue (by encouraging lawlessness and undermining the proper functioning of conscience & reactive attitudes). So, here underlying idea seems to be (and this is the reconcialition I just promised) this: if one wants to achieve physiocratic ends in a humane and just way, one must follow a Smithian political economy.

On Ibn Khaldun and Ronald Reagan (and a now obscure Belgian scholar).

President Reagan, in his news conference yesterday, cited a 14thcentury Islamic scholar as an early exponent of the ''supply-side'' economic theory on which his Administration bases many of its policies. An authority on the scholar later said that the reference seemed accurate.

Supply-side theory, among other things, holds that a cut in tax rates will stimulate the economy and thus generate even greater tax revenues.

Responding to a question about the effects of tax and spending cuts that began taking effect yesterday, Mr. Reagan said the supply-side principle dated at least as far back as Ibn Khaldun, who is generally regarded as the greatest Arab historian to emerge from the highly developed Arabic culture of the Middle Ages.

Paraphrasing the historian, Mr. Reagan said Ibn Khaldun postulated that ''in the beginning of the dynasty, great tax revenues were gained from small assessments,'' and that ''at the end of the dynasty, small tax revenues were gained from large assessments.''

''And,'' said the President, ''we're trying to get down to the small assessments and the great revenues.'' Interpretation Held Accurate

Franz Rosenthal, the Sterling Professor of Near Eastern Languages at Yale University, who has translated many of Ibn Khaldun's writings and is regarded as one of the world's foremost Ibn Khaldun scholars, said later that the President's interpretation of the historian's ideas on taxes appeared to be accurate.

Ibn Khaldun, who was born in Tunis in 1332 and died in Cairo in 1406, was an official of the Tunisian and Moroccan courts, a judge and teacher in Cairo and the author of many volumes on history. His most noted contribution, Professor Rosenthal said, was to treat history as a science that incorporated politics, economics, sociology and geography. 

Ibn Khaldun is perhaps best known as the author of ''Kitab al-Ibar,'' a four-volume universal history, and ''Muqaddimah,'' an introduction in which he argues that rise and fall of human societies may be traced to specific, discoverable causes.--The New York Times, October 2, 1981, p. 26.

It was moderately newsworthy once that President Ronald Reagan invoked Ibn Khaldun as an athority in a news conference.[*HT Robert Irwin] It would be more startling now that many of our politicians and too many our very own intellectuals try to convince audiences, learned and unlearned, that being Islamic de facto means being intellectually backward. (For a minority of them the association with Reagan or supply-side economics would prove the point.) 

In the press conference (see here for the transcript; the video must be of slightly different occassion, and what follows is my comment on the video), Reagan reminds his audience that he was an economics student in college. (He was an econ and sociology major at Eureka college.) Irwin implies that the reference to Ibn Khaldun originates with Reagan's "speech writers." That's  not impossible, of course. But it is also not impossible that an educated economics or sociology professor (these could be the same persion in that period) could have said it in a depression era economics (or economic soociology) course. After all, most such economics/sociology faculty were trained in the history of economics--then still a central part of graduate education in economics (and sociology). While it would be silly to suggest that Ibn Khaldun was famous, he was not wholly unknown to educated English language readers (as this google search reveals).

And, in fact, the very claim that Reagan fondly remembers can, in fact, be found (I was surprised to learn) in a translation of Ernest Nys's (1899) Researches in the History of Economics, p. 15. (Here's a fuller text of the french original.) Nys is an important early contributor to the development  of international law (and, alas, apologist for Leopold's rule of Congo); I had no idea he also wrote about the history economics. (Sadly a hard copy of the text is not in Eureka's library.) That text would have  been the cutting edge  when Reagan's economics teacher was a student. In fact, I think Nys may well be the original source for Reagan (or his speech writer) because in his speech, Reagan treats of Ibn Khaldun as an Egyptian (which would be a natural way to read Nys) and talks of tax rates in "the empire" which is precisely how Nys talks about Ibn Khaldun's claim (but not the direct translation of Ibn Khaldun--for example, in his English translation, Rosenthal goes for 'dynasty' [which is surely closer to Ibn Khaldun's intent]).** 

There are two further reason to allow that Reagan, who had great fondness for his college education long before he became President, is drawing on his own memory. First, that's because he makes a major gaffe. He claims "Ibn Khaldun lived 1200 years ago in Egypt." (That's about 8-10 second mark.) That would have been ca 780 (the gaffe does not exist in the press conference of 1 October 1981--in the transcript he makes clear this is not the first time he spoke about Ibn Khaldun).

Second, in his remarks at the 1981 press conference (but not in the video), he uses Ibn Khaldun to illustrate his claims about the effects of tax policy of the 1920s. That's not peculiar if you learned about those tax policies alongside a remark about Ibn Khaldun in that same decade.

In his book, Irwin associates Reagan's claims with the Laffer curve. But there is no evidence in the press conference (or video) that Reagan makes that connection. Rather, he claims that tax cuts can generate more revenue than they bring in. (Of course, that's not unconnected to the Laffer curve.) And he claims the principle of that (supply side economics) claim goes back to Ibn Khaldun. That's not all wrong: Ibn Khaldun does recognize that there are conditions in which low taxes bring in larger revenue than high taxes. But the conditions that do so are (as Irwin correctly notes, p. 149) the cause not the effect of the tax rate(s). Some other time I have  more to say about (recall) Ibn Khaldun's political economy. 

 

Adam Smith, Plutarch and The 1001 Nights

When Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in the partition. These last too enjoy their share of all that it produces. In what constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much above them. In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings are fighting for.--Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

Because of the mention of providence in the quoted passage, which occurs just after the only mention of an invisible hand in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), it is easy to discern in the last quoted sentence a Stoic influence on Smith or even Smith's stoicism in it and that's how the passage has been discussed in the secondary literature (for example, Sam Fleischacker, who on the whole rejects the identification of Smith's philosophy with Stoicism, treats it as an instance of "extreme stoicism" (108)).

Before I get to the sunny beggar, it is worth noting that the whole, rhetorically complex and much discussed passage is meant to illustrate the problems with the (Humean idea) that "the fitness of any system or machine to produce the end for which it was intended, bestows a certain propriety and beauty upon the whole, and renders the very thought and contemplation of it agreeable," And, in fact, the very next sentence (after the beggar who suns himself by the side of the highway) in the very next paragraph picks up the thread (which the reader may well have  lost in the cascade of interesting claims and tropes). "The same principle, the same love of system, the same regard to the beauty of order, of art and contrivance, frequently serves to recommend those institutions which tend to promote the public welfare." And while Smith warns against the danger of love  of system, he also thinks -- or so I argued in my book and here [in response to Jacob Levy] -- it can do some good, is even necessary, in guiding public policy.

Okay, I think it's pretty obvious that the sun-tanning beggar is an allusion to Diogenes the cynic,+ familiar to Smith from the anecdote in Diogenes Laertius and, especially, Plutarch (which I quote from his Lives):*

And now a general assembly of the Greeks was held at the Isthmus, where a vote was passed to make an expedition against Persia with Alexander, and he was proclaimed their leader. 2 Thereupon many statesmen and philosophers came to him with their congratulations, and he expected that Diogenes of Sinope also, who was tarrying in Corinth, would do likewise. 3 But since that philosopher took not the slightest notice of Alexander, and continued to enjoy his leisure in the suburb Craneion, Alexander went in person to see him; and he found him lying in the sun. 4 Diogenes raised himself up a little when he saw so many persons coming towards him, and fixed his eyes upon Alexander. And when that monarch addressed him with greetings, and asked if he wanted anything, "Yes," said Diogenes, "stand a little out of my sun." 5 It is said that Alexander was so struck by this, and admired so much the haughtiness and grandeur of the man who had nothing but scorn for him, that he said to his followers, who were laughing and jesting about the philosopher as they went away, "But verily, if I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes."

Plutarch's version raises interesting questions about the metaphysical nature of identity and modality, but for once I'll ignore these. Plutarch's anecdote is structured along two kinds of identities: The first one -- and this tends to be ignored -- is that his version of the story suggests that many philosophers willingly flatter imperial power. It is not impossible that Plutarch himself sometimes was of this kind, but I treat those that willingly flatter and seek out imperial power as  false philosophers. (I am not being subtle about my polemic with the applied, public philosopher as would be policy consultant.) Whereas those that keep their distance from power are true philosophers. 

The second identity is an important one and easily missed for those accustomed to Christianizing readings  of poverty. Diogenes fails to seek out Alexander not because he is humble or more moral than the others, but -- if Alexander's interpretation (as represented by Plutarch) is to believed --  because he has an enlarged image of himself [ὑπεροψίαν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος]. That is, in Plutarch's version, Alexander understands Diogenes as aiming at magnanimity of a sort that is only (marginally) second to his own conquering kind. This magnanimity of the true philosopher is fundamentally missed by Alexander's retinue, but not by Alexander. It is also not missed by Hume (who -- imitating the conceit behind Plutarch's Lives couples Diogenes with Pascal -- , who calls him an instance of an "extravagant philosophy," but even so singles out his "magnanimity, ostentation, pride, and the idea of his own superiority above his fellow-creatures." (The comparison is rather favorable to Diogenes, although he is a model unsuitable to an egalitarian and democratizing age.)

Such an enlarged conception of self is key to one of the most striking (and strange) claims in Adam Smith's TMS: When we act truly virtious, it follows from this enlarged conception of self: "It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which generally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters." Here Smith explicitly rejects the Christian motive ("It is not the love of our neighbour,") and the Stoic philanthropy  ("it is not the love of mankind,"). It seems to follow that while there are many sources of moral corruption, our psychological littleness is central to our indifference to evil in the world. 

It is, of course, non-trivial that Smith replaces the philosopher with a beggar and substitutes Alexander's love of glory (see Plutarch's previous paragraph) with a preference for security. The main point in the sentence that Smith is making is about the objective nature of "real happiness" -- it is not merely revealed preference -- and its availability to all regardless of income. (That the beggar is secure presupposes the rule of law of in the background.) But the more subtle point is that such a beggar has real happiness available to him (if he can appreciate it). Thus, such a beggar could be more knowledgeable not just than kings, but many others whose imaginations are dazzled and deceived by riches and palaces (go read the whole section in Smith).

Smith is cautious about claiming that his beggar knows what he is doing, unlike Plutarch's true philosopher. It is not that Smith thinks one needs to be a true philosopher to know such stuff. For him the real problem, which he announces on the same page is how to integrate such knowledge into a system that serves the "public welfare" and how to make such system loved by those that can act on it. That is, Smith must reject the Plutarchian version of the opposition between a true and false philosopher** because while he rejects aiming for military empire (which in addition to Alexander he associates with Mercantilism and the savage conquest of Ireland), he does think philosophy needs to address itself to true legislators (as opposed to crafty politicians), that is the powerful.

Let me close with one final observation. Smith's treatment of the beggar is in some ways more akin to "Alexander the Great and the Poor King," a tale that is associated with "Tales from 1,001 Nights," but not in all editions [Go read it!] (It's not, I think, in the version most popular in eighteenth century English, but I have not checked the much larger French Galland translation.) One reason to mention it is that the tale is both more theistic than Plutarch's version of Diogenes as well as is explicit about the contentment/happiness of the unambitious. 

On Brazil, Ronaldo, and smart Coaching

The world cup will be won by the team that wins its final four matches. That is not to deny that the first round of group play isn't informative, even important, especially since Fifa moved to awarding three (rather than two) points to victory (back in 1994). But a team can still recover from a bad result in the first match, even a loss, although the latter almost certainly entails winning six matches in a row. A brilliant side, Spain, did so in 2010, after losing to a very good Swiss side. (Brazil won all its matches at the 2002 world cup.)+ 

I hadn't looked at Nate Silver's website since the Presidential election fiasco, but I just noted that before this year's tournament, Nate Silver rated Brazil the team with the best chances to win. He did so, too, four years ago, when his Bayesian predictions were still treated with too much respect, Brazil had home team advantage. After the first game (a dubious victory over Croatia), I noted that the first game "exposed the vulnerability of Brazil's defense. For whenever the Brazilian backs were challenged on the flanks, they had trouble not just containing the Croatian counter attacks on the wings (catching the Brazilians on the back-foot), they were incapable of preventing Croatian crosses into the box that exposed Brazil's lack of organization at the core of their defense." The only surprise then was that they reached the semi-final (helped by a friendly schedule and kind refereeing) where Germany took advantages of these weaknesses and won a historic victory.

Amazingly, given the pre-tournament hype, the Swiss exposed, yet again, the lack of organization in the Brazilian defense: on the goal, Zuber was left unmarked in the box (on a set-piece, no less). If you look at the film, I count seven (!) Brazilian players in the box, none of them marking anybody! This is the kind of thing that can sometimes happen to at the end of a game, when people are fatigued.* At the start of the tournament, it exposes lack of drilling in training camp. They were unlucky not to win -- in any given game they can clearly score a number of goals --, but the Swiss deserved their point.**  

When I was a kid, and not an especially gifted player, I sometimes played on teams where the only major tactic was 'give the ball to your best player and let him make plays.' It's clear that when Ronaldo plays for Portugal, he assumes this is their tactic. As tactics go, it's not silly even at world class level: every time Ronald has the ball danger can ensue. In the thrilling game against Spain, he made his Madrid team-mate, Nacho, look foolish and commit a foul after a characteristic Ronaldo run, including a scissor fake -- it's the world cup, and he executes a scissor at full speed! -- , into the penalty area. (Nacho got his revenge with a powerful goal.)  

The very best players are capable of deciding the game with their brilliance -- Ronaldo's equalizing penalty late in the match was astounding mixture of skill and determination -- and simultaneously, through their passing and positioning, make the players around them play better. Ronaldo has never quite convinced on the latter (although the last few years at Madrid increasingly so). In fact, two years ago, Portugal proved it was a better team without Ronaldo than with him--winning its first major title -- and defeating a fantastic French squad after he dropped out of the game with injury. Spain (which are the best side technically and tactically and played with great heart, including a very hungy Costa) has two such players, Iniesta and Isco, and it is glorious to see them play so well together. After the game, which was one of the best games between national teams I have ever seen, the talk was rightly about Ronaldo and his astounding hat-trick. But the smartest move of the night was the decision by the new Spanish coach, Hierro, to take Iniesta off (in the 70th minute) and preserve him for the duration of the campaign. 

 

On Integrity

You know what I mean by a good man? One who is complete, finished, – whom no constraint or need can render bad. I see such a person in you, if only you go steadily on and bend to your task, and see to it that all your actions and words harmonize and correspond with each other and are stamped in the same mould [or form]. If a man's acts are out of harmony, his soul is discordant [discordant]--Seneca, Letter 34.

The underlying idea here is that we are not naturally bad, but that we are made bad by (to use anachronistic language) unsatisfied preferences.  We can, thus, avoid being bad by reducing desires (need) or by removing impediments to their satisfaction (constraint). In the surface of this letter, Seneca treats the two strategies symmetrically. (In some other places he sounds more 'Stoic' by advocating the elimination of need. ) The badness consists in a lack of (what I call, recall) philosophical integrity between one's articulated ideals and actions. 

Seneca here does not really confront the possibility of somebody having integrity between ideals and actions not worth having. That's because he makes two assumptions: first, and this is unstated, the unworthy ideals all presuppose desires that can't be satisfied. This is not so question-begging as it seems: most, quite ordinary forms of badness presuppose lack of moderation. But it's an open question if integrity, which is a kind of internal relation, always has (again to use anachronism) external validity.

Second, Seneca assumes the existence of the worthiness of a station and with it associated duties and tasks [id egeris]. This means that are station-relative duties are assumed to be self-justifying (as long as they do not prompt immoderate desires, etc.). Here, too, Seneca does not confront the possibility that one's station supports a status quo -- when those in charge are bad, and the empire they rule, bad too -- not worth having. As the tutor to Nero, and now former tutor, Seneca had ample time to reflect on the problem (familiar to us already from Tacitus). One sometimes wonders how many dutiful public servants recognize the problem. 

This gets me to the underlying topic of the letter, which is about the nature of claiming somebody else as a student. Seneca, treats it -- and ongoing instruction -- as something violent akin to grabbing a runaway slave. Such violence may be legally sanctioned, of course. But it does not follow it is wanted.* More interestingly, perhaps, is that thereby Seneca grants that claiming somebody else as one's student is a characteristically immoderate even narcissistic action: he is explicit that for him it is the projection of an image  of one's former self onto another. As if teaching another is really tantamount to redoing one's own life with the benefit of hindsight and, thereby, be rejuvenated--teaching as a means toward one's own immortality (in thought0.

The whole letter amounts to Seneca asserting [contrary, perhaps, the evidence of the Meno and Protagoras] that virtue can be taught -- and perhaps he even thinks that such assertion makes it more likely --, while simultaneously drawing attention to the fact that the very practices of teaching are implicated in a whole number of institutions  and practices that seem to violate virtue (and rely on self-deception).  It's an open question if the fruits of such an education can justify the means.

It's easy to imagine that when Seneca draws attention to himself, he does so as an exemplar worth emulating. But the alternative possibility -- that he draws attention to his own excessive needs as a path worth avoiding -- cannot be ruled out. 

On Aesthetics and The Problem of Tragedy in De Grouchy

The sympathy we feel for physical suffering, and which constitutes part of what we call humanity, would be a sentiment too transient to be often useful, my dear C***, were we not capable of reflection as well as sensation. But because reflection prolongs the ideas brought to us by our senses, it extends and preserves in us the effect brought on by the sight of suffering, and it is that, one might say, which makes us truly human. Indeed, reflection will fasten in our souls an instance of suffering that was only present to our eyes for one brief moment, and make us want to be relieved from it and from the unwelcome and painful idea of it. It is reflection which, making up for our natural changeability, forces our compassion into action by presenting it anew with objects which had only made a momentary impression. It is reflection which, when we see someone oppressed by pain, reminds us that we too are subject to that same tyrant, destroyer of life, and through emotion and self-pity moves us closer to her, making her sufferings interesting to us, even when they are more repulsive than attractive.--Sophie de Grouchy, Letters on Sympathy, translated by Sandrine Berges, Letter II.

Aesthetics -- and in particular, the effects of beauty -- is of central importance to the argument of the Letters on Sympathy. Grouchy brackets the metaphysical question about the nature and origin of beauty. Rather, she settles for a pragmatic definition: something is beautiful if it gives us pleasure to watch (or hear, etc.) it. This means it is grounded in sensibility. And this means that for her, paying attention to beauty and beautiful people can be a significant source of "happiness" (Letter III), especially if we sympathize with them. Elsewhere I have discussed the significance of beauty to her account (recall) of demagoguery. So, here I want to focus on her 'solution' to the problem of tragedy.

The problem of tragedy—a topic widely discussed in eighteenth century thought--can be stated (with thanks to Wasserman)* in simplified form as follows: why do viewers find pleasure, or something like pleasure, in the dramatic representation of an action that is painful and repellent in real life. This problem generated a huge amount of reflection in the middle of the eighteenth century. As Grouchy notes in Letter IV, Adam Smith had also taken it on in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Modern students may encounter a version of the problem when they enjoy a horror movie.  

The problem of tragedy is an especially acute one for Grouchy for two related reasons: first, given her account of sympathy, we do not find the suffering of others pleasant, and we try to remove the causes of such suffering. But while audiences sometimes leave a theater in disgust (or avoid going to a horror movie), we generally do not try to help those suffering on stage. So, how come we willingly go watch tragedies and enjoy them? Second, she claims (and here she adapts a view standard since Scaliger) that the "point of tragedy" is in part ethical: it is in "great part to make our sympathy for the misfortunes of others seem pleasant." So, tragedy serves a didactic purpose in virtue of being pleasing. But given her account of sympathy, why would it do so? 

It is central to Grouchy's argument that we sympathize more with pains that we are likely to experience (Letter IV). This is as true for physical as psychological discomfort, even if according to her, we tend to sympathize more with physical suffering than the psychological ones.  

So, her strategy in dealing with the problem of tragedy is to emphasize two features of a tragic performance: first, the events portrayed are unlikely to happen to the viewers. Most of us are not kings or heroes, and so according to Grouchy we really do not identify directly with the protagonists and so do not really sympathize with them. Second, tragedies prepare our sensibility slowly and avoid "suddenly confronting" us "with the heartbreaking sight of physical pain." So, de facto, these two features entail that we actually sympathize very little or very lightly with the agents portrayed. The exceptions -- pity for the fallen mighty -- prove the rule: "we have more compassion for their misfortunes than for those of others, it is only because kings who seem to be preserved from misfortune by their elevation, strike us as more sensitive to them." (Letter IV; here she explicitly disagrees with Adam Smith.) 

As a solution to the problem of tragedy this is unsatisfying. And because she rejects Smith's idea that the outcome of the sympathetic process is always pleasing, she seems in a bad position to solve the problem. But she is clearly assuming some background commitments that mitigate the problems with her position. For example, when she first introduces the problem of tragedy, she discusses the nature of boredom, which on her account we do anything to avoid. It is so "unbearable" that "we do not fear, in order to avoid it, to give ourselves over to painful sensations, and that it is the desire to avoid it which leads us to seek the proximity of the idea of suffering." (Letters II.) This means that we subject ourselves to tragedy in order to avoid a worse fate (boredom), especially if the ideas encountered in it are fairly novel. (This is why it matters to Grouchy that in tragedy we encounter events we are unlikely to experience.) These ideas were already used (go read Wasserman) by two influential and widely read French theorists, Du Bos and Fontenelle, in addressing the problem of tragedy. (It would be a surprise if she had not encountered either in her education and readings.) 

Grouchy adds an important point. We can identify with the victims of tyranny in a tragedy because we can be subject to the same tyrant. She seems to evoke Antigone at one point in the passage quoted above  in Letter II. But we do not find this pleasant or attractive at all. Rather, this identification activates "self-pity" and so we find the actions of the tragedy of interest (even if unpleasant). This serves the didactic purpose of generating an interest in humanity. So, the other part of Grouchy's strategy in addressing the problem of tragedy is to deny simply one of its premises altogether: we do not really enjoy a tragedy even when we find it of interest. 

On The Brexit/Lexit Pseudo-Democrats and Pseudo-Internationalists

Brexit offers a historic opportunity for democratic and economic renewal. This opportunity is being squandered by Britain’s political class. The Full Brexit will set out radical arguments for a clean break with the European Union. Instead of the conservative nostalgia of the Eurosceptics, our arguments will put the interests of working people – the majority of citizens – at the centre of the case for a democratic Brexit.

In the EU referendum, British voters seized the opportunity to protest against a politics that offers no real alternatives and an economic model that leaves many behind. The Leave campaign’s slogan, “take back control”, resonated with millions of people whose interests are no longer represented in British politics. For this revolt, Leave voters have been slandered as dupes and racists. The Full Brexit stands up for and with the majority of British people: not just Leavers, but also Remain voters who believe the decision must be respected, and for everyone hungry for meaningful political and economic change.

Eurosceptics rightly complain that powerful elite Remainers are conspiring to sabotage Brexit. But this is not the main reason Brexit is adrift. The real cause is that the entire political class lacks any compelling vision of Britain’s future, leaving most British citizens without effective political representation.

Having lost touch with ordinary people, political parties have retreated into European Union policymaking networks. After decades of integration, few politicians, civil servants or academic experts can now imagine any kind of future outside of the EU. Yet Leave campaigners on the right also lack any positive vision. Nostalgic bluster about “Global Britain” has led only to the sterile argument about free trade agreements versus the Single Market and the Customs Union. This wrangling about trade fails to address the problems that led people to reject the EU.

The problems of low investment, stagnant wages and ageing infrastructure that blight our towns and cities require a much more fundamental reconsideration of Britain’s economic and political model. Lacking ideas about how to tackle the deeper problems, politicians on all sides are defaulting to conservative positions, seeking to minimise change, whether through full single market membership or “regulatory alignment”, mostly to defend vested interests like the City of London.

This lack of vision threatens to neutralise Brexit’s potential to renew our political and economic life. EU rules are not neutral: they lock in a set of neoliberal policies that tightly constrain governments’ capacity to innovate, experiment, and tackle voters’ concerns. By preventing practical redress of voters’ grievances, this corrodes representative democracy. Brexit offers a precious opportunity to change this. If this opportunity is squandered, the public will rightly conclude that voting changes nothing. Disengagement and cynicism will intensify and populism – rampant elsewhere in the EU – will surge, threatening what is left of our parliamentary democracy.

A challenge to the logic that “There is No Alternative” is urgently needed, and this must come from the left. The Full Brexit is not a political party. We do not all agree about each and every policy or document on this website. But we do agree, first, that the left’s proper role is to be the architect of a better, more democratic future and, second, that a clean break with the EU is needed to realise that potential. 

To this end, we will provide analysis of the present political situation and proposals for the future. We will engage with the public, politicians and anyone who shares our democratic ethos. And we will conduct our work in solidarity with those on the left in other European countries to develop a genuinely internationalist and democratic politics of national sovereignty.

Brexit offers an unprecedented opportunity to reshape Britain for the better. Please join us in that mission.--"Founding Statement" of the Full Brexit. [HT Chris Bertram]

The list of signatures of Full Brexit contains some prominent academics and journalists. It invokes a "democratic ethos" and internationalist "solidarity" and warns against, "disengagement and cynicism" as well as "populism." Somewhat curiously, the very language of the statement is, in fact, populist: it criticizes the "powerful elite" and castigates the whole "political class" without distinction. It speaks on behalf of the "interests of working people," implying strongly that that the elites are a rentier class of leeches. One wonders who will speak on behalf of the children, retired, and (the non-working) disabled?  

The manifesto claims to defend "parliamentary democracy" and "representative democracy," but it has explicitly disqualified the status of those who sit in parliament (they are part of the political class, after all) or those who wish for parliament to be the arbiter of policy. If one takes parliamentary democracy (let alone sovereignty) seriously then one should not simply appeal to a (merely binding) referendum as the authentic voice of  the people. To elevate referendums as the center of a democratic ethos is to promote a conception of democracy that fails to recognize difficult trade-offs; that reduces democracy to simple, straightforward decisions as opposed to bargaining within constraints. To glorify a referendum is to undermine a democratic ethos, which is a set of dispositions that recognizes no decision is final, and that communal living is not about winners and losers, but joint action, collaboration, and mutual respect even if we disagree about fundamental values.

In addition, it is notable that the manifesto signers claim to worry about slander, and then repeat the routine slander of the EU as a merely technocratic project. But without suggesting that the EU is perfect, or not recognizing that it is often captive to well-organized interests, its rules are made and agreed upon through the representatives of national governments (in the EU Councils and Commission) and national representatives (in the European parliament).  It is especially rich to lament the lack of direct control by EU citizens of EU policy, because it has been British opinion-makers that have constantly agitated against increasing anything that may appear as further European  integration.

Of course, I know that such manifestos are a funny mixture of compromise and opportunism. But even so, to speak of internationalist solidarity when you both stand for a policy of forced deportations -- let's call a spade a spade, that's what Brexit and Lexit involve* -- and happily pull out of one of the key mechanisms for solidarity,** Left or otherwise, among European nations, is (ahh) cynical. 

I am not a British citizen, and unlike others among the European chattering classes, have not lost my fondness for the British. If they want to pursue an experiment in national sovereignty, I wish them well. I find the moment ill-chosen because American policy is withdrawing its security guarantee and is clearly trying to rule by promoting European divisions; Russia has proven its willingness to use military force and gas exports to intimidate its neighbors (including EU members). Britain's true allies, by shared interest, are its European partners.

I also think these self-described Lefties are deluded in a more important fashion: if Britain goes it alone, it will succeed only, I think, by promoting a low wage and low regulation economy (its workers are less educated, its infrastructure less well maintained than its natural rivals) and by being welcoming of the hot money of foreign oligarchs and dictators. That is, by being the enemy of the imperfect, these purportedly lefty intellectuals are playing into the hands of their own purported class enemies--the city of London needs Europe less than worker safety, social security, and environmental regulation do.